Postwar Germany and the Growth of Democracy

A Resource Guide

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
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Postwar Germany and the Growth of Democracy
A Resource Guide

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Introduction

Germany is a country in transition. The end of the Second World War brought with it the rebirth of democracy in a country that has for centuries enjoyed a proud tradition of self-determination. The termination of the Cold War as symbolized by the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resulting reunification of East and West Germany presented both unique opportunities and challenges for economic, social, and political growth in that country. As a result of that growth, Germany has established itself as a major player in world affairs.

This document has been developed to help teachers and students understand how Germany’s rise as a strong democratic republic after World War II has led to that country’s rebirth as a major economic power in Europe. The lessons contained in this publication will enable teachers and students to explore Germany’s social, political, and economic experiences since 1945. Studying Germany’s history and literature can provide students with a foundation for understanding the relationship between past and present. Such knowledge will equip students to deal with social, political, and economic issues that might arise in our own country.

The lessons in this document will also help students to understand chronological thinking, the connection between causes and effects, and the relationship between continuity and change. Studying the history and literature of postwar Germany will enable students to see how the German people have grappled with the fundamental questions of truth, justice, and personal responsibility. They will also more fully understand that ideas have real consequences and realize that events are shaped both by ideas and the actions of individuals.

In 1995, the Virginia Board of Education took an important step to raise the expectations for all students in Virginia’s public schools by adopting new Standards of Learning (SOL). The new standards set reasonable targets and expectations for what teachers need to teach and students need to learn. The lessons contained in this publication provide useful instructional approaches for teaching Virginia’s History and English SOL.
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The First Postwar Years: Reconstruction and Economic Development after World War II

1945: A Watershed Year in German History

The location of a great historical battle often conjures up visions of catastrophic defeat. Examples of this would be Waterloo for the French and Stalingrad for the Germans. Sometimes a date raises the vision of an ominous event in the history of a nation — e.g., in the history of the Roman Empire, the Ides of March in 44 B.C. when Caesar was assassinated. In German history, the entire year 1945 is such a date. On April 30, 1945, Hitler committed suicide; on May 7 and 8, his generals signed the declaration of total capitulation; on May 9, the Second World War in Europe formally ended.

The situation could not have been worse. Germany was utterly defeated; its cities were in ruins. More than three million soldiers and two million civilians had been killed. Twelve million people flooded into Germany after having been expelled from the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and from what had been German territories in present-day Poland and Russia. There was a great shortage of food, shelter, and coal for heating. Cardinal Frings of Cologne declared in a sermon that under those dire circumstances, it was morally acceptable for parents to steal some coal for their freezing families. As a result, the verb fringsen was coined. But there was another dimension to the defeat besides this misery. By methodically murdering millions of Jews in Auschwitz and other concentration camps, the Nazi regime had left Germany with a grave moral burden. The country had become an outcast among civilized nations.

The allied role

In the conferences of Teheran in the late fall of 1943 and Yalta on the Crimean peninsula in February of 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin prepared a blueprint on how to deal with Germany after the end of the war. The three leaders agreed that Germany would be divided into three occupation zones. Berlin would also be divided into three sectors. They agreed further that Germany would lose its eastern provinces to the Soviet Union and Poland. Poland in turn would lose part of its eastern territory to the USSR.

After the war ended, the three Allies met again, this time in Potsdam, a city just southwest of Berlin. This conference, which took place in late July of 1945, had a somewhat different cast of participants. The Soviet Union was still represented by Stalin. Instead of Roosevelt, who had died on April 12, Harry S. Truman participated for the United States. Churchill led the British delegation, but he was replaced shortly before the end of the conference by the newly elected prime minister, Clement Attlee. Because the Allies had demanded total capitulation, they not only assumed total control over Germany after their victory, but they also had to take full responsibility for the future of the country. This included the economic treatment of Germany, the design of new political structures, and measures to stamp out National Socialism, punish the worst offenders of the Nazi regime, and reeducate the followers of Hitler.
France was not invited to participate in these conferences that determined Germany's future because it had played a very minor part in the victory over Nazi Germany. France had been overrun and occupied by Hitler's forces in 1940. It was freed in the latter part of 1944 after the Normandy invasion. Even though French troops under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle had been involved in the liberation of France, the country had not been granted equal status as an ally, much to the chagrin of de Gaulle. Nevertheless, it became one of the occupying powers. However, as Stalin demanded, the French zone was carved out of the American and British zones. Thus the Soviet Union ended up with the largest chunk of territory, especially if one considers that it also annexed the northern half of East Prussia, which did not count as an occupation zone. The Soviet zone had the added advantage of combining rich farmland in Mecklenburg and Pomerania with a well-developed industrial base in Saxony and Thuringia.

In Potsdam, the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union had agreed to treat Germany as one economic unit. Stalin and his foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, wanted to prevent the Ruhr district — the industrial powerhouse of Germany — from falling solely under the control of the Western Allies. Great Britain and the United States, on the other hand, wanted to make sure that their zones would receive some of the agricultural production of the Russian zone. However, economic cooperation between the occupation powers did not in fact take place, as will be discussed below. The Soviets expected reparation shipments from the western zones, but they were not willing to formulate a common import-export program as had been promised. Therefore, General Lucius Clay decided in May 1946 to stop all shipments from the American to the Soviet zone.

The organization of political life

There seemed to be agreement among the Allies that the reorganization of political life in Germany should be built on democratic principles. It soon became apparent, however, that the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had an entirely different understanding of democracy. Shortly before the end of the war, a group of German Communists who had fled Nazi Germany and had been trained in Moscow was brought back to Germany. Among them was Walter Ulbricht, who was to assume a leading role in the political life of the Russian zone. The Russians were the first to license political parties; they did so one day after the formation of the Soviet Military Administration. Even though other parties received a license, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) enjoyed a privileged position from the start and soon eclipsed its rivals.

Partly in reaction to the speed the Soviets exhibited in licensing parties in their zone, and partly as a logical step in the reconstruction of political life, the Western Allies started the process of party formation in their zones in the fall of 1945. They followed a grass-roots approach, allowing parties first at the local level. Only parties with democratic principles — but including the KPD — were given a license.

Dealing with Germany's past

As mentioned before, the third responsibility facing the Allies in 1945 was the so-called de-Nazification of the Germans. All four Allies agreed on the necessity of punishing the worst Nazi criminals. The Nuremberg Trials began in November 1945 and lasted almost a year. Several high officials in the Nazi hierarchy were given the death penalty,
among them Hermann Goering, Hitler’s deputy and commander of the air force, who hanged himself in his cell. Many were given prison terms of various duration. These trials were later followed by many more trials, conducted mainly by German courts but also by courts in the countries in which alleged war crimes were investigated.

Besides the Nuremberg Trials, the Allies tried to deal in various other ways with Germany’s Nazi past. In the western zones, former members of the Nazi-party were classified in five categories. Depending on the degree of their involvement, they were either imprisoned, fined, restricted in their political life, or declared innocent. The Soviets proceeded in a more radical fashion. More lawyers, teachers, and former state and city employees were removed permanently from their positions. Quite often they disappeared in internment camps, where many died under harsh conditions and mistreatment.

The Cold War and the Division of Germany

The occupation zones move in different directions

In July 1945, the three victorious Allies decided in Potsdam to form a joint body, the Allied Control Council, which would decide questions concerning Germany as a whole. This Council, which later included the French, met in Berlin and was headed by the four allied commanders-in-chief. Almost from the start, it had trouble agreeing on any central administrative measures or institutions. The culprit was not always the Soviet commander-in-chief, at least not initially. The French representative informed the others that his government could not agree at this time to one important goal that the three war-time Allies had set at the Potsdam Conference — i.e., to create eventually a central German government. Because of the French objection, certain central administrative agencies envisioned in the Potsdam Agreement, such as the one planned for transportation and finance, were not formed.

If we can regard this failure to form common German institutions as the first stumbling block to the unification of the four zones, a second, weightier one was soon to follow. The Soviet Union proceeded quickly to shape the political institutions, industrial economy, and agriculture of its zone according to Communist principles, resulting in profound changes (discussed below). By this time there could no longer be any illusion that the Soviet Union would let its zone be ruled according to Western democratic principles. Consequently, a unified German government no longer seemed a realistic prospect, at least in the short term.

At the same time, the Soviet Union forced its Marxist-Leninist interpretation of democracy on the Eastern European countries. It pressured Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and in 1948 Czechoslovakia to set up Communist governments. Soviet military strength made sure that any serious opposition was futile. On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, in which he declared: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent.”

The Allies still held joint meetings in the Allied Control Council as well as discussions at various meetings of the foreign ministers, but they could no longer agree on anything substantial concerning Germany. The rising tensions at the onset of the Cold War made it unlikely that the Germans would be granted the right to form a central government in the foreseeable future and to live again in a united country. Those Germans who
had the misfortune of living in the area occupied by the Soviet Union felt increasingly isolated, and many East Germans fled to the western zones. For those Germans, however, who lived in the three western zones, the rising tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviets held the promise of improved living conditions and more political autonomy. Americans in particular began to look upon “their” Germans in a new light. They wanted to make sure that living conditions improved in the western zones so that the population would resist Communist influence.

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes signaled in a speech in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, that from now on the United States’ policy towards Germany would be more conciliatory. The United States and Great Britain combined their zones into the so-called Bizone, which was created on January 1, 1947. The declared purpose was the improvement of economic planning, but actually it was also to serve as the seed for a central West German government. France hesitated because it tried at the time to annex the Saarland economically and even politically and believed that the creation of any kind of central German government would hinder this endeavor. (In 1955, the people in the Saarland made it clear in a plebiscite that they wanted union with Germany, and the territory was joined to West Germany as a new state or Land in 1957.) But with the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the French joined their zone to the Bizone in February 1948, thus uniting the three Western zones economically and setting the stage for political union the following year.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, which opened on March 10, 1947, made the rift between the Soviet Union and its former Allies even more obvious. Two days later President Harry Truman declared in a speech before Congress that Communism had to be resisted by giving economic, financial, and military support to countries that were threatened by it. This speech later became known as the Truman Doctrine; it represented the beginning of the American policy of containment of the Soviet Union. It was followed by the far-reaching initiative, the Marshall Plan, announced on June 5, 1947 (discussed below).

The reorganization of political life

In the meantime, the reorganization of political life had not been standing still. The first local elections in Western Germany took place at the beginning of 1946, and the first elections to the state parliaments followed in November and December of the same year. The manner in which these elections were conducted revealed the increasing gap between the forms of government in West and East Germany. Even though there were slight differences in procedure in each of the three western zones, the elections there were conducted according to democratic rules. In East Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the party with the longest democratic tradition in Germany, was forced to unite with the Communist Party (KPD) in April of 1946 to form the new Socialist Unity Party (SED). This party was to dominate political life in East Germany until 1989. The five East German states (Länder) did not fare any better. Created in 1947, they lacked political clout and were replaced by fifteen districts in 1952.

The rift that had already developed between the three western zones on the one hand and the Soviet-held zone on the other was made apparent at a conference in Munich
in June 1947. The prime minister of Bavaria had invited the prime ministers of the newly formed state governments in East and West to this conference. When the East German representatives arrived, they demanded that the agenda of the conference be changed. They insisted on the discussion of the formation of a central government, a demand that ran counter to the instructions laid down by the Western military governments as a precondition for the conference. When the chairman of the conference rejected the demands of the East German representatives, they got up and left before the conference even started.

**Rising tensions, the Berlin blockade, and the Berlin airlift**

The tension between the United States and its Western Allies on one side and the Soviet Union and its satellite states on the other had been building continuously since the war ended. In 1948, events steered the two superpowers towards a confrontation. In February, the Communists took over the government of Czechoslovakia. On March 20, Marshal Sokolovski walked out of an Allied Control Council meeting in Berlin in protest against allied actions. (The Council was not reconvened again until 1990 during the process of German reunification.) On June 23, 1948, as a reaction to the Western currency reform (discussed below), West Berlin was cut off from the East German supply of electricity and coal. Access roads from West Germany to Berlin were blocked in an effort by the Soviet Union to drive the Western Allies out of the city.

The problem seemed insurmountable. How could a city of almost two million be supplied entirely from the air? The will of three men made it possible. The American commander-in-chief, General Lucius D. Clay, had a meeting with Ernst Reuter, the mayor of Berlin. Clay talked about the idea of feeding the population of West Berlin by air and asked Reuter whether the Berliners would be able to withstand the hardships. Reuter answered, “You take care of the airlift and I take care of the Berliners.” President Truman understood the importance of West Berlin as a bastion of Western democracy. The blockade lasted for more than a year. When it ended, world opinion in general and American opinion in particular had undergone a change. The city which had been a symbol of Hitler’s evil empire turned into a symbol of the will of free people to stand up to Communist aggression.

The French historian, Alfred Grosser, describes the importance of the airlift in the following way:

The airlift has saved Berlin. The airlift, moreover, has permanently shaped West German policy, especially foreign policy. In the winter of 1948–49, a German-American solidarity formed. American planes were certainly not the only ones which participated in the transport of coal and food. But it was the government in Washington and General Clay who organized the airlift and furnished most of the supplies. From now on, every German foreign policy which was not based on the premise that the further protection of Berlin and West Germany depended solely on the trust of the Americans in German policy would seem unacceptable.

In other words, the foremost goal of every West German chancellor for decades to come would be to earn and keep American trust. As we will see, Berlin was to remain the focal point of the Cold War. It was a sore in the side of the Communist camp, which the Soviets tried repeatedly to remove. In contrast to the drab existence of the East Berliners, the vibrant life of West Berlin made a mockery of the Communist claim of superiority.
Thousands of disillusioned East Germans used Berlin as an exit to freedom until the East German policymakers stopped the exodus by building the infamous Berlin Wall in August 1961.

Passage of the Basic Law and the establishment of a West German state

During the Berlin Airlift, the new West German state, the Federal Republic of Germany, was created. In June 1948, a conference took place in London with not only the three Western Allies but also the Benelux countries participating. This conference authorized the prime ministers of the German states (Länder) to convene a constitutional assembly. On May 23, 1949, the Basic Law, intended as a provisional constitution, came into effect. On August 14, the first elections to a West German federal parliament were held. On September 12, Konrad Adenauer was sworn in as the first chancellor of the new government. The Soviets responded by allowing the East German Communist leaders to draft a constitution and form a central government of their own. On October 7, 1949, the German Democratic Republic was founded. As we will see in the next lessons, the two German states did not share many features in the beginning and drifted even farther apart in regard to constitutional order as time went on.

The economic recovery of Germany

Conditions after World War II favored neither a rapid German economic recovery nor a role for German politicians and economists to shape West Germany’s economic future. Yet the economy developed better than expected, and Germans were able to participate as a result of unanticipated events, including the different agendas of each of the occupying powers.

The Soviet Union and France had been invaded by Nazi Germany. Their populations had therefore suffered a great deal more than the American or British people. The Soviet Union had lost more than 20 million of its inhabitants. Both countries felt they were entitled not only to have their occupation troops fed and paid for by Germany but also to dismantle and ship factory equipment and industrial output to their homelands. The Soviet Union proceeded much more massively and systematically than France. For example, the Soviet troops removed one of the two railroad tracks that ran through much of their occupation zone, thus hampering the movement of people and foodstuffs within the territory. According to Mary Fulbrook in her book, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918–1990, “Soviet dismantling reduced the productive capacity of the (Soviet) zone by about 26%, compared with a figure of 12% for the western zones. By the spring of 1948, the Soviets had dismantled over 1900 plants, almost 1700 of them completely.” (pp. 153–154)

Immediately after the War, there was no clear American or British policy on how to treat the German economy. It is not surprising that initially none of the war-time Allies felt inclined to treat the Germans leniently. Various plans on how to proceed had been under discussion before the war ended. One of the most prominent was the plan named after the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. According to this plan, Germany would have lost considerably more territory than it later did; it would have been cut up into several small German states and reduced to an agricultural society. Even though the Morgenthau Plan was eventually rejected, some of its ideas were followed temporarily after the war.
The three principles that the Western Allies initially applied to the German economy were:

- the extraction of goods and money, whether in the form of reparations or payments for the occupation forces;
- the reduction of the industrial plant; and
- the transformation of large corporations like the Krupp Steel Company into much smaller firms.

It soon became apparent that this concept had serious flaws. Even before the war, Germany had to import 20 percent of its food supplies. With the loss of the rich agricultural areas in Silesia and East Pomerania, this percentage was bound to increase. The American and British governments saw themselves forced to import food for the populations of their zones in order to avert mass starvation. If the German industrial output had been reduced, Germany would not have been able to become self-sufficient, much less to have made payments to the occupying forces.

The United States and Great Britain began to recognize the need to revive the economy in their zones. But they differed in the methods which they thought should be applied. The newly elected Labour government in Britain wanted to implement socialist principles in Germany as well as at home, including the nationalization of key industries. The American government opposed this concept vehemently. In this situation, which could easily have led to a stalemate, American leadership was decisive. W. R. Smyser has written in his book, The German Economy: Colossus at the Crossroads, about the postwar German economy,

The U.S. government began to differ with its friends in the first years of the occupation. Washington became more and more disturbed by the prospect of Soviet domination over all of Europe after the anticipated American withdrawal. The American occupation commander, General Lucius Clay, increasingly saw Germany as a potential bulwark against the Soviet Union. Clay also wanted to prevent Germany from becoming a permanent liability for the United States and others, and he repeatedly blocked Russian and even French efforts to exact reparations from the Western zones. Nor did Clay endorse or support London's efforts to establish a socialist system in Germany. (p. 131)

Under Clay's leadership, the American government sought to combine the Western zones in order to achieve an economically more viable territory. As we have seen above, this was accomplished by the beginning of 1948.

A giant step toward economic recovery was taken when the Truman Administration decided to grant Europe, including Germany, a large financial aid package, generally referred to as the Marshall Plan. In this so-called European Recovery Program (ERP), Secretary of State George C. Marshall offered financial aid to European countries in East and West, including the Soviet Union and all of Germany. The United States now officially supported the view that "an orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and prosperous Germany." Under the threat of Communism, all thoughts of punishing Germany further and restricting its economy were abandoned. Countries which were to receive the Marshall Plan aid had to follow the principles of a market economy. Since the economies of the Soviet Union, its Eastern European satellites, and its German zone were all state-controlled, and, more importantly, since Stalin objected, it
came as no surprise that they all refused the offer. The consequence of this refusal was to be far-reaching. While the economies of West Germany and Western Europe as a whole soon began to pick up and prosper, economic development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was destined to lag behind. Anthony Glees concluded in his book, *Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945*,

> It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this American policy which had such a profound impact on the shaping of Germany's future.... [W]estern Germans used it first for food and then for modernizing their industrial base and building homes. The impact this act of American generosity (the aid was a gift, not a loan) had on western Germans was enormous; it played a key part in locking West German democracy into the Atlantic relationship. (p. 37)

German confidence was also boosted sharply by a crucial currency reform in 1948. The old Reichsmark had lost most of its value, and currency reform was the next logical step in creating the conditions for economic recovery. When the Allied Control Council failed to agree on a currency reform for all of Germany, the Western Allies decided to act separately. On June 20, 1948, the Deutschmark (DM) replaced the Reichsmark in the three Western zones and West Berlin, setting the stage for financial stability for decades to come. The Soviets reacted with a currency reform in their zone and a blockade of West Berlin. The fact that from now on people in East and West no longer used the same currency pushed the two halves of Germany farther apart.

While the Marshall Plan and the currency reform were initiatives undertaken by the United States either alone or with the support of Great Britain and to a lesser extent France, German politicians were included in economic decision-making much earlier than originally envisioned. Smyser writes, “Allied uncertainties and disagreements served not only to delay and finally block the originally planned dismantling of the German economy. More important, they gave the Germans themselves the unexpected opportunity to define their own economic destiny.” (p. 131)

Ludwig Erhard had emerged already in 1948 as the economic architect of the British-American Bizone. In contrast to many other German politicians of the time, he agreed with General Clay that socialization of the German economy had to be avoided. Erhard was to become one of two politicians who shaped the Federal Republic more than anyone else. Together with Konrad Adenauer, the political architect who anchored the new West German state in Western Europe, reconciled it with its neighbors, and closely attached it to the Atlantic Alliance, Ludwig Erhard set the course for economic reconstruction and earned himself the title, “father of the economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder).”

**The social market economy**

Erhard’s concept for the German economy became known as the “social market economy.” Together with his colleagues mostly from the University of Freiburg, Professor Erhard had secretly begun to develop the concept during the years of Nazi rule. The so-called Freiburg School was searching for a new model for the postwar economy that would avoid the pitfalls of the Weimar Republic and Nazi era. As expressed in the definition, it consisted of two strands of ideals and ideas. In looking for a market economy, Erhard and the Freiburg School proclaimed that freedom of initiative was to be one central idea. The role of the government was to be limited to the protection of the competitive environment...
from monopolistic tendencies. Under the motto “as little government as possible, as much government as necessary,” the state was to play a mainly regulatory role in the market economy. Erhard wanted to avoid the kind of connivance between big business and government that had helped to bring Hitler to power. Consequently, he also rejected the formation of big cartels that would wield too much influence. Besides freedom of initiative, Erhard wanted to guarantee stability in order to avoid the economic collapse that occurred in the late 1920s. A strong currency was to be the cornerstone of the new economy. Thus in 1948, the Deutschmark, usually called simply DM or Mark, replaced the Reichsmark throughout the territory of the Federal Republic and West Berlin. A politically independent body, modeled after the American Federal Reserve, became the watchdog of monetary stability. Since 1957, its name has been Deutsche Bundesbank, and it has been located in Frankfurt am Main, Germany’s financial center.

The second strand of ideas for the social market economy stemmed from the desire to maintain and promote social peace and justice. In the 1920s and 1930s, the political battles between left and right had been fierce. Adenauer and Erhard both wanted to avoid a climate of confrontation that could lead to the re-emergence of radical movements. They were joined in this wish by the trade union leaders. W. R. Smyser notes,

As the German economic and political leaders shaped their plans for the future German economy, they found themselves thinking in political, societal, and human terms as well as economic. They saw in Germany’s Stunde Null (Zero Hour) an historic, and perhaps a final, opportunity to take Germany on new and totally different bearings. The economy was to be an instrument for prosperity, but it was also to safeguard democracy and to help maintain a stable and peaceful society. (p. 130)

The social commitment appears even in the Basic Law. Article 20 states: “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.” Directly following the war, the main social features of the system consisted of the following:

1. A government-regulated health insurance scheme for everyone except those professionals who could afford private insurance. Besides illness, this public health insurance also covered preventive and curative health care. A person could apply for a stay in one of Germany’s many spas for three weeks or longer in order to receive treatments for an ailment. Part of the cost was to be covered by the health insurance and part by the person’s employer. Health insurance also covered the elderly, pensioners, the unemployed, trainees and students, and the disabled.
2. Pensions for all former members of the armed forces as well as civilian war victims. When these programs first became available, 4.5 million Germans applied.
3. Subsidized rents for a considerable number of Germans in order to keep living expenses down. A massive building boom in apartment houses helped to provide housing for refugees and those who had lost their housing due to bombing.
4. Burden sharing to compensate war victims for their financial losses. Financial compensation up to a certain limit was given to the more than ten million refugees and expellees from the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and eastern provinces of Germany lost during and after the war as well as to the more than a half million refugees from the Soviet occupied zone. Also, assets that had remained unharmed in the West during the war were taxed more heavily.
All of these measures, as substantial as they may seem, were only the beginning of a welfare system which over the years became increasingly generous. (By the 1990s, many observers began to argue that this development was beginning to endanger the very idea of a market economy built on personal initiative as envisaged by Erhard.)

Besides the benefits mentioned above, decisions in the field of labor relations furthered social harmony. In Weimar Germany before Hitler, trade unions had been organized according to party affiliation. The relationship among them had often been very confrontational. Hitler suppressed all trade unions. In postwar West Germany, the socialist, Christian, and liberal trade unions were merged, thus eliminating the opposition among their members.

One of the major goals of trade unions was the achievement of worker participation in decisions made by industrial corporations. The British occupation authorities, at that time operating under a Labour government, first introduced co-determination into the steel industry of the Ruhr Valley. In 1951, federal law provided that representatives of workers in large West German coal and steel companies would hold a number of seats equivalent to those held by stockholders’ representatives on the supervisory boards that exercised ultimate corporate authority over the companies’ operations. An additional seat would be held by a person acceptable to both sides. Trade unions tried to achieve a similar worker representation in other industries, but at the insistence of business leaders, they had to settle for one-third of the seats on the advisory boards.

Henry J. Turner, J r. describes in his book, Germany from Partition to Reunification, another union accomplishment:

The Factory Constitution Law established, in addition, works councils elected by employees of all but the smallest of firms. In consultation with management, these councils were to resolve problems affecting the workplace other than those covered by the basic terms of collective-bargaining contracts. As works councils received no direct voice in management, they were dismissed as a palliative by the frustrated advocates of thoroughgoing co-determination. The councils nevertheless often proved an effective device for reducing friction between management and labor. (p. 11)

The combination of generous social benefits and unparalleled worker participation in the economic decision-making process led to a period of social peace that was unique not only in German history but perhaps in all of Europe. It contributed substantially to the success of the postwar West German economy. The spirit of cooperation between organized labor and management, the absence of costly labor conflicts, and the restraint of trade unions in wage negotiations made West German goods highly competitive.

The economic miracle

The German economic success story, referred to as the Wirtschaftswunder, did not begin immediately. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 raised the demand for industrial goods dramatically all over the world. Several factors helped to make German products particularly competitive. They include the following:

1. By the 1950s, due to the destruction during World War II and some dismantling of German industry, Germany’s factories had more modern machinery than was found in most other countries. The Marshall Plan was directly responsible for much of the rebuilding of the industrial base.
2. Due to the cooperation of labor unions, wages were lower in the Federal Republic than in other Western countries. Also the general absence of strikes translated into higher productivity. Thanks to the age-old system of apprenticeship training, workers were also generally highly skilled. And because of the influx of refugees, there was an abundant labor force.

3. German industry was more flexible and could adjust to demand more easily than socialized industries in Great Britain and France.

Due to its lack of natural resources, Germany has always had to rely on exporting goods. It has been most successful in the fields of automobiles, machine tools, engineering, ship building, and steel. Exports of these and other goods skyrocketed during the 1950s, and by the end of the decade, West Germany ranked second in world trade, outdone only by the United States. In the years between 1950 and 1954, the gross national product rose at an average annual rate of 8.2 percent, and in the years 1955 to 1958 at a rate of 7.1 percent. One example of the economic boom was the production of passenger cars which increased more than 27 times between 1949 and 1966. The Volkswagen beetle became the symbol of the economic miracle and was highly popular not only in Germany but also in the United States.

In the meantime, purchasing power more than tripled. After years of deprivation, Germans enjoyed their ability to consume and went through several “waves” of consumer behavior. After the Freßwelle (eating binge wave) came the Kleidungswelle (clothing buying wave), followed by the Einrichtungswelle (furniture buying wave) and finally the Urlaubswelle (vacations and travel buying wave). Germans are still the world’s most dedicated tourists, traveling in proportionately larger numbers than the people of any other country.

It seems appropriate to point out at the end of a lesson dealing with the postwar years in Germany that economic success became for West Germans a substitute ideology for the national pride they could no longer feel as a result of the Nazi atrocities. Thus Germans took pride in their economic miracle, reconciling themselves to the fact that in the political arena Germany had become a relatively minor participant. This was to be expressed later as “Germany being an economic giant but a political dwarf.”

Meanwhile, in East Germany an economic miracle on a smaller scale was taking place, so that the GDR was sometimes referred to as the “Golden West” of the east. In the early 1960s, it was ranked among the ten most industrialized countries in the world. But in contrast to West Germany, the population benefitted relatively little from industrialization. Housing and consumer products were the stepchildren of an economy that was closely linked to the Soviet Union. Strict central planning focused on industrial production of heavy machinery destined for Soviet agricultural use and investment products, as well as uranium to be used by the Soviet Union. In spite of rather drab living conditions, many East Germans nevertheless gained a feeling of pride from their economy which was quite successful in comparison to the rest of the Soviet Empire.

Conclusion

The situation in Germany after the war was desperate and chaotic. Not only was there a severe lack of food, fuel, and housing, but Germans were also looked upon as moral outcasts as a result of the horrors of the Holocaust. Even though the Allies had planned to
treat Germany as one economic unit, cooperation among them soon broke down. While the Soviet Union continued to exploit its zone, the United States, Great Britain, and later France came to the conclusion that they had to help their respective zones recover and become self-sufficient.

Some political activity was already permitted at the end of 1945. While the Americans and British followed a grass-roots approach, the Soviets organized their zone according to centralized Communist principles. When it became clear that the Soviets were about to make their zone into a puppet state, all cooperation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union ceased. The division of Germany into East and West threatened to become permanent. The increasing tensions of the Cold War helped the Germans living in the Western zones achieve better economic and political conditions. The three zones were combined into what would become the Federal Republic of Germany. Political life flourished at the local, then state, and after 1949, national levels. Meanwhile, the Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic, a Soviet-dominated state without the democratic features common in Western liberal thought and practice.

The Allies also followed different paths with respect to former key members of the Nazi party. Following the Nuremberg Trials, de-Nazification processes in the West were at first rigorous and comprehensive, but soon became unwieldy, especially in the American zone. In order to staff the bureaucracy, compromises were made, and the process was turned over to the West Germans, whose performance in dealing with former officials was mixed. While there were criticisms in the West that too many former Nazis were not punished severely enough or not at all, the Soviets and East Germans were far more sweeping and indiscriminate in their approach and placed not only responsible Nazi officials but also many fellow travelers and alleged sympathizers in prisons and concentration camps from which many never re-emerged.

A currency reform in 1948 gave West Germany and West Berlin a new Deutschmark which was to become one of the strongest currencies in the world. The Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949 cemented a special relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic. The American government began to look upon West Germany as a bulwark against communism and Soviet expansion. Due to the generous Marshall Plan aid, the currency reform, and Ludwig Erhard’s concept of a “social market economy,” rapid economic recovery took place and became known as the Wirtschaftswunder. Erhard’s concept called for a maximum of free competition and a minimum of government intervention together with a strong government commitment to selected social welfare programs. Worker representatives in large industrial corporations were granted rights of participation in decision-making, and work councils on which elected workers in all but the smallest firms sat to discuss personnel matters helped bring about a spirit of cooperation and labor peace in the postwar years. Identification with economic success almost developed into a substitute ideology for West Germans who found it difficult to face the trauma of the Nazi years and the division of their country. East Germans in the meantime enjoyed some modest economic success, but it could not compare with the rising affluence in the West, and it came at the high cost of repression.

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This text can be found on the Armonk Institute’s Web site at armonkinstitute.org/gunlickslesson04.htm
Selected Bibliography

UNIT I: LESSONS

The First Postwar Years: Reconstruction and Economic Development after World War II

Lessons in Unit I

Lesson 1: Geography of Postwar Germany
Lesson 2: The Condition of Germany at the End of World War II
Lesson 3: The Marshall Plan
Lesson 4: Effects of the Marshall Plan
Lesson 5: Berlin Blockade and Airlift

Overview

The lessons in this Unit focus on economic conditions in Germany at the end of World War II by addressing the following four topics:

1. The division of postwar Germany and the problems arising from that division
2. The rebuilding of a conquered nation
3. The aid given to Germany from the West and the response from the Soviets
4. The Berlin blockade and airlift and the beginnings of the Cold War

Lesson 1: The Geography of Postwar Germany

Preview of Main Points

This activity will allow students to confront the situation facing the Western powers, the Soviet Union, and Germany at the end of World War II. It is important for the student to understand the tension created by the amount of territory controlled by Soviet forces and the fear on the part of the United States and Western Europe that the Soviets might attempt to stretch their influence farther and farther west. This lesson will visually demonstrate the predicament facing the Western powers and will illustrate their belief that an alliance needed to be forged. Students will also be introduced to the Soviet perspective: how Stalin viewed the confrontation between the newly emerging super powers, and what the security issues were for the Soviets that influenced their foreign policy on Eastern Europe and Germany.

Key Concepts

- Location
- Security
- Containment
- Balance of power
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Related Concepts
- Boundaries and borders
- Alliances

Objectives
During this lesson, students will
- identify the territory occupied by Western and Soviet troops at the end of World War II
- identify the problems created by the location of the troops at the end of the War
- explain the perspectives of the West and the Soviet Union on the reluctance of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops
- identify and evaluate the possible solutions to the problems created the occupation.

Focus Questions
1. How did the United States and the Soviet Union view Europe in 1945?
2. What were the different political beliefs and security issues that drove their respective foreign policies?

Teaching Suggestions
This lesson focuses on map-reading and interpretation skills. The teacher should ask the students to create maps portraying both the land controlled by the Western powers and the land controlled by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. When the maps are complete, the students should be encouraged to interpret the meaning of the maps from the perspective of the United States and the Western Allies as well as from the perspective of the Soviet Union.

Beginning the Lesson
Explain the situation at the end of World War II in Europe as the Nazis were losing on all
Developing the Lesson

Give each student an outline map of Europe. Ask them to depict on their maps all the territory occupied by the Soviet Union and all that occupied by the Western forces at the end of the war (see Activity below). Conduct a discussion in which the class speculates as to the feelings of the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Eastern European countries about the occupation. What might each have been worrying about in the years directly following the war?

Show the students that one solution to the problems arising from the occupation of Germany and Eastern Europe was to extend the right of self-determination to the peoples living in the occupies territories. Who might have objected to this solution? Why? How would the United States have responded to these objections?

Concluding the Lesson

Conduct a discussion based on the following questions:
1. If the Soviet Union had refused to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe, what should have been the response of the United States?
2. Why would the United States have responded in this way?
3. To what extent were the Soviets’ concerns about security real?

Activity

Ask the students to color or shade in areas of their maps to show the countries and areas occupied by Western forces and those occupied by the Soviet forces immediately following the end of World War II. Ask students to answer the following questions:
1. What countries were occupied by Soviet troops?
2. What countries were occupied by Western troops?
3. How was Germany divided at the end of World War II?
4. What problems might this division have created?
5. What does the map tell us about the balance of power in Europe?
Lesson 2: The Condition of Germany at the End of World War II

Preview of Main Points
This lesson addresses the physical, social, and economic condition of Germany at the end of World War II. Having fought a war on their own soil and suffered a devastating defeat, German citizens were left in a state of physical, economic, and psychological ruin. Using photographs and memories of Germany in 1945, this lesson allows students to understand and empathize with Germany’s condition.

Key Concepts
- Reconstruction
- Scarcity and poverty
- Responsibility

Related Concepts
- Occupied country
- Infrastructure

Objectives
In this lesson, students will
- identify major physical, economic, and psychological problems affecting Germany at the end of WW II
- empathize with the plight of the German people at the end of the War
- evaluate the impact of Germany’s physical ruin on its social, psychological, economic, and political fabric
- speculate on the role of the victors toward their defeated enemy.

Focus Question
How does one begin to put things back together after a ruinous defeat?

RELATIONSHIP TO THE VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF LEARNING

History and Social Science
9.10 The student will analyze major historical events of the 20th century, in terms of
a. causes and effects of World War I and World War II;
b. the Russian Revolution;
c. the rise, aggression, and human costs of totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan;
d. the political, social, and economic impact of worldwide depression in the 1930’s;
e. the Nazi Holocaust and other examples of genocide;
f. new technologies, including atomic power, and their influence on the patterns of conflict;
g. economic and military power shifts since 1945, including the rise of Germany and Japan as economic powers;
h. revolutionary movements in Asia and their leaders, including Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh;
i. how African and Asian countries achieved independence from European colonial rule, including India under Gandhi and Kenya under Kenyatta and how they have fared under self-rule;
j. regional and political conflicts including Korea and Vietnam; and
k. the beginning and end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

9.11 The student will demonstrate skills in historical research and geographical analysis by
a. identifying, analyzing, and interpreting primary and secondary sources and artifacts;
b. validating sources as to their authenticity, authority, credibility, and possible bias;
c. comparing trends in global population distribution since the 10th century;
d. constructing various time lines of key events, periods, and personalities since the 10th century;
e. identifying and analyzing major shifts in national political boundaries in Europe since 1815; and
f. identifying the distribution of major religious cultures in the contemporary world.

10.12 The student will analyze the patterns and networks of economic interdependence, with emphasis on formation of multinational economic unions, international trade, and the theory of competitive advantage, in terms of job specialization, competition for resources, and access to labor, technology, transportation, and communications.

10.13 The student will distinguish between developed and developing countries and relate the level of economic development to the quality of life.

10.14 The student will analyze the forces of conflict and cooperation as they influence
a. the way in which the world is divided among independent countries and dependencies;
b. disputes over borders, resources, and settlement areas;
c. the historic and future ability of nations to survive and prosper; and
d. the role of multinational organizations.

11.11 The student will demonstrate an understanding of the origins and effects of World War II, with emphasis on
a. the rise and aggression of totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan;
b. the role of the Soviet Union;
Teaching Suggestions

This lesson contains both an affective and a cognitive component. The study of the photographs and the writing activity are meant to help students empathize with the plight of the average German citizen during the aftermath of the war. The reading and discussion activities are designed to help students explore how a country might recover from the devastation of such a war.

Beginning the Lesson

Tell the students to imagine the following scenario and ask them the following questions about it: assume that an enemy army has marched through and bombed your town during a war. What problems would your town face after the troops left and the bombing stopped? Who might be able to help you?

Developing the Lesson

Distribute copies of the photographs “Rubble’ women starting to clean up Berlin after the war” and “Two children in the street in postwar Germany.” (see Resources 1 and 2). In small groups, ask the students to study each photograph and complete the exercises in Activity 1. When they have completed the exercises, conduct a discussion to determine the extent to which students understand the condition of Germany at the end of the war. Try to correct any misunderstandings. Make certain that they understand just how difficult it was it for the German people to rebuild their lives.

Ask students to read “Miles to Go: From American Plan to European Union” (see Resource 3). Ask students to complete Activity 2.

Concluding the Lesson

Conduct a class discussion about what the German people might have done to rebuild their country and what the role of the United States in the rebuilding might have been. Would the German people have been able to rebuild without outside aid? How does one start to put things back together after such a ruinous defeat? Should the victor help the vanquished?
Activity 1

Divide the class into groups of three to four students each. Ask each group to examine the two photographs showing the ruins of Berlin (see Resources 1 and 2). Ask each group to list five ways in which the destruction revealed by the photographs might have affected the lives of the people shown.

Ask the group to examine the people in the photographs. What psychological problems may they have suffered from such devastation? Do their images reveal any hopeful signs for Germany's future? Have the groups try to list five such signs.

Ask each group to write an imaginary conversation between the women in the first photograph and the two boys in the second photograph in which they assess their situation and their hopes for the immediate future.

Activity 2

Ask students to identify or define by using a textbook, dictionary, or other resources:
- Helmut Schmidt
- apocalyptic
- Battle of the Bulge
- black market
- Goebbels.

Then ask students to read “Miles to Go: From American Plan to European Union” (see Resource 3).

Divide students into small groups to discuss the following questions:
1. Helmut Schmidt appears to have had conflicting thoughts about the Americans. In what ways did he view them as a threat? In what ways did he view them as a source of hope?
2. What was Schmidt’s attitude concerning the Soviets? Based on what you have learned about World War II, why do you think this was so?
3. What problems facing postwar Germany did Schmidt mention?
4. Who do you think was the intended audience for Schmidt’s reflections? What evidence supports your opinion?
Lesson 3: The Marshall Plan

Preview of Main Points
Secretary of State George Marshall’s European Recovery Plan contributed greatly to the shape of the world today. In this lesson, students begin to understand how economic and political conditions in Germany and Europe led to the development of the Marshall Plan. Using a speech by Marshall as well as the commentary of an historian, the lesson explores the issues and objectives that caused Marshall’s central idea to prevail.

Key Concepts
• Ideological divisions
• Containment
• Economic recovery and growth

Related Concepts
• Communism
• Cold War

Objectives
During this lesson, students will
• identify the major foreign policy objectives of the United States that led to the Marshall Plan
• explain how postwar recovery issues contributed to the beginning of the Cold War
• identify key factors that led to acceptance of the European Recovery Plan by Western Allies
• evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Marshall Plan.

Focus Question
Why should the victor help the vanquished at the end of a bitter, costly struggle?

Teaching Suggestions
Books, articles, and primary documents relating to the Marshall Plan exist in abundance in the wake of the 50th anniversary of the plan’s implementation. Secretary Marshall’s speech offers the students an introduction to U.S. postwar foreign policy as presented by its primary architect. Referring to Marshall’s own thoughts, students should interpret and analyze the writings of the historians about the event. [Note: Teachers may want to edit the speech and the other readings to match the reading level of their classes.]
Beginning the Lesson

Place on the board the quote from Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address “With malice toward none, with charity for all …” Ask the students what the stance of a country should be toward her defeated enemy. Does the victor have any responsibility to help the vanquished? Ask students to brainstorm why the U.S. should or should not have become involved in aiding Germany to recover. Why should one aid one’s former enemy? How had the balance of power shifted in the few years after 1945? What new pressures and situations confronted the U.S. at that time?

Developing the Lesson

Ask students to read the “Marshall Plan Speech” (see Resource 4). After they have completed reading, ask them to answer the questions in Activity 1. Conduct a discussion of the motivations behind the Marshall Plan. Why did the United States grant so much money to aid the recovery of Europe? To what extent were the goals of the United States humanitarian? To what extent were the goals to ensure the availability of open markets for American trade? To what extent were the goals aimed at stopping the spread of communism into Western Europe?

Ask students to prepare a political advertisement in support of the Marshall Plan (see Activity 2).

Concluding the Lesson

Ask students to read, “From Plan to Practice: The Context and Consequences of the Marshall Plan” by Charles S. Maier (see Resource 5). Ask students to answer the questions in Activity 3.

Conduct a discussion of the significance of the Marshall Plan to the security and economic recovery of Germany. How was the Marshall Plan helpful to Germany? How was it harmful? How would Germany and Europe be different...
Activity 1

Ask students to read the “Marshall Plan Speech” (see Resource 4) and answer the questions below. Then use the questions as the basis for a class discussion.

1. List five examples of physical destruction in Europe that concerned Marshall. What did Marshall regard as the most important obstacles to recovery?
2. What evidence did he present to support his views?
3. What reasons did Marshall give for regarding European recovery as one of America's problems? Which reason seems to have been the most important to him?
4. What objections might Americans have had to the Plan?
5. Do you agree or disagree with the Plan? Why?

Activity 2

Ask the students, working in small groups of three to four, to imagine that they were media consultants at the time. Have each group write a 60-second script for a political advertisement that could have been used to persuade Americans to Marshall’s point of view. Be sure that they specify reasons why Germany in particular should be included in a European recovery plan. Have each group list the types of photos, films, and/or sound bites that they will use in their advertisement. Videotape each advertisement to show to the class, and have the students evaluate the work of each group.

Activity 3

Ask students to read “From Plan to Practice: The Context and Consequences of the Marshall Plan” (see Resource 5). Ask them to answer the following questions:

1. What fears about communism served as motives for the Marshall Plan? What evidence existed to support these fears?
2. Why did Marshall and his advisers decide to extend the offer of economic assis-
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1. Distance to all countries in Europe, including those in Eastern Europe?
2. How was the Marshall Plan different from ordinary relief or welfare programs?
3. How much aid did the Marshall Plan give by 1951? How, specifically, did Germany benefit from this aid?
4. How did the Soviet Union respond to the Marshall Plan?
5. How important was the Marshall Plan in aiding the recovery of Europe?
6. What were the advantages and disadvantages of the Marshall Plan?

English

9.2 The student will make planned oral presentations.
9.3 The student will read and analyze a variety of literature.
9.4 The student will read and analyze a variety of print materials.
9.6 The student will develop narrative, literary, expository, and technical writings to inform, explain, analyze, or entertain.
10.1 The student will participate in and report small-group learning activities.
10.2 The student will critique oral reports of small-group learning activities.
10.3 The student will read and critique literary works from a variety of eras in a variety of cultures.
10.7 The student will develop a variety of writings with an emphasis on exposition.
10.9 The student will use writing to interpret, analyze, and evaluate ideas.
11.1 The student will make persuasive presentations.
11.2 The student will analyze and evaluate persuasive presentations.
11.3 The student will read and analyze relationships among American literature, history, and culture.
11.4 The student will read a variety of print material.
11.7 The student will write in a variety of forms with an emphasis on persuasion.
12.1 The student will make a 5-10 minute formal oral presentation.
12.2 The student will evaluate formal presentations.
12.4 The student will read a variety of print material.
12.7 The student will develop expository and technical writings.
Lesson 4: Effects of the Marshall Plan

Preview of Main Points
This lesson focuses on the short- and long-term effects of the Marshall Plan on Europe. It explores both the American and the Soviet perspectives on asking for German reparations and on the Marshall Plan. It examines the American fear about the spread of communism into Western Europe, and it looks at America’s desire for new markets in Europe. It also examines the Soviet decision not to participate in the Marshall Plan. The lesson ends with a discussion of the effects of the Marshall Plan on Europe that are still evident today.

Key Concepts
• Economic recovery
• Containment
• Cold War

Related Concepts
• Reparations
• Economic union
• Blocs

Objectives
In the course of this lesson, students will
• identify the response of Western Europe to the Marshall Plan
• describe actions taken by the Soviet Union as a result of the Marshall Plan
• discuss how these responses led to the formation of a “Western bloc” and an “Eastern bloc” in Europe
• analyze the Marshall Plan from both Eastern and Western points of view
• evaluate the long-term effects of the Marshall Plan on European security and economic integration.

Focus Question
Why do groups and countries often have different solutions to the same problems?

Teaching Suggestions
It is important to focus on the idea of multiple perspectives when teaching this lesson. The readings are difficult ones and may need to be edited for some classes. The lesson also helps to develop discussion skills in small groups. Teachers should stress the importance of civil discourse — i.e., affirming the validity of others’ ideas while disagreeing with them. It is also important to connect the Marshall Plan with the origins of the Cold
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War and with the current economic integration in Europe.

Beginning the Lesson
Suggest to the students that sometimes a problem involving different parties can have different solutions depending on how it is viewed by the parties. Ask the students to identify a problem in their local area or school and then explain the opinions of different groups with varying viewpoints on how to solve the problem. Ask them to identify an international problem and then explain the opinions of different groups on how to solve it.

Developing the Lesson
Ask students to brainstorm the reasons the U.S. chose to provide economic assistance to Germany at the end of World War II. Divide the class in half. Ask half the class to read “From Plan to Practice: The Context and Consequences of the Marshall Plan” (see Resource 5). Ask the other half to read “The European Response: Primacy of Politics” by David Reynolds (see Resource 6). Brainstorm with the students the main ideas found in each reading. What were the main reasons for the Marshall Plan from the American perspective? Which countries were suspicious of America’s motives behind the Marshall Plan? What were their suspicions? What reasons did the Soviets have for believing they were entitled to reparations from Germany?

Ask the students to complete Activity 1. Then ask them to read the short excerpt from the book Civilization and Beyond by S. Nearing (see Resource 7). Conduct a class discussion, using the questions in Activity 2.

Ask students to read “Uniting Europe” by M. Robert Schuman (see Resource 8). Ask them to complete the questions in Activity 3. Conduct a class discussion on the long-term consequences of the Marshall Plan for European economic cooperation, using some of the newspaper articles that the students find.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF LEARNING

History and Social Science

9.10 The student will analyze major historical events of the 20th century, in terms of
a. causes and effects of World War I and World War II;
b. the Russian Revolution;
c. the rise, aggression, and human costs of totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan;
d. the political, social, and economic impact of worldwide depression in the 1930’s;
e. the Nazi Holocaust and other examples of genocide;
f. new technologies, including atomic power, and their influence on the patterns of conflict;
g. economic and military power shifts since 1945, including the rise of Germany and Japan as economic powers;
h. revolutionary movements in Asia and their leaders, including Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh;
i. how African and Asian countries achieved independence from European colonial rule, including India under Gandhi and Kenya under Kenyatta and how they have fared under self-rule;
j. regional and political conflicts including Korea and Vietnam; and
k. the beginning and end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

9.11 The student will demonstrate skills in historical research and geographical analysis by
a. identifying, analyzing, and interpreting primary and secondary sources and artifacts;
b. validating sources as to their authenticity, authority, credibility, and possible bias;
c. comparing trends in global population distribution since the 10th century;
d. constructing various time lines of key events, periods, and personalities since the 10th century;
e. identifying and analyzing major shifts in national political boundaries in Europe since 1815; and
f. identifying the distribution of major religious cultures in the contemporary world.

10.4 The student will analyze how certain cultural characteristics can link or divide regions, in terms of language, ethnic heritage, religion, political philosophy, social and economic systems, and shared history.

10.6 The student will analyze past and present trends in human migration and cultural interaction as they are influenced by social, economic, political, and environmental factors.

10.9 The student will identify natural, human, and capital resources, describe their distribution, and explain their significance, in terms of location of contemporary and selected historical economic and land-use regions.

10.12 The student will analyze the patterns and networks of economic interdependence, with emphasis on formation of multi national economic unions, international trade, and the theory of competitive advantage, in terms of job specialization, competition for resources, and access to labor, technology, transportation, and communications.

10.14 The student will analyze the forces of conflict and cooperation as they influence
a. the way in which the world is divided among independent countries and dependencies;
b. disputes over borders, resources, and settlement

continued overleaf
Concluding the Lesson

Referring to the varying points of view about the Marshall Plan, write the following statement on the board: “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” Ask the students to write a one-paragraph response to this statement, using the information gathered and discussed in the lesson.

Activity 1

Create groups of four students each with two students representing the American perspective as stated by Secretary Marshall and the other two representing the Soviet perspective as expressed by Molotov. Ask each group to prepare and conduct a structured dialogue between Marshall and Molotov. Those representing the American perspective should try to persuade Molotov that a) he should not seek reparations from Germany and b) European cooperation under the Marshall Plan is the best solution to the problem of rebuilding Europe. Those representing the Soviet perspective should try to persuade Marshall that a) Molotov should seek reparations from Germany and b) European cooperation under the Marshall Plan is not a good solution. Before the dialogue begins, allow each pair in each group 10 to 15 minutes to identify their best reasons.

After the dialogue, ask each pair to identify the strongest reasons presented by the opposing pair and report those reasons to the other pair. The purpose of the dialogue is to discuss, not debate, the issues. Have each group then decide which approach to the problem, Marshall’s or Molotov’s, is best.

Activity 2

Conduct a class discussion, using the following questions:

1. On what facts do Nearing’s and Reynolds’ accounts of the Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan disagree?
2. On what facts do the two accounts
agree?
3. What information does one need to determine which account is more correct?

Activity 3
Ask students to answer the following questions:
1. According to Schuman, where did Europe get the expression “European integration”?
2. What fact about European solidarity did many Europeans learn from World War II?
3. What did Schuman think of the Marshall Plan?
4. How did the Marshall Plan encourage European integration?
5. What was the psychological barrier to European integration?
Ask students to find an article from the newspaper that talks about the euro or the European Economic Community. Ask the students to complete a summary of the article, using the following questions:
1. What happened?
2. Why did it happen?
3. What difference does it make?
4. What will happen next?
Lesson 5: Berlin Blockade and Airlift

Preview of Main Points

The purpose of this lesson is to have the students explore how individual countries responded to a common problem and how these responses affected their long-term relationships. It is important to relate this historic event to a more universal theme — the nature and causes of international friendship, alliance, and enmity. More specifically, the lesson addresses the reasons for the Berlin blockade and the resulting airlift as well as the consequences of the blockade and airlift for the Cold War.

Key Concepts

- Security
- Ideology
- Blockade
- Airlift

Related Concepts

- Containment
- Communism
- Alliance

Objectives

During this lesson, students will
- explain reasons for the blockade of Berlin
- explain reasons for the allied airlift to Berlin
- analyze the consequences of the blockade and airlift on the division of Germany and the Cold War
- describe how enemies may become friends.

Focus Question

What circumstances could make possible an enemy becoming a friend?

Teaching Suggestions

The lesson relies largely on a video and three letters written to President Truman about the airlift. The video is an important resource because it graphically demonstrates the difficulty of the airlift. Likewise, the letters illustrate how gripping the event was for many Americans. The students will see how the blockade and airlift were important events that led to the friendship between the German and American peoples.
Beginning the Lesson

Ask the students if they ever had an enemy who became a friend. Discuss examples as described in their responses. Introduce the focus question and speculate on responses to it. Why did our former enemy quickly become our newest ally?

Developing the Lesson

Show the first segment — Berlin: Blockade and Airlift — of the video accompanying this document (or available from the Department of Education). Discuss the video, using the questions in Activity 1 below.

Give the students a list of advantages and disadvantages and copies of the three letters written to President Truman about the Berlin airlift (see Resources 9, 10, and 11). Have them complete Activity 2.

Concluding the Lesson

Ask the students to draw conclusions about why enemies become friends. Ask them to write a poem or a brief story about an enemy who becomes someone’s friend.

Activity 1

After showing the video Berlin: Blockade and Airlift, conduct a class discussion using the following questions:

1. What were the reasons for the blockade?
2. What were the reasons for the airlift?
3. How did these events help change the attitude of the German people toward Americans? How did they help change Americans’ attitude toward Germans?
4. What events can cause an enemy to become a friend?

RELATIONSHIP TO THE VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF LEARNING

History and Social Science

9.10 The student will analyze major historical events of the 20th century, in terms of:
   a. causes and effects of World War I and World War II;
   b. the Russian Revolution;
   c. the rise, aggression, and human costs of totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan;
   d. the political, social, and economic impact of worldwide depression in the 1930's;
   e. the Nazi Holocaust and other examples of genocide;
   f. new technologies, including atomic power, and their influence on the patterns of conflict;
   g. economic and military power shifts since 1945, including the rise of Germany and Japan as economic powers;
   h. revolutionary movements in Asia and their leaders, including Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh;
   i. how African and Asian countries achieved independence from European colonial rule, including India under Gandhi and Kenya under Kenyatta and how they have fared under self-rule;
   j. regional and political conflicts including Korea and Vietnam; and
   k. the beginning and end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

9.11 The student will demonstrate skills in historical research and geographical analysis by:
   a. identifying, analyzing, and interpreting primary and secondary sources and artifacts;
   b. validating sources as to their authenticity, authority, credibility, and possible bias;
   c. comparing trends in global population distribution since the 10th century;
   d. constructing various time lines of key events, periods, and personalities since the 10th century;
   e. identifying and analyzing major shifts in national political boundaries in Europe since 1815; and
   f. identifying the distribution of major religious cultures in the contemporary world.

11.11 The student will demonstrate an understanding of the origins and effects of World War II, with emphasis on:
   a. the rise and aggression of totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan;
   b. the role of the Soviet Union;
   c. appeasement, isolationism, and the war debates in Europe and the United States prior to the outbreak of war;
   d. the impact of mobilization for war, at home and abroad;
   e. major battles, military turning points, and key strategic decisions;
   f. the Holocaust and its impact; and
   g. the reshaping of the United States’ role in world affairs after the war.

11.12 The student will analyze and explain United States foreign policy since World War II, with emphasis on:
   a. the origins and both foreign and domestic consequences of the Cold War;
   b. communist containment policies in Europe, Latin America, and Asia;
   c. the strategic and economic factors in Middle East policy;
   continued overleaf
Activity 2

Give the students the list of advantages and disadvantages of the Berlin airlift found below. Ask them to decide which of these are advantages and which are disadvantages. Have them place a D by the disadvantages and an A by the advantages. Then have each of them share his/her answers with a partner and prepare to discuss his/her choices with the class.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Berlin Airlift

1. If the United States showed off its military strength and tried to force the Soviet Union to open up the land and water routes into West Berlin, it could lead to another war.

2. Using the planes necessary to make the airlift successful would make the United States military less able to defend our country in the event of an attack.

3. Bringing food and supplies into Berlin by planes would help to establish good relationships between the United States and Berlin.

4. General Clay, President Truman’s military advisor, thought the Soviets would probably attack armed convoys bringing in supplies by land.

5. General Clay thought the Soviets would not attack our airplanes unless they had decided to go to war with us.

6. If the United States permitted the blockade to be successful, all of Berlin would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union.

Ask the students to read the three letters written to President Truman in 1948 (see Resources 7, 8, and 9). Identify additional advantages and disadvantages contained in the letters. After looking at all the advantages and disadvantages, ask the students to write several paragraphs describing what they think Truman should have done and why.
RESOURCE 1
“Rubble” Women Starting to Clean Up Berlin after the War
Source: Courtesy of the German Information Center. Reprinted by permission
RESOURCE 2
Two Children in the Streets in Postwar Germany

Source: Courtesy of the German Information Center. Reprinted by permission.
... To understand the effects of the Marshall Plan, one must first comprehend what life was like for ordinary Germans, like me, toward the end of World War II and in those first turbulent years afterward. We had lost. I had been convinced for several years that we would, and many of my comrades in Germany's armed forces had reached a similar conclusion. During the day, we fulfilled our missions on the battlefield; at night, we hoped for a quick defeat of our own country. After the Battle of the Bulge in late 1944, when my division was driven out of Belgium and Luxembourg, I complained to my commander about Germany’s war strategy: prudence dictated that we concentrate our energies on the Soviets in the East, and in the West let the Americans occupy as much German soil as they wanted. Although he angrily rejected my suggestion, he did not report me.

I had imagined that when we lost the war we Germans would have to live in caves and holes in the ground, but this apocalyptic vision turned out to be much worse than our actual conditions. True, we struggled for coal and food; there were days during the winter of 1946 when we stayed in bed because there was nothing to eat and nothing to burn for warmth. Divided into four zones and occupied by the Allies, Germany was in agony. Its remaining industrial capacity was being dismantled, unemployment was rising, and the black market was the only market. But my generation, cut off from the rest of the world since adolescence, had a great desire for knowledge and for a new beginning. I studied economics, while my wife taught in a secondary school.

Germans who grew up in the 1930s — I was 14 when Hitler came to power in 1933 — did not know much about the rest of the world. Our knowledge of America was limited to the little we were taught in school: the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. role in the First World War, Black Friday on the New York Stock Exchange. When the war broke out, my ideas about economic and social conditions in the United States did not have a positive cast. Only the widespread anti-American propaganda made me suspect that the United States must have some virtues; otherwise, why would Goebbels go to such trouble to debase it in our eyes? ...
RESOURCES 4
The Marshall Plan Speech

Source: United States Information Agency
Reprinted by permission

The following is the speech given by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in which he outlined a program of economic assistance to war-torn Europe. It became known as “The Marshall Plan Speech.”

Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 5, 1947

Mr. President, Dr. Conant, members of the Board of Overseers, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I’m profoundly grateful and touched by the great distinction and honor and great compliment accorded me by the authorities of Harvard this morning. I’m overwhelmed, as a matter of fact, and I’m rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you’ve been generous enough to accord to me. In these historic and lovely surroundings, this perfect day, and this very wonderful assembly, it is a tremendously impressive thing to an individual in my position.

But to speak more seriously, I need not tell you that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth, and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life and the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads were correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past ten years conditions have been abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than has been foreseen.
There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile, people in the cities are short of food and fuel and in some places [are] approaching the starvation levels. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe’s requirements, for the next three or four years, of foreign food and other essential products — principally from America — are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States. It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be
undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I’ve been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgement. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?

Thank you very much.

 RESOURCE 5
From Plan to Practice: The Context and Consequences of the Marshall Plan

By Charles S. Maier

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When Secretary of State George C. Marshall delivered his lapidary Commencement address under the Harvard elms on June 5, 1947, the concept he outlined was hardly a finished “plan.” Still, it summarized weeks of intensive discussion and position papers at the State Department and other government agencies.
Political and economic developments seemed grave for many reasons. Marshall had returned dismayed from the Moscow foreign ministers' conference in April 1947. Although the victorious Allies had pledged in 1945 to administer occupied Germany as a unit, mutual suspicions and conflicting agendas were sealing off their respective zones. In Moscow, both the Western Allies and the Soviets seemed to approach agreement, then dug in their heels, preferring to assure the development they wanted at least in their own parts of the country rather than to gamble on losing influence over the whole.

The disputes were complicated: Americans feared the burden of reparation exactsions that Russia felt had already been agreed to, and London and Washington were also concerned that the Soviets aspired to dominate the agencies that would administer a unified Germany. In addition, the Western Allies, observing the increasingly repressive grip of the Communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party in the eastern zone of occupation, were unwilling to risk any such result in their regions. Meanwhile, the German economy was mired in shortages, flight from a vastly depreciated currency, stalled reconstruction, and a breakdown of urban-rural exchange. These stresses were leading to hunger protests and a continuing decline of the already vastly diminished production of mines and factories.

Nor was Germany the only region in distress. European trade had barely revived since the war. After a promising resumption of production in 1946, the delicate postwar economy appeared snarled in bottlenecks and demoralization. The 1946 harvest had been meager; the severe winter that followed had frozen the rivers on which barges normally transported much of the coal needed to generate electricity and run factories. Reconstruction required products from the United States; the Europeans did not have the dollars to purchase this material.

In the same months, East-West ideological divisions became ever more intractable. Russians and Americans had failed to reach agreement on the control of atomic energy; they had exchanged bitter messages on the control of postwar Iran; most dismaying, the East European countries that Soviet troops had occupied were forced into satellite status as Communist people's parties or spurious political fronts tightened their control over government, industry, and the press. In the West, Communist and non-Communist parties ended the coalition governments that they had formed in the immediate aftermath of liberation. The fading politicians, labor leaders, and intellectuals who still wanly hoped to bridge the deepening split were consigned to irrelevance and excluded from influence in the West; in the East, they were silenced, exiled, or imprisoned.

In March 1947, Washington agreed to assume Britain's role in supplying and in fact organizing the Greek government's fight against Communist guerrillas. As the president explained in what became known as the Truman Doctrine, the United States was prepared to extend aid to any government fighting subversive movements. The resounding declaration was designed for American political realities. The midterm elections of 1946 had returned a Republican Congress. Some GOP conservatives feared embroilment in Europe, but the majority of the party was prepared to support an anticommunist, bipartisan foreign policy.

The "vital center" — to cite the expression of then Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. — would rally to define an anticommunist liberalism. Nonetheless, the Truman Doctrine was not an instrument for combating the discontents in Western Europe. Could not Americans offer something more positive and hopeful?
This was the challenge to which Marshall and his assistants responded in the six weeks between Moscow and Harvard Yard. The new policy planning staff under George Kennan coordinated ideas; everyone in the relevant agencies was soon eager to claim paternity, as Charles Kindleberger — then dealing with German and Austrian economic affairs in the State Department and for decades thereafter a vigorous economist and historian at MIT — pointed out in a humorous note on the origins of the plan. The concept that emerged was simple but innovative: Washington must make a multi-year commitment of foreign aid to those European governments that would respond cooperatively, in order to alleviate the dollar shortage, catalyze recovery, and preclude any reversion to authoritarian solutions.

The new assistance program, eventually christened the European Recovery Program (ERP), differed from the substantial aid provided ever since the end of the war. The United States had been extending roughly $5 billion in aid each year (from a peacetime GNP rising toward $200 billion) under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA); the funds went to countries in eastern as well as western Europe, to Egypt, and to its own occupation forces. Washington had also extended or facilitated key loans to Britain and France. But Congress grew increasingly restive about these expensive stopgap infusions. Some UNRRA supplies flowed to Communist countries that became more and more hostile, or went toward relief measures that did not seem to promote any revival of production. The new program would target investment and reconstruction; it would include what today we call technology transfer and involve advisers in economic modernization. Advocates stressed that ERP was not merely an anticommunist expedient, but an effort to encourage Europe to emulate the modern production methods that the United States had mobilized so successfully in fighting World War II.

From Marshall’s speech onward, the Europeans were summoned to cooperate among themselves in assigning priorities, although the United States would sign a pact with each. The political astuteness of the project lay in its openhanded offer. No country was to be excluded: if the East European Communist regimes were willing to open their economies to scrutiny and cooperative trade practices — and undoubtedly to American investors and products — they could allegedly share in the resources. Did Marshall and his advisers really expect this result? Could they have persuaded Congress to authorize such assistance? Skepticism was warranted. But perhaps the Marshall Plan might persuade Moscow to move toward a more cooperative course, such as had seemed possible at the end of the war. If not, the onus for the break would be on the Soviets, and a critical mass of the West European working and middle classes, desirous of sharing in American aid, would rally around non-Communist leaders.

Not all these developments could be envisaged as part of a coherent strategy in early June 1947. But the key concepts were all implicit: sustained aid targeted for investment, growth, and balance-of-payments viability, not just for relief; aid proffered to a potentially integrated economic region, not just to individual countries; aid that would stress productivity and cooperation between capital and labor and would encourage Europeans to emulate the productive political economy of the United States.

Subsequent developments would shape the final outcome. Although Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov briefly attended the initial Paris conference of recipients in July, the Russians and the regimes they controlled soon withdrew. Moscow’s leaders summoned foreign Communist parties together in September and warned them to prepare for
a long period of hostile confrontation. The Communist parties of France and Italy soon engaged in a series of provocative and unsuccessful strikes to protest their recent exclusion from governing coalitions. In effect, Europe's Communists retreated into a political ghetto at Moscow's behest rather than risk losing their militant identity. They accepted the risk of isolating themselves rather than accept the risks of détente. The Czech government, still democratic and still a coalition, dared to remain in Paris for another few months until Soviet pressure compelled it to withdraw. The concession did not placate Moscow, and Communist factory committees and political leaders forced a dictatorial regime upon the country in February 1948. This final extension of Communist control helped to overcome remaining hesitation on the part of the American Congress to fund the recovery program.

Americans designed an innovative structure: an independent aid agency in Washington, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) under former Studebaker Corporation president Paul Hoffman, who headed the effort, coordinated economic planning and solicited the yearly appropriations from Congress. Former Lend-Lease administrator and Soviet ambassador Averell Harriman (followed in 1950 by future Harvard law professor Milton Katz) headed the Paris ERP headquarters as special representative in Europe and coordinated the country aid missions attached to each American embassy. Each country had to prepare recovery plans and have them approved by the new Organization for European Economic Cooperation (founded in 1948) and by the Americans. The amount allocated depended upon the projected balance of payments deficit; need, not virtuous austerity, opened Washington's purse. Once the European planners received approval for the matériel sought from the United States, the ECA bought the goods from American suppliers — steel and industrial raw materials, industrial components, wheat, foodstuffs, and tobacco — and delivered them across the Atlantic. The recipient governments then in effect sold the goods for local currency, termed “counterpart,” to the national agencies or industries that had sought them. Marshall Plan officials retained a voice in approving the use of local counterpart funds. The French, for example, allocated their counterpart francs to Jean Monnet's national planning commission for specific infrastructure projects; the British won approval to reduce government debt, which in turn freed private capital for market-oriented investment.

In general, American advisers found it difficult simply to oppose the counterpart projects for which Europeans might plead; aside from vetoing the occasional rank pork-barrel proposal, it was hard to impose alternatives. Still, U.S. advisers could play constructive roles in collaborating on local development strategies; Hollis Chenery, Ph.D., was instrumental in planning for Italy's Mezzogiorno region. The young economists who staffed ERP agencies had learned the new Keynesian doctrines just before the war. They appreciated large and integrated markets, but understood that sometimes government spending was required to help markets function. World War II had further demonstrated that governments could plan purposeful economic activity and mobilize productive resources.

How decisive an economic and political impact did the Marshall Plan exert over its four-year existence? By 1951, when, in the wake of the Korean War, the U.S. transformed the assistance program into the Mutual Security Administration, Americans had supplied about $14 billion in aid, probably between 1 and 2 percent of our gross national product for the period — roughly five times the proportional share we now allocate to
foreign assistance. In the first two years of the program, American aid provided a major share of German and Italian gross capital formation; then it fell, as in Britain and France, to a much smaller share. In quantitative terms, Europeans were soon accumulating their own capital. Nonetheless, Washington's assistance satisfied key needs and was targeted to eliminate critical shortages. Assistance in dollars allowed Europeans to invest without trying to remedy their balance of payments drastically through deflation and austerity. This meant that economic recovery did not have to be financed out of general wage levels. Working-class voters (at least outside France and Italy, where strong Communist political cultures still thrived) could thus be rallied by politicians who offered gradualist social-democratic alternatives and remained friendly to the West.

Would Europe have “gone Communist” without the Marshall Plan? No, but the mean and dispirited politics of the late 1930s might well have returned. The Marshall Plan made it easier to inaugurate a quarter century of ebullient economic growth; it provided incentives for closer regional integration (especially the decisive European Payments Union of 1950, which Washington helped to finance); and [it] worked to stabilize the consensual welfare-state politics that prevailed until the 1970s.

Such an outcome was hardly foreordained. Europeans and Americans had trapped themselves in destructive policies in the 1930s, with catastrophic consequences. They could have done so again. But in the late 1940s, Americans and Europeans made constructive choices. Fifty years later, that moment in Harvard Yard gives us a lot to ponder. What policies will unleash innovative energies, transforming bleak prospects and dangerous impasses into opportunity? How do we recover that sense of public purpose, that confidence in our institutions?

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**RESOURCE 6**

**The European Response: Primacy of Politics**

(excerpt)

By David Reynolds

Source: Reprinted by permission of


... *The View from the East*

In June 1947, however, the overriding question was whether the Soviets would participate. Recently declassified documents indicate that Moscow attributed the Marshall Plan to America's need to extend credits to a dollar-less world so as to sell its surplus production. This claim was often made, in non-Marxist language, in Britain and France as well, but Soviet analysts reckoned that America's underlying intent was political — to build on the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine and establish an anti-Soviet Western Euro-
Nevertheless, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, agreed to join Bidault and Bevin to discuss Marshall’s offer. He arrived in Paris on June 27 with a delegation of around 100 officials, suggesting a readiness to talk seriously.

Molotov’s brief, approved by Stalin, had three main themes: to ascertain the type and amount of aid, to avoid a Europe-wide program and instead secure assistance on a country-by-country basis, and, finally, to permit German involvement only if Soviet demands regarding Germany, particularly for reparations, were satisfied. Ironically, these basic aims were not dissimilar to those of France, which also wanted to maximize American aid, minimize the supranational framework, and exploit German resources as much as possible.

But the French and British were both closer to the United States and more dependent upon it. They decided to defend their interests from within any American plan, but Molotov terminated the discussions on July 2 when it became clear that the program still had no content and that the last two Soviet conditions would not be met. Bidault confessed his puzzlement at Soviet tactics. By walking out, he later said, Molotov “had chosen the only way to lose for sure.” Had he stayed, the Soviets might have extracted some economic aid or, more probably, ensured the plan’s defeat in Congress. But such tactics would have required a combination of persuasive charm and subtle propaganda totally out of character for the man known in the West as “Mr. Nyet.”

At the time, Moscow’s policy, like Washington’s, was in flux. In 1945–46, Stalin had probably hoped to advance Soviet interests without open conflict with the West. He understood the Yalta agreements to mean a free hand for him in Eastern Europe, and he was intent on securing a satisfactory German settlement. The Soviet Union, after all, had lost some 28 million [people] in the war — over 14 percent of its 1939 population — compared with 350,000 British (.75 percent) dead and 300,000 Americans (.25 percent). The Soviets’ industry was still underdeveloped relative to the other Allies, and its civilian economy had been shattered. Stalin was not posturing when he told Marshall in April 1947 that the “United States and England might be willing to give up reparations; the Soviet Union could not.” He probably concluded from the Truman Doctrine and the deadlocked Four-Power Moscow conference that the rift between the superpowers was now unbridgeable.

In the first week of July, Stalin had concluded that Marshall’s initiative was aimed not merely at creating a Western bloc, but at detaching Eastern Europe from the Soviet sphere. Bevin himself had told Clayton that he thought the Marshall Plan was “the quickest way to break down the iron curtain. Ironically, however, it was in July 1947 that the iron curtain fell irrevocably across Europe. Over the next few months, Moscow whipped the national communist parties into line through the newly established Cominform and accelerated the Stalinization of the Eastern European economies to counter commercial dependence on the West. The Soviet response to Marshall’s speech defined the geography of the Marshall Plan. Its content would now be decided by the United States and the countries of Western Europe. ...
RESOURCE 7
Civilization and Beyond (excerpt)

By S. Nearing

Source: Civilization and Beyond, Harbor Side, ME: Social Science Institute, 1975, p. 165

"War destruction had played havoc with much of Europe. The Soviet Union was especially hard hit. Under the Marshall Plan, billions of dollars of United States aid were poured into Britain, France, Belgium and West Germany. At the same time, the Soviet request for United States loans was refused categorically by President Truman. Alone and unaided the Soviet people repaired the extensive damage inflicted by the 1941 military invasion from the West and went on with the task of socialist construction which the war had interrupted. Within five years — by 1950 — the Bolsheviks were again on their feet, going strong, extending substantial aid to China and other professedly socialist countries, and playing a crucial part in the struggle for disarmament and peace.” (Nearing, 1975)

RESOURCE 8
Uniting Europe (excerpt)

By M. Robert Schuman

Since World War II, European countries have broken down many of the political and economic barriers separating them. One of the leaders of this movement was M. Robert Schuman, a prominent French politician. The following excerpt is from a speech given by Schuman in the United States in 1954. He describes some of the forces pushing European countries closer together.

The expression “European integration” is, in reality, neither a European term nor a European idea. It comes from your country; it is an imported product. But it implies the solution to a problem which is specifically European.

We Europeans became conscious of this problem soon after the Second World War, when our countries, devastated and exhausted, were faced with the necessity of repairing their ruins, fulfilling their tremendous need for supplies, materials and tools, and gradually regaining their place in world economy. This was later followed by another anxiety — that of ensuring the security of Europe, of protecting her against further bloody upheavals and thus safeguarding the peace of the world.

The war itself taught us one lesson — that of European solidarity. One fact became clear to all — the fact that none of the countries of Europe could recover or defend them-
selves by their own means. Before the war, national self-sufficiency seemed to be a workable proposition. It was the proud ambition of the totalitarian regimes, in particular.

We have become accustomed to admitting our difficulties and our deficiencies without any false shame.... We have learned — or rather learned over again, for this has always been a Christian truth — that people are made for one another. Having been, by our own errors, the responsible authors of our common misfortune, we Europeans are forced to recognize that our destinies can no longer be dissociated, and that the aid or the cooperation of all is indispensable to each one of us. We need one another, if only to sell our goods. Specialized production and costly inventions are likely to yield sufficient returns only so long as there is a market open to them by far exceeding national requirements....

When, in 1947, Europe seemed on the brink of misery and anarchy, the Marshall Plan brought us immediate and substantial relief. The initiative was both generous and clear sighted, for it saved the lives of millions of human beings, while at the same time restoring economic activity which the war had interrupted or ruined completely. For this two-fold purpose, the Marshall Plan made use of available surplus production. It administered not only the oxygen required to keep the patient alive, but also the blood transfusion enabling the system to regain strength and to function normally.

It was at that very moment that Europe began to think of its future. It was compelled to do so by the necessity of apportioning and utilizing Marshall aid to the best advantage. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation owes its existence to this temporary task. The Marshall Plan, in guiding the European countries towards a lasting collaboration [agreement to work together], has played a first-rate educational role. Henceforth, all economic problems of interest to the eighteen participating Western countries, including neutrals like Switzerland and Sweden, are discussed in the course of periodic Ministers’ Conferences and studied by a permanent and common agency. However, the link thus established does not yet constitute integration. Integration is the lasting welding together of what was once independent; integration assumes subordination to an overhead organization, to an authority exercised in common. Neither the O.E.E.C. nor the Council of Europe implies integration. The member States of these bodies retain full sovereignty; to the extent that decisions are reached, they are reached unanimously; no State can be made to enter into an engagement against its will....

The difficulties facing European integration are first and foremost of a psychological nature. As I have just told you, integration means the renunciation of one’s sovereign powers in favor of a common authority. Yet for centuries the countries of Europe have fought bloody wars to gain their independence and establish their national unity which in fact meant the same thing. They will not therefore relinquish the smallest parcel of their autonomy: it would be like denying all their past ideals and glory.
Letter to President Truman

2335 Norwalk Avenue
Los Angeles 41, Calif.
September 12, 1948

President Harry S. Truman,
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The so-called "Berlin Crisis" is entirely an outgrowth of your own incredible stupidity. When you attended the Potsdam Conference [sic] to arrange final details for the occupation of Germany, it was your duty to look out for American interests and insist upon the establishment of a corridor to the American Zone for ingress and egress to the city. This you failed to do. Possibly this was because you believed Joe Stalin to be a "good old chap," as you expressed it some time ago. But I am inclined to think that you were just too dumb to know that such a corridor was necessary.

In the meantime, you seem to be willing and even eager to force this country into a war with Russia merely for the purpose of "saving face." If you do this, the blame for such a war will rest upon your own shoulders, and the blood of American boys butchered in this war will be on your head.

Read the inclosed article from the Los Angeles Times of September 12, and then perhaps even your feeble mind will grasp the fact that the Berlin Crisis can be solved without dragging the United States into war.

Yours truly,

PHILIP JOHNSTON
Office of the President

October 13, 1948

Dear President Truman:

Our national affairs committee has given much of its attention to the present international situation. That committee urged and our Board of Directors on October 11 approved a motion placing our Chamber of Commerce on record as backing the federal government in its decision to take a strong stand in the present Berlin and German crisis.

We recommend that the United States not retreat from Berlin in the face of Russian threats since such retreat would ultimately throw all of western Europe into the Russian sphere of influence. It is also recommended that the federal government continue its present practice of using all reasonable diplomatic means possible to avoid war.

We hope this expression of opinion will be of value to you and we are forwarding similar letters to our congressional representatives and to the Secretary of State.

Respectfully,

C. E. Scott, President

The Honorable Harry S. Truman
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Letter to President Truman

December 4, 1948

Dear President Truman:

Like every American I have been watching the Berlin situation with great concern. A thought occurs to me in connection with it, which I am passing on to you in all humility. You have hundreds of experts on the job far more capable than I, who may have had the same thought and discarded it for excellent reasons. Yet, on the off chance that it has not been considered I am prompted to make this suggestion.

Might it not be possible to reconcile the Berlin situation by having the United Nations take both Russia and the United States out of this highly controversial area, and bring in several of the smaller nations to govern it?

I do not want to seem presumptuous in making this suggestion but because it seems to me to have a germ of possibility I feel that I must pass it along.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR B. BAER

ARB: jm

Honorable Harry S. Truman
Coming to Terms with the Past: Lessons from the Holocaust

The Holocaust will always be a heavy burden for Germany. The term holocaust refers generally to a great or total destruction, especially by fire. However, following Hitler’s brutal rampage in Europe, it has come to mean his policy and acts of massive slaughter, especially the genocide against Jews.

Anti-Semitism

Conscious of the magnitude of the crimes that Germans committed against Jews during the Third Reich, the postwar German democracy has always forbidden any public expression of anti-Semitism. This taboo against voicing anything critical of Jews has been demonstrated by the fact that performance of Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice has not been permitted in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) for years. Other plays, such as Rainer Fassbinder’s Garbage, the City, and Death, have been prevented from opening because of the unacceptable anti-Semitic language they contain. [Ed. note: The Fasbinder play is presently (April 1999) being performed in Berlin by an Israeli theater group.]

The FRG’s first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, said that “in our name, unspeakable crimes have been committed, and they demand restitution, both moral and material, for the persons and properties of the Jews who have been so seriously harmed.” The FRG has made good on that promise. From 1949 to 1997, it provided more than $57 billion (DM 100 billion) in restitution, a figure that is expected to rise to approximately $76 billion (DM 124 billion) by the year 2030. It settled most property claims made by Jews, amounting to some $2.3 billion (DM 4 billion). It made lump sum payments to former concentration camp internees who were the objects of medical experimentation, and to prisoners of war (POW) from Palestine who, because of their Jewish background, did not receive the humane treatment guaranteed prisoners of war under international law. In 1996, the FRG began allowing German-speaking Holocaust survivors in Israel and the United States to receive German old-age pensions. A year later it opened talks on compensating Holocaust victims in Eastern Europe, person whom the Cold War had prevented from being compensated. In 1952, the FRG agreed to pay $2 billion (DM 3.45 billion) to the state of Israel and various Jewish organizations to help finance the resettlement of Jews throughout the world to Israel. It has in most cases made every effort to support the state of Israel diplomatically, although some Germans have been critical of Israeli treatment of Arabs.

In general, the Jews who have resided in the FRG since the war have not suffered discrimination and indignity. When Germany was unified in 1990, the government opened the country to Jews from the former Soviet Union. By 1998, Germany had the fastest-growing Jewish population in the world, with an influx of 2,000 per month. In those eight years, 1990–1998, the number of Jews residing in the FRG tripled to more than 100,000. This growth was especially dramatic in Berlin. Nonetheless, this number is still far below the German Jewish population of more than 500,000 before the war.
It was an understandable shock to Jews in and out of Germany to learn after reunification of several cases of Jewish monuments and memorials in Germany being defaced. Violence-prone German hoodlums know that the best way to get international publicity is to deface Jewish shrines and spout anti-Semitic slogans. Jerzy Kanal, chairman of the Jewish Community of Berlin, noted that “the entire Jewish community is disturbed. We could hardly have imagined that such a thing is again possible today in Germany.” Such outrages have occurred in many European countries. However, memories of the Nazi past cause such incidents within Germany to attract particular international interest. Such disgraces declined dramatically after 1993, but they still sometimes occur and are the subject of cautious concern.

The common thread between the wave of hostility toward foreigners in the 1990s and the pre-1945 anti-Semitism in Germany is the need to identify scapegoats for social misfortune. The most visible targets for the anger of the economically discontented are the refugees who pour into Germany. Although the embarrassment and shame for such acts is great, the political culture of the Federal Republic cannot be compared to that of the Weimar Republic or the Third Reich. Ignatz Bubis, the leader of Germany’s Jewish community, was right when he screamed at left-wing anarchists pelting President Richard von Weizsäcker who was pleading for tolerance: “I am ashamed of what has happened here. We are not in 1938, but in 1992!”

Education

One way the FRG has countered ignorance about the Hitler era since the mid-1960s has been to improve the school curriculum dealing with the subject. Because very few 1990s teachers are old enough to have been adults during the Nazi period, they are therefore far less inhibited about discussing these most painful aspects of the past. Some take pupils to visit concentration camps such as Dachau, which is Germany’s fourth most visited site, attracting about 6,000 school groups each year. Young Germans also have the opportunity to speak with former Jewish inhabitants of their cities, who are invited back to their hometowns for visits and discussions. At the university level, dozens of courses on the Holocaust are offered. The University of Heidelberg has a chair of Jewish studies, and Berlin’s Free University created an Institute of Anti-Semitism.

The effort in the schools and universities is boosted by a greater openness in German society as a whole to discussions dealing with the Nazi era. As fewer and fewer Germans who experienced the Third Reich as adults remain alive, those who were children at that time no longer need to feel so ashamed of a past that they did not help to create. Because the country’s guilt has become less personalized, it is now not so difficult to talk about it.

To help its citizens learn more about the Holocaust, the Bonn government recommended in 1979, and the Land-based radio and television boards agreed, that the American television mini-series Holocaust be aired in the FRG, despite criticism of its commercial, Hollywood qualities. Because of the fear of how young people might react to it, warnings were issued not to watch it alone, and hot lines were set up to deal with emotional crises it could cause. Thousands of schools and universities organized discussions about the series, which enjoyed an astonishing audience rating of about 40 percent. The movie Schindler’s List had a similar effect in 1994.
Collective Guilt?

From the 1980s on, some major German cities displayed exhibits on the Third Reich that would have been unthinkable earlier. For instance, in 1997 a controversial photographic exhibition entitled “The Crimes of the Wehrmacht” was displayed in many German cities. It unleashed emotional commentary and street demonstrations. By showing how the Wehrmacht (the German army during the Third Reich) committed atrocities on the eastern front, it challenged the prevailing view that the Wehrmacht, in contrast to the Gestapo or SS, was essentially a normal army of decent Germans defending their country. Because most German males had served in the armed forces during the war, this exhibition was perceived by many as blasphemy against themselves, their fathers, or their grandfathers.

Any suggestion that “ordinary Germans” were involved in Nazi crimes can still touch a very sensitive nerve in Germany. After a half century, the notion that all Germans are “collectively guilty” of Hitler’s crimes has generally been discarded. It has given way to the view that while most Germans are not directly responsible for Nazi atrocities, all Germans bear a special responsibility to ensure that such things never happen again in Germany and Europe.

Despite more than a half century of stable democracy and respect for human rights, Germans can still find themselves accused as a nation. In 1996, a young Harvard historian, Daniel Goldhagen, published a sensational book arguing that the crimes of the Nazis can indeed be blamed on all the Germans: Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. Goldhagen’s argument is simple: the extermination of the Jews was caused by “a demonological anti-Semitism” that was deeply rooted in German society. Hitler and the Germans were “of one mind” about the Jews. All Hitler had to do was to “unleash” their “pre-existing pent-up” anti-Semitism to perpetrate the Holocaust. Germans showed no reluctance, aside from some squeamishness, because ordinary Germans had been taught to “want to be genocidal executioners.” They “killed for pleasure,” “equipped with little more than the cultural notions current in Germany.” Germans were so saturated with anti-Semitism that killing Jews was “the common sense” of the day.

Published also in German, Goldhagen’s book was widely read in Germany. A nervous German government unwittingly advertised it by publicly attacking it. Few scholars accept Goldhagen’s overall argument, although many joined in the debate stirred up by it. Social scientists tend to be skeptical of monicausal explanations of things. Life and history are messy, and causality is multifaceted and complicated; things can almost never be reduced to one simple explanation. Nevertheless, great interest was paid to Goldhagen during his promotional tour of Germany. It is noteworthy that he was awarded Germany’s prestigious Democracy Prize for reigniting a national debate. The author noted: “The real story is that Germans, more than the people of any other country, deal with the inglorious and horrific parts of their past.”

Another revealing and troubling study that also found a huge reading audience in Germany is Christopher Browning’s book, Ordinary Germans. He documents how a reserve police battalion from Hamburg was sent to Poland and became a part of the systematic killing of Jews. At first all were sickened by this assignment, but most eventually adjusted to it as a routine job. In this book, we learn that most of the killers were not sick and twisted, but were quite ordinary men. Only 10 percent to 20 percent of the reserve
policemen refused to kill. Most of the non-Germans assigned to the unit also followed orders to murder, even though they had not grown up in a German society “saturated with anti-Semitism.” (In fact, a third of the SS by the end of the war was non-German.)

Unlike Goldhagen’s book, Browning’s forces the reader to ask what he/she would have done if he/she had been put in a similar situation in wartime. In a brutal dictatorship like Nazi Germany where dissidents could be tortured and beheaded (as were the idealistic Scholl siblings in Munich), silence was not necessarily consent.

Memorials and Monuments

German soul-searching did not end with reunification in 1990. In a country that tries both to remember and to look to the future, any discussion of memorials quickly becomes controversial. The decision to move the nation’s capital from Bonn to Berlin beginning in 1999 raised the question of what kind of Germany would be symbolized by a city with so much history. According to Daniel Libeskind, commenting on a celebrated new building of the Berlin municipal museum that houses Berlin’s Jewish Museum, “every brick, every tree was witness to something. It is a question of what traces of the past are incorporated into the present and the future.”

The search for a new spirit begins with street names. Hundreds of streets are losing the names they received from the Nazis or Communists. For example, the grandiose Reich Stadium Street leading up the 1936 Olympic stadium has been renamed to honor Adolf and Gustav-Felix Flatow, two German Jewish brothers who won gold medals in the 1896 Athens Olympics and later perished in Nazi concentration camps. Running parallel to the stadium is Jesse-Owens Street, commemorating the black American athlete in the 1936 Olympics whose hand Hitler refused to shake.

After the actress Marlene Dietrich died in 1992, efforts were made to name a street or square after her in the Schöneberg district, where she was born, or within the massive Potsdamer Platz, Berlin’s liveliest square before the war. Because of her repugnance toward the Nazis, she left Germany and became an American citizen in 1937. She later remarked that her more than 500 performances to Allied troops had been “the only important thing” she had ever done in her life. Some Germans consider her a traitor, even if she was motivated by opposition to Hitler. Thus her legacy is still debated, and so is any suggestion that she should be memorialized.

Berlin opened Germany’s first comprehensive Holocaust museum in the lakeside Wannsee Villa, where Hitler’s top aides planned the Final Solution (eradication of the Jews) in 1942. Here, one is confronted with a photographic chronology of the policy to exterminate Jews. More than 50,000 people visit this hard-to-find museum annually. Another museum and documentation center, called “Topography of Terror,” is located on the site of the former Gestapo Headquarters. Because of budgetary problems, the city government announced in 1996 that it would no longer be able to bear the expense for this museum, located on prime property close to the new business area being built around Potsdamer Platz. Many Berliners are incensed by the prospect that this museum might close.

Many other sites are maintained in Berlin. The Sachsenhausen concentration camp is within the city limits in the East, as is the New Synagogue and Jewish Center in
Oranienburg Street. Built in 1995 on the ground where Berlin's largest synagogue had stood, this heavily-guarded center now serves as both an important Jewish meeting place and as a museum for the history of Berlin's Jewish community. In West Berlin, visitors can see the museum and memorial to the German resistance in the Staufenberg Street, as well as the site in Plötzensee where enemies of the Nazis were murdered.

The most emotional controversy at the end of the twentieth century involves construction of a Holocaust memorial in the heart of Berlin between the Brandenburg Gate and the Reichstag building. There are numerous local Holocaust memorials throughout Germany, but there is no national one. The debate revolves around the question of how and where to remember the victims of Nazism. A design competition drew 528 entries. The winning design in 1995 called for a gigantic sloping gravestone more than 100 yards by 100 yards and rising to a height of over ten yards. On it would be inscribed the names of six million murdered Jews.

The criticism against this plan was so great that the project had to be postponed. A 70-person team of historians, politicians, intellectuals, and Jewish leaders were appointed to try to reach a consensus on a new design. Some found a memorial larger than a football field too grandiose to be moving and meaningful: such a site would be more appropriate for tourism than for atonement and quiet mourning. Others disliked the fact that only Jews were to be recognized as victims and that others who also suffered — Gypsies, homosexuals, religious sects — were to be ignored. Still others argued that the huge expenditure ($10 million) could be better spent on a living museum, like the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, where one could learn the full story of how the Nazi crimes happened.

Legacies of the Past

One cannot follow either the “great debates” or current events in the FRG without being constantly reminded of the shadow of the Nazi past. The collapse of Hitler’s state was the reason for the division of Germany. Any talk of German reunification therefore reawakens among some people memories of the war and of the Holocaust.

Domestic politics reflect a fear of the past repeating itself. In the 1970s, the Allies prodded Germany to stimulate her economy. This was routinely resisted by politicians, who cited the fact that inflation and unemployment during the Weimar Republic paved the way for Hitler’s takeover. Much popular clamoring to limit various kinds of immigrants and refugees pouring into the country and to encourage the departure of many of the four-and-a-half million foreign “guest workers” in the FRG was long rejected by politicians on the grounds that the new Germany must bend over backwards to respond to human suffering.

For several decades after the war, there was considerable discussion in the FRG about “overcoming the past” (Vergangenheitsbewältigung). The death of Rudolf Hess in Spandau Prison in 1987 was a reminder of how few “big fish” were still around. By the 1990s, two-thirds of all Germans had grown up in the postwar era, compared with one-third in the late 1960s.

Every nation needs a usable past which can validate its present and inspire faith in its future. Germans have a long and rich history, but since it was marred by the Nazi era and World War II, a sense of patriotic pride has often been lacking. There have been signs
in the FRG of a desire to revive certain national traditions. The nationwide debate over the meaning of Prussia in Germany's past and present, crowned by several special exhibits in Berlin, whose 750th birthday was celebrated by both Germanys in 1987, indicate that many persons are searching to find more positive possibilities for national identification. Events commemorating Martin Luther's death 400 years ago and the Staufen and Wittelsbach dynasties have taken place and are indicative of a similar quest to look to more positive events for national identification.

Helmut Kohl, who came to power in October 1982, is a symbol of the changed times and climate. Born in 1930, he was the first chancellor who was too young to play any part in the Hitler era, including performing military service. He claimed to exemplify a new generation of leaders untainted by the past and sought to appeal to those Germans, including those on the center-left, who want again to feel proud of their country. He used the word Vaterland in his speeches, and his encouragement to play the national anthem more often helped make it possible to close the day's television programming with its melody. In short, he wanted to help produce a “normal patriotism,” the kind that is taken for granted in other countries. Germans still show little enthusiasm for such symbols. Nevertheless, national feelings, which were taboo for a long time, are slightly stronger.

Kohl's efforts to apply total normalcy to relations with other countries did not always succeed. Sometimes foreign countries are still unwilling to regard the FRG solely as an economically strong, socially just, and stable democracy that is a reliable trading partner and NATO ally. Fritz Stern, an American historian who fled from Hitler, was correct when he noted that “the past dominates the present to an extraordinary degree, and the past cannot be erased.”

Undoubtedly the most eloquent warning against moving too quickly away from the past was made by former President von Weizsäcker in his famous speech before parliament on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the defeat of the Third Reich:

All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, must accept the past. We are all affected by its consequences and held responsible for it. ... It is not a matter of overcoming the past. One can do no such thing. The past does not allow itself to be retrospectively altered or undone. But whoever closes his eyes to the past becomes blind to the present.

The New German Armed Forces

A look at the efforts to create a Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) that fits the new democratic order is an example of the success Germans have had in overcoming negative aspects of their past. With Germany in ruins by 1945, there was little thought in anyone's mind of placing Germans back into uniform. Anti-war sentiment within Germany was strong, and the controversy in the 1950s over entering NATO and reintroducing conscription was so intense and emotional that it is a wonder that the young democracy survived it. A mass movement known by the slogan “ohne mich” (“without me”) enjoyed widespread support. In a 1950 opinion poll, 70 percent of males at Bonn University vowed never to put on a military uniform. It was in this charged atmosphere that the Bundeswehr was born.

Much attention was paid to creating the right kind of military, an “army of democrats” operating under democratic military statutes, resolutely accepting civilian control,
and committed to the defense of parliamentary democracy. The civil and military worlds were presented as integrated and mutually reinforcing. Service in the military would not be a radical break from civilian life.

These goals were to be ensured by a new concept: innere Führung (inner leadership). This means that the soldier, as a “citizen in uniform” with the emphasis on “citizen,” has rights that he sustains through participation and personal initiative. He is an autonomous moral being who may “balance the claims of subordination against the demands of conscience.” It is assumed that a soldier performs better when he understands the political values for which he fights. Finally, in a technical army, self-discipline is more important than blind obedience. Leaders issuing orders to highly specialized soldiers must apply modern management techniques to achieve maximum efficiency. Innere Führung is crucial for the thinking soldier. All officers are given a university education in one of two Universities of the Bundeswehr, one in Hamburg and the other in Munich. Regardless of their majors, they must take courses in ethics and social science in order to deepen their consciousness of being morally responsible members of a democratic state and society.

Germany retains its conscript army on the principle that it is a vital link between the military and society. The founders of the Bundeswehr feared the creation of a “state within a state,” as was the case during the Weimar Republic. Males in both parts of Germany are required to perform 10 months of military service, unless they morally object and are judged to be conscientious objectors. In such cases, they must perform 13 months of alternative civilian duty such as working in hospitals or homes for the elderly. No other NATO country has such a large percentage of its population which seeks to avoid compulsory military service by claiming conscientious objector status. This right is anchored in the Basic Law. There are scores of C.O. organizations, and many churches and other groups are active in giving advice about how to apply and argue successfully for such exemption.

After intense domestic debates, Germans, by and large, have come to accept the military deterrence as a necessary means for maintaining peace. However, the Greens passed a program in 1997, confirmed at their party conference in March 1998, that calls for the dissolution of NATO, and few Germans can accept the notion that the use of force is ever actually justified.

Many Germans have persuaded themselves that nobody knows the horrors of war better than they do and that they are particularly sensitive to the victims and the consequences. This is partly a result of western Germany’s efforts for decades to drive home the lessons of the two world wars that militarism is wrong and war never pays. This black-and-white message is taught in the schools, propagated in the public media, and expressed on public monuments. The idea that war is always wrong has become a kind of ideology in Germany. It made it difficult for the German government to deploy German forces in the former Yugoslavia. However, ethnic cleansing and the brutality of the war in the former Yugoslavia influenced some pacifists in Germany to consider the positive value of the military in Europe in general as a peace-keeping force.

To appear unthreatening, the Bundeswehr renounced all possession of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as long-range bombers and missiles. In time of war, it would revert completely to NATO command, whose top commander, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), is always an American general. Therefore, it can-
not fight independently outside of NATO, an organization of 16 (19 in the year 1999) democratic states that admits no new members who cannot demonstrate their commitment to democracy.

The German government is compelled to pay heed to domestic opinions on defense questions. It must constantly explain to the public the necessity and rationale for the country’s defense and for its military collaboration with the NATO and the United States. This need sometimes puts the German government in a bind. At times it has to disappoint its allies by its overly cautious defense policies.

Wayne C. Thompson
Virginia Military Institute
October 1998

This text can be found on the Armonk Institute’s Web site at armonkinstitute.org/gunlickslesson13.htm
Coming to Terms with the Past: Lessons from The Holocaust

Lessons in Unit II

Lesson 1: Holocaust Education in Germany Since the End of World War II
Lesson 2: Responsibility and Restitution
Lesson 3: Never Again — The Protection of Human Dignity

Overview

The lessons in this Unit explore specific ways in which the Holocaust has shaped contemporary German politics and culture. Central issues for Germans include discovering a “usable past” (a past which one remembers and from which one learns), dealing with the consequences of and responsibility for the past, and preventing the recurrence of such a tragedy. To these ends, German politics explore and stretch the limits of democracy. These topics are difficult because they involve not only facts but also value judgements and emotional responses. Students should be familiar with the events of the Holocaust before beginning this Unit. Preparatory activities might include visiting a Holocaust museum, viewing the movie Schindler's List, or talking with a Holocaust survivor.

This Unit will contribute effectively to World History, AP World History, AP Government, Sociology, and World Literature classes. The introductory essay accompanying the Unit will prove a valuable tool for the teacher.

Special thanks go to the many people who were interviewed for this project and especially to Joel L. Levy, Chairman for Germany of The Ronald S. Lauder Foundation, and to Ms. Annegret Ehmann, Director of Education for the House of the Wannsee Conference, for their suggestions.

Lesson 1: Holocaust Education in Germany Since the End of World War II

Preview of Main Points

This lesson addresses how the Holocaust is taught in German schools today. Attention is given to requirements issued by the federal government and implemented by the individual Länder. Attention is also given to the fact that before reunification, Holocaust education was not a major part of the curriculum of the GDR.
### Key Concepts
- Education as a source of change
- Acceptance of responsibility
- Human rights
- Acceptance of truth

### Objectives
During this lesson, students will
- define and use basic vocabulary and concepts (see Resource 1 below)
- compare and contrast Holocaust education as it is presented in three German Länder today
- identify the differences among the former GDR states in teaching the Holocaust in schools
- analyze the reactions of German students and adults to lessons on the Holocaust
- compare and contrast Holocaust education in Germany with that in the United States.

### Focus Questions
1. During the Nazi era, schools were used as a means of transmitting the “official” party line. Today, German schools are used as a means of transmitting information about what really happened during the Holocaust. How can the same institutions transmit such opposite values?

2. How do Germany's efforts to teach the truth about the Holocaust compare with the efforts in America to teach the truth about instances of persecution in our own country such as slavery, segregation, discrimination against African-Americans, the mistreatment of Native Americans, and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II?
Teaching Suggestions

Information in this lesson will come from readings concerning the requirements for Holocaust education (see Resources 2 and 3 below) and also from interviews with adults and students who have completed these programs (see Resources 4 and 5). Students should be introduced to the vocabulary, allowed to read the materials, and encouraged to interpret the information. Major emphasis should be placed on why this education is necessary.

Beginning the Lesson

Review and discuss with the students the vocabulary in Resource 1. Be aware that they may or may not be familiar with the terminology and organization of the German government. Discuss why learning about the past, and especially about the Holocaust, is necessary. Discuss why a study of the Holocaust might be more difficult in Germany than in the United States.

Developing the Lesson

Have the students read and discuss the Holocaust education requirements in different Länder. Because these requirements vary, focus the discussion on comparing them (see Activities 1 and 2 and Resources 2 and 3 below).

Examine any major differences discovered among the requirements in the different Länder.

Have the class compare the reactions of students from western Germany with the reactions of students from the former GDR states. Discuss the differences that are perceived (see Activity 3 and Resources 4 and 5).

Have the students research information about appeals made to German youth during the Nazi era.

Concluding the Lesson

Conduct a class discussion in response to the second focus question. What are the differences in the efforts shown by the two countries? What explains these differences? How should schools tell the truth about human rights violations in our own history?

Choose one of the assessment devices outlined in Activity 4.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
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<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>The student will read and analyze a variety of print materials.</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>The student will develop narrative, literary, expository, and technical writings to inform, explain, analyze, or entertain.</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>The student will credit the sources of both quoted and paraphrased ideas.</td>
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<td>9.8</td>
<td>The student will use electronic databases to access information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>The student will participate in and report small-group learning activities.</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
<td>The student will critique oral reports of small-group learning activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>The student will read and critique literary works from a variety of eras in a variety of cultures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>The student will develop a variety of writings with an emphasis on exposition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>The student will critique professional and peer writing.</td>
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<td>10.9</td>
<td>The student will use writing to interpret, analyze, and evaluate ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>The student will collect, evaluate, and organize information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>The student will write in a variety of forms with an emphasis on persuasion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>The student will analyze, evaluate, synthesize, and organize information from a variety of sources into a documented paper dealing with a question, problem, or issue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>The student will make a 5-10 minute formal oral presentation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>The student will evaluate formal presentations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>The student will write documented research papers.</td>
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Activity 1

Have the students read the article “Focus on Holocaust Education in Germany,” found in Resource 2 below. After all have read the article, conduct a class discussion, using the following questions. Ask the students to use facts to defend their points of view.

• Why is it important to teach the Holocaust in Germany today?
• Who sets the requirements for Holocaust education in Germany?
• In what classes do German students study the Holocaust? What do these students learn about the Holocaust? How does this compare with the way the Holocaust is taught in the United States?
• How does Holocaust education relate to current events in Germany?
• Who else is involved in the development of Holocaust education in Germany? Why?
• Can education help prevent prejudice?
• Do you think that the efforts of the German government to promote Holocaust education might have adverse effects? For example, could the study of National Socialism inadvertently glamorize Nazism?

Activity 2

Divide the class into three groups. Assign each group to read one of three articles representing three very different regions of Germany today (see Resource 3):

• “Passing on Knowledge of the Holocaust in the Schools of the Free State of Saxony”
• “Passing on Knowledge of the Holocaust in the Schools of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia”
• “Passing on Knowledge of the Holocaust in the Schools of the Free State of Bavaria.”

After the groups have read their assigned articles, ask each group to answer the following questions and then report to the rest of the class, using a spokesperson of their own choosing.

• On what are these guidelines based and when were they put into effect in the state that you have studied?
• What are the main topics included in Holocaust studies in the state that you have studied?
• At what grade levels and in what classes are students taught about the Holocaust in the state that you have studied?
• Where did the teachers mentioned in your article get their information about the Holocaust?

After these questions are answered, conduct a class discussion that compares and contrasts the answers from all three groups. Are there significant similarities? Are there any significant differences? If so, what may account for this?

Activity 3

Ask the students to read “Reactions to Holocaust Education” (see Resource 4) and watch the video interviews (Resource 5). After reading the article and watching the interviews, conduct a class discussion, using the following questions:
In view of the premise that history study consists basically of explaining to people who were not there something that happened, why would the Holocaust be more difficult to explain than any other historical event?

Recalling that the GDR (East Germany) came under Communist control following World War II, why would the Communist government deliberately downplay the involvement of this region in the Holocaust? (This may involve research into the methods and ideologies of the GDR government, depending on what information may already be known.)

Keeping in mind that from 1945 the Communists controlled education in eastern Germany, how would you react if something you, your parents, and even your grandparents had been taught suddenly was revealed to be untrue?

How would you feel if you found out that your parents and/or grandparents had been directly involved in promoting the Holocaust? How would you deal with these feelings?

Activity 4 (Assessment Devices)

Have the students choose either to visit the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., or to view the movie Schindler’s List and, based upon that experience, write a reaction paper describing how they feel about what they saw and learned.

Have two teams of five students each develop and conduct student surveys concerning what American students know about the Holocaust. Be sure that they design and conduct these surveys to reflect as wide a range of students as possible.

Have the students write short stories from the point of view of students in Germany attempting to deal with Holocaust education and the stories concerning the issue told them by their elders.

Have the students write essays in which they compare and contrast the different methods used to teach about the Holocaust in the three Länder studied. Have the students use peer editing for these essays.

Have the students research information on the Jungvolk and Hitler Youth movements of the Nazi era. Why were these programs aimed at the youth rather than at the parents? What similar dangers, if any, exist in American education today?

Set up two teams of three students each to debate the issue of whether a country should admit a horrific moral failure and then move on in its national life, or whether it should perpetually remember and study the event as a way of preventing similar things from ever happening again.
Lesson 2: Responsibility and Restitution

Preview of Main Points

This lesson examines how Germans today are dealing with the aftermath of the Holocaust. Attention is given to programs designed to help people accept responsibility for the actions of the Nazis. Attention is also given to the on-going question of restitution to surviving victims of the Holocaust and their families.

Key Concepts
- Responsibility
- Restitution
- Human rights
- Change
- Tradition

Objectives

In this lesson, students will
- define and use basic vocabulary and concepts (see Resource 1)
- analyze programs in Germany designed to promote an awareness of German responsibility for the Holocaust today
- evaluate the on-going question of restitution to survivors
- research and analyze the questions of the United States government’s responsibility for
  - past actions of slavery
  - treatment of Native Americans
  - internment of Japanese-Americans during WWII.

Focus Questions

1. How responsible are we for the actions of our ancestors?
2. Can money buy forgiveness? Why or why not?
3. Does one country have the right to judge another for its violation of human rights? Why or why not?
Teaching Suggestions

This lesson will allow students to do some investigative research on their own into the importance of the idea of accepting responsibility for past actions. In keeping with the constant effort to encourage students to keep up with current events through the media and the Internet, in this lesson they should be challenged to follow the continuing search for “Nazi gold.” The various activities provide numerous choices for teachers and students.

Beginning the Lesson

Continue to review and discuss the vocabulary in Resource 1 with the students.

Discuss why taking responsibility for an event that took place more than 50 years ago may be difficult for many people today. Why do the events of the Holocaust especially merit overcoming this difficulty?

Encourage students to look for articles in a variety of sources on current events that relate to the Holocaust.

Have the students engage in an extended role-play. Divide the class into various groups that, after World War II, could remake the laws of Germany. Basic categories should include formerly disenfranchised groups such as Jews, an international contingent such as the Allied countries, a dominant ethnic population group, and a group representing other religious faiths. Have these groups establish ten mutually acceptable rules that will safeguard against another Holocaust and promote Germany's economic and cultural recovery from the devastation of war.

Developing the Lesson

Discuss the lesson's focus questions with the class. Then have the students read “German Restitution for National Socialist Crimes” (Resource 6) and answer the questions in Activity 1.

Have the students read “German-Israeli Relations” (Resource 7) and answer the questions in Activity 2. Encourage students to explore the Internet and other media sources in search of materials relating to the search for Nazis today and the search for “Nazi gold.”

Have the students read the articles (Resource 8) on the Vienna monument, the controversy concerning the proposed Berlin memorial to victims of the Holocaust, and the memorials at concentration camps such as Sachsenhausen. Have the students watch the video interview with the director of Wannsee House (Resource 9). Then ask each student...
to participate in or complete one or more of the tasks outlined in Activity 3.

Have the students read the quotes relating to responsibility and restitution (Resource 10). Then have each of them complete one or more of the tasks outlined in Activity 4 below.

Ask the students to research magazines, TV, and Internet sources to find information on current events relating to the search for Nazi gold, reparations (e.g., the PBS program Frontline and its continuing coverage of the role of Swiss banks in “laundering” Nazi gold), and the continuing hunt for Nazi war criminals (Resource 11). Ask the students to complete Activity 5.

Have the students research magazines, books, and Internet sources to find information dealing with the U.S. government and

• proposed apologies/offers of restitution for slavery
• court cases involving claims for restitution by Native Americans
• action involving compensation/restitution to families of Japanese-Americans interned during WWII.

Have them use this information to develop reaction papers, debates, or class discussions (see Activity 6).

Concluding the Lesson

Use the three focus questions as guidelines for a discussion on responsibility and forgiveness.

Activity 1

Ask the students to read the article “German Restitution for National Socialist Crimes” (Resource 6) and write answers to the following questions in preparation for discussion:

• When did the German government first assume responsibility for making reparations to victims of the National Socialists? How was this done?
• What was the specific relationship between Germany and Israel following World War II?
• How did German reunification in 1990 affect the payment of reparations?
• How much money has been involved in these reparations? What countries received the most in reparations?
• What can a country hope to achieve by paying monetary restitution?
• What are some types of restitution other than money?
• Do you think that restitution of any sort is good? What facts support your opinion?

Activity 2

Ask the students to read the article “German-Israeli Relations” (Resource 7) and write answers to the following questions in preparation for discussion:

• What is the basis for the specific relationship between Germany and Israel?
• What is being done by both countries to foster better relations?

Have the students research the same topic from another perspective, for example,
the Israelis' view of their country's relationship with Germany. Have the students research a similar relationship between Germany and another country directly involved in the horrors of the Holocaust, for example, Poland. Have the students present their findings to the class.

Activity 3

Have the students read the article “Vienna Builds Monument to Jewish Victims” and the two articles concerning a National Holocaust Memorial (Resource 8). Have them watch the video interview that accompanies this Unit (Resource 9).

Conduct a class discussion based on the following questions:
• Although Vienna is not a German city, the Austrians also accept some responsibility for the events of the Holocaust. What role did Austria play in the Holocaust?
• Many Austrians, including top government leaders such as Kurt Waldheim (President 1986–1992), have kept their involvement with the Nazis in World War II a secret. Why would they do this? How does this make accepting responsibility even more difficult?

Have each student write down one political and one personal reason that they can think of for such a deception.

Have the students conduct further research on plans and controversies concerning the National Holocaust Museum in Germany. Have several students hold a round table discussion on the various issues involved in creating this museum, using the following questions:
• What different groups are involved in the controversy and what “agenda” might each of these groups (or individuals) have?
• What psychological roles — good and bad — may be served by building a monument to a tragedy?

Have the students design a German museum to the Holocaust that includes five rooms, each with a different theme. For each room, have them select pictures, newspaper articles, statements of survivors, letters, art, music, news broadcasts, and other artifacts that describe the theme. Be sure that they justify their selections. Have them include basic written or graphic plans for the structural design for the museum.

Have the class design and create a memorial to a person, group of people, or a cause or idea that is important to them. Conduct a class discussion which takes it cues from the following questions:
• What is a memorial?
• Why do people create them?

Using the Internet, have the students research how the memorial at the House of the Wannsee Conference portrays the progression of social changes that made persecution possible. In particular, have them pay attention to how opposition was eliminated as an initial step, how bureaucracies functioned to eliminate personal responsibility in government, and how a seemingly objective science such as genetic research was used for racist purposes. Have them write essays discussing the things people can learn from this memorial site about how a “holocaust” can occur (see Resource 9).

Ask the class to debate these questions:
• Should horrific sites such as concentration camps be preserved?
• What should a memorial accomplish?
• What criteria should guide the design of a memorial?
• Should memorials be more concerned with the approval of survivors, critical experts, or the general public?

Activity 4
Ask the students to read the quotes in Resource 10. Conduct a class discussion using the questions:
• What is the main theme of each of these quotes?
• What are the authors trying to say to the people of today’s world?
• How are we held responsible for the events of the past?
• How can we safeguard the future?

Then have the students imagine that a German says to them, “I’m tired of our guilt.” Choose four students to participate in a role-playing exercise in which they discuss their responses to this statement. The roles might include a U.S. citizen, an Israeli citizen, a West German, and an East German.

According to a poll taken by Der Spiegel news magazine in the summer of 1994, only 52 percent of the young people in the whole of Germany are proud to be German. Fifty-seven percent said they felt no emotion whatsoever when, for example, they were in a foreign country and saw the black-red-gold German national flag. Until recently, the playing of the German national anthem at public events was not popular. Have the students research and analyze the words of the German national anthem, and ask them to evaluate it as a symbolic representation of the German people. Ask the students to write an essay explaining why nationalism/patriotism is a difficult concept for Germans of today to handle.

Organize a Socratic discussion of the meaning of the quote by Niemöller (Resource 10, No. 3). Conclude with a discussion of whether this advice is still relevant today, and if so, how?

Activity 5 (Assessment Device)
Have the students develop unique ways of presenting their findings to the class about the search for Nazi gold, reparations, and the hunt for war criminals. Alternatively, allow them to choose one of the following methods:
• publishing a newspaper with recent information about reparations
• holding a debate of the issue of whether it is appropriate to continue the search for Nazi war criminals
• making a chart organized by countries showing the amounts of money being paid to Holocaust survivors
• writing an editorial which takes a stand on the issue of restitution and penance

Activity 6 (Assessment Devices)
In an essay, have the students take and defend positions on the role Americans must take today in facing the actions of their own past. How much responsibility should we
take? What steps have been taken to avoid similar actions in the future? What steps should be taken to avoid such actions?

or

Have the students write editorials in which they argue for where the limits of restitution should lie after horrific occurrences such as the Holocaust or slavery.

Have the students compare and contrast the American efforts to address the aftermath of slavery with the German efforts to address the aftermath of the Holocaust.

Have the students research information on the issues of slavery, violations of civil rights, treatment of Native Americans, or the internment of Japanese Americans in the United States. Have them write reaction papers defending or refuting these actions, and then have them present their arguments orally.

Have the students research the history of land ownership in Virginia, perhaps in their own or nearby counties. What are the ways in which land has been lost by owners? To what extent, if any, has race or religion played a role in this? What efforts have been made to make restitution?

Have the students analyze what Germany has learned in the past fifty years that could be of help in protecting cultural diversity in the European Union.

Have the students read Ursula Hegi’s Tearing the Silence: On Being German in America. Have them analyze the book by assessing Hegi’s experience in school and then critique how she dealt with the problems caused by her sense of her German heritage.

After viewing the movie Schindler’s List and reading the book Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, have the students research the legal, cultural, and financial status of Jews in Germany and Native Americans in the United States. Have them write research papers in which they present this information and develop a comparative analysis about the treatments of these two groups during the 1990s.

What did Germany learned from the collapse of the Weimar Constitution that helps to safeguard against a similar collapse in this decade? Have the students research the Weimar Constitution and the current constitution, the Basic Law, to support their discussion. In their conclusions, they may wish to identify areas where the United States faces its most crucial threat to democracy.
Lesson 3: Never Again — The Protection of Human Dignity

Preview of main points

This lesson addresses the methods by which the German government guarantees and protects the rights of its citizens in order to prevent anything similar to the Holocaust from ever happening again. Current issues involve negative attitudes towards “foreigners,” a small but vocal right-wing element in the government, and racist influences from outside Germany that enter the country via electronic media.

Key Concepts

• Prejudice
• Constitutionalism
• Human rights
• Reform
• Law

Related Concepts

• Immigration
• Xenophobia

Objectives

During this lesson, students will
• identify the basis for individual rights as stated in the German Basic Law
• identify the events related to right-wing violence and hate crimes in Germany today
• recognize that prejudice, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism exist in today’s world
• recognize that these attitudes are not limited to any one country or region.

Focus Questions

1. Why is prejudice towards people who are “different” still an issue in today’s world?
2. Why are many people and nations unwilling to confront or even admit issues of prejudice?
Teaching Suggestions
This lesson provides opportunities to develop student abilities to compare and contrast documents such as the German Basic Law, the U.S. Constitution, and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is important for students to realize that human rights violations continue to occur, not only in Germany, but all over the world. Therefore, the lesson encourages students to compare and contrast contemporary issues and events in Germany with those in the United States and elsewhere. The lesson provides opportunities for independent or group research.

Beginning the Lesson
Review and discuss the vocabulary with the students (see Resource 1).

Have the students read the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Resource 12) as a basis for learning what are universally acknowledged human rights.

Ask the students to read from Germany's Basic Law the Articles dealing with basic rights (Resource 13). Have the students compare these Articles to similar portions of the U.S. Constitution and the U.N. Universal Declaration. Have the students compare the human rights sections of the U.N. Universal Declaration, the U.S. Constitution, and the German Basic Law. Ask the students to complete one or more of the tasks in Activity 1 below.

Point out that the German Basic Law was written following World War II and has been amended several times since then, most notably by the Reunification Treaty of 1990. Point out that the readings in this lesson deal with only a part of the Basic Law.

Developing the Lesson
Have the students read “Combating Right-Wing Violence and Hate Crimes in Germany” (Resource 14) which discusses how these crimes were dealt with. Have each student carry out one or more of the tasks described in Activity 2. In small groups, ask the students to research other events involving violations of basic human rights. Examples may include the “killing fields” of Pol Pot in Cambodia and the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia or the Middle East. Ask each group to make a creative presentation to the class based on their research. See Activity 3 for greater detail.

Ask the students to read “Foreigners in Germany” by Steffen Beitz (Resource 15) and “German Citizenship and Naturalization” (Resource 17). Then ask each student to
participate in or complete one of the tasks in Activity 4.

Ask the students to develop a set of interview questions for use with recent immigrants to the United States. After approving the questions, have the students conduct the interviews of actual immigrants and report their findings to the class. See Activity 5 for other details.

Concluding the Lesson

Have the students read Terrible Things: An Allegory of the Holocaust by Eva Bunting (Jewish Publications, 1996). In this allegory, animals of the forest are carried away, one type after another, by the Terrible Things, not realizing that if they would stick together and not look away, such tragedies might not happen. Help the students analyze Terrible Things as an example of allegory. Have the students write essays describing the success of the novel in achieving the apparent purposes of the author.

Have the students watch the video The Wave (available in the library or video stores: Embassy FLM 252V-web; $79; 46 minutes; color). This is a thought provoking dramatization of an actual classroom experiment on individualism vs. conformity in which a high school teacher formed his own “Reich” called “the Wave” to show why the German people embraced Nazism.

Lead a discussion of the steps used by the teacher in the video to guide his students into a particular way of thinking. Discuss how this could or could not actually happen in an American classroom today. Emphasize that this video is regularly shown in German high schools today.

Activity 1

Read the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Resource 12) and Germany’s Basic Law, Articles 1–19 (Resource 13). Ask the students to complete one or more of the following tasks:

• Summarize each article, noting the relationship, if any, between the article and events that took place during the Holocaust. Discuss your summary with other students to see if you agree on the main point of each article.

• Compare these articles to the U.S. Constitution. Locate a comparable section in the Constitution. Write a short summary explaining which is more specific and why, taking into account when each was written.

• Using the Internet, look up articles concerning freedom of speech and recent legal controversies in Germany. Using the “Auschwitz-Lüge” controversy or another more recent example, write an essay in which you take a position, pro or con, on whether there should be limits to freedom of speech.

• Refer to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Resource 12) for specific statements on human rights while researching examples of crimes against humanity. Compare these statements to those sections in the U.S. Constitution and German Basic Law (Resource 13). Which is more specific? Why?
Activity 2

Ask the students to read “Right Wing Violence and Hate Crimes in Germany” (Resource 14). Have them list incidents of right wing violence and hate crimes in Germany since 1990. Conduct a class discussion, using the following questions:

- What has been the reaction of the German people to these incidents?
- What are some possible reasons for the fluctuation in the number of offenses from 1990 to 1995?
- Who are the “resident foreigners” and why have there been such negative attitudes towards them in Germany, especially since 1990?
- What is the role of economics in developing such attitudes?
- Would the actions taken by the German government (see “Government Countermeasures” in Resource 14) be constitutional in the United States? Explain, using specific references.

Ask the students to do research in one of the following areas:

- Examples of Americans playing a role in these events in Germany, for example as sources of “hate speech” over the Internet. List dates, who was involved, and what actions were taken, if any. Does or should the U.S. government have any role in preventing this type of speech from going out over the Internet? Defend your position on this.
- Instances of hate crimes in the United States in recent years. Use the Internet and media sources to conduct research. Compare these crimes to those in Germany, and identify any correlation.
- Examples of immigration threatening the resident culture. What are the requirements for obtaining a green card to work and reside permanently in the United States? What are the American naturalization requirements? Compare these to the German requirements. Explain how these requirements add to or diminish the “threat” of immigration (see Resource 17).
- Examples of the changes in musical tastes in Germany in the past fifty years. American music may have had its influence, but are there distinctively German elements? Was there political protest music during the 1960s and 1980s? Is there any particular music associated with the Skinhead or Neo-Nazi groups of Germany today? You may wish to view the commercial film/video Swing Kids as a resource for analyzing the power of music to influence politics.

After researching these topics, have the students report to the class on their findings. Hold a classroom discussion on the more interesting points raised.

Activity 3

Have the students research, using the Internet or other media resources, events involving “crimes against humanity” that have taken place in other parts of the world, such as ethnic cleansing in Bosnia; ethnic cleansing in Iraq (Kurds); ethnic cleansing in Algeria, Rwanda, or the Congo; refugees in Kosovo.

Group the students, and assign each group to research one of these events and prepare an oral presentation to the class. Encourage the groups to design creative presentations that include a variety of modes of expression — e.g., musical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, linguistic. Presentations might include news broadcasts, original songs, role-playing, storytelling etc. The following questions might be used by the groups to gather infor-
UNIT II: LESSONS

What are the basic facts concerning the event?
• What was the impetus behind this event? Who instigated these crimes and why?
• When were these crimes discovered — as they were taking place or later?
• What was the reaction of people within the country involved?
• Why did these people react in this manner?
• What was the reaction of the international community?
• Why did the international community react in the way it did?
• What, if anything, has been done to make amends?
• Why do hate crimes continue to happen in spite of continuing education about the protection of human rights? Cite evidence to back up your opinion.

Activity 4
Have the students read the article “Foreigners in Germany” by Steffen Beitz (Resource 15) and “Citizenship and Naturalization” (Resource 17). Ask the students to participate in or complete one or more of the following tasks:
• Write an essay which analyzes changes brought about by the 1993 modification of the right to political asylum under the Basic Law of 1949. Consider particularly how Germany has attempted to balance its commitment to cultural diversity with its need for economic survival. In your conclusion, discuss what, if anything, you would change in the current guidelines.
• Take part in a role-play, becoming a member of either a group of present-day German citizens or a group of foreigners seeking to immigrate to Germany. As a part of your group, discuss your point of view on immigration in a two-minute defensive argument. Develop your line of argument as a group, and then select an individual from the group to role play the group’s view. The goal of the role-play would be to air the differences between the two groups’ points of view and to come to some consensus about how to resolve them.

Activity 5
Have the students develop a set of interview questions to ask immigrants in the United States about their experiences. Make sure that they include the important question about whether or not the immigrants have experienced resistance from American residents. Because this may be a sensitive issue, the students should
• design a set of questions that can be given to the interviewee prior to the interview
• peer edit to check for language or ideas that may be offensive to the interviewee
• secure approval of the questions by the teacher
• practice role-playing awkward situations which might arise from these questions.

Have the students interview actual immigrants from various countries. (Determine if the students’ peer group at the school includes immigrants.) Have the students report their findings to the class and compare them with their findings about immigrants to Germany, analyzing similarities and differences.
RESOURCE 1
Glossary of Terms

Abitur. German term for an exam which determines promotion given at the end of the term in Gymnasium.

Anschluss. German word for the annexation of Austria by Germany on March 13, 1938.

anti-Semitism. Hostility toward or discrimination against Jews.

Basic Law. The constitution of Germany, written after World War II.

ethics. Motivation based on the ideas of right or wrong.

extremism. Actions based on fanaticism or intolerance of other views.

FRG. Federal Republic of Germany and signifying a system of government in which states make their own laws and policies under the supervision of a national government.

GDR. German Democratic Republic, the former East Germany, which included Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia.

genocide. The deliberate and systematic destruction of a religious, racial, national or cultural group.

guest workers. Term referring to immigrants living and working in Germany.

Gymnasium. German word for an academic high school (not vocational school).

Holocaust. The destruction of some 6 million Jews in Europe between 1933 and 1945. Today the Biblical term Shoah, meaning widespread disaster, is often used instead.

innere Führung. German words for inner leadership.

Kristallnacht. German word for night of broken glass, the first major country-wide action against the Jews by the Nazis.

Land; Länder. German words for state; states.

Mittelschule. German word for middle school (grades 5–9).

National Socialists. Official name for the German Nazi party.

ohne mich. German words for without me, a slogan signifying an anti-military position in reaction to the activities of the Nazis.

peace museum. A museum dedicated to the peace movement and anti-war causes, established in various German cities.

prejudice. Feelings of hatred towards another person or group based on religious, cultural, or ethnic reasons.

protection of human dignity. Attempt to insure that people are treated with respect.

responsibility. The action of accepting obligation or answering for one's conduct.

restitution. A sum of money paid in compensation for a wrong.

Reunification (Unification). The 1990 treaty that brought the former GDR states into the Federal Republic of Germany.

righteous among the nations. An expression applied to non-Jews who, at the risk of their own lives, saved Jews from their Nazi persecutors.

totalitarian government. A government which exerts total power over its people.

Vaterland. Nationalistic German word for the fatherland.

Wannsee Conference. A meeting of many high ranking Nazis at a site near Berlin where
plans were made on January 20, 1942, to coordinate the “Final Solution” — i.e., the complete extermination of the Jewish population.

**Weimar Republic.** Government in Germany between World War I and World War II.

**xenophobia.** Fear/hatred of foreigners or strangers.

**Zionism.** Policy for the establishment of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine.

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**RESOURCE 2**

**Focus on Holocaust Education in Germany**

Source: German Information Center
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**Holocaust Education in Germany**

“Those who run away from their past will be caught up by it. We Germans face up to the past for the sake of the future.” Federal President Roman Herzog voiced this conviction, shared by all democrats in the Federal Republic of Germany, during the visit of President Ezar Weizman of Israel to Bonn in early 1996. Herzog’s decision a few weeks earlier to proclaim January 27 — the anniversary of the Allied liberation of Auschwitz — a national day of remembrance for the victims of Nazism similarly reflects Germany’s commitment to keeping alive the memory of the crimes of the Holocaust and to assume responsibility for its past.

Outbreaks of xenophobic violence in Germany, arson attacks on Holocaust memorials, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, and above all the sight of young “skinheads” bedecked with right-wing insignia in the wake of unification prompted some observers to question whether Germany had in fact come to terms with its history. On the other hand, the many candlelight vigils and demonstrations against neo-Nazism in December 1992 and January 1993, many of them attended by hundreds of thousands of German citizens, show that the German people, and not just their political leaders, are aware of the past. It is estimated that a total of more than three million people took to the streets in protests against xenophobia and neo-Nazism.

World War II and Hitler’s dictatorship have in fact figured prominently in the curriculum of (West) German schools since the early 1950s. From the 1960s onwards, special emphasis has been placed upon conveying the horrors of the Holocaust. Outside the school curriculum, World War II, the Holocaust, and Jewish issues are often featured in the print media, on television, and in the world of arts.

This Focus looks at how the Holocaust is taught in schools in Germany. What follows
is a presentation of the basic principles of Holocaust teaching in West Germany. They were also introduced in eastern Germany following unification in 1990.

**The German Education System**

Education in Germany is the responsibility of the Länder (federal states). Education policy is coordinated on a national level by a standing conference of Land (state) ministers of education and cultural affairs. It is this body that has issued specific guidelines for teaching about the Holocaust which have been in force in the western German states since 1960.

What is taught in classrooms in Germany is determined by 1) state government syllabus directives issued in accordance with the national guidelines mentioned above and 2) state government-approved textbooks produced by independent textbook publishers. The syllabus directives do not establish lesson plans. Instead, they determine the topics to be covered for every given grade and subject and the teaching objectives to be achieved.

**The Continuing Relevance of the Holocaust**

For Germans, the Holocaust is not an event that happened in a faraway place in some distant past, but is part and parcel of their recent history. The memory of the Nazi dictatorship, of which the Holocaust is an integral part, and its traumatic legacies have been shaping German politics since the end of World War II. The rebuilding of political institutions in western Germany and postwar political education were largely determined by a serious effort to try to understand the horrors of the Nazi dictatorship and by searching for safeguards in order to prevent history from repeating itself. Consequently, teaching about the Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust at schools is not limited to a niche in the history syllabus like the “French and Indian Wars.” Instead, it is discussed again and again in different ways, in a number of subjects, and at different points in time.

The treatment of the Nazi period in all its aspects — Hitler’s rise to power, his establishment of a dictatorship in Germany, the abolition of the rule of law, the persecution of all kinds of political opponents, the racially motivated persecution of the Jews culminating in the Holocaust, the reticence and opposition of German citizens, and Germany’s instigation of world War II — is compulsory teaching matter at all types of schools in Germany and at all levels of education. In addition, primary and secondary school teachers have the opportunity to take continuing education courses on the most effective means of addressing the Holocaust in the classroom. The Holocaust and the Nazis’ war of aggression are treated as the most important aspects of the period of Nazi rule.

**The Principles of Holocaust Teaching**

The Holocaust is treated in various school subjects in different ways. In history classes, the Nazi period is dealt with in the context of 20th century German history or world history. Students who pass the Abitur exam — the prerequisite for university study — at the age of 18 or 19 receive a formal historical presentation of German history in the 20th century twice: during their final two years before graduation, and at 9th or 10th grade level.
In civic studies and current affairs classes, the lessons from the Holocaust are related to the teaching about Germany's political institutions and about the values that govern political life in a democratic society. When current affairs — e.g., anti-Semitic incidents and right-wing extremism in Germany and elsewhere, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the Middle East conflict, etc. — are discussed, teachers will emphasize the importance of tolerance and the rule of law as lessons to be learned from the Holocaust.

In religion or ethics classes, the Holocaust is discussed with reference to the guilt and responsibility of those Germans who did not risk their lives to fight National Socialism or to protect Jews. Because the notion of inter-religious tolerance and the knowledge of other world religions are subjects of religious studies courses at German public schools, the teacher will often arrange a meeting with members of the organized Jewish community, a visit to the local synagogue, or a visit to a Holocaust memorial or museum.

Postwar German literature, above all in the 1950s and 1960s, is preoccupied with coming to terms with the Nazi era and the Holocaust. The fate of Holocaust victims and what Germans did or did not do during the Third Reich often become subjects of German literature classes, when the works — novels, short stories, plays — of authors like Alfred Andersch, Ilse Aichinger, Heinrich Böll, Gunter Grass, Rolf Hochhut, Marie-Luise Kaschnitz, Siegfried Lenz, and others are discussed in the context of teaching about contemporary German literature.

A visit to a Holocaust memorial or a Holocaust museum at the site of a former concentration camp is a standard feature of school excursions. In fact, the largest category of visitors at former concentration camps is often German high-school students led by their teachers.

The objective of teaching about the Holocaust is not limited to educating students about historical facts. Instead, the primary political and educational objective for confronting young Germans with their country’s darkest past and their ancestors’ guilt is, above all, to make them understand the consequences of Hitler’s dictatorship and the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and to make them appreciate the values and institutions that protect freedom and democracy.

The following quotations from government education documents serve as illustrations of the philosophy of Holocaust education in Germany today. The syllabus directive issued by the education ministry of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia for the treatment of the Holocaust in 9th grade Realschule history classes emphasizes the importance of democratic institutions and ideas. The directive entitled “From Anti-Human Ideas to the Extermination of Human Lives” reads in part as follows:

Students should learn to recognize that the destruction of a democratic government based upon the rule of law, the enforcement of the Führer (leader)-principle, the total regimentation of the population through propaganda, discrimination and terror, and the anti-human ideas of the prerogative of an Aryan race form the basis from which Hitler could unleash a world war and embark upon the systematic destruction of human lives.

According to a document prepared by the North Rhine-Westphalia ministry of education, directives for Holocaust teaching in Hauptschulen stipulate among other things that:

Teaching must seek to counter obliviousness to the past and critically examine tendencies toward a “normalization” of German historical awareness. The examination
of the causes of the success of National Socialism in Germany must therefore be a focal point in teaching.

Teaching is to be devised in such a way that students realize the present and future significance of remembering National Socialism. Therefore, teaching of these topics has to address the questions associated with the responsibility of later generations, and the present manifestations of neo-Fascism and neo-anti-Semitism.

Teaching must in particular convey the perspective of the victims and give students the opportunity to learn about everyday life under National Socialism in a vivid and tangible way.

Evaluating Holocaust Education

The German government has in the past established bilateral textbook commissions in cooperation with education specialists from a number of foreign countries (including the U.S. and Israel). These joint commissions examine the school textbooks of both countries with reference to the treatment of the other country, and issue recommendations. The German-Israeli textbook commission, whose findings were published in 1985, has had considerable influence on the treatment of Jewish life and Jewish history, including the Holocaust, in school textbooks in Germany. Recently, the Israeli education expert Chaim Schatzker, who has examined German textbooks since the early 1960s, stated that although he was not entirely satisfied with everything he had read, the treatment of anti-Semitism as part of German history was adequate in general and exemplary in some textbooks. He also noted that the Holocaust is treated extensively and in an uncompromising way in all textbooks. He added that the large majority of textbooks addressed the issue of responsibility and co-responsibility of German citizens during the Third Reich seriously and in detail.

Teaching social values and imparting the knowledge of the achievements and crimes that human beings are capable of are essential for nourishing a commitment to tolerance and democracy in young people. However, Holocaust education alone, like any ethics teaching, is not enough to eliminate the crime and intolerance that are bred by social dislocation. If the teaching of ethics were a panacea, there would be no thefts, no homicides, and no bias-related crimes, because all perpetrators were once taught not to steal, not to kill, and not to hate a fellow citizen of a different color or creed.

Researched and written by Günter Wehrmann
RESOURCE 3

Passing on Knowledge of the Holocaust

Passing on Knowledge of the Holocaust in the Schools of the Free State of Saxony

General Objectives

In processing the “broken antifascism” and the “unholy alliance between Stalinism and real socialist anti-Semitism” (Konrad Weiss) of the past in the GDR, as well as the revived trend towards racism amongst young people with extremist views, the State Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs in the Free State of Saxony regards it as its duty to provide a diverse range of opportunities for dealing with the past and bringing history alive in schools.

Article 101 of the constitution of the Free State of Saxony, for example, states the following:

Young people shall be brought up to have respect for everything living, to love their neighbor, to work for peace and conserve the environment, to love their native country, to be aware of ethical and political responsibility, to strive for justice and to respect the convictions of others, to act socially, and to adhere to the principles of freedom and democracy.

It is on this article of the constitution that the current version of the Law on School Education of July 3, 1991, bases its definition of the role of education and socialization:

School education shall contribute to the development of the personality of the pupil in the community. The school shall fulfil this task by teaching the knowledge, skills and values required to achieve educational goals and to awaken a pleasure in learning.

As far as dealing with the history of the Jewish people and the Jews’ religious and ethnic traditions and cultural achievements is concerned, sound methods are being sought for increasing awareness of historical processes and the role of Jews in art and science, both in the context of classroom teaching and in informal educational activities. The teaching provided at the Mittelschule and the Gymnasium, with its accent on the lives and suffering of the Jewish people in Germany and Europe, emphasizes the centuries-old process of mutual enrichment between diverse cultures as well as the grave interference in this process provided by anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews.

It is particularly important that, after the collapse of two totalitarian regimes, young people in Saxony gain an insight into the value of a liberal and democratic basic order. By dealing with the Holocaust, it can be illustrated what unimaginable crimes humankind is capable of both committing and tolerating whenever the principles of the basic order and the respect of human dignity — the most important principle — are abused by the state.
UNIT II: RESOURCES

The Treatment of the Holocaust in History Courses

At Mittelschule and Gymnasium, the subject of History tackles significant stages and events from the history of the Jewish people:

- the people and the state of Israel (migrations of Israelite tribes, rise and fall of an empire, Jewish ways of life in past and present)
- Jews in the medieval town
- enlightenment, emancipation
- modern anti-Semitism, racism
- persecution and extermination of political opponents, Jewish citizens, and other minorities during the National Socialist period.

Consideration of these themes should teach pupils how cross-fertilization to the benefit of different cultures can occur. At the same time, it should highlight the brutality and inhumanity with which anti-Semitism brought an end to these opportunities and the danger still posed by anti-Semitism.

The Treatment of the Holocaust in Civics and Law Courses

In formulating the subject’s general tasks and aims, the syllabus for Mittelschule and Gymnasium emphasizes that:

- The tensions between the majority and a minority, and between freedom and equality, are to be illustrated with the case of basic rights. Through activity-oriented tuition, the pupil shall be empowered to enter the democratic process as a responsible and informed citizen. Moreover, he or she shall come to understand that tolerance and fairness are important prerequisites for this process.

With regard to dealing with models of liberal democracy, the formulation of the learning objectives includes the following statement:

- Using the example of the Federal Republic of Germany, the pupils should examine the realization of human rights in the form of a social state based on the rule of law, comparing this with the structure of other state forms that have existed in Germany. The pupil should recognize that every political system has to be judged by the way it works in reality and that it is not sufficient merely to examine its basic principles.

The general tasks and goals of the subject Civics and Law are made more specific in the syllabuses. Examples of this include:

- fundamental values and basic rights as constitutional principles
- the rule of law and guarantee of basic rights
- the values adopted by the National Socialists and their view of humankind and the impact of these on the process of creating political will.

The Treatment of the Holocaust in Ethics Courses

For the subject of Ethics at Mittelschule and Gymnasium, the general educational mission is defined as follows:

- The aim of Ethics tuition is to make pupils capable of finding their way in the modern world and giving meaning to their own lives, ensuring that they do this with an awareness of others and a sense of responsibility for them.
In the context of the plurality of faiths and world views, the essential foundation for achieving this aim is respect for human dignity as embodied in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Constitution of the Free State of Saxony. The main cornerstones are

- respect for the personal integrity and the dignity of human beings
- respect for the work and achievements of fellow citizens
- respect for ethical forms of conduct shown in history and in the present
- tolerance towards other world views and ethical attitudes on the basis of respect for human dignity
- responsibility for oneself
- responsibility for our immediate and distant fellow human beings
- responsibility for nature and the environment.

The above aims present this subject with the special task of making a contribution to combating the emergence of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and extremism. Reference is explicitly made to this in the learning objectives and contents of all learning areas for all grades at every type of school. At grade 9 of the Mittelschule and Gymnasium, the learning content for the area of “Conscience and Responsibility” states that responsibility be understood as a check against the abuse of conscience and can be exemplified in terms of “Germans and Jews — then and now.” As part of the treatment of religions/world views, there is detailed age-group-targeted discussion of Jewish ways of life and of ethical questions and responses from a Jewish perspective.

The Treatment of the Holocaust in German Courses

The syllabus for Mittelschule and Gymnasium is designed to meet the following requirement:

German tuition provides pupils with a broad and solid literary education. It familiarizes them with important literary works of national and universal culture and thereby helps them develop an open-minded attitude to the world combining love for their national culture and respect for foreign cultures.

To this end, the syllabus recommendations on the selection of literary texts available to pupils offer a wide variety of options from past and present authors for every level and type of school. Thanks to the authors selected and the nature of the works themselves, pupils learn about Jewish life and the persecution to which Jews were subjected. This is seen most clearly in the case of The Diary of Anne Frank.

The Treatment of the Holocaust in Social Studies Courses

This subject offered at vocational schools is also aimed at consolidating a basic democratic attitude. The following subject areas play a major role here:

- the basic rights of mankind, their significance for the individual, and their specification in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany
- the need for a rational approach to society's marginal groups and the importance of their integration in society; the removal of prejudices towards marginal groups
- the resistance shown by individual personalities and groups as an expression of political and moral responsibility and as an ethical foundation for the reconstruction of Germany.
In-service Teacher Training

In-service training programs for teachers are of central importance in developing the methodologies and teaching techniques needed for presenting the Holocaust. The benefits of special courses on the topics of Jews and the State of Israel are further enhanced by others offering an introduction to the world of the Bible from a literary or ethical-religious perspective. The Holocaust is a central point of reference in courses on subjects such as xenophobia, extremism, flight, expulsion, and emigration.

Treatment of the Holocaust is a special focus in both the program of the Land’s in-service training academy, the Sächsische Akademie für Lehrerfortbildung, and the regionally-based further training courses for teachers. In planning and implementing its one-day or several-day courses, the academy has, since its foundation, been working closely with the Israeli Consulate General and the Hatikva Center in Dresden.

The only way to secure the future of a democratic society is to deal in an intensive manner in the classroom with National Socialism, the conditions that permitted its emergence, and its consequences. In order to teach tolerance, liberal-mindedness, peaceableness, and solidarity, teachers must maintain a sensitivity and vigilance towards any threat being posed to democracy.

These are the objectives of a number of further training seminars, which can be grouped together in the following clusters:

• A first cluster centers around further training needs for specific subjects. For instance, the topic of “The Third Reich in History Teaching at Mittelschule and Gymnasium” deals directly with National Socialism and the annihilation of the Jews.

• A second cluster consciously deals with aspects of regional history and current politics such as, for example, “The History of the Jews in Saxony: Anti-Semitism Today” or “Jews in Leipzig.”

• “Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, and Right-Wing Extremism — Foreigners Amongst Us.” By analyzing these subjects, grouped together in a third cluster, questions relating to the opportunities and difficulties involved in social interaction are examined, and psychological and social causes of new forms of xenophobia are investigated. The above three complexes are primarily offered to teachers of history, religious education, and ethics.

Courses on the subject “Judaism and the State of Israel,” which help to give an insight into Jewish self-perception, to increase understanding of the nature and principal features of Zionism against the background of Jewish history, and to place specific geographic facts and political events in their overall context, are offered on a multi-disciplinary basis to teachers from all types of schools and from all levels of education.

Courses for teachers of German on the theme of “Jewry: An Intellectual-Literary Encounter” are specifically designed to allow them to get to know and appreciate Jewish art and culture. Central to this is a discussion of works by Lasker-Schüler, Celan, Singer, Roth, and Kafka.

An especially intensive form of further education is a teacher’s study visit to Israel. An agreement to this effect has been concluded between the Israeli Education Ministry and the State Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs of Saxony and forms the basis for project continuity. In addition, two Israeli educators are currently working in Saxony, initially for a period of one school year.
Extracurricular Activities and Activities Outside the Classroom

Important impetus for children and teenagers to tackle the Holocaust and deal with the lives of Jewish people also comes from activities offered in the sphere of informal and extracurricular education. Of special importance here is “learning on the spot.” On the one hand, this involves acquiring direct personal experience of contact with Jewish people. In this respect, the development of school twinning arrangements with Israeli educational institutions is given special priority. Thanks to cooperation between Saxony’s State Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs and the Israeli Ministry of Education, it was possible to establish, for example, personal contacts between children from Saxony and Israel during a school exchange program.

Following the initiative launched by Saxony’s State Institute for Education and School Development in cooperation with Saxony’s State Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs, 98 school pupils from Saxony contributed essays, pieces of artwork, and videos to an international competition entitled “Against Anti-Semitism, Racism, and Xenophobia,” staged by the Israeli Ministry of Education. The awards ceremony at Land level took place on May 5, 1995, in Saxony’s state parliament building. A total of 15 prizes were awarded during a ceremony held against the backdrop of an exhibition produced by school pupils from Eilenburg following a visit to Auschwitz. The jury, which also included one Israeli member, selected five entries to go on to the next round of the competition in Israel.

On the other hand, learning “on the spot” also means exploring regional or local evidence of the Jewish past and present. This is the purpose of the “tracing the Jewish heritage in Saxony” program which includes study of names and street names, visiting cemeteries, visiting exhibitions, and visiting a Jewish community and a Synagogue.

Moreover, books on the Jewish people that are designed for young readers and a plentiful selection of media resources help to make the topic accessible and interesting. Worth mentioning in this respect are articles by the State Center for Political Education. Entitled “Mission for the Future,” a work on Jews in Gorlitz and their synagogue, was published in 1995. The brochure “Jews in Saxony: Their Life and Suffering” also received support from subordinate bodies at Saxony’s State Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs.

Such publications can receive government funding, as in the case of a series published by the Ephraim Carlebach Foundation entitled The History of the Jews in Leipzig. This series is designed to demonstrate the special place of Jews in Leipzig’s history in the course of that city’s development into one of Germany’s major cultural and economic centers. It also draws attention to the enormous loss suffered by Leipzig as a result of Nazi tyranny and the Holocaust. Edited by scholars, the series is suitable for use both in the classroom and in extracurricular and informal education.
Passing on Knowledge of the Holocaust in the Schools of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia

General Objectives

The parties represented in the Landtag (State Assembly) of North Rhine-Westphalia and all relevant groups of society agree that schools have an irrevocable responsibility to enlighten their pupils about the nature of National Socialism, to keep the memory of the Holocaust alive, and to develop in pupils the ability and willingness to deal in a thoughtful and sensitive way with the significance of this historical experience for German society today and for their own identity.

In the July 6, 1978, decree on “The Treatment of National Socialism in Teaching” issued by the Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, which must be seen as complementing existing guidelines and syllabuses and as setting objectives for subsequent curricular developments, the Minister stated among other things that:

Even many decades after Auschwitz, recalling the causes and consequences of National Socialism is one of the most pressing tasks facing schools. Nobody has the right to forget, and no achievement of the German postwar generation, regardless of how impressive it may be, can deceive us as to our responsibility to face up to contemporary German history. Not least, the successes of radical right-wing groups among juveniles and young voters are a reason to devote particular attention to the treatment of National Socialism in the classroom. …

A constructive treatment and discussion of the recent German past should strengthen an understanding of the connection between National Socialist megalomania and its unscrupulous policy of violence, between racist discrimination and genocide, between intolerance towards minorities and “eradication.”…

It seems to me that, for us, developing sensitivity towards every form of oppression, segregation, and intolerance is a commensurate form of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past). We should set a living example of behaving towards minorities in our society in a manner differing radically from the way that the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft (community of the people) treated those whom they expelled as alien to the community.

The Holocaust is also singled out in other basic decrees on Political Education as a topic of particular historical and political-moral importance. For example, the decree on “Education for International Understanding, with Consideration of the Relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany with Eastern European States,” issued on November 15, 1977, is directed against any attempt to play down the singularity of the genocide against European Jews (e.g., by referring to wrongs perpetrated upon Germans in connection with flight, expulsion, and forcible resettlement after 1945). This decree also calls for consideration to be made of the history of the state of Israel. Among other things, it states:

In the context of contemporary history, special importance must be attached to grappling with the causes, course, and consequences of World War II. Like the history of National Socialist rule, it is essential that this topic is also treated. Judgements shall
be based on an analysis of the causes, while the different European manifestations of fascism should be included along with their consequences, some of which reach into the present. In connection with the course and consequences of World War II, the problem of expulsion, flight, and displacement, as well as that of a meaningful integration of expellees, refugees, and displaced persons, must be treated in terms of their Central European as well as their worldwide significance. This topic is indivisibly linked with the deliberate annihilation of peoples and sections of the population. In this regard, the fate of the Jewish people and its ties with the state of Israel must be singled out for exemplary treatment on its own, without passing over the suffering of other peoples and ethnic groups.

The decree on “Peace Education in the Classroom” of March 1, 1985, defines peace education as an attempt “to cover the various forms of violence and lack of peace in the international arena and within societies, analyze their causes, recognize their mutual interdependencies, and contribute towards a reduction of violence.” The decree describes the following factual historical state of affairs as a focus of historical-political peace education:

The legacy of German history, especially since 1933: the revisionist and expansionist policies pursued by the National Socialist state; the launching of World War II by the Third Reich; invasion and occupation of European countries by the Third Reich; exploitation, genocide, and Holocaust by the Third Reich as a fundamental cause of the perception of threat and security needs of west and east European countries.

Integration of National Socialism and the Holocaust in History Guidelines and Syllabuses

The genocide committed against European Jews is focused on mainly in guidelines and syllabuses for History courses. Other subjects — e.g. Politics/Social Sciences, Roman Catholic and Protestant Religious Instruction, and German — also include this material in the questions to be posed in courses. This overview, however, will be limited to the area of History teaching.

The currently valid guidelines/syllabuses for History in the different levels and types of schools do not share a common conception and structure. The intentions and subject matter set forth in these are not all equally concrete and binding. This is because the guidelines/syllabuses originated at different times between 1979 and 1994 and therefore followed different curricular conceptions. However, it can be stated generally that they all

- are oriented only to study goals and thus do not constitute subject-matter syllabuses.
- place the onus for decisions about didactics and teaching methods largely on the teacher. This also applies to decisions, within the framework of certain compelling objectives, about the choice of contents and the accentuation of themes.
- make the treatment of National Socialism compulsory in all school levels and types.

Integration in Secondary schools — lower level

Hauptschule: The History/Politics syllabus provides for treatment of National Socialism in the thematic unit entitled “Only’ Twelve Years.” An integral element of this unit is the pupil’s confrontation with the persecution of Jews and the Holocaust. The
following study goals are to be achieved as the student is

... looking into the causes of Holocaust and world war and recognizing that even societies with a great cultural tradition and the highest level of civilization can regress into the most extreme state of barbarism and inhumanity; and being prepared, even as a member of a later generation, to bear the historical responsibility and oppose neo-fascist strivings in a politically competent manner.

Realschule: The syllabus for History provides for Fascism, National Socialism, and Racism to be taught as one subject unit. By way of guidance for the investigation of history and the developing of opinions, the following topics are expressly mentioned as areas that should be dealt with:

- the extermination of the European Jews and other minority groups in society
- the death, suffering, and destruction caused by the perpetrators
- the inactivity and passivity of the onlookers
- the helplessness of the victims.

Gymnasium: According to the syllabus for the lower level of Gymnasium, the murder of European Jews must be covered in the 10th grade in conjunction with the examination of the period of National Socialist rule. The syllabus expressly points out that “recalling National Socialism, its causes, and its consequences” remains an “... indispensable element in raising the historical awareness of [young people] and in politically educating the up-and-coming generation.” Pupils are to be made aware that the National Socialist past creates a particular duty for them to take responsible, political action in the present.

Gesamtschule: Guidelines are currently being developed for the Social Studies field, which also includes the subject of History. Teaching is oriented towards the objectives of the basic decrees on Political Education and towards History syllabuses for other school types at secondary level 1. There is no doubt that National Socialism and the Holocaust are dealt with by teachers in Gesamtschule just as intensively as by those in the other types of schools.

Integration in Secondary schools — upper level

Gymnasiale Oberstufe: The guidelines state that the subject of Fascism and National Socialism is compulsory. The guideline’s concept expects teachers to develop themes and lines of questioning independently within the framework of syllabus objectives (learning goals, areas of learning). The guidelines therefore do not, in principle, identify concrete themes and teaching contents. The basic decrees on Political Education, among which is the decree on “The Treatment of National Socialism in Teaching,” also set compulsory requirements for teaching History in the gymnasiiale Oberstufe. As a rule, the work unit “genocide committed against European Jews” is part of the history program in the gymnasiiale Oberstufe.

Höhere Berufsfachschule mit gymnasialer Oberstufe: The Politics/History guidelines require treatment of the following themes in the 12th grade:

- “National Socialism — Conformism and Resistance and the Problem of Historical Responsibility.” This includes the following contents and problems in detail:
  - The National Socialist system of rule: ideology, Gleichschaltung (total regimentation), inward- and outward-directed violence, conformism, and resistance in everyday life.
UNIT II: RESOURCES

- “Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Coming to Terms with the Past) in the Federal Republic of Germany; Anti-fascism and Neo-revisionism as Orientations for Political Action.”

- “Them and Us: Racism, Anti-Semitism, and Xenophobia.” In the framework of this teaching unit, the intention is to deal with “the relationship of a minority to society as a whole, using the example of the Jews in European history.”

Kollegschule: Provisional guidelines and syllabuses exist for the subject of “Social Studies with History,” which belongs to the compulsory field of studies in all Kollegschule courses. They stipulate that “National Socialism is among the mandatory contents of teaching.” Treatment of the Holocaust is foreseen in connection with the thematic units “The Racial Theory of the National Socialists” and “The National Socialist System of Rule.”

Berufliche Schulen: At vocational schools, historical themes are treated in the framework of Politics education. The subject areas and problems contained in the syllabus include the following:

- Anti-Semitism
- Jewish Emancipation
- Zionism
- social, economic, political, racial, and religious forms of discrimination
- conflicts of identity
- segregation vs. assimilation
- history of the persecution of Jews
- annihilation of Jews in the Third Reich
- discussion of and Aufarbeitung (confrontation) of the past
- National Socialist trials
- financial gestures of compensation
- Jews as a minority after 1945
- anti-Zionism
- neo-Nazism
- the relation between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel.

Treatment of National Socialism and the Holocaust in Hauptschule History/Politics Courses

Having provided an overview of how this thematic material is anchored in guidelines and syllabuses in the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, the didactic conception of the appropriate teaching unit in the History/Politics syllabus of Hauptschule schools will be explained here in more detail.

The syllabus for History/Politics represents curricular development work carried out in North Rhine-Westphalia and makes clear the basic pedagogic and didactic decisions which are to govern teaching on National Socialism and the Holocaust. The Landesinstitut für Schule und Weiterbildung, Soest (State Institute for Schools and Further Education) has produced a manual on the History/Politics syllabus for teachers, explaining the objectives set by the syllabus and providing ideas and suggestions for teaching practice. Explanations of the thematic unit “‘Only’ Twelve Years” put the emphasis on four key approaches towards teaching this unit:

- Teaching must seek to counter obliviousness to the past and to critically examine tendencies towards a “normalization” of German historical awareness. The ex-
amination of the causes of the success of National Socialism in Germany must therefore be a focal point in teaching. In this connection, certain traditions in German society should also be considered, such as “anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, Prussianism and militarism, authoritarianism and obedience to authority, and nationalism.

• Teaching is meant to be devised so that pupils realize the present and future significance of remembering National Socialism. Teaching on these themes must therefore treat questions about the responsibility of later generations, and the present manifestations of neofascism and neo-anti-Semitism.

• Teaching must in particular convey the perspective of the victims and give pupils the chance to learn about everyday life under National Socialism in a vivid and tangible way. Thus, in the teachers’ manual projects are suggested which relate to local history (e.g. “Let’s examine where Jewish life once took place in our community, where Jews once lived and what became of them, and where synagogues stood!”). The manual proposes a visit to a memorial site or a former concentration camp. It also recommends fictional titles written for this age group as reading matter and draws attention to publications that are particularly suitable because they reflect everyday experience and relate to pupils.

• Teaching in History/Politics is meant to draw on the learning value of other subjects in the treatment of these themes. As examples, the manual points to the teaching unit “Church and National Socialism” in Protestant Religious Instruction and the unit “Jews and Christians” in Roman Catholic Religious Instruction.

Teaching the History of the Jews and German-Jewish Relations

The guidelines and syllabuses for History in the respective school types explicitly provide for the treatment of themes and problems taken from the history of the Jews and German-Jewish relations. The aim is not for pupils to acquire a coherent overview of these historic processes, but to produce exemplary analyses of particularly important historical phenomena. The requirements and references in the guidelines/syllabuses essentially focus on three periods:

• In the context of medieval and early modern history, the status of Jews in the society of the times (e.g., ghettos, professions, cultural achievements, relationships with Christians and the Church, anti-Judaism, programs) are, as a rule, identified as teaching topics.

• In the treatment of 19th century German history, teaching should include the emancipation of Jews as well as the ideological and socio-economic causes for the emergence of anti-Semitism and its establishment as a political movement.

• The antecedents and foundation of the state of Israel, its development up to the present, and its position in Middle-East conflicts are possible focal points for teaching post-1945 contemporary history.

The history of the Jews and of German-Jewish relations is also dealt with in other subjects. An example is the syllabus for Protestant Religious Instruction at Gymnasium, which speaks of the guiding principle of “taking paths to Jerusalem” and expressly supports the imperative “that Auschwitz never be repeated” (Theodor W. Adorno). The syllabus requires that the history of relations between Jews and Christians, marked by anti-
Semitism, anti-Judaism, and, more recently, anti-Zionism, be treated as the story of Jewish suffering and, at the same time, of Christian guilt by looking at specific historical examples. Work on this theme is to be complemented by focusing on “examples and beginnings of a new, responsible relationship between Christians and Jews.”

Learning and Teaching Material

The development of learning and teaching material is the task of private textbook publishers who develop their products in line with the intentions of the guidelines and syllabuses of the respective Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany. Official authorization for learning material for political education subjects, like the material for other subjects, is mandatory in North Rhine-Westphalia. The Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs decides which books are to be approved on the basis of the evaluations of a Land Textbook Commission working on behalf of the Ministry. Serious shortcomings in the portrayal of National Socialism and the Holocaust regularly lead to the rejection of textbooks. This practice has led to a situation in which the currently approved learning material provides a comprehensive and discerning treatment of this period of German history. Generally positive findings were also made by the German-Israeli Textbook Conference, which in 1985 noted among other things that

The most detailed portrayal in the textbooks is that of the history of the Jews in the modern world. However, the density of information in the survey period is extremely uneven. The ideological defamation and, even more so, the persecution and murder of the Jews under National Socialist rule stand quite unmistakably in the foreground. The fate of Jews during this period is neither hushed up nor trivialized. The intensity of reporting in general has increased considerably in comparison with earlier textbooks. This manifests itself not only in the scope of the portrayal and in a consistently very broad documentation of text and picture sources, but also in the way that, especially in the more recent works, the persecution is no longer dealt with as part of Hitler's biography but is placed more strongly in its social context. The crucial question of responsibility and co-responsibility for the persecution of Jews is posed more sharply than in earlier textbooks, even if it does not always receive a clear enough answer. (Deutsch-Israelische Schulbuchempfehlungen [German-Israeli Textbook Recommendations], Braunschweig, 1985, p. 18)

The history textbooks in use are supplemented by a variety of thematically centered source booklets and working material from private publishers. These enable teachers to establish special emphases when treating the history of the Jews and German-Jewish history.
Passing on Knowledge of the Holocaust in the Schools of the Free State of Bavaria

The dignity of man shall be inviolable.
— Article 1, Paragraph 1, Basic Law

No one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.
— Article 3, Paragraph 3, Basic Law

With these words, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany professes to a centuries-old ethical tradition. Its authors were also making a decisive break with the practices of National Socialism, which had systematically negated and disdained these values.

Fully in line with the values adopted by the Basic Law, the authors of the constitution of the Free State of Bavaria formulated the following goals for its state education system and schools as early as 1946: “The highest educational goals are reverence before God, respect for religious convictions and the dignity of man, self-control, a sense of responsibility, and pleasure in taking responsibility. … Pupils shall be educated in the spirit of democracy ... and in the spirit of international understanding.” (Article 131, Paragraphs 2 and 3, Bavarian Constitution)

In consequence of this, Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Bavarian Law on Education and Teaching of September 10, 1982, charges schools with the task of educating young persons “to exercise freedom responsibly, to show tolerance, a peaceful attitude, and respect for other people ... in the spirit of international understanding.”

These requirements set two very specific goals for teaching. The first is to impart to the growing generation the conviction that a fundamental value system, as laid down by the constitution and by law, is indispensable for human coexistence in peace and justice. The second is to teach young people that this value system has frequently been exposed to extreme danger in the course of history and has been trampled underfoot.

Premises

In the words of Santayana, “Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it.” Such an act of remembering, which seeks both to impart knowledge and shape the consciousness of pupils positively, must focus primarily on the relationship between Jews and non-Jews in the course of occidental history, especially during the period of National Socialism. Clearly the following three premises are worth considering in this connection:

1. The behavior of non-Jews towards Jews in Europe was to an almost unparalleled extent defined for centuries by intolerance and aggression. Every so often this behavior erupted into acts of persecution and, in the case of the recent past, mass murder and even genocide. Furthermore, this behavior was characterized by ignorance, bigotry, persistent distortion, and prejudice.
2. The attitude of the non-Jews towards the Jews is a paradigm of the behavior of a majority towards a minority, and not least in terms of the missed opportunities
and failures entailed in such behavior.

3. National Socialism, with all the suffering and injustice perpetrated upon the Jews, created a schism in the relationship between Germans and their collaborators on the one hand and Jews on the other unlike any other in history. Those twelve years of German and European history indelibly stamped the consciousness of Jews and non-Jews. They are unique and unforgettable, a view ultimately shared by the majority of historians who spoke out in the great debate over Germany's National Socialist past known as the Historikerstreit. Since 1945, it is no longer possible for anyone to speak uninhibitedly about the relationship between Jews and non-Jews, especially that between Germans and Jews.

Conclusions
These premises lead to three conclusions:

1. Although the crimes and terror of the Holocaust were historically unique, one must not focus exclusively on it. A broader perspective should be maintained, not with the intention of playing down the Holocaust or keeping silent about it, but rather as the only way to achieve a proper understanding both of the Holocaust in its singularity and of the specificity of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. For example, in addition to dealing in detail with events during the National Socialist period, teaching in Bavarian schools uses characteristic examples to consider other periods — ancient times, the Middle Ages, and the modern period — when Jews were persecuted. Also, periods of apparent normality and mundane everyday life are examined to show that Jewish life was usually subject to extensive restraints and burdens from the social environment even when there were no anti-Jewish programs. It is shown that the brief periods of genuinely relaxed co-existence between Jews and non-Jews, such as those following upon the Enlightenment and the Emancipation of Jews, failed to exert a lasting positive influence. It is made clear that Jewish history and German, or rather occidental-European, history have been closely interwoven in every period. This also becomes evident to pupils when they realize the major role Judaism has played and still plays in the evolution of European culture in the realms of science, literature, visual arts, music, philosophy, etc.

2. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant Religious Instruction, Ethics, History, and Social Studies are subjects that naturally make an important contribution in this respect. These subjects convey knowledge about religions, or value systems, as well as about historical events and relationships. On the other hand, communicating a sense of values and teaching international understanding and tolerance cannot be left to depend exclusively on these few, albeit important, subjects. It becomes clear from the above that every school subject can contribute valuable insights from its own particular perspective. If the final aim of educational efforts is not to pay mere lip-service, but to achieve insights from which a stable sense of values arise, then all subjects and all teachers are called upon to play a role.

3. Only the above-mentioned approaches can prepare the way for the growth of a lively, many-faceted and multidimensional image of Jewish destinies, Jewish life, and Jewish culture. This purpose is also served by studying Jewish ways of
life, Jewish festivals and customs — in short, the broad sphere of Jewish culture. The pupil should learn to recognize the characteristics and high standing of Jewish culture, for this recognition is the real precondition for understanding, respect, and tolerance.

In accordance with these premises and conclusions, pupils at Bavarian schools are taught about the history of the Jews and the relationship between Jews and non-Jews, in line with the teaching profiles of the respective school types and subjects taught and with due regard to the stage of psychological development of the students. Subject to syllabus requirements, focal points for treatment of the subject are

- Judaism in the framework of the ancient civilizations and those of the Mediterranean world of antiquity
- Jews in medieval society, particularly in the medieval city
- emancipation and assimilation of Jews since the Enlightenment
- late 19th-century and 20th-century anti-Semitism/racism and persecution
- the Jewish faith as a world religion; Jewish philosophy and ethics.

Reflecting the intentions of a series of resolutions by the Standing Conference ("Treatment of National Socialism in Teaching," April 20, 1978; "Recommendation on the Treatment of the Resistance During the National Socialist Period in Teaching," December 4, 1980), it has certainly been ensured that appropriate attention is paid to the period of National Socialism. In particular, the anti-Semitism and ideology of National Socialism, removal of rights, persecution, and murder of the Jews are specifically identified in all valid syllabuses as learning matter.

Bavarian Gymnasium (secondary schools) are all the more certain to treat this period even more profoundly in future because, starting with the 1991–92 school year, history teaching will commence as early as the 6th school year and the additional time gained for teaching will be used to study 20th-century history more intensively.

Another particularly noteworthy aspect is the overall concept for political education in schools, which was published in 1991. This exceeds previous achievements in ensuring that by the end of secondary level 1 (Mittelschule, grade 10) or on completion of general secondary school (Hauptschule, grade 9) pupils in all types of schools will receive a basic political education in line with the constitutional principles and legal requirements quoted above.

Just as important as requirements laid down in laws or curricula are the teaching materials and aids that provide support for teachers in their efforts to achieve the educational and teaching aims and the goals and contents of learning. Such support material is provided primarily by the Staatsinstitut für Schulpädadagogik und Bildungsforschung (State Institute for School Education and Educational Research) in Munich and the Akademie für Lehrerfortbildung (Academy for In-Service Teacher Training) in Dillingen, both institutes working on behalf of the Bavarian State Ministry for Education, Cultural Affairs, Science and Art.

A 1988 publication by the State Institute entitled Aspects of Jewish History provides fundamental didactic and methodological guidance for teaching the topic in History courses at the lower and intermediate levels. In the summer of 1991, this manual was complemented by a comprehensive volume designed to aid teachers at all types of schools to treat Jewish history and culture. Its contributors include renowned Jewish authors. The following list of contents for Aspects of Jewish History may illustrate the Bavarian school
teaching approach, outlined above, to treating the relationship between Jews and non-Jews:

PART I: INTRODUCTION
Overview of Jewish history (chronological table)
Overview of the annual cycle of Jewish festivals
Glossary of Jewish terms

PART II: TEACHING OUTLINES
On the history of Judaism in ancient times
The Jewish Chosen People: a small nation outlasts the mighty empires
The Jewish faith helps them to survive
Jews and Christians in the Roman Empire

On the history of Judaism in the Middle Ages
Before the first Crusade: a crusade against the Jews in their own country
Jewish religion; Christianity; Islam
Jews in the Middle Ages: from citizens with equal rights to imperial bondsmen

On the history of Judaism in the 19th century
A new era dawns for Jews too: outsiders on sufferance become citizens
Jews in the German Empire: minority in the nation-state

On the history of Judaism in the 20th century
Political engagement: destiny and significance of Jewish-descended political personalities in the early Weimar Republic
Persecution and genocide (chronology)
Jewish self-help in the Third Reich
The emergence of the state of Israel

PART III: APPENDIX
Encounters with Judaism: Jewish cultural monuments in Bavaria (compendium and references)
A visit to the synagogue in the Museum of Jewish Culture in Augsburg
List of literature (with brief comments)

The Academy for In-Service Teacher Training offers regular in-service training events for teachers from all types of schools. In these, knowledge about the Holocaust in particular and questions about Jewish culture and history in general are discussed according to syllabus aims and contents. These events include, for example, symposia devoted to the history and culture of Judaism. The results (lectures, materials, teaching models etc.) of some of these in-service training events have been published in a number of Academy reports. Especially worthy of note here are Volume 62 — Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial; Volume 133 — Resistance against National Socialism; Volumes 139, 141, 163 — The Germans and Their Eastern Neighbors: Germans and Czechs, Germans and Poles, Germans and the Peoples of the Soviet Union; and Volume 279 — Danzig/Gdansk. Information and in-service training offered by the state are complemented by regional in-service teacher training events at the Regierungsbezirk (administrative district) level.

Teachers receive offers of free media information on this subject in the form of audio-accompanied slide series, videotapes, films, etc. by the most varied local and regional
picture and film services. More than 100 titles are made available. In connection with the 50th anniversary of the November 1938 pogroms launched by the Nazis under the name Reichskristallnacht, the State Ministry devoted an entire issue of its 1988 journal, Schulreport (School Report), to the topic of Jews in Germany, offering numerous aids to teachers on subject matter and methodology.

Extensive didactical and methodological material was supplied gratis to all schools to accompany the 1988 exhibition entitled “Behold, the Stone Cries Out from the Wall.” This exhibition on the history and culture of the Jews in Bavaria was staged by the House of Bavarian History, the City of Munich, and the Germanic National Museum in Nuremberg.

In a letter directed to all school principals on September 21, 1988, the State Ministry itself drew attention to all the teaching aids and manuals published until then and proposed special remembrances on the 50th anniversary of November 9, 1938.

Similarly, in 1994 as part of the commemoration of the contribution made by men and women to the German resistance against Hitler, and in 1995 during the events marking the anniversary of the end of the war, the fate of the Jews was also taken into account. The State Ministry sent out announcements to all schools accordingly.

Special significance is attached to “on-site learning,” — i.e., the investigation of regional or local testimonies to the Jewish past and visits to concentration camp memorial sites. Through such experiences, characteristic and vivid examples are used to communicate lasting impressions of the singularity of Jewish life in Germany and the relationship between Germans and Jews.

In this connection, Bavarian school classes showed lively interest in an exhibition entitled Jews in the Rural Community: the Example of Ichenhausen,” which was staged in summer 1991 by the House of Bavarian History in the former synagogue of Ichenhausen (Grunzburg District). The exhibition catalogue was very informative and particularly useful for pupils. This exhibition was not only an exemplary contribution to regional historiography but also a valuable and enlightening contribution to the turbulent history of the Jews in Bavaria reaching back many centuries.

Important stimuli to take up the topic of Jewish life in Bavaria are contained in the documentation compiled by Israel Schwierz on “Testimonies in Stone to Jewish Life in Bavaria,” which exhaustively catalogues and briefly explains all Jewish cemeteries, synagogues, and prayer houses besides other buildings that bear witness to Jewish life. The profusely illustrated documentation was entered into the registry of publications at the Bavarian State Center for Political Education and may be obtained gratis by every teacher.

Another important work is the guide to the Jüdisches Kulturmuseum (Jewish Culture Museum) in Augsburg. Compiled by seminar teachers for History, this work at the Bavarian National Museum was instigated by the State Ministry. The guide not only describes the synagogue and the exhibits displayed in it for some years now, but also, thanks to the profound advice of Jewish experts, offers an informative overview of Jewish Torah teachings, the Jewish calendar, and Jewish festivals. A valuable addition to this guide entitled “Jewish Culture and History: An Overview” was written by Peter Ortag and published in Munich in 1995. It is available from the Bavarian State Center for Political Education.

In this connection, great importance is attached to visits by pupils to the Dachau and Flossenbürg concentration camp memorial sites. In response to a Bavarian Landtag (state
assembly) resolution of May 31, 1960, teaching excursions by school classes to these memorial sites (lately expanded to include Kaufering, a former external camp of the Dachau complex) are financially supported by the Bavarian State Center for Political Education. Encouraged to no small extent by a 1984 proclamation by the State Ministry exhorting schools to arrange visits to such memorial sites, a great many school classes make use of this opportunity every year. Qualified teaching personnel especially supported by the State Ministry are available at these sites to provide detailed information to pupils and teachers. A guide written for school classes is distributed gratis. In order to prepare for such visits and to plan follow-up work, the Museum-Pedagogical Center in Munich has produced additional handouts for all teachers. These include “Comprehending the Incomprehensible: A Tour of the Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial Site” (Munich, 1995); “Remembering Instead of Forgetting: A Tour of the Flossenbürg Graves and Memorial Site” (Munich, 1995).

It should be added that the Dachau concentration camp memorial site has been placed under the aegis of the State Ministry for Education, Cultural Affairs, Science and Art since January 1, 1991. Traditionally close contacts continue to be maintained from here with the Comité International de Dachau in Brussels, which also has the aim of promoting the education of pupils about the Dachau concentration camp.

RESOURCE 4
Reactions to Holocaust Education

According to the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (KMK) of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany, the citizens of the former East German states were taught from 1945 until 1989 that only the West Germans were responsible for the crimes of the Holocaust. Since unification, Holocaust education has been introduced into these former GDR states. The following quotes come from citizens educated in German schools on both sides of “the Wall” during this time:

“I was ashamed and embarrassed to find out that we, too, had played a role in the Holocaust.” (Bürgermeister [Mayor] of the Town of Freiberg, the state of Sachsen, former GDR)

“It is difficult to explain history [so terrible as the Holocaust] to those who haven’t experienced it. Although my father was a soldier, he did not talk about his experiences relating to the Nazis in the war. Jews were not part of the mainstream life in my town, so it was hard to relate to the events of the Holocaust. We were taught that it was something that “old” [West] Germany did.” (Professor Dr. Dusing, Technical University of Freiberg, the state of Sachsen, former GDR)

“When I found that what I had been taught about the Holocaust [that it was only the West Germans who had been involved] was a lie, I felt anger, disgrace. ... I was terribly
upset. I cried. . . .” (Christoph Kreuzmüller, docent at the Memorial House of the Wannsee Conference, educated in the former GDR in the 1980s)

“Although I had studied the Holocaust and visited Sachsenhausen [concentration camp near Berlin], I learned primarily about the second half of World War II. I did not see photographs of Nazis until after the [Berlin] wall fell.” (Stefan Gabriel, Press Officer, educated in the former GDR in the 1980s)

“During GDR times [local] students had to spend 10 hours studying about the Holocaust. One hour had to be at Sachsenhausen. They usually toured in groups and were not very interested. Today, students still study but on a more personal basis. They often do research on individual prisoners (this work is kept on file and is available) and try to meet survivors if possible. Volunteer groups of students come in to mow grass, plant flowers, clean the area, etc.” (Ms. Sylvia Nickel, Guide at Sachsenhausen)

RESOURCE 5
Video Interviews

Source: Department of Education
Division of Technology
Film Library
P.O. Box 2120
Richmond, VA 23218-2120

Interviews with German citizens of different ages are contained on the video entitled Postwar Germany and the Growth of Democracy: Video Resources.
RESOURCE 6
German Restitution for National Socialist Crimes

Source: German Information Center
950 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022-2781
September 1998
Web site: http://www.germany-info.org
Reprinting permitted

From the time of its founding in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany assumed responsibility for making reparation for crimes committed during the Nazi era to the extent that such is possible. This sense of responsibility was expressed by the first chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, in a statement made on September 27, 1951:

The federal government and the great majority of the German people are deeply aware of the immeasurable suffering endured by the Jews of Germany and by the Jews of the occupied territories during the period of National Socialism. The great majority of the German people did not participate in the crimes committed against the Jews, and wish constantly to express their abhorrence of these crimes. While the Nazis were in power, there were many among the German people who attempted to aid their Jewish fellow-citizens in spite of the personal danger involved. They were motivated by religious conviction, the urgings of conscience, and shame at the base acts perpetrated in the name of the whole German people. In our name, unspeakable crimes have been committed and they demand restitution, both moral and material, for the persons and properties of the Jews who have been so seriously harmed. ...

In the 47 years since Adenauer made this statement, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has striven to make amends to those who suffered at the hands of the National Socialists on account of their race and their religion, their political beliefs, their physical disabilities, their sexual orientation, or simply because of their refusal to comply with the norms of Nazi ideology.

No matter how large the sum, no amount of money will ever suffice to compensate for National Socialist persecution. But in dealing with the legacy of the Hitler regime, the Federal Republic of Germany has, since 1951, established a precedent for legislating and implementing a comprehensive system of restitution for the injustices of the Nazi era.

Since 1990, unified Germany has continued and extended the restitution policies of the pre-unification Federal Republic. By early 1998, Germany had provided more than DM 100 billion in restitution and compensation, and it expects the figure to increase to approximately DM 124 billion. Additional payments are being made to German-speaking Eastern European Jewish victims of National Socialist persecution in the form of social security payments and war victims’ relief payments. These expenditures, which supple-
ment the disability pensions already being paid, are estimated to reach a total of DM 10–13 billion.

The Beginnings

After the war, the occupation powers enacted laws in their individual zones that restored to the original owners property confiscated by the Nazis. These laws were restricted to property. They did not apply to personal damage to the victims of Nazi persecution, which encompassed physical and psychological suffering, unjust deprivation of freedom, or injury to a person’s professional or economic potential. Nor did these laws provide for assistance to the families of those who died as a result of Hitler’s policies. The occupation forces foresaw the German state assuming responsibility for reparation for such damages.

The focus on restitution for property losses during the first years after the war soon shifted to individual restitution for personal losses, however. This initially took the form of social assistance on a local level for victims of National Socialist persecution.

The Luxembourg Agreement between Germany and Israel

The Luxembourg Agreement between the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, known simply as the Claims Conference, defined the shape of the legislation eventually enacted to regulate restitution. Negotiations on the agreement took place in Luxembourg on September 10, 1952. Among the agreement’s provisions was the requirement that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany pay DM 3.45 billion to the state of Israel and various Jewish organizations. Payments to Israel, particularly in the form of goods, recognized the fact that the young nation bore the tremendous financial burden of providing for the many victims of Nazi persecution who had settled there. Monetary payments to the Claims Conference were designed to aid Jewish organizations throughout the world in resettling Jews who lived outside Israel.

Legislation

The Supplementary Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution, enacted on October 1, 1953, was followed by the Bundesentschädigungsgesetz or BEG (Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution) of June 29, 1956, which substantially expanded the scope of the 1953 law. The Final Federal Compensation Law enacted on September 14, 1965, increased the number of persons eligible for compensation as well as the assistance offered.

On May 1, 1992, two years after German unification, the Gesetz über Entschädigungen für Opfer des Nationalsozialismus im Beitrittsgebiet (Law on Compensation for Victims of National Socialism in the Regions Accessing to the Federal Republic) was enacted. It superseded, in a modified version, the compensation legislation of the German Democratic Republic. Under this law, persons who had been persecuted by the Nazi regime and who, for reasons inimical to the rule of law, had been denied compensation by the authorities of the former German Democratic Republic, may submit fresh applications. An additional regulation was enacted on the basis of this law in favor of BEG-defined victims who had not received any compensation due to their residency in the former German Democratic Republic.
Indemnification for Persecution of Individuals

The BEG laws compensate individuals persecuted for racial, religious, or ideological reasons and also apply to persons who were persecuted because of their nationality. The laws focus on payments for

- physical injury and damage to health
- restrictions on personal freedom
- damage inflicted upon economic and professional growth
- damage done to personal property.

The laws include provision for compensation to artists and scholars whose work disagreed with Nazi tenets. They also provide compensation to people who were persecuted merely because they were related to or friendly with victims of the Nazis. Finally, they guarantee assistance to the survivors of the deceased victims.

The BEG legislation extends far beyond the responsibilities assumed by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Luxembourg Agreement. Of the approximately 4.4 million claims submitted under this legislation, all except an insignificant number have been settled. Approximately 40 percent of those receiving compensation under the provisions of BEG laws live in Israel, 20 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 40 percent in other countries. The amount of restitution paid under BEG and other restitution laws is shown in Table 2 at the end of this text.

Restitution for Lost Property

Claims for property lost as a result of National Socialist persecution are handled according to the provisions of the Bundesrückerstattungsgesetz or BRüG (Federal Restitution Law) of July 19, 1957. As of January 1, 1987, 735,076 claims had been made on the basis of BRüG; with a few exceptions, they have all been settled.

As noted above, the original restitution statutes were issued by the three Western Allies in their zones of occupation to expedite the return of still-existing property and to settle related legal questions. Difficulties arose, however, in handling claims for property that no longer existed, and there was no common policy for resolving such claims. The BRüG legislation represented official recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany of its obligation to pay compensation for objects confiscated by the Third Reich that no longer existed in their original state and thus could not be returned.

The BRüG legislation was further developed in four supplementary laws, the last of which was enacted on September 3, 1969. Compensation for lost property is made according to the estimated replacement value as of April 1, 1956. The BRüG legislation is also applicable to property confiscated outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, provided that at the time of confiscation it was brought into or held in territory covered by BRüG legislation.

With the achievement of German unity, a law (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen) was passed which regulated unresolved issues of property and assets within the area of the former German Democratic Republic. This law established a framework for the return of assets taken from individuals and associations between January 30, 1933, and 1990. In cases where restitution is not possible, compensation will be made for the loss of property in eastern Germany. Part of the regulations applying to people persecuted by the Nazis were negotiated with the Claims Conference and are now set out in the Entschädigungs- und Ausgleichsleistungsgesetz (Law on Compensation and Adjustment),
which went into effect on December 1, 1994.

An agreement with the United States was concluded on May 13, 1992, to settle approximately 1,900 claims based on U.S. Public Law 94-542 of October 18, 1976, and the International Claims Settlement Act. Claims could be made by U.S. citizens for confiscated property in the former German Democratic Republic and East Berlin. The agreement provides for a lump-sum payment of $102 million to the U.S. for distribution to claimants who are not otherwise eligible for restitution, or in cases where the applicant elected to receive a portion of the lump sum instead of restitution. The claims are administered by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

International agreements had initially limited the Federal Republic’s financial obligations under BRüG to DM 1.5 billion. The amount actually paid to date exceeds DM 3.9 billion. When all claims for loss of property have been settled, the Federal Republic of Germany will have paid DM 4 billion in restitution for lost property.

Additional Compensatory Laws and Agreements

To supplement this basic legal framework, several additional compensatory laws have been enacted to aid those who suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced by the Nazi regime. On August 22, 1949, a law was passed restoring the rights and privileges of those who had been discriminated against in Nazi social legislation. That same day, another law was approved extending the assistance to war victims ineligible for such benefits by Nazi law. A law of May 11, 1951, provided for restitution to members of the civil service who had suffered injustice at the hands of the Nazis. The scope of each of these three laws has been considerably expanded by subsequent revisions.

Mention must be made as well of the lump sum payments made to former concentration camp internees who were the objects of medical experimentation and to prisoners of war from Palestine who, because of their Jewish background, did not receive the humane treatment guaranteed prisoners of war under international law. A special fund was set up to assist individuals persecuted by the Nazis for having Jewish ancestry although they themselves were not of Jewish faith.

The Bundestag supplemented the provisions of the BEG in December 1979 with an allocation of DM 400 million. This sum was earmarked for payments to Jewish individuals whose health was seriously impaired by the Nazi regime but who had not been able to obtain restitution previously because they missed the deadline for filing claims or did not meet residency requirements. Shortly thereafter, the Bundestag made up to DM 100 million available for payments to non-Jewish victims of the Nazi regime who likewise had not been able to receive restitution.

Existing provisions guaranteeing compensation were confirmed and partly expanded during the 1990 negotiations on German unification. In Article 2 of the September 18, 1990 Agreement on the Enactment and Interpretation of the Unification Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic agreed that unified Germany would continue the Federal Republic’s pre-unification policy on restitution. It was also agreed to establish an additional fund for persons who had not yet received restitution or who had received little compensation. United Germany recognized the fact that the German Democratic Republic had not, on economic and ideological grounds, made consistent compensation for injustices perpetrated by the Nazi regime. The regulations were specified in an agreement with the Claims Conference in October 1992. Hardship
payments to victims of Nazi persecution had begun under guidelines introduced in October 1980. The new regulations maintained the eligibility requirements and payment amounts set out in those guidelines, but they also made provisions for aid, especially by regular monthly payments, to victims of the Nazi regime in economic need who had not received help under the Federal Republic’s pre-unification compensation provisions. The agreement is intended primarily to provide additional monthly payments for individuals. It does not extend indemnification for Nazi persecution to persons who live in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, but applicants from those states who now reside in other countries may be eligible if they meet the requirements.

In early 1996, the German Bundestag approved agreements with Israel and the United States allowing formerly German-speaking Holocaust survivors in those countries to receive German old-age pensions. The individuals in question, estimated to be some 35,000 in number, are not now and have never been German citizens; in most cases, they were originally Romanian or Latvian citizens. However, because German law allows persons of German origin from Eastern Europe to come to Germany and grants them numerous benefits, the German government agreed in negotiations with Israel and the U.S. to grant similar pension benefits to German-speaking Eastern European Jews living in those two countries. The prerequisite is retroactive payment into social security funds. Total costs are expected to reach some DM 2.3 billion.

Bilateral Agreements

Between 1959 and 1964, the Federal Republic of Germany concluded “global agreements” with eleven European nations; today, there are 15 agreements with European nations and one with the U.S. As a result of these agreements, the Federal Republic of Germany provided more than DM two billion to those nations to enable them to compensate citizens not eligible under the BEG for damages incurred as victims of Nazi policies. The victims’ survivors also became eligible for compensation. Germany has spent a total of 1.8 billion DM since 1991 in compensation to victims in Eastern European countries, including contributions to foundations in Poland, Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as well as allocations for victims of pseudo-medical experiments. Special funds administer and regulate distribution.

Under the agreement concluded with Poland in 1991, Germany pledged to pay DM 500 million to the Foundation for German-Polish Reconciliation to compensate Polish citizens who had been victims of Nazi persecution. A similar arrangement was made to compensate victims in the successor states to the Soviet Union. Under the agreement, Germany has contributed DM 1 billion to the Foundations for Understanding and Reconciliation in Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
Table 1
Funds pledged by the Federal Republic of Germany as a result of global agreements with European nations and the United States:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of agreement</th>
<th>Approximate amount in millions DM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>July 11, 1959</td>
<td>DM 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>August 7, 1959</td>
<td>DM 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>August 24, 1959</td>
<td>DM 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>March 18, 1960</td>
<td>DM 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>April 8, 1960</td>
<td>DM 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>July 15, 1960</td>
<td>DM 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>September 28, 1960</td>
<td>DM 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>June 2, 1961</td>
<td>DM 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>June 29, 1961</td>
<td>DM 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>June 9, 1964</td>
<td>DM 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>August 3, 1964</td>
<td>DM 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>October 16, 1991</td>
<td>DM 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>March 3, 1993</td>
<td>DM 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>March 3, 1993</td>
<td>DM 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>March 3, 1993</td>
<td>DM 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>September 19, 1995</td>
<td>DM 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>DM 2.379 billion</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Austria: The Federal Republic of Germany has made available to the Austrian government DM 102 million for compensatory payments. Of this amount, DM 96 million were used for the establishment of two funds: one to pay victims of political persecution in Austria for the loss of income, and the second to aid such victims in other countries. The remaining DM 6 million were set aside to pay claims for lost property.
Table 2
Public expenditures in restitution for Nazi damages, in billions DM (as of January 1, 1998):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures thus far</th>
<th>Approximate amount in billions DM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compensation of victims (BEG)</td>
<td>DM 78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution for lost property (BRüG)</td>
<td>DM 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensatory pensions (ERG)</td>
<td>DM 0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel agreement</td>
<td>DM 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral agreements</td>
<td>DM 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (civil service, etc.)</td>
<td>DM 8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments by German states (not BEG)</td>
<td>DM 2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final restitution in special cases</td>
<td>DM 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>DM 102.1 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated future expenditures:
| Compensation of victims (BEG)                             | DM 16.656                        |
| Restitution for lost property (BRüG)                       | DM 0.045                         |
| Compensatory pensions (ERG)                               | DM 0.703                         |
| Bilateral Agreements                                      | DM 0.420                         |
| Other (civil service, etc.)                               | DM 3.200                         |
| Payments by German states (not BEG)                        | DM 1.012                         |
| Final restitution in special cases                         | DM 1.925                         |
| Subtotal                                                  | DM 23.961 billion                |

**Estimated Total** DM 126.061 billion

In addition to expenditures totaling more than DM 100 billion as of January 1998, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has committed itself to making the following payments:

- The German-Czech Declaration signed in Prague on January 21, 1997, stipulates the establishment of a German-Czech Future Fund to finance projects of mutual interest, such as care of the elderly, the building and operation of sanatoria, the preservation and restoration of monuments and cemeteries, and partnership projects. The German contribution is set at DM 140 million. The projects are to benefit victims of Nazi violence in particular.
- From 1998 until the year 2000, an additional DM 80 million will be made available for humanitarian assistance to Nazi victims in other Eastern European countries who have not received any compensation.
- Victims in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania receive compensatory payments through two German-funded “Foundations for Understanding and Reconciliation” in Minsk and Moscow. The federal government has also made available DM 6 million for projects such as hospitals and nursing homes that care for Nazi victims.
- From the year 1999 until the year 2002, Germany will provide DM 200 million for a new fund, to be established by the Jewish Claims Conference, to help Jewish Holocaust survivors in Eastern Europe who are suffering hardship and have not received any compensation so far. The payment modalities will be set by the fund itself. This fund will apply the same criteria valid for the fund established
in accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement on the Enactment and Interpretation of the Unification Treaty (see above).

**Addendum**

This survey of restitution laws and measures does not include payments (in billions) made according to the provisions of laws such as the Gesetz über die Behandlung der Verfolgten des Nationalsozialismus in der Sozialversicherung (Law on the Treatment of Victims of National Socialist Persecution in the Area of Social Security) or the Bundesgesetz zur Wiedergutmachung nationalsozialistischen Unrechts in der Kriegspferversorgung einschließlich des Sondergesetzes für Berechtigte im Ausland (Federal Law on the Reparation for National Socialist Injustice in the Area of War Victims’ Relief) or the Allgemeines Kriegfolgengesetz (General Law on the Consequences of War).

By Susan Steiner and Peter Welsch

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**RESOURCE 7**

**German-Israeli Relations**

**Source:** German Information Center  
950 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022-2781  
(212) 888-9840  
June 1995  
Web site: http://www.germany-info.org  
Reprinting permitted

The history of Europe and our concern for peace in the Middle East have imposed upon us a special responsibility for Israel’s existence and security. For this reason ... supporting [Israel] has been a key priority of all German governments since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany.

— President Roman Herzog of the Federal Republic of Germany, December 7, 1994

The German-Israeli relationship is unique. It has been shaped by the memory of the Holocaust and the strong desire on the part of the German people to help ensure that the suffering endured by the Jewish people between 1933 and 1945 will never recur. Most Americans would be surprised to learn of the full extent of German-Israeli ties. In some fields, cooperation between Germany and Israel is as extensive as between Israel and the U.S.

Germany and Israel established diplomatic relations in 1965. However, already in the early 1950s, long, difficult negotiations were held among Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion of Israel, and Nahum Goldmann, chair of the Jewish
Claims Conference. These negotiations resulted in the 1953 Restitution Agreement, Germany's first step towards compensating the victims of the Holocaust. The close relationship that developed between Adenauer and Ben Gurion during these negotiations played an instrumental part in setting the tone for the development of German-Israeli relations.

Since then, a growing network of contacts links the two countries on the governmental and parliamentary levels. State visits stand as highlights in the history of German-Israeli relations: President Richard von Weizsäcker of Germany visited Israel in October 1985; President Chaim Herzog of Israel came to the Federal Republic of Germany in April 1987; and Germany's new president, Roman Herzog, went to Israel in December 1994 on his first official visit to a country outside of Europe. The two governments are now adapting their long-standing cooperation in light of recent international developments, including German unification, the end of the East-West conflict, the peace process in the Middle East, Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, and Israel's desire for closer economic relations with Europe, which Germany actively supports.

The Human Dimension

German-Israeli relations rest on a foundation of support from committed citizens in both countries — individuals who, in full remembrance of the past, want to contribute to mutual understanding and friendship. The involvement of so many people at the grass roots level is one of the most remarkable features of German-Israeli relations. Churches and trade unions have also been particularly active in fostering relations. The German peace organization Aktion Sühnezeichen (Action Reconciliation) has played an especially important role in bringing Germans and Israelis together. Since 1961, Action Reconciliation has sent about 2,500 volunteers to work in Israeli hospitals and social welfare programs.

More than eighty cities and counties in Germany and Israel maintain partnerships and “sister city” relationships. There is an intensive youth exchange program. In 1993, 3,000 young Israelis came to Germany and 7,000 Germans went to Israel within the framework of the program. Since 1965, encounters involving two million youth have been sponsored by the German government.

Economics

Germany is Israel's second largest trading partner after the United States. German exports to Israel in 1993 totaled U.S. $1.95 billion (at exchange rate $1 = DM 1.59), and imports from Israel $820 million. Since 1966, Israel has received financial aid in the form of set annual loans of DM 140 million (currently about $88 million) to improve the infrastructure of the country; to date, these loans total $2.5 billion. The loans are for a period of 30 years at two percent interest, with a ten-year grace period.

Science and Culture

Germany contributes approximately $22 million annually to support research at Israeli universities. Since 1966, this assistance has amounted to $315 million. German research funds are distributed through the Minerva Program, which is run jointly by the Max Planck Institute and the Weizmann Institute. Funds are also distributed through Israel's National Committee for Research and Development and research endowments at
individual Israeli universities. Funding for joint research projects is also provided by the German-Israeli Foundation for Research and Development. In 1993, the foundation's endowment doubled and now totals nearly $190 million. There are 47 university partnerships.

Cultural exchange is very lively in the fields of music, theater and the arts. Approximately 15,000 Israelis participate in German language courses at the Goethe Institutes in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem every year.

Holocaust Restitution

Germany realizes that no sum of money is sufficient to compensate the victims of the Holocaust for their suffering. To date, approximately $57 billion has been paid as restitution, of which 40 percent ($22 billion) has gone to individual recipients in Israel or to the state of Israel itself. Total payments are likely to reach $80 billion.

Gulf War-Related Aid

Germany provided the Israeli government with $158 million in immediate humanitarian aid and $39 million in military assistance during the Gulf War. Israel also received $103 million for “Patriot” anti-missile systems and $554 million for submarines. Total German assistance to Israel during the Gulf War was $880 million.

(Exchange Rate: U.S. $1 = DM 1.59)

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RESOURCE 8
Building Holocaust Monuments in Vienna and Berlin

58 Years after Kristallnacht, Vienna Builds Monument to Jewish Victims

By Teddie Weyr, Associated Press writer

Source: The Associated Press  
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Jan. 26, 1996
VIENNA, Austria (AP)

The city of Vienna has selected a British sculptor to build its first large-scale monument to the more than 65,000 Austrian Jews who died in the Holocaust.

The idea to build the monument, which will be located on Judenplatz (Jews’ Square) in the city center, was initiated by Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal.
To be built by sculptor Rachel Whiteread, the monument is to be unveiled on Nov. 9, the 58th anniversary of Reichskristallnacht, a pogrom in Germany and Austria that ushered in the Holocaust. In Austria alone, 65 synagogues were torched and innumerable homes, shops and other facilities owned by Jews were destroyed or damaged during the rampage.

The monument will consist of a large gray cement cube with bookcase-like sides to symbolize the importance of books and writing to Judaism.

“We are a people of books,” Wiesenthal said. “Our monuments were never made of stone and steel.” That was “why our enemies could never destroy our monuments.”

On a glass plate underneath the monument will be inscribed: “In memory of the more than 65,000 Austrian Jews who were murdered by the National Socialists (Nazis) in the period 1938-1945.” The names of 41 death camps and places where, according to Wiesenthal, at least 50 Austrian Jews were murdered will also be engraved in the glass.

The monument will be the first in Vienna dedicated specifically to the Austrian Jews murdered in the Holocaust. Vienna currently has a monument to the victims of Nazism at the site of the former headquarters of the Gestapo, Adolf Hitler’s dreaded secret police.

Austria’s pre-war Jewish population of more than 200,000 has dwindled to about 8,000.

Hitler annexed his native Austria to Nazi Germany in 1938, a move welcomed by a large majority of Austrians. Many Austrians were in top Nazi positions.

After World War II, the Allies declared Austria Hitler’s first victim and, unlike Germany, the country failed to confront its past.

It was only in 1991 that Chancellor Franz Vranitzky for the first time publicly admitted that Austrians were both victims and perpetrators of Nazi horrors.

Holocaust Memorial Committee to Name Finalists in New Design Competition: Previous Winner Rejected

Source: The Week in Germany, copyright German Information Center
November 7, 1997
Reprinted by permission

When the committee in charge of selecting the design for a national Holocaust memorial announces its list of finalists in a few weeks, the winning entry in the original design competition will not be among them. Berlin Senator (Minister) for culture Peter Radunski (CDU) acknowledged on November 1 that the proposal put forward by artist Christine Jakob-Marks and a group of collaborators in the first competition two years ago is no longer in the running. The selection committee will be presenting the eight final contenders in mid-November.

There are many historical sites in Germany attesting to the crimes of the Nazi regime and numerous local memorials to those who lost their lives at German hands under the Nazis, but there is no national Holocaust memorial per se. A campaign for such a memorial was launched in 1989 and quickly found broad support. In the wake of unifica-
tion seven years ago, the German government said it would reserve a prominent spot between the Reichstag, the once and future home of Germany’s parliament, and the Brandenburg Gate in central Berlin for the memorial.

A competition for the design of the memorial was opened in the spring of 1994, and a year later the selection committee announced it had settled on the proposal submitted by the Jakob-Marks group. To pay tribute to the memory of the European Jews murdered by the Nazi regime, Jakob-Marks and her collaborators want to inscribe all six million of their names upon a massive iron slab measuring 100 by 100 meters (328 feet). Set in the ground at an angle, the slab would rise gradually to a height of about ten meters.

This proposal met with considerable criticism. Many supporters of the project, among them Chancellor Helmut Kohl, complained that the Jakob-Marks group’s memorial was simply too large. A number of Jewish groups, Holocaust survivors and the family members of those murdered, also voiced reservations about the proposal. Ignatz Bubis, chair of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, argued, for example, that listing the names of the Holocaust dead would not lift them from anonymity. To the contrary, countered many German Jewish families, recording the names on a public memorial would violate the right to privacy of both the dead and their survivors (TWIG 7/21/97, p.7).

After a protracted debate on whether the project should go ahead as planned despite the wide objections to the Jakob-Marks group’s design, the memorial’s backers announced this past summer that a selection committee would reconsider the eight finalists in the 1995 competition and invite another 16 artists to submit new proposals.

Noted Intellectuals Reopen Discussion of National Holocaust Memorial

Source: The Week in Germany, copyright German Information Center
February 13, 1998
Reprinted by permission

With the many sites throughout the country attesting to the horrors of the Nazi era, does Germany need a national memorial to the victims of the Holocaust? A group of prominent participants in German public debate thinks not and explained why in an open letter published earlier this month.

“We do not see how an abstract installation of oppressively immense dimensions — on a field the size of a sports stadium — can serve as a place of quiet mourning and remembrance, of warning (Mahnung) or meaningful explanation,” the letter argues. The spot in central Berlin set aside for the planned memorial, it notes, is only a few hundred years’ distance from the Topography of Terror documentation center, and important sites directly associated with the Holocaust — the villa on the Wannsee where Nazi officials decided on the “final solution,” for example, and the Sachsenhausen concentration camp — are found within the city or in its immediate vicinity. Compared to the vividness of these historical sites, “a gigantic ‘national’ memorial will remain a place rather of distraction (Ablenkung), of distancing from reality (Entwirklichung) and cold abstraction: not a witness to the past, not a sign for the future.” The signatories of the open letter thus call
upon the memorial’s backers to stop the project in the interest of keeping alive the memory of the Holocaust — for a “renunciation out of understanding” (Verzicht aus Einsicht).

The letter carried the names of 19 public figures, most known for their part in German cultural life. Among the signatories are Countess Marion Donhoff, one of the founding editors of the weekly Die Zeit; Gyorgy Konrad, a novelist and president of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of the Arts; and Günter Grass, a veteran of many public debates and controversies over the years.

Grass and another of the signatories, writer Walter Jens, had initially backed the idea of a national Holocaust memorial when it was first proposed nearly a decade ago. Jens, who had chaired one of the selection committees in the protracted design competition for the memorial, explained his change of mind in an article that appeared Saturday (February 7) in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. His earlier views on the subject, he wrote, simply could not hold up to his critical scrutiny. Instead of building a memorial (Mahnmal), Jens went on to suggest, effort should be focused on preserving “horror sites” (Schreckensmale) like Dachau and Auschwitz.

Reaction from the recipients of the open letter varied. Lea Rosh, the journalist who launched the memorial project, said she could not understand objections coming so late — just weeks before a final decision on the design of the memorial is due. “They certainly could have had the thought sooner that this is not the right idea.” A spokesman for Mayor Eberhard Diepgen of Berlin suggested that the open letter deserved respect if for no other reason than the eloquence of its argumentation. On behalf of Chancellor Kohl, Government spokesman Peter Hausmann said it was noteworthy that two of the early backers of the memorial had joined in the call for the project to be abandoned.

RESOURCE 9
Video Interview

Source: Department of Education
Division of Technology
Film Library
P.O. Box 2120
Richmond, VA 23218-2120

An interview with Annegret Ehmann, Director of the Education Division, House of the Wannsee Conference, is contained on the video entitled Postwar Germany and the Growth of Democracy: Video Resources. In this interviews, she is seen discussing the purpose of the Wannsee House as a memorial that educates.
RESOURCE 10
Responsibility and Restitution

Quotes

1. “There are two types of guilt: systematically committing a crime, and making it possible and permitting it. We didn’t want this and didn’t know that. But we should have wanted and should have known. ...” (Alfred Döblin, 1946)

2. “Those who run away from their past will be caught up by it. We Germans face up to the past for the sake of the future.” (President Roman Herzog, Federal Republic of Germany, 1996)

3. “In Germany the Nazis came for the Communists and I did not speak up because I was not a Communist. Then they came for Jews and I did not speak up because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists and I did not speak up because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I was a Protestant so I did not speak up. Then they came for me. By that time there was no one left to speak up for anyone.” (Martin Niemöller)

RESOURCE 11
Nazi Gold

A Chronology of Events Surrounding the Lost Assets of Victims of Nazi Germany

Source: Frontline, 1997 (PBS documentary)
Copyright 1997 by WGBH/ Frontline
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May 25, 1946

Switzerland and the Allied powers sign the Washington Agreement whereby the Swiss agree to pay $58.1 million in gold to a commission set up by the Allies after the war. The payment is a voluntary contribution to rebuilding Europe. In return, the Allies drop further claims to the monetary gold Switzerland bought from Germany during the war. (The May 1997 U. S. Government Eizenstat Report estimated Switzerland held $305 to $409 million in looted Nazi gold.)
December 20, 1962
Prompted by Jewish agencies and Israel, the Swiss Bankers Association asks Swiss banks to investigate bank accounts that may have belonged to Holocaust victims. A total of 9.5 million Swiss francs are eventually turned over to claimants, the Swiss Jewish communities, and a Swiss refugee organization. Swiss bankers say that this represents the last of unclaimed wartime deposits which they hold.

1992
A coalition of Jewish organizations forms the World Jewish Restitution Organization. Its purpose is to coordinate claims for the return of assets and property lost in the Holocaust and the claiming of any heirless property for Jewish people. The Israeli Minister of Finance, Avraham Shohat, signs a memorandum recognizing that the State of Israel considers itself the heir to Jewish public property and heirless Jewish private property lost in the Holocaust.

January 1, 1996
The Swiss Bankers Association establishes a central information service to facilitate inquiries into Holocaust accounts. The information service processes all claims and forwards them to one of 400 Swiss banks.

February 7, 1996
The Swiss Bankers Association announces that after an internal investigation it conducted on its own behalf into Swiss Holocaust-era accounts, roughly $32 million has been found in 775 dormant accounts. Many Jewish leaders believe this sum is far too small.

April 23, 1996
Senator Alfonse D’Amato chairs a hearing on the Swiss bank Holocaust account controversy before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. President Clinton expresses support for a full investigation.

May 2, 1996
Jewish leaders and representatives from the Swiss Bankers Association agree to create a commission to investigate the status of Holocaust victims’ assets in Switzerland. Known as the Volcker Commission (also as “The Committee of Eminent Persons”) it will investigate both accounts opened by Holocaust victims and assets stolen from Holocaust victims that may have passed through Switzerland or have been deposited by the Nazis in Swiss banks. The investigation will include audits performed on the Swiss banks by three international auditing companies.

September 10, 1996
The British Foreign Ministry publishes a memorandum describing transactions between the Swiss National Bank and Nazi Germany for gold sales. The memorandum causes an international controversy. Senator D’Amato asks the Federal government to re-negotiate the 1946 Washington Agreement.
October 5, 1996
Gizella Weisshaus, a Holocaust survivor, files the first U.S. class action lawsuit against Swiss banks for an account opened during World War II.

October 15, 1996
Senator D’Amato holds a second hearing on the Swiss Holocaust accounts.

October 18, 1996
A second class action suit is filed in The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on behalf of three classes of Plaintiff’s against the Swiss Union Bank. The complaint concerns looted assets and actions to prevent the recovery of these assets by their owners.

October 24, 1996
A task force is formed in Switzerland by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs to investigate the Holocaust assets controversy.

November 15, 1996
Senator D’Amato reports evidence that the Nazis placed sympathizers inside Swiss banks during the war to gain access to secret account numbers and information. According to documents provided by Senator D’Amato, the Nazis then used this information to extort money from Jews and other account holders in Germany.

November 29, 1996
Argentina’s President, Carlos Saul Menem, promises full support of investigations into Argentina’s actions during World War II and says Argentina will release all secret files on Nazis who fled to Argentina after the war.

December 13, 1996
The Swiss Parliament passes a “Federal Decree concerning historical and legal investigations into the fate of assets brought to Switzerland because of the National Socialist rule.” The Parliament waives the customary Swiss banking secrecy laws for the next five years to facilitate the Volcker Commission’s investigation. The Swiss Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry (The Bergier Commission) is formed. It consists of nine historians who are to investigate all aspects of Switzerland’s wartime actions.

January 1, 1997
Former Swiss President Jean-Pascal Delamuraz makes a statement calling demands for the compensation of Holocaust victims by Swiss banks and threats to boycott Swiss banks “blackmail.”

January 3, 1997
Negotiations between Jewish leaders and the Swiss cease because of Delamuraz’s remark and the Swiss government’s failure to repudiate his statement.
January 7, 1997

The Swiss government announces that it intends to establish a fund for Holocaust survivors with money from unclaimed Swiss bank accounts.

January 14, 1997

The UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland), one of Switzerland’s largest banks, is caught by one of its security guards, Christophe Meili, shredding documents related to accounts opened before and during the war.

Week of January 20, 1997

French Prime Minister Alain Juppé announces that he will create a commission to investigate the seizures of Jewish property by the occupying Nazi forces and the French collaborationist during the war. He says attempts will be made to trace the ownership of any questionable property and return it to its rightful owners or their heirs.

January 28, 1997

Swiss high school students begin a collection for Holocaust survivors. The students release a statement saying that Holocaust victims cannot wait for the Swiss government investigations, but need aid now. The students will donate the money they collect to AMCHA, an Israeli organization that provides psychological and social support for Holocaust survivors.

February 5, 1997

A resolution to boycott Swiss banks is presented to the City Council of New York. Three major Swiss banks establish a humanitarian fund of 100 million Swiss francs (around $70 million U.S.) to benefit Holocaust victims. Jewish organizations in New York announce that they intend not to participate in any boycott of Swiss banks. A coalition of Swiss businesses contributes about $100 million to the fund.

February 19, 1997

The Ambassadors to the United States from Spain and Portugal are presented with new evidence that their countries received shipments of Nazi gold from Switzerland during the war.

February 26, 1997

The Swiss Federal Council announces that the Holocaust humanitarian fund will be administered by a group of seven, four will be Swiss appointees and three will be appointed by the World Jewish Restitution Organization.

March 5, 1997

The Swiss Parliament announces plans to create a $4.7 billion investment fund whose earnings will be used to compensate Holocaust victims. The fund is subject to a referendum in Parliament. At the time of the announcement, the fund has approval ratings of 60% of the Swiss voters.
March 7, 1997

A Brooklyn Federal judge rules to consolidate three U.S.-based class action lawsuits that have been brought against Switzerland’s banks. The lawsuits will be administered by a 10-member executive committee.

April 2, 1997

French museums display art work acquired during World War II and its aftermath in an attempt to trace the owners and heirs. During the war, the Nazis took possession of some 61,200 artworks; more than 45,000 were returned to their rightful owners. The Swiss humanitarian fund grows to approximately $300 million.

May 7, 1997

U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat releases the U.S. government’s comprehensive report “U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II.” (The more than 200-page text is available at the Web site of the U.S. Holocaust Museum.) The report harshly criticizes the actions of most Allied and neutral countries for failing to aid Holocaust victims both during and after the war and details the extent of Swiss financial transactions with Nazi Germany. It suggests that by acting as bankers for the Nazis, the Swiss prolonged the war.

May 23, 1997

The Swiss Federal Council officially responds to the Eizenstat Report, saying it is “one-sided” and some of its conclusions are “unsupported.”

June 4, 1997

The United States House Immigration subcommittee approves a measure granting sanctuary to Christophe Meili, the Swiss security guard who reported that the Union Bank of Switzerland was shredding account information from World War II. Meili testifies that he no longer can live comfortably and safely in Switzerland.

Still to Come

Later in 1997, an international conference will address the issue of the $70 million in so-called residual gold from World War II yet to be distributed by the Tripartite Gold Commission. Technically, it must be used as restitution to countries whose central banks were looted by the Nazis. But many are calling for a portion of the $70 million to be used for victims of Hitler who live in the former Soviet bloc countries and for Holocaust survivors. The Swiss will vote on a referendum that would allow the government to revalue national gold reserves and set up a $4.7 billion fund, the interest income of which would go to Holocaust survivors and to other humanitarian causes.
The Sinister Face of “Neutrality”: the Role of Swiss Financial Institutions in the Plunder of European Jewry

Switzerland’s reputation as a neutral safe-haven during World War II has been badly tarnished by recent revelations about its wartime transactions with Germany. What began as an examination of the dormant bank accounts of Holocaust victims has gained momentum to include the whole gamut of Swiss financial dealings with the Nazis. In recent months, a vast amount of incriminating documentation has been unearthed that reveals the sinister side of Swiss “neutrality.”

Switzerland served as a repository for Jewish capital smuggled out of Nazi Germany and the states threatened by it, and also for vast quantities of gold and other valuables plundered from Jews and others all over Europe. Right up until the end of the war, Switzerland laundered hundreds of millions of dollars in stolen assets, including gold taken from the central banks of German-occupied Europe. At the war’s end, Switzerland successfully resisted Allied calls to restitute these funds, and in the Washington Agreement of 1946, the Allies contented themselves with acceptance of a mere 12 percent of the stolen gold. Holocaust survivors and the heirs of those who perished met an implacable wall of bureaucracy and only a handful managed to reclaim their assets. As it turns out, some of the dormant accounts were taken by Swiss authorities to satisfy claims of Swiss nationals whose property was seized by Communist regimes in East Central Europe.

Among the most recent revelations is the fact that both the United States and the United Kingdom still retain looted gold recovered in Germany. Jewish groups and others have suggested that the gold be transferred for the benefit of Holocaust survivors.

In the last year, international pressure has steadily mounted on the Swiss to allow for the conduct of a transparent audit and investigation. U.S. Senator Alfonse D’Amato has spearheaded these efforts to force the Swiss to restitute property and has called for the Washington Agreement to be re-negotiated. In May 1996, the Swiss Bankers’ Association signed an agreement with the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJ RO) to establish the “Independent Committee of Eminent Persons” to carry out a thorough and transparent audit which will identify and recover dormant accounts. Switzerland and the United States have also established special committees to investigate the fate of plundered Jewish and other property which was secreted in Switzerland.

Background

Swiss banks have long been a favored repository of capital from unstable countries. Before the Second World War, with the rise of Nazism, many Jews in Central and East Europe sought to protect a part of their assets by depositing money in Swiss accounts, and their valuables in Swiss safe deposit boxes. To encourage such transfers, the Swiss in
1934 even strengthened special banking secrecy laws which facilitated preservation of the anonymity of depositors.

Most of the Jews who availed themselves of the opportunity to transfer their assets failed to escape the flames of the Holocaust. While happy to accept Jewish capital, the Swiss were less happy to accept Jewish refugees (often their own depositors). It is well known that the Swiss vigorously blocked the entry of Jews attempting to flee Germany and occupied Europe. In 1938, (at the suggestion of Swiss Chief of Police Heinrich Rothmund) Bern requested that Berlin mark the passports of Jews with a J so that German Jews could be instantly distinguished from German gentiles and be denied admission to Switzerland. Indeed, the great majority of those denied sanctuary in Switzerland perished in the German death camps.

Speaking about Swiss complicity in the Holocaust in 1995, Federal President Kaspar Villiger declared that “we bear a considerable burden of guilt for the treatment of Jews by our country.” This was the first official admission of any Swiss culpability for the fate of European Jewry. It took the Swiss fifty years to admit any responsibility for wrongdoing. It took the Swiss fifty-five years to exonerate (posthumously) Paul Grueninger, the police chief in the St. Gallen Canton who defied regulations and aided thousands of Austrian Jews in escaping to Switzerland. As a result of his actions, Grueninger was dismissed from the police and convicted of fraud.

After the war, when the survivors attempted to reclaim their assets, they were ensnared in a web of bureaucracy that refused to recognize the fact that death camp survivors, or the heirs of those who perished, could not possibly furnish customary documentation such as death certificates. Swiss banks strictly adhered to the rigid restrictions of Swiss banking law in total disregard of the special situation which had arisen out of the mass murder of the Jews of Europe.

**Eldorado on the Bahnhofstrasse**

The Swiss enriched themselves not just from the victims of the Shoah, but also from the perpetrators. Switzerland was the favorite haven for Nazi bank accounts and safe deposit boxes, which often contained property plundered from Jews. Swiss banks did a lucrative business with the German Reichsbank and with individual Nazi officials. Symbolically, even the royalties from Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* were deposited in a Swiss bank account.

Toward the end of the war, when other neutral states refused to purchase gold directly from Germany, Switzerland continued to carry on this highly profitable trade. That gold generally came from two sources: the gold reserves of the central banks of the occupied countries and gold taken from individuals, including gold dental fillings extracted from corpses.

Documents recently uncovered in former East German archives suggest that in 1944, SS Chief and German Interior Minister Heinrich Himmler sent a special train loaded with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of gold, jewelry and art objects to Switzerland for deposit in the vaults of Swiss banks. There is considerable evidence to suggest that these funds were originally earmarked for laying the foundations of a Fourth Reich. This scenario was first publicized in a novel by Frederick Forsyth called the *Odessa File*. As Forsyth explained, his book was based on several actual events, including a meeting by German industrialists, representing some of the leading German concerns, in Strasbourg
in November 1944. In recent months the WJC has uncovered secret documents confirming that the Maison Rouge gathering actually did take place.

At that meeting, at which SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Scheid presided, the captains of German industry were told, “From now on, German industry must realize that the war cannot be won and that it must take steps in preparation for a postwar commercial campaign.” These steps included smuggling over $100 million in gold bullion to Switzerland.

Thus, Swiss banks managed to attract and retain the assets that Jews managed to smuggle out, and much of what they did not. The latter, plundered by the Germans, was deposited in Switzerland. As it happens, not only Swiss financial institutions were beneficiaries of Jewish suffering, but Swiss commercial and industrial firms as well. For example, Bally, the celebrated Swiss shoe company, appears to have acquired shops in Germany confiscated from Jews. Diamonds stolen from over 1,000 firms in German-occupied Belgium were sold to Swiss and Spanish dealers.

Swiss art dealers trafficked in art seized from Jews and others. Britain’s chief investigator of looted art produced damning reports on the activities of the Swiss dealers. Both American and British authorities pressed for the prosecution of several of the worst offenders. Nothing, however, seems to have come of this.

World Jewish Congress efforts to force Switzerland to look into the issue of the dormant bank accounts of Holocaust victims led to a broader investigation which revealed the extent of Switzerland’s role as a depository of plundered Jewish and Allied property. Consequently, we can distinguish several types of assets which wound up in Switzerland and which are now the focus of international attention and a number of committees of inquiry:

- dormant private and corporate bank accounts and safe deposit boxes
- monetary gold plundered from the central banks of the occupied countries
- privately owned gold and other precious metals and jewels, including dental gold, much of which was melted down and intermingled with the monetary gold
- all manner of assets, “legitimate” and plundered, including art work, stashed in Switzerland by German officials and businessmen
- stolen assets bought by Swiss individuals and institutions for disposal in Switzerland or abroad
- insurance policies.

Paying a Pittance

A 1962 law compelled the banks to make what amounted to a half-hearted attempt to identify dormant accounts belonging to victims. It was up to Swiss banks themselves to determine whether or not an account fell into that category. Moreover, there was no independent supervision. Banks were not obliged to draw up a list for outside inspection. Money from depositors in East Europe (the home of the majority of Shoah victims), which had fallen under Communist control, or in the names of corporate entities (which could not, claimed the Swiss, be victims of racial persecution) were disqualified. The banks were compelled to handle only submitted claims, immediately eliminating cases in which beneficiaries or heirs did not themselves have knowledge of the existence of accounts, or were so intimidated by the bureaucracy that they never submitted claims.

A total of SF 7.5 million in 961 accounts was turned over to claimants, and an additional SF 2 million was given to the Swiss Jewish communities and a Swiss refugee orga-
nization. However, only a tiny fraction of the 7,000 cases received in response to a Swiss appeal for submission of claims were affected by this action. Safe deposit boxes were not affected by the law, nor were any of the other assets enumerated above.

Some nine years ago, in an effort to assuage critics, Union Bank of Switzerland donated U.S. $40 million to the International Red Cross (IRC) as token payment to compensate for unclaimed accounts belonging to victims of the Shoah. It is difficult to ignore the irony in the fact that the recipient of the Swiss banks’ charity was an organization particularly indifferent to the plight of European Jewry during the war, as its present President, Corneli Sommaruga, admitted publicly. Addressing the WJC-sponsored Israel Council on Foreign Relations in Jerusalem in June 1995, Sommaruga expressed his “compassion for the millions of victims of the Shoah. ... Our failure to speak out at that time was a moral defeat.” WJC Secretary General Israel Singer characterized the money given to the IRC as “a gift of money from those who did not own it to those who did not deserve it.”

For many years, the Swiss banking community had maintained that its 1962–63 payout settled once and for all the question of unclaimed Jewish assets. Last year, however, that facade began to crack. The international news media, including leading business publications such as the Wall Street Journal, Business Week and the Financial Times, devoted considerable attention to this issue. Two important Swiss banks — the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) and the Societé de Banque Suisse (SBS) — were compelled to admit that they “probably” still have the accounts of Holocaust victims on deposit. That Swiss banks used the dormant accounts in order to enrich themselves is now beyond question. Last year, there was already enough evidence of this to prompt Swiss MP Otto Piller to investigate the allegations and to submit the issue to the Swiss Parliament. The Swiss Government issued a reply which, while not admitting that the banks were engaging in such practice, did call for the banks to cooperate and facilitate the handling of claims. The Director of the Federal Banking Commission, Kurt Haud, declared that “the money remains the property of the depositors and their legal heirs” and added that the charges that banks had been appropriating such money “prejudice the reputation of the Swiss financial establishment.”

A Breach of Trust

Last year, in the face of a concerted campaign to induce the Swiss to address the issue of Holocaust-era assets in Switzerland, SBA President Georg Krayer admitted that the banks were holding Jewish assets and announced the discovery of U.S. $32 million in still dormant accounts. That figure was immediately called into question, and independent researchers believed it to be a gross underestimate. However, from the outset, the World Jewish Congress made it clear that irrespective of the amount of money that could or would be retrieved, a principle was involved. Neither Swiss banks nor any others should be allowed to benefit from the murder of their depositors. This principle was acknowledged by Swiss President Villiger at a meeting with WJC President Edgar M. Bronfman in September 1995.

Consequently, the SBA finally agreed to establish a special commission to investigate this question and appointed an ombudsman to oversee it. A central office was established to answer inquiries. Of particular importance was the pledge to create a central research center which would gather the necessary documentation in order to determine
the identity of heirs and accounts and would look into the applications with a minimum of red tape and bureaucracy. Georg Krayer claims that “banking secrecy does not obstruct the search for assets in any way.” A separate problem entirely is that of funds entrusted to law offices which were to act in a fiduciary capacity, and savings that were placed in insurance policies.

The Swiss historian Jacques Picard attributed the willingness of the Swiss bankers to deal with this issue to the international expansion of their banks: “Internationalization means banks have to adopt world standards of business ethics.” The WJC insisted on an independent and transparent audit, and the Swiss agreed.

The Swiss bankers apparently thought that they could manipulate events to suit themselves. In February 1996, in direct contravention of the understanding with the World Jewish Congress, the SBA announced, unilaterally, that it had already conducted its own (non-independent) audit and “discovered” a total of U.S. $32 million in dormant accounts in its member institutions, reiterating the figure it had publicized before concluding an agreement with the WJC. It was never made clear whether the alleged U.S. $32 million included interest on the dormant accounts.

Conservative estimates, however, placed the figure at several hundred million dollars. “This amount [announced by the SBA] defies credibility” stated Mr. Bronfman. “In any case, I told them that we weren’t interested in the money but the process. Swiss banks cannot be allowed to profit from the Holocaust.”

Washington Steps In

In late April 1996, New York Senator Alfonse D’Amato chaired a hearing on the Swiss banks issue before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Meantime, President Bill Clinton expressed his support for WJC efforts in a personal letter to Mr. Bronfman. In fact, the U.S. Government has been particularly supportive of efforts to force the Swiss to conduct a thorough, transparent investigation. Its special envoy for restitution matters, Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat, was charged with representing the United States. Under increasing pressure and eager to avert a public relations disaster (there was even talk of a boycott of Swiss financial institutions along the lines of that used against companies which did business with South Africa in the days of apartheid), the Swiss capitulated.

On 2 May 1996, Swiss banking officials signed an agreement with the World Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Restitution Organization to investigate deposits of Holocaust victims. The agreement provided for the creation a six-member commission, an “Independent Committee of Eminent Persons” to carry out a thorough audit which will identify and recover dormant accounts. This new body is composed of three Jewish representatives and three representatives of the Swiss banking establishment. The Jewish side is represented by President of the Latin American Jewish Congress Ruben Barrage, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Avraham Burg, and WJC Treasurer Ronald Lauder. The Swiss appointees are Professors Main Hirsch, Klaus Jacobi, and Curt Gasteyger. The Committee is chaired by former U.S. Federal Reserve chairman, Paul Volcker. The alternates for the Jewish side are Zvi Barak of the Jewish Agency and WJC Secretary General Israel Singer. The Swiss alternates are Hans Baer and Dr. Pieder Mengiardi. The work of the Volcker Committee is to be completed by 1998.
The Plot Thickens: “Operation Safe Haven”

The WJC investigation into Swiss banking transaction led to the discovery of incriminating evidence of Switzerland’s blatant collaboration with Nazi Germany. WJC researchers in the U.S. National Archives found declassified documents on an American intelligence project called “Operation Safe Haven.” The aim of this operation was to recover assets seized by Germany and sent to Switzerland and other neutral states.

As already noted, throughout the war, but particularly toward the end, when it became clear to German leaders that the Reich would be overrun, vast amounts of plundered property were spirited to Switzerland. Even before the end of the war, in April 1945, the U.S. Legation in Bern advised Washington that “the Swiss agreed with the Germans to accept 3,000 kilos (6,600 lbs.) of gold for use against ‘diplomatic’ services.” There are, in fact, varying estimates of the value of these assets. However, one document suggests that the Germans succeeded in seizing U.S. $587 million in gold, of which U.S. $402 million was “shipped to or through Switzerland,” truly a money-laundering operation unprecedented in scope and magnitude.

After the war, when U.S. intelligence debriefed the director of the foreign exchange department of the German Economics Ministry, it became clear that whereas all the neutral countries, out of consideration for their stance as neutrals, had refused to accept gold directly from the Reichsbank, Switzerland carded on gold transactions with Berlin until the beginning of 1945.

With the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the United States and other Allied powers attempted to secure the return of this property. However, the Swiss were less than eager to surrender their new-found economic windfall. Eventually, after several years of stonewalling by Bern, the Allies agreed to accept a paltry $60 million or about 12 percent of the value of the gold sent to Switzerland. This arrangement was formalized in the Washington Agreement of 1946. That 12 percent was transferred to the Allied Tripartite Gold Commission which was established to return monetary gold to the central banks from which it had been plundered, and later it was divided among ten Allied claimants. Thus the lion’s share of the booty enriched the coffers of Swiss financial institutions. In effect, Switzerland was handsomely rewarded for its cozy relations with Nazi Germany. Researchers believe that much of the looted gold that found its way to Switzerland was sold to third parties, notably Portugal.

Of late there have been calls, by Senator D’Amato and others, for the Allies to renegotiate the Washington Agreement which was signed in part because the Swiss had withheld information on the true magnitude of their transactions with the Germans.

Unanswered Questions

Questions remain concerning the ultimate disposition of gold sequestered by Germany’s foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who smuggled 15 tons of gold out of Berlin before the city’s fall to the Red Army. Recently declassified documents suggest that 6.5 tons of that gold was surrendered to U.S. forces and some 2 tons wound up in the hands of the British army in the German province of Schleswig-Holstein. The balance was smuggled out of Germany to various neutral countries including Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Switzerland. A part of these assets, including some which fell into the hands of Allied forces, has disappeared — at least for the time being — without a trace. SS Chief Heinrich Himmler also succeeded in smuggling plundered property to Switzerland, but
the whereabouts of this trove have never been established.

Some of the loot never made it to Switzerland. In the Merkers salt mine in Germany, for example, Allied troops discovered a cache of valuables, including bags of gold and silver coins, huge quantities of candlesticks, kiddush cups, dental fillings, jewelry, opera glasses, and other items. In a memorandum, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “the hoard may constitute items of evidence... for the prosecution of war criminals.” What is known for certain is that only a fraction of these assets were placed at the disposal of organizations working for rehabilitation of the survivors themselves. The great majority wound up in the hands of the Tripartite Gold Commission. As Mr. Bronfman noted: “Everyone was blithe about Jewish property. It wasn’t just the Swiss. That was the attitude of everyone — the Americans, the English, the French. It was as if they were saying ‘The Jews are dead, so to hell with ‘em.’ They really weren’t very concerned that lots of people were making profits from the assets of dead people.”

Under these circumstances, U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce Eizenstat called on the United States to examine its own records to see exactly what was done with the U.S. $60 million which the U.S. Government received from Switzerland and why the Allies were not more forceful in their negotiations with the Swiss. Speaking in Jerusalem in August 1996, he explained: “We know that in 1946, the Swiss Government turned a significant amount of funds over to the U.S. Government, possibly looted money. We believe that the amount was distributed. Some was kept in the U.S. Treasury; some was distributed to the Allied powers. What we do know is that none of that money went into the hands of those from whom it was looted. Just as Switzerland may have to undergo some painful examination about its role, so too will the U.S. Government.”

Since that time it has been revealed that some of the gold turned over to the U.S. — two tons in fact — has been sitting deep within the bowels of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank in New York City for close to fifty years. Describing the latest findings, Mr. Eizenstat wrote: “We are peeling back the layers of an onion.”

Questions have been raised in Britain, which was also a party to the negotiations with the Swiss and which received a lump-sum payment. The British Government initially denied any knowledge of the matter. However, pressed by MP Greville Janner who revealed the existence of declassified secret documents on the transactions, the government opened an investigation. The findings of that inquiry highlighted Bern’s refusal to return more than what the Times of London called “a fraction of the huge sum of booty hidden in Swiss vaults.” The government report confirmed that Germany looted more than $550 million in gold (now worth more than $6 billion) and dispatched most of it to Switzerland, and that only a small portion was ever returned to Allied governments. Apparently some of it (three tons) still sits in the vaults of the Bank of England. The Times described the Foreign Office report as “a fascinating account of greed, deception and double dealing. It does not admit to any British conspiracy to hide ill-gotten ingots in the Bank of England. But it does point to an almost unconscionable delay in overcoming the legal and bureaucratic obstacles that stood between the Nazis’ victims, or their heirs and representatives, and the money plundered from them to fund Hitler’s war machine.” Together with the gold in the U.S. Federal Reserve in New York, some $65 million has yet to be distributed to those from whom it was looted, or at least to their heirs.

The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) has also not emerged from this affair unscathed. Historians have revealed that the BIS was an important cog in the Reichsbank’s
money-laundering operations. The BIS bought gold from the Swiss fully cognizant of the fact that it had been looted by the Germans and sold to the Swiss. Moreover, the BIS had acted to facilitate Reichsbank gold transactions with third countries, directly aiding the German war effort.

Stealing from Peter to Pay Paul

There seems to be almost no end to the damning revelations of Switzerland’s wartime and immediate postwar financial activity — and the extent to which the Swiss are willing to try to cover their tracks. For example, attention has been focused on the fact that after the war, Switzerland concluded bilateral agreements with the Communist regimes in Poland and several other countries in East Europe. Under the terms of these arrangements, Switzerland transferred the proceeds of dormant bank accounts of Polish citizens to Swiss businessmen in order to satisfy their claims for property nationalized in Poland. This handy deal considerably simplified the clearance of Swiss claims to Swiss-owned property seized by the Communists. Although this agreement was not covert and was debated in the Swiss Parliament, until recently the Swiss Foreign Ministry vigorously denied the existence of any such accords. That denial rang hollow, however, when detailed documentation revealing the matter was published in the Swiss and foreign media.

Heirless Property: Following an Established Precedent

The question of heirless accounts is particularly troubling. Some Jews managed to secure their capital in Swiss banks, but they and their entire families were wiped out. Under those circumstances, many accounts have never been claimed. Here a precedent has already been established. In the case of property in Central and East Europe, the State of Israel and the Jewish people have come forward as the legitimate beneficiaries of those who perished leaving no heirs.

In 1992, following the precedent set by the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, leading Jewish organizations, including the WJC, B’nai B’rith, the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency, and survivors’ groups, created the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJ RO). The organization’s activities are focused on the coordination of claims for the return of communal property and the transfer of heirless holdings to the Jewish People. WJC President and WJ RO Chairman Edgar M. Bronfman and then Israeli Minister of Finance Avraham Shohat signed a memorandum in November 1992 in which the State of Israel’s special interest in the restitution of Jewish property was established. The memorandum recognized that “the State considers itself to be the natural and principal heir to Jewish public property and where there is no other heir to Jewish private property, together with the local Jewish communities and the Jewish People.”

Conclusion: “Immoral Behavior”

In recent months, Switzerland has come under heavy international attack for its behavior both during the war and after. The Times of London called Switzerland “the largest beneficiary of German gold efforts” and called its refusal to hand over that money
outrageous.” Switzerland, it claimed, had repeatedly displayed a “tidy habit of hiding away past embarrassments” and its present behavior was “immoral, selfish and unworthy of a democracy.”

As a 1946 U.S. government memorandum addressing the subject of Allied Policies for Negotiations of Looted Gold Question noted: “Allied negotiators should make it clear to the Swiss officials that the fact that specific looted gold is no longer in Swiss possession does not operate to defeat the Allied claim or hinder or impede the handing over of an equivalent amount of gold.” This principle should certainly be applied today, especially now when some in Switzerland claim that the gold in question has already been passed on to other countries — “fenced” as it were — and therefore Switzerland is no longer obliged to pay any compensation.

Clearly, in the wake of these findings, Switzerland’s neutrality in World War II must be closely examined. Given Switzerland’s recent record, there can be no letup of international pressure on the Swiss to resolve the issue of Holocaust victims’ accounts and the return of property plundered by the Germans. The number of Holocaust survivors is dwindling fast. Speedy action has to be taken in order for them to enjoy some of the benefits that may accrue from the restitution. There can be no rest until justice is done, even if its fruits are, alas, primarily posthumous ones.

The case of Switzerland highlights the fact that it is not just countries once shrouded by the Iron Curtain that have benefitted from plundered Jewish assets. Indeed, in recent months considerable evidence has emerged to indicate that property stolen from Jews in Norway, the Netherlands, France, Austria, and elsewhere was not always restituted. Countries which served as repositories for plundered property must be pressed to open their archives for investigation.

Just as other nations in Europe have been forced to confront the seamy side of their history, so too must the Swiss, no matter how embarrassing or costly. Some in Switzerland have recognized this and said as much. Swiss MP Verena Grendelmeier has spearheaded domestic efforts to open a serious investigation. Lili Nabholz, president of the lower house’s Legal Affairs Commission, told her colleagues in parliament: “What we are doing, we are doing late, but it is never too late.” Another MP, Paul Rechtsteiner, said that an investigation offered “a unique chance for Switzerland to draw up a picture of itself that is close to reality” adding that the current image was based on “self-deception and lies.” Fifty years have elapsed since the catastrophe that claimed the lives of two-thirds of the Jews of Europe — a third of world Jewry. In the face of increasing evidence of the widespread Swiss collaboration through omission and commission, justice dictates that at least the assets of the victims be restored to their heirs — and where there are none, to Israel and the Jewish people.
Switzerland's wartime and postwar actions are the subject of a number of major inquiries by Swiss and foreign investigative bodies:

**The Volcker Commission**
Also known as the “Independent Committee of Eminent Persons,” this commission is overseeing the work of three international auditing companies (Arthur Andersen, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Price Waterhouse) which are probing millions of names in Swiss bank accounts, looking to identify and recover dormant accounts of victims of Nazi Germany. Auditors will have unrestricted access to accounts opened before, during, and immediately after World War II. The investigation is to be completed by June 1998.

The Volcker Commission was established in May 1996 by formal agreement between the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA), the World Jewish Congress (WJC), and the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJ RO). Three of its members are from Jewish organizations, three from SBA and the chairman is Paul Volcker, former U.S. Federal Reserve chairman. The audits are being paid for by the SBA. In conjunction with the investigation, the Swiss Parliament passed legislation which waives the customary Swiss banking secrecy for the next five years.

**United States Inter-Agency Inquiry**
Eleven U.S. government agencies carried out a review of Swiss conduct during and after the war under the direction of U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart Eizenstat. The “preliminary” report, called the Eizenstat Report (full text available online at <http://www.ushmm.org/index.html>), was issued May 1997 and harshly criticized Switzerland, concluding that its government deliberately failed to respect a 1946 agreement to return hundreds of millions of dollars in monetary gold and other assets that Nazi Germany looted from European banks and Holocaust victims.

The report asserted that Swiss bankers were indifferent to the needs of the Holocaust victims and their heirs until pressured to take actions. It also faulted the Truman Administration for settling for token reparations from Switzerland due to pressures to focus on the emerging Soviet threat.

**The Bergier Commission**
Officially called the Independent Commission of Experts, this group was established by the Swiss Parliament and is headed by Jean-Francois Bergier, an economic historian. The Commission is made up of Polish, American, Israeli, and Swiss historians whose task is to conduct a major review of the entire historical relationship of Switzerland to Nazi Germany.
The Swiss Foreign Ministry “Assets of Nazi Victims” Task Force

This group was created in October 1996 to coordinate and help with the activities of all the groups and organizations, foreign and Swiss, investigating lost assets of Nazi victims. It is a 30-member team of people headed by diplomat Thomas Borer.

The Swiss Foreign Ministry Inquiry

This group will probe Switzerland’s bilateral agreements with Poland, Hungary, and other East European countries. Two Swiss historians are authorized to review accords under which dormant Swiss bank accounts were turned over to Swiss nationals to settle claims for nationalized property.

U.S. Senate Banking Committee

Senator Alfonse D’Amato has chaired several hearings on the issue of looted assets held in Switzerland, the first one held in April of 1996. These hearings spurred the U.S. government to launch a major U.S. interagency inquiry which produced the May 1997 “Eizenstat Report.”

The British Foreign Office

It conducted a 1996 inquiry into what became of gold secreted in Switzerland. Its published findings can be found at the web site of the British Information Services. The report confirmed that Germany looted more than $550 million (value at that time) in gold and sent most of it to Switzerland. Only a small portion was ever returned to Allied governments.

The Polish Foreign Ministry

It has started an investigation of the accord with Switzerland whereby Switzerland gave Poland inheritance rights to assets held in Switzerland belonging to Polish citizens. (Switzerland had a similar accord with Hungary.)

Other Countries: Sweden, Spain, Portugal, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Brazil, and Argentina

These countries have created historical commissions to investigate the issue of assets looted by Nazi Germany.

In Addition

The Eizenstat report of May 1997 said the United States would explore the idea of an international conference on the flow of Nazi assets after the war and said it would be important to have German Reichsbank records available for tracing records. Britain’s new Labor government offered in May 1997 to host such a conference, and Switzerland welcomed the idea.

Three class-action lawsuits have been brought against Switzerland’s banks on behalf of Holocaust victims and their heirs. In March 1997, a Brooklyn Federal judge ruled that the lawsuits be consolidated and administered by a ten-member executive committee. There are thousands of plaintiffs in these lawsuits seeking damages in the billions of dollars.
Press Reactions to the *Frontline* program on Nazi Gold

**From the Chicago Tribune by Steve Johnson**

“One of the most compelling current stories has its roots in events of five and six decades earlier: the soul-searing debate over the questions of Swiss complicity in the Nazi regime’s killing and looting of its victims.

“With typical timeliness, PBS’s vigorous *Frontline* documentary series examines the issue ... echoing and adding to the chorus of doubts that previous reports have raised about World War II and Switzerland’s reputation for neutrality.

“... The documentary raises anew charges that Switzerland allowed German train cars full of Jews bound for death camps to travel through the country — charges Borer also denies.

“The film’s taking-off point is the efforts of Edgar Bronfman, the Seagram’s liquor heir and president of the World Jewish Congress, who two years ago began efforts to try to recover Jewish money that had been deposited in Swiss banks before the war and had seemingly disappeared afterward.”

**From the San Diego Union Tribune by Robert P. Laurence**

“While much of the story has been reported piecemeal in the last few months, Nazi Gold a co-production by *Frontline* and the BBC, wraps it in a single, coherent package and adds historical perspective and new details.

“... Skilled in the editing of film for maximum impact, Olgiati alternates historical black-and-white film of Hitler and emaciated bodies in Nazi death camps with modern, color shots of snow-covered Swiss mountains and picturesque villages. Most haunting in the context of the film’s subject is a single shot of a peaceful; idyllic Swiss meadow, partially covered by snow, seen through barbed-wire fence.”

**From the New York Times by Walter Goodman**

“Nazi Gold will do nothing to shine up Switzerland’s image, much tarnished in the past year by allegations that money deposited in its banks in the 1930s by Europe’s threatened Jews has vanished. A lawyer who is suing the Swiss Government on behalf of Jewish survivors and the families of those who did not survive says drily, ‘It was the only safe place to put money.’

“... More than half a century after the war, documents are few and memories cannot be confirmed. Although tonight’s wartime photographs make their own case against the Swiss, they are evidence mainly of the producers’ skill in putting together a strong documentary. So some of the charges advanced here seem shaky, while others are only too plausible and along with the recent revelations do little credit to the Swiss notion of neutrality.

“...Beyond the story of the suit, Nazi Gold documents Swiss collusion with the Nazis in arms production. *Frontline* makes its point clear — under the guise of neutrality, the Swiss, out of fear of invasion, conspired with the Germans, and Swiss neutrality was a myth.”
“The season’s final installment of the PBS series Frontline, tonight’s Nazi Gold, could best be described as a work in progress. It tackles the subject of possible Swiss complicity in Nazi war crimes but doesn’t deliver a verdict. Technically, that’s because the class-action suit filed by families of war survivors against Swiss banks is still pending. Practically, it’s because any challenge to the long-held notion of Swiss neutrality is met with lots of resistance and very little evidentiary support.

“Some of these allegations are backed only by testimony from witnesses and family survivors; others are being pursued and proven in the courts. The highlight of Nazi Gold comes when one Swiss bank official is confronted with proof about the existence of one wartime account. The official confirms that it existed and that one tiny withdrawal was made from it by a business partner — but that’s it.”

“The Swiss banking story has made the nightly newscast in recent months. But this heavily documented Frontline report is the first in-depth television coverage. The documentary, in typical Frontline style, doesn’t skirt the issues regarding Switzerland’s relationship to Nazi Germany and her financial actions against the Jews.

“... In addition to the Swiss financial wheelings-and-dealings, perhaps the most riveting segments of Nazi Gold deal with the internal political events that allowed Switzerland’s border police to turn fleeing Jews away and into the hands of the Gestapo.”

“Nazi Gold, the Frontline season finale, provides a close examination of Switzerland’s role in the theft of Jewish savings, but also goes well beyond that, indicating that the Swiss played a much greater role in the rise of Nazi Germany than previously recognized.

“... The film provides a number of chilling accounts of how Jews were robbed and their savings sent to Switzerland for deposit.

“... Still, tonight’s film presents some evidence that Switzerland profited enormously as a nation by allowing German businessmen to travel in and out of the country without interference and by helping the Nazi regime convert gold stolen from Jews and from the banks of conquered nations into convertible funds.”

“The documentary examines how Germany acquired hard currency in Switzerland in exchange for looted gold, some of which was literally pulled from the teeth of their victims. The head of the Nazi State Bank said the German economy would collapse within two months without the help of the Swiss.

“... In the show, some of the people interviewed admit the country made a wrong turn, but others continue to rationalize or explain away these problems.

“‘The Swiss bitterly resent that foreigners are calling their history into question,’ said Olgiati.”
On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the full text of which appears in the following pages. Following this historic act, the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and “to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories.”

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10.
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed, nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state.

**Article 17.**
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

**Article 18.**
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

**Article 19.**
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

**Article 20.**
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

**Article 21.**
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

**Article 22.**
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

**Article 23.**
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration, ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

**Article 24.**
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

**Article 25.**
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

**Article 26.**
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

**Article 27.**
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interest resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28.
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
RESOURCE 13
Basic Rights of the German Basic Law

Source: The Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany
English translation revised by the Federal Ministers of the Interior, Justice and
Finance, July 1991
Reprinting permitted

Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic of Germany
(Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on May 23, 1949, as Amended by the

Conscious of their responsibility before God and Men, animated by the resolve to serve
world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people have adopted, by
virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law.

The Germans in the Länder of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg,
Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North-Rhine-
Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein,
and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-deter-
mination. This Basic Law is thus valid for the entire German People.

1. Basic Rights (Articles 1–19)

Article 1 (Protection of human dignity).
(1) The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state author-
ity.

(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as
the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.

(3) The following basic rights bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as di-
rectly enforceable law.

Article 2 (Rights of liberty).
(1) Everyone has the right to the free development of his personality insofar as he does not
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code.

(2) Everyone has the right to life and to inviolability of his person. The freedom of the
individual is inviolable. These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law.
Article 3 (Equality before the law).
(1) All persons are equal before the law.

(2) Men and women have equal rights.

(3) No one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith or his religious or political opinions.

Article 4 (Freedom of faith, of conscience and of creed).
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed religious or ideological, are inviolable.

(2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.

(3) No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service as an armed combatant. Details will be regulated by a Federal law.

Article 5 (Freedom of expression).
(1) Everyone has the right freely to express and to disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by radio and motion pictures are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.

(2) These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection of youth and by the right to inviolability of personal honor.

(3) Art and science, research and teaching are free. Freedom of teaching does not absolve from loyalty to the constitution.

Article 6 (Rights of the family).
(1) Marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state.

(2) Care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the parents and a duty primarily incumbent on them. The state watches over the performance of this duty.

(3) Separation of children from the family against the will of the persons entitled to bring them up may take place only pursuant to a law, if those so entitled fail in their duty or if the children are otherwise threatened with neglect.

(4) Every mother is entitled to the protection and care of the community.

(5) Illegitimate children shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for their physical and spiritual development and their position in society as are enjoyed by legitimate children.
Article 7 (Education).
(1) The entire education system is under the supervision of the state.

(2) The persons entitled to bring up a child have the right to decide whether they shall receive religious instruction.

(3) Religious instruction forms part of the ordinary curriculum in state and municipal schools, excepting secular schools. Without prejudice to the state's right of supervision, religious instruction is given in accordance with the tenets of the religious communities. No teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious instruction.

(4) The right to establish private schools is guaranteed. Private schools as a substitute for state or municipal schools, require the approval of the state and are subject to the laws of the Länder. This approval must be given if private schools are not inferior to the state or municipal schools in their educational aims, their facilities and the professional training of their teaching staff, and if a segregation of the pupils according to the means of the parents is not promoted. This approval must be withheld if the economic and legal position of the teaching staff is not sufficiently assured.

(5) A private elementary school shall be admitted only if the educational authority finds that it serves a special pedagogic interest or if, on the application of persons entitled to bring up children, it is to be established as an interdenominational or denominational or ideological school and a state or municipal elementary school of this type does not exist in the community.

(6) Preparatory schools remain abolished.

Article 8 (Freedom of assembly).
(1) All Germans have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior notification or permission.

(2) With regard to open-air meetings this right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law.

Article 9 (Freedom of association).
(1) All Germans have the right to form associations and societies.

(2) Associations, the objects or activities of which conflict with the criminal laws or which are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, are prohibited.

(3) The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades and professions. Agreements which restrict or seek to hinder this right are null and void; measures directed to this end are illegal.
Article 10 (Privacy of letters, posts, and telecommunications; amended 24 June 1968).
(1) Privacy of letters, posts, and telecommunications shall be inviolable.

(2) Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a statute. Where a restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation, the statute may stipulate that the person affected shall not be informed of such restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies appointed by Parliament.

Article 11 (Freedom of movement).
(1) All Germans enjoy freedom of movement throughout the Federal territory.

(2) This right may be restricted only by or pursuant to a statute, and only in cases in which an adequate basis of existence is lacking and special burdens would arise to the community, or in which the restriction is necessary to avert an imminent danger to the existence or the free democratic basic order of the Federation or a Land, to combat the danger of epidemics, to deal with natural disasters or particularly grave accidents, to protect young people from neglect or to prevent crime.

Article 12 (Right to choose an occupation, prohibition of forced labor; amended March 19, 1956).
(1) All Germans have the right freely to choose their trade or profession their place of work and their place of training. The practice of trades and professions may be regulated by law.

(2) No one may be compelled to perform a particular work except within the framework of a traditional compulsory public service which applies generally and equally to all. Anyone who refuses on conscientious grounds to render war service involving the use of arms may be required to render an alternative service. The duration of this alternative service shall not exceed the duration of military service. Details shall be regulated by a law which shall not prejudice freedom of conscience and shall provide also for the possibility of an alternative service having no connection with any unit of the Armed Forces.

(3) Women shall not be required by law to render service in any unit of the Armed Forces. On no account shall they be employed in any service involving the use of arms.

(4) Forced labor may be imposed only in the event that a person is deprived of his freedom by the sentence of a court.

Article 12a (Liability to military and other service; added 24 June 1968).
(1) Men who have attained the age of 18 years may be required to serve in the Armed Forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a civil defense organization.

(2) A person who refuses, on grounds of conscience, to render war service involving the use of arms may be required to render a substitute service. The duration of such substitute
service shall not exceed the duration of military service. Details shall be regulated by a statute which shall not interfere with freedom to take a decision based on conscience and shall also provide for the possibility of a substitute service not connected with units of the Armed Forces or of the Federal Border Guard.

(3) Persons liable to military service who are not required to render service pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article may, during a state of defense (Verteidigungsfall), be assigned by or pursuant to a statute to an employment involving civilian services for defense purposes, including the protection of the civilian population; it shall, however, not be permissible to assign persons to an employment subject to public law except for the purpose of discharging police functions or such other functions of public administration as can only be discharged by persons employed under public law. Persons may be assigned to an employment — as referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph — with the Armed forces, including the supplying and servicing of the latter, or with public administrative authorities; assignments to employment connected with supplying and servicing the civilian population shall not be permissible except in order to meet their vital requirements or to guarantee their safety.

(4) Where, during a state of defense, civilian service requirements in the civilian health system or in the stationary military hospital organization cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between eighteen and fifty-five years of age may be assigned to such services by or pursuant to a statute. They may on no account render service involving the use of arms.

(5) Prior to the existence of a state of defense, assignments, under paragraph 3 of this Article may only be made where the requirements of paragraph 1 of Article 80a are satisfied. It shall be admissible to require persons by or pursuant to a statute to attend training courses in order to prepare them for the performance of such services in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article as require special knowledge or skills. To this extent, the first sentence of this paragraph shall not apply.

(6) Where, during a state of defense, staffing requirements for the purposes referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 3 of this Article cannot be met on a voluntary basis, the right of a German to quit the pursuit of his occupation or quit his place of work may be restricted by or pursuant to a statute in order to meet these requirements. The first sentence of paragraph 5 of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis prior to the existence of a state of defense.

Article 13 (Inviolability of the home).

(1) The home is inviolable.

(2) Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of danger in delay, by other organs as provided by law and may be carried out only in the form prescribed by law.

(3) Otherwise, this inviolability may be encroached upon or restricted only to avert a common danger or a mortal danger to individuals, or, pursuant to a law, to prevent immi-
nent danger to public security and order, especially to alleviate the housing shortage, to combat the danger of epidemics or to protect endangered juveniles.

**Article 14 (Property, right of inheritance, taking of property).**

(1) Property and the rights of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits are determined by the laws.

(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.

(3) Expropriation is permitted only in the public weal. It may take place only by or pursuant to law which provides for kind and extent of the compensation. The compensation shall be determined upon just consideration of the public interest and of the interests of the persons affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts.

**Article 15 (Socialization).**

Land, natural resources and means of production may for the purpose of socialization be transferred into public ownership or other forms of publicly controlled economy by a law which provides for kind and extent of the compensation. With respect to such compensation Article 14, paragraph 3, sentences 3 and 4, apply mutatis mutandis.

**Article 16 (Deprivation of citizenship, extradition, right of asylum).**

(1) No one may be deprived of his German citizenship. Loss of citizenship may arise only pursuant to a law, and against the will of the person affected it may arise only if such person does not thereby become stateless.

(2) No German may be extradited to a foreign country. Persons persecuted for political reasons enjoy the right of asylum.

**Article 17 (Right of petition).**

Everyone has the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to the competent authorities and to the representative assemblies.

**Article 17a (Restriction of individual basic rights through legislation enacted for defense purposes and concerning substitute service; amended March 19, 1956).**

(1) Laws concerning military services and alternative service may by provisions applying to members of the Armed Forces and of alternative services during their period of military or alternative service, restrict the basic right freely to express and to disseminate opinions by speech, writing, and pictures (Article 5, paragraph 1, first half-sentence), the basic right of assembly (Article 9), and the right of petition (Article 17) insofar as it permits to address requests or complaints jointly with others.

(2) Laws for defense purposes, including the protection of the civilian population may provide for the restriction of the basic rights of freedom of movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).
Article 18 (Forfeiture of basic rights).
Whoever abuses freedom of opinion, in particular freedom of the press (Article 5, paragraph 1), freedom of teaching (Article 5, paragraph 3), freedom of assembly (Article 8), freedom of association (Article 9), the secrecy of mail posts and telecommunications (Article 10), property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article 16, paragraph 2) in order to attack the free democratic basic order, forfeits these basic rights. The forfeiture and its extent are pronounced by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Article 19 (Restriction of Basic Rights).
(1) Insofar as under this Basic Law a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, the law must apply generally and not solely to an individual case. Furthermore the law must name the basic right, indicating the Article.

(2) In no case may a basic right be infringed upon in its essential content.

(3) The basic rights apply also to corporations established under German Public law to the extent that the nature of such rights permits.

(4) Should any person's right be violated by public authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him. If no other court has jurisdiction, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts.
RESOURCE 14
Spotlight on Hate Crimes

Source: German Information Center
950 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022-2781
Phone: (212) 888-9840
October 1998
Reprinting permitted

Combating Right-Wing Violence and Hate Crimes in Germany

Statistics and Background
Violent offenses with proven or suspected right-wing motivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of violent offenses</th>
<th>Change from previous year</th>
<th>Cases of murder</th>
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<td>309</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>+383%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2,639</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>-33%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>-30%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>-40%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>+27%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(all statistics provided by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)

Following four years of steady decline, violent offenses with proven or suspected right-wing motivation increased from 1996 to 1997. Only a very small number of perpetrators are motivated by a coherent right-wing ideology. In fact, most are not members of a political group or party.

The rise appears to reflect a general increase in youth crime, with youths and young adults involved in two-thirds of the crimes. In addition, particularly in Germany’s eastern region, difficult economic conditions play a role in the increased violence. Uncertain and fearful about their futures, some teenagers have taken out their frustrations on those perceived as weaker or different.

Violent offenses include hate-crimes against foreigners (462) and crimes aimed at political opponents (114). They also count the 11 violent offenses motivated by anti-Semitism, a figure unchanged from 1996.

Historical and Social Context
Despite the increase in offenses seen in 1997, the figures are still below levels con-
nected with communism’s disintegration in the early 1990s. The relatively lower levels reflect the German government’s and people’s ongoing efforts to limit the growth of right-wing activities.

In 1994, the government introduced tough laws aimed at curtailing extremist organizations and anti-foreigner violence (see “Government Countermeasures” below). Combined with widespread educational efforts, these changes led to a fall in the number of right-wing offenses in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. These measures to foster tolerance and combat violence continue and will be intensified.

The increases in right-wing-motivated offenses in 1991 and 1992 were clearly linked with the dramatic changes in Germany and Europe around that period. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and the communist government in eastern Germany rapidly and unexpectedly broke down. German reunification followed shortly in October 1990, which led to the complete replacement of familiar social and economic structures in the eastern part of Germany.

At the same time, throughout Central and Eastern Europe, communist governments collapsed and societies were in transition. This instability contributed to approximately one million foreigners and ethnic Germans immigrating to Germany in 1992, half of whom sought asylum. Though Germany is 25 times smaller than the United States, that year it took in the same number of immigrants and asylum-seekers as the United States. This dramatic influx, combined with a recession and high unemployment in Germany, created tension and anti-foreigner feelings in some segments of German society.

With the most lenient asylum laws in Europe, Germany faced insupportable immigration growth. As a result, in 1993, Germany brought its laws closer to those of other Western nations. Even with these changes, the following year Germany still accepted around 50 percent of all asylum-seekers in Europe, “by far the highest load of any European country,” according to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees.

**Popular Support for Foreign Residents**

Currently Germany has a resident foreigner population of 7.2 million, or nearly 9 percent of the total population of 81 million.

At the height of right-wing violence in the winter of 1992-93, more than 3 million Germans joined candlelight marches in Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Bonn, and many other cities to show their support for foreigners living in Germany.

In May 1994, one year following the arson attack that killed five Turks, a monument was dedicated in Solingen to the memory of the victims.

Each year, discussions, displays, films, and other cultural events are held during Woche des ausländischen Mitbürger (Week of Foreign Fellow Citizens). Events across the country focus on the contributions to society made by individuals from various cultural backgrounds now living in Germany. Begun in 1983 as the successor to an earlier one-day event held annually since 1970, the celebration is sponsored by trade unions, church groups, civil rights organizations, and political groups.

**Right-Wing Organizations and Their Followers**

In 1997 the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) recorded 48,400 Germans with extreme right-wing leanings (.06 percent of the population), of whom 7,600 are classified as militant right-wingers (mostly
Skinheads). There are 109 radical right-wing organizations or groups in Germany.

These figures include the right-wing parties, the Republikaners (REP), which claimed 15,500 members in 1997, and the German People’s Union (DVU), which claimed 15,000. Neither party has ever had members elected to the Federal Parliament. In the October 1998 federal elections, the REPs received only 1.9 percent of the vote and the DVU got 1.2 percent.

**Government Countermeasures: Ban on Right-Wing Parties and Groups**

According to the Basic Law (Germany’s constitution), political parties and groups that seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order, or endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, are unconstitutional. Only Germany’s Constitutional Court has the power to ban such organizations.

Banned right-wing groups include: The Nationalistische Front (NF), Deutsche Alternative (DA), Nationale Offensive (NO), Deutscher Kameradschaftsbund (DKB), Nationaler Block, Heimattreue Vereinigung Deutschland (HVD), Freundeskreis Freiheit für Deutschland (FFD), Wiking-Jugend, Freiheitliche Arbeiterpartei (FAP) and Nationale Liste.

The Republikaner Party, the German People’s Union, and the Nationale Partei Deutschlands (NPD) are under close surveillance by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

**Police and Legal Efforts**

On December 1, 1994, Germany’s “Crime Prevention Laws” took effect. Targeted in large part against extremist organizations and anti-foreigner violence, the legislation introduced new criminal laws and toughened existing penalties. In addition, in certain cases it expedited criminal prosecution. The legislation effectively

- broadened the definition of incitement of violence and racial hatred to include statements defaming whole groups and minorities
- outlawed the use of any Nazi-like flags, badges, uniforms, slogans, or gestures (the use or replication of actual Nazi material or gestures has been banned since 1945)
- increased penalties for crimes involving personal injury
- established special anti-extremist police units
- set up a central communications network to coordinate information on suspects’ movements
- broadened legal grounds for holding suspected and repeat offenders.

In Germany it is a federal crime punishable by up to five years in prison to deny the Holocaust’s existence. Since 1945, the production and distribution of Nazi memorabilia and propaganda, including leaflets, posters, and newspapers, have been illegal in Germany.

**American Neo-Nazi Ties**

German officials estimate that American organizations produce and send 85 percent of all the outlawed neo-Nazi material found in Germany. In December 1993 and again in October 1995, Germany urged the U.S. to prevent American right-wingers from publishing and sending anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi material to Germany. A prominent German human rights group, Project “Against Forgetting — For Democracy,” is also active on this
issue. In October 1996, it appealed to the U.S. to intervene and asked U.S. authorities to provide legal assistance to German investigations of American neo-Nazi activities in Germany.

In August 1996, German courts convicted Gary Lauck, an American neo-Nazi and the main supplier of propaganda to German neo-Nazis for about 20 years. Lauck was sentenced to four years in prison for inciting racial hatred and disseminating illegal propaganda in Germany. Since his arrest and conviction, the amount of neo-Nazi propaganda reaching Germany from the U.S. has dramatically decreased.

Lauck had based his operations in Lincoln, Nebraska. In December 1994, the city of Lincoln, Nebraska, passed a resolution initiated by the German-American Heritage Society that condemned Lauck’s ideas and disassociated the city from any neo-Nazi activities. The governor of Nebraska did the same on the state’s behalf in June 1995.

Education and Open Information Policy

Teaching about Nazism and the Holocaust is compulsory for all types of schools at all education levels.

The federal and state governments have joined with trade unions, corporations, and sports associations to educate the public about the dangers of intolerance. The governments sponsor seminars and public discussions designed to foster a government-citizen partnership to address this important issue. Teachers, parents’ groups, community liaison representatives, and school paper editors are all involved in a variety of educational and public awareness campaigns aimed at reaching young people. Students work with classroom materials that explore the causes of right-wing activity, xenophobia, and violence and ask them to reflect on ways to combat such negative behavior.

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Criminal Police Office collect and publish on a regular basis comprehensive data about hate crimes and other forms of right-wing violence in Germany.

Major Incidents

**August 1992, Rostock**: arson attack against an asylum shelter

**November 1992, Mölln**: three Turks are killed in an arson attack

**May 1993, Solingen**: five Turks are killed in an arson attack

**March 1994, May 1995, Lübeck**: arson attacks against a synagogue

Prosecution

**December 1993, Mölln**: one arsonist was sentenced to life in prison, and the other received the maximum juvenile sentence of 10 years.

**October 1995, Solingen**: the one adult received 15 years, and the three juveniles received maximum sentences of 10 years.

**April 1995, Lübeck**: four arsonists were sentenced to terms ranging from two-and-a-half years to four-and-a-half years.
No country can live without foreigners.  
That is no longer possible on this Earth.

— Assem El Ammry, an Egyptian citizen who has lived in Bonn with his family since 1986

Abstract

This IN basic information describes how foreigners live and work in Germany, how they cope with their problems, and who supports them in doing so. It deals in particular with the educational and vocational training situation of the so-called “third generation” of foreigners, gives a comprehensive view of Germany’s policy on foreigners, and also covers such subjects as crime among foreigners and xenophobia among Germans.

Foreigners as an Integrative Part of German Society

Of the some 82 million people who live in Germany, 7.3 million (8.9 percent) are foreign nationals. In percentage terms, that is Europe’s fifth greatest proportion of resident foreigners, after Luxembourg, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria.

Every fourth non-German — a total of 1.8 million people — comes from a member country of the European Union (EU). Since the dismantling of internal EU borders, non-German EU citizens also enjoy full freedom of movement in Germany. If they can present a contract to work in Germany, they have a legal right to a residence permit. They may not be disadvantaged on account of their nationality, have a right to all State social security benefits, and can vote in municipal elections.

More than one-quarter of the foreign community in Germany comes from Turkey. In recent years, the proportion of people from former Yugoslavia and the Eastern European countries has risen markedly.

The present composition of the foreign population is due mainly to former West Germany’s “economic miracle” of the 1950s. At that time, German entrepreneurs were badly in need of labour. In order not to endanger economic growth, the Federal Labour Office began purposeful recruitment of “guest workers” in southern Europe and Korea. In those days, there was no debate worth mentioning about alternatives and social consequences. Employment of foreigners was seen as a “temporary phenomenon.” By 1964,
there were already about one million foreign workers in former West Germany. By 1973, there were 2.6 million, who together with their families totaled four million people.

The itinerant workers saw an opportunity to escape the difficulties in their homelands. They perceived themselves not as classic emigrants, who intentionally leave their own countries in order to begin a new life in another. Their goal was to earn as much money as possible as soon as possible so that they could make a materially better and more secure life for themselves and their families when they returned home.

Many of these workers did indeed return to their homelands. Others, some supported by their employers, wanted to stay permanently, and from the mid-1960s they began to bring their wives and children to Germany. Since then, the proportion of the resident foreign population in Germany has risen steadily. Thus, during the last four decades several million people have found a new home in Germany.

Foreign workers were also employed in former East Germany, if to a lesser extent and subject to time limits. Like the “guest workers” in the Federal Republic, they worked mostly in jobs in the manufacturing sector for which Germans had little liking, especially shift work. The recruited foreigners were also required to return to their homelands when their employment contracts expired. In the meantime, their families were not permitted to join them. At the end of 1989, a total of 191,200 non-Germans was resident in East Germany, a foreigner ratio of 1.2 percent.

Today, about 30 percent of all foreigners in Germany have been resident here for 20 years or more. Half of them have lived in Germany for more than 10 years. They have relatives and friends in Germany. More than two-thirds of their children were born and raised here. The former “guest workers” and their families have become fellow-citizens, permanent residents with foreign nationalities, and thus an established part of German society.

### The 10 Largest National Groups (December 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>As percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>2,014,311</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslav (Serbia/Montenegro)</td>
<td>797,754</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>586,089</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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</table>

In regional terms, the foreign community is concentrated in the industrial conurbations of the Länder (states) of North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg, the Rhine-Main-Neckar rivers region, and in the western part of Berlin. Three-quarters of the resident foreigners live in these areas. Almost every second non-German lives in a big city with 100,000 or more inhabitants. Frankfurt-am-Main has a foreign contingent of 30 percent, the highest of all big German cities. Stuttgart’s foreign community accounts for 23.8 percent of its population, and in Munich the ratio is 23.4 percent.
Foreigners in Germany now work as, among other professions, doctors, academics and scientists, entrepreneurs, and social workers. They involve themselves in trade unions, social policy initiatives, and sports associations, and run for election to municipal advisory committees on foreigner affairs. They also even get “crowned” as Carnival Princes (the “Royalty” of the annual Rhineland Carnival season whose strongholds are the cities of Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Mainz). Over the years, they have built up numerous organizations of their own in Germany. The Turkish community in particular now has an extensive social infrastructure, including football clubs, workers’ associations, and many hundreds of mosque associations of different branches of Islam, which also have their own kindergartens and chain stores.

There is now hardly an area in German social and working life where one does not come across foreign-born people and/or their children. Notable examples of that are the actresses and authors Renan Demirkan and Emine Sevgi Özdamar, the TV journalists Cherno Jobatey and Ranga Yogeshwar, the footballers Anthony Yeboah and Krazimir Balakov, and the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) MPs Leyla Onur (Social Democratic Party) and Cem Özdemir (Alliance 90/Greens).

Parliamentarian Özdemir, who received German citizenship at age 16, describes himself an “Anatolian Swabian.” That underlines his view of how inappropriate it is to label the second and third generation — the children and grandchildren of the “guest workers” — as foreigners. He says it also shows how heterogeneous German society has become.

**Foreigners as an Economic Factor**

Foreigners enrich life in Germany not only in human and cultural terms. They are also an important macroeconomic and labour market factor and make a decisive contribution to social security.

They have a right to unemployment benefit and social assistance, rent subsidies, and children’s allowances because they fulfill their obligations as taxpayers and the socially insured. Foreign workers pay income tax and, on account of their younger age structure, pay three times as much into the old age pension fund as they get out of it. They also help to finance the cost of German unification via the so-called solidarity surcharge on income tax which is levied to pay for the reconstruction of former East Germany.

Besides that, foreigners support the domestic economy, and as taxpayers, consumers, tenants, and the self-employed, contribute to increasing Germany’s Gross Domestic Product. The money they remitted to their homelands in the early years of their employment here is now spent mostly in Germany on daily necessities, durable consumer goods, and insurance premiums, and also for home-buying and business investment.

**Employees and the Self-employed**

Foreigners arriving in Germany today find a difficult economic situation. It is no longer defined by a shortage of labour, but by a downsizing of workforces. Many low-skilled jobs in particular have been scrapped by rationalization and automation. In addition, local labour offices offer what jobs are available first to Germans and then to other EU citizens. Thus, in mid 1997, the unemployment rate of more than 20 percent among foreigners in Germany was almost double that of western Germans. But on average they are out of work for shorter periods than are Germans. The foreigners are more willing than the Germans to accept jobs with lower status and pay than their previous employ-
Despite the tight jobs situation, a general reduction in hiring foreigners would face certain economic sectors with insoluble problems in replacing them. The corresponding potential in German workers would, at best, be available only in arithmetical terms. For example, many German jobless previously had service sector jobs such as salespersons and office workers, while foreigners work predominantly in manufacturing. About 75 percent of all foreigners in Germany do jobs for which no Germans can be found.

The majority of the around 2.1 million foreigners at work in Germany are officially employed workers who are obliged to pay social security contributions. In 1995, 64.5 percent were blue-collar workers, and 26.5 percent white-collar employees. The main area of their employment remains manufacturing, especially in the steel, mechanical engineering, motor vehicle, textiles, electro-technology, and chemicals industries.

The economic integration of foreigners in Germany is manifested above all in their increasing founding of their own enterprises. In 1990, the number of self-employed among working non-Germans was 144,000. Now there are around 270,000 self-employed foreigners, whose businesses also create jobs for German workers. Their preferred branches have for many years been catering, retailing, tailoring, shoemaking, and repairing. Now more and more of them are engaged in trade and other service sectors, including transport.

Since the 1980s, the foreigners’ trend to becoming self-employed entrepreneurs has been most marked among the Turks in Germany. The tighter German labour market has accelerated this development. Thus, 42,000 Turkish entrepreneurs are now active in a total of 55 branches, including tourism, import-export, food wholesaling, building, and freight shipping, compared with 30,000 in 1988. Most of their businesses are small to medium-sized with an average of six employees, but their turnovers are notable. In 1996, Germany’s 10,000 Turkish snack bars alone achieved sales totaling DM 3.6 billion, more than the McDonald’s fast-food chain here.

However, one-third of the Turkish entrepreneurs fail in the first two years of trading. That is why, for example, the government of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia has set up five transfer centres across the State aimed at helping to integrate foreigners’ businesses in the region’s economic structure. The centres advise new entrepreneurs on commercial law issues, help them find promotional funds, and assist them to prepare for loan negotiations with banks.

The most successful Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany include Aydin Yardimci, Europe’s leading wholesaler of lamb, and the major clothing businessman Kemal Sahin. The latter was also the main initiator of the Association of Turkish Traders and Industrialists in Europe (ATIAD), which was founded in 1992 by 25 Turkish-born entrepreneurs in Germany. “We contributed to the EU’s customs union with Turkey being approved by the European Parliament in Strasbourg in December 1995 by a large majority,” he says proudly. The ATIAD estimates that the proportion of self-employed among Turks living in Germany will rise from a current 6 percent to equal that of the Germans, around 9 percent, by 2010.

School Pupils, Apprentices, and University Students

There are now more than 1.6 million foreign children and young adults living in Germany, 75 percent of them from the six main countries of origin. Almost half of them are Turkish nationals. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the children of migrants have
accounted for an average of 10 to 15 percent of all births in Germany. Thus, in 1996, of every 100 children born in Germany, 13 were of foreign origin.

Today, two-thirds of all non-German children and young adults under 18 in Germany were born here. Most of them will also grow up in Germany, go to kindergartens and schools, take vocational training, work, marry, and in turn have “foreign” children. Statistically, they will still be registered as foreigners, although they see themselves predominantly as children of this country and wish to stay here.

The situation of foreign children and young adults differs in essential points from that of their German peer group. It is defined by linguistic and educational problems, as well as their belonging to different cultures. Often, they know the countries of origin of their parents or grandparents only from holidays there, and their German is better than their mother tongue. While not rejecting their parental traditions and cultural influences, many young foreigners wish for the freedoms enjoyed by their German contemporaries. Their attempt to realize this claim and achieve a compromise between their own interests and those of their parents, as well as those of German society, illustrates very clearly the demands integration make on migrant children and young adults.

Germany’s demographic development shows how important it is that precisely these children find their place in German educational, working, and social life. Germany’s population is on average getting ever older. In order to maintain the current population level, about 50 percent more children must be born than at present. Against this background, the Cologne-based Institute of the German Economy concludes:

Without net immigration, and given a development of employment oriented solely on the global course of the supply of labour, it is conceivable that in 2020, for every 1,000 employed persons there would be 750 to 800 others aged more than 60. ... The anyway already strong pressure on the pillars of social security will therefore increase considerably if this process is not slowed down. That requires an annual quota of immigrants until well into the next century. At the same time, the politicians must make the immigrants fit for working life with a package of measures so that they can also pay contributions into social security funds.

A large majority of the children of immigrant families are already well prepared for working life. They have a good to very good knowledge of German. Their success at school has continuously improved, and the level of their school-leaving qualifications is rising. But the gap between German and non-German school leavers has not narrowed because the trend to better leaving qualifications is also continuing among the former.

The Federal Länder (states) promote the in-school education of young foreigners, including providing extra-curricular lessons in their mother tongues. At school, where the main work of integration is carried out, they learn German, become familiar with a society that is strange to them, and make their first friendships. By the end of their school years, they are well equipped for higher education or vocational training.

But this development does not always turn out well. The 1,140,000 school pupils (1994) with foreign passports are over-represented in German Hauptschulen (upper elementary schools) and Sonderschulen (schools for mentally retarded children), and distinctly under-represented in Realschulen (secondary modern schools) and Gymnasien (grammar schools). However, a trend to grammar school education and higher school-leaving qualifications among foreign children since the mid-1980s can be noted. While in...
1994, 26.5 percent of German pupils attended a Realschule and 31.5 percent a Gymnasium, the comparative figures for non-German pupils were 9.1 percent and 9.7 percent respectively. Some foreign youths and girls have no school-leaving qualification. In 1994, the figure was 15.8 percent.

No less than 40 percent of non-German juveniles end their mandatory school years without any vocational training. Their idea is to earn money quickly. This threatens them with permanent backwardness in today's society. The importance these days of vocational training qualifications in a changed working environment is often not recognized by their parents. So an elementary education is seen as sufficient.

Non-Germans account for only 8 percent of apprentices, much less than their proportion of 15 percent of the population of the same age. Foreign apprentices are disproportionately to be found in less promising branches or low-paid jobs. Institutions such as the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHT) and the Federal Union of German Handicrafts Associations (ZHD) complain time and again over the disadvantaging of non-German young people in the allocation of apprenticeships. For Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, since 1990 the Federal Government's Commissioner for Matters Relating to Aliens, this is a key issue:

The integration of young people of foreign origin in the Federal Republic of Germany's social security and social system stands or falls with the educational and occupational opportunities they are offered. On the one hand, a low educational level can impair the acceptance of migrants by the German population, and on the other hand have negative impacts on the migrant children's social standing and perception of their own value.

So far as the chances of making a start in working life are concerned, there have been signs for a few years now of a change for the better for young foreigners. A great number of model projects to improve their situation in vocational training have been implemented. For example, an important contribution is being made in North Rhine-Westphalia by 23 regional Labour Centres for the Promotion of Foreign Children and Young Adults (RAA), which are funded by the State government and the respective municipalities. One of the RAA's key areas is supporting the transition from school to first job. The experience of the Advisory Centres for Qualification of Foreign Junior Staff (BQN), established in 1989, have shown in Hagen (Ruhr), Hamburg, and Cologne that the training situation of young foreigners can be improved by purposeful measures. It has also been seen that disseminating information can lessen the skeptical attitude of businesses and trainers towards non-German young people. Thus, in Cologne alone between 1989 and 1993, the number of foreign apprentices almost doubled from 1,605 to 3,366. In summer 1996, the Cologne Chamber of Industry and Commerce (IHK) was also able for the first time to qualify a total of 15 Turkish entrepreneurs as vocational training instructors. “All of them now aim to hire apprentices, and many of them have already done so,” said IHK Managing Director Elmar Conrads-Hassel. “Turkish entrepreneurs often also employ Turkish youngsters — and they still need all the help they can get on the training market.” He hopes other German cities will follow suit.

The situation of young foreigners in the higher education sector is also improving gradually. The number of foreign students has trebled in the last 20 years. In the winter term 1994–95, 137,000 foreigners were studying at German universities. More than half
of the foreign students are domiciled in Germany, and thus are so-called “education nationals.” Non-German university students in 1994 accounted for 7.6 percent of the entire student body.

Pensioners

The number of foreign workers who have grown old in Germany is in fact comparatively small, but growing. While older immigrants currently account for only slightly more than 2 percent of the over-60s in Germany, the figure in 2010 will probably be 6.4 percent.

The onetime emigrant workers have long become immigrants. Most of them wish to remain with their children and grandchildren, have given up their dreams of returning to their old countries, and describe themselves as “two-homeland people.” A survey by the city of Stuttgart found that five out of six non-Germans over 65 stay in Germany in their old age. The veteran migrants, accustomed to Central European living conditions over decades, frequently express irritation at changes in their country of origin and no longer feel at home there.

Their pensions are somewhat lower than those of their German contemporaries because they have not worked in Germany for as long. Many of them also need more medical care, and sometimes become nursing cases. Most foreign workers have neglected their health in the hope of a quick return to their homeland with money in the bank. They have done piecework, clocked up much overtime, and accepted the hardest jobs — in coal-mining, on shifts in steel mills, or in refuse collection crews.

On principle, all facilities for senior citizens in Germany are open to all old people. But foreigners do not always feel that the facilities are meant for them. That is why their own infrastructure for non-German seniors has developed for some years now. That applies in particular to North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state, which also has the most foreigners. In Duisburg, for example, a section of an old people’s home has been set up especially for Turkish seniors. In many other cities, the social services for foreigners and charitable associations have provided further facilities.

Policy on Foreigners

In recent years, there has been an ongoing debate in Germany about political and social policymaking on immigration. At the beginning of the 1990s, the debate focused on the then dramatically rising numbers of asylum-seekers that were flooding into Germany. Human rights violations, and wars and crises in many regions across the world, but above all the political and economic upheavals in Eastern Europe, the opening of the borders between East and West, and the civil war in the Balkans have, since the mid-1980s, led to a marked increased in migration pressure. Germany has the highest immigration rate in the EU. For several years, about half of all EU emigrants have come here. Around three million people, foreigners and so-called Spätaussiedler (German repatriates from former East Bloc countries, especially the former Soviet Union) entered Germany from 1989 to 1993. As a whole, Germany since the late 1980s has accepted more immigrants than the classic immigration countries of Canada and Australia combined.

Germany is one of the few countries in the world with an individual basic right to political asylum that is guaranteed by its Constitution. By enshrining it in Germany’s Basic Law of 1949, the founders of the Federal Republic of Germany drew the consequences from the sufferings of German emigrants under Nazi rule. The right to asylum
was limited for the first time on July 1, 1993, against the background of the increasing pressure from would-be immigrants. The amendment allows foreigners who wrongfully claim asylum in Germany to be quickly returned to their homelands. The aim is to reduce the number of unjustified applications for asylum substantially and permanently.

Refugees from war zones are granted a residence permit for only a limited time and during that period cannot lodge an application for asylum. Asylum-seekers from “safe countries of origin” or who enter Germany via a “safe third country” are excluded from the asylum process. As Germany’s neighbouring countries are regarded as safe third states, the number of asylum-seekers has dropped sharply since mid-1993. In 1996, only 116,367 foreigners asked for asylum in Germany.

Until a final decision on their request for asylum is taken, asylum-seekers in Germany are subject to a number of conditions. They do not enjoy freedom of movement, but are distributed around the federal Länder according to a quota system. Their residence is restricted to the district to whose Aliens Office they have submitted their application for asylum.

The Spätausiedler do not need to apply for asylum. As ethnic Germans, they have a right to live in the Federal Republic. True, in the meantime the Federal Government’s declared goal is to enable the German minorities in the East to have a better quality of life in their present homelands. But since 1987, more than 2.5 million ethnic Germans, mainly from Poland, Romania, and the successor states to the former Soviet Union, have resettled in Germany. In the wake of the political changes in Eastern Europe, they were able to realize their wish to leave it.

Their integration in economic and social life in Germany is proving difficult. They want to live as “Germans among Germans.” But many Spätausiedler come to a Germany that their forebears left generations or centuries ago, such as the “Transylvanian Saxons,” whose ancestors left as far back as the Middle Ages. They are strangers in an alien society. They have problems not only with the German language, but also in finding a job.

Germany’s policy on foreigners has for many years been determined by two principles. One is the integration of the foreign workers and their families that live here permanently. The other is the limiting of further immigration from non-EU countries. When in 1973 an economic recession threatened to cause high unemployment in Germany, the Federal Government of the day ordered a stop to recruitment of foreign workers from such countries, which is still valid. But proposals by the Federal-Länder Commission to further develop a comprehensive concept for the employment of foreigners, which were agreed in 1977, foresaw Germany employing foreign workers long-term. At the same time, however, their readiness to return to their homelands was to be financially promoted.

The legal status of foreigners in Germany can differ greatly. There is a limited residence permit for the first entry into the country, an unlimited permit if the foreigner has had a limited one for five years and an unrestricted work permit is on hand. The right of residence in Germany, and thus the right of continual abode here, is granted if a residence permit has been held for eight years and the foreigner has a secured claim to a pension. Foreign students are as a rule given a residence permit since the purpose and time-limit of their stay in Germany is fixed from the start. For non-Germans who are allowed to stay in Germany under international law or for humanitarian or political reasons, there is a so-called residence authorization. Which heading residence comes under is not at the discretion of the authorities, but is determined by the purpose of the stay.
Like most of its western European neighbours, the Federal Republic of Germany in recent decades has in fact long developed into a multi-cultural emigrant society due to the immigration and permanent settlement of migrant workers, refugees, and their families. But the politicians have so far not taken that into account in legal terms. This is the other aspect of the public debate in Germany on the political and legal design of immigration. The consequences of adjusting the legal situation to the actual conditions would touch upon the self-perception of the state and society. It would require a law on immigration and amendment of the valid Nationality Act of 1913. The law still rules that only the children of German citizens are automatically also German nationals. Children born in Germany of foreign parents remain foreigners — unless they apply for and are granted German citizenship.

According to the German news agency, dpa, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), the junior partners in the Federal Government coalition, and sections of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) call for a model in which such children should obtain German citizenship by virtue of their birth here. If that resulted in them having dual nationalities, they would have to decide upon reaching majority at age 18 which nationality they wanted to retain. But Federal Interior Minister Manfred Kanther and the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU's Bavarian sister-party, are holding firmly to the goal of a “children's nationality.” This was laid down in the three parties' agreement on joint policies prior to them forming a coalition government again after winning the 1994 Federal election. It foresees a “children's nationality” being granted to young foreigners upon application by their parents, which would give the youngsters a German identity card, but not a German passport nor a residence permit. They would obtain German citizenship only if they renounced their foreign nationality before their 19th birthday.

If nothing changes in the demographic situation described at the beginning of this article and annual immigration remains at its current level, estimates put the proportion of the foreign population in Germany in 2015 at 19 percent, and in 2030 at 25 percent. This raises the question of whether, against the background of an absence of internal borders within the EU, it would not be better if this political sector were regulated at EU level within the framework of a European law on immigration. For the time being, however, every EU member country is insisting upon retaining its own jurisdiction in handling policy on foreigners, such as the citizenship issue.

Germany has for some years had an Aliens Act which, compared to the previous legal situation, has simplified acquirement of German citizenship. In order to facilitate naturalization for young immigrants age 16 to 23 who have spent at least eight years in Germany, including six years at school here, and for foreigners who have lived in Germany for at least 15 years, they have been accorded a legal right to naturalization. Besides naturalization by right, the competent authorities have discretionary power to grant it to foreigners who have lived in Germany for at least 10 years. In principle, naturalization in Germany means giving up the previous nationality. But in practice, in exercising their discretion on naturalization, the German authorities accept dual nationality in every third case. True, when measured against the number of foreigners in Germany, the naturalization rate is relatively low, although it has risen since 1991. The number of naturalizations increased from 34,913 in 1985 to 313,606 in 1995. However, the increase was due mainly to naturalization by right of ethnic German resettlers. The Federal
Government’s Commissioner for foreigners believes that in practice the requirement to give up their previous nationality presents the biggest obstacle to the naturalization of foreigners living in Germany.

The debate on foreigner policy in Germany’s political parties has many facets. There are votes for the passing of an immigration law in all party factions in the Bundestag, without that having taken place to date. While the majority of the CDU-CSU faction insist that Germany is not an immigration country, their FDP coalition partner and also the Opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) are now calling for a law to manage immigration and the setting of annual immigration quotas. The SPD, FDP, and the Alliance90/Greens faction argue that foreign children born in Germany should automatically acquire German citizenship (ius soli). Besides that, they add, immigrants should have a right to naturalization after eight years residence in Germany. The Alliance90/Greens faction also demand far-reaching legal parity of nationals of non-EU countries and EU citizens after a residence of five years, and fundamental acceptance of multi-citizenship.

A dense network of public and private institutions and initiatives that stand up for the interests of foreigners has existed in Germany for many years. Examples are the advisory centres of the Catholic and Protestant churches, and the ProAsyl working group for refugees. Almost every federal state and many big cities have a Commissioner for foreigners. These are charged with advising and assisting non-Germans in word and deed, and also with promoting tolerance towards the immigrants by the Germans. The Federal Government’s Commissioner for Matters Relating to Aliens supports the Government in its efforts on policy on foreigners and at the same time is to provide ideas for the further development of the integration policy.

The Centre for Turkish Studies, founded in Essen, North Rhine-Westphalia, in 1985, focuses on research on the political and economic factors represented by the Turkish minority in Germany, with the aim of helping to intensify German-Turkish relations. The centre, led by Professor Faruk Sen, is promoted by an association, federal and state ministries, and the city and University of Essen. In the autumn of 1997, the State Centre for Immigration in Solingen began work under the leadership of Dr. Lale Akgün. The centre is to function as a transfer interface between the academic and scientific worlds, politicians and practitioners on immigration and integration issues. The North Rhine-Westphalian State Government’s Declaration of Intent said the centre should give “new impulses for local people and immigrants to live alongside each other in equality and peace.”

Crime

Crime by non-Germans is one of the most sensitive areas of policy on foreigners. No other topic appears to be more suited to promote and strengthen existing prejudices against foreigners. The crime rate among them is in fact declining. The proportion of non-German crime suspects in 1993 was 33.6 percent, but dropped to 28.3 percent in 1996. But Bundestag Deputy Speaker Burkhard Hirsch (FDP) points out: “We should take account of the fact that the crime statistics also include offences by foreigners that Germans cannot commit, such as those against the laws on passports and residence permits.”

Statistically however, compared with the rest of the population, foreigners are indeed disproportionally represented not only in crime as a whole, but also in some serious offence categories. The latter include dealing in drugs, extorting “protection” money, theft,
and robbery. A cause of the “immigrant crime” is certainly the now very noticeable prosperity gap between the western European countries and those of the former East Bloc.

Professor Christian Pfeiffer, Director of the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, and one of the most noted crime researchers in Germany, points out in explaining the immigrants’ social situation:

Foreigners have a high proportion of young men, live more frequently in big cities, are much more often jobless and socially non-integrated, and in the light of such general conditions commit more crimes. The foreigners’ high crime rate has nothing to do with what passport they have, but simply with their social marginalization. If, for example, we compare them with Germans in a similar situation, such as the newly-arrived resettlers of recent years, there is no difference in criminal behaviour. …The ups and downs of the relative crime figures of Germans and foreigners depend upon the success of integrating the respective wave of immigration. …”

Young immigrants who turn to crime belong as a rule to the so-called “underclass.” They have often a low perception of their own value and no positive concept for themselves. This encourages criminal behaviour. In contrast, integrated foreigners who have lived in Germany for many years show up in the crime figures no more frequently than do Germans. Thus, the proportion of “classic guest workers” (such as Italians, Greeks, and Turks), to the total of non-German crime suspects dropped markedly from 32.6 percent in 1984 to 18 percent in 1992, although the overall number of foreign workers in Germany rose during this period.

But the proportion of asylum-seekers to the total number of foreign suspects during the same period increased from 7.7 percent to 33.9 percent. It must be noted here, however, that almost 30 percent of the non-German suspects was investigated merely because of alleged offences against the Aliens Act and/or the law covering applications for asylum. In addition, the figures tell us nothing about proven guilt or innocence. Only every fourth foreign suspect ends up being convicted, while every third German accused is found guilty.

The politicians attempted in part to meet the growing perceived needs of many Germans for more security by resorting to radical measures to combat crime by foreigners. Thus, the Bundestag in June 1997 passed a law under which foreigners can be deported for simple breach of the peace, such as taking part in a non-approved demonstration, without them having been tried and convicted of the offence with which they are accused. The same applies to foreigners who have been convicted of a premeditated crime for which they have been sentenced to at least three years in prison. The EU is currently also strengthening its fight against internationally organized crime with specific measures. In the long term, the EU can only be successful by harmonizing its member countries’ interior and judicial policies.

The police chief of Hanover, Hans-Dieter Klosa, has launched an advertising campaign to recruit foreigners as police officers. Klosa points out that they would eliminate the many language barriers between the police and foreign criminals. Police investigations could obtain certain information much earlier and act accordingly. Finally, Klosa says, it also makes sense if understanding for the culture and mentalities of ethnic minorities can be promoted among German police officers. He sees queries about his initiative from colleagues in other big cities as confirming that he is right.
Xenophobia
At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of factors triggered among sections of the German population insecurity, fears, and also aggression against innocent people. The factors were strong immigration pressure, rising unemployment — now affecting 4.5 million people — economic uncertainties and the process of radical change, endangerment of social security, disenchantment with politics, loss of value orientations and family bonds, and the collapse of the political, economic, and social systems in the new eastern German federal states. Attacks on foreigners made clear that xenophobia had grown not only in juvenile sub-cultures. The German churches in July 1997 issued a joint statement on the challenges of migration and the flight of refugees that said in part:

An important cause of xenophobic defensive attitudes is to be found precisely in the continuing disorientation of the [German] population in the face of the social problems of migration, integration, and minorities. Another cause is that no adequate consequences have been drawn from the obvious fact that the Federal Republic has for more than a decade become a new type of immigration country — not within the legal meaning, but in the social and cultural sense.

Following the attacks on foreigners, it was very heartening for many foreigners living in Germany to see that millions of Germans took to the streets to protest against the outrages. Many social activities at various levels have developed in recent years in reaction to the increase in racially-motivated violence against immigrants and members of other minorities. The activities include the anti-discrimination work of initiatives, the continuation of the trade unions’ anti-racial educational work of many years, protest demonstrations, and miles-long chains of people holding candles. There are also Round Tables, Refugee Days, and Intercultural Weeks, statements by social associations and political parties, and measures to combat violence in which government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) work closely together. The various activities focus on offering protection, advice, and help to the people affected by discrimination and violence, initiating discussion processes, and sending public signals against xenophobia.

The Government supports these measures by funding anti-racism projects. For example, the Action Programme Against Aggression and Violence brought previously violence-prone groups into specific youth work projects. Besides that, the German authorities take rigorous action against right-wing extremism. Public prosecutors, internal security services, and the police have been well-equipped to deal with it by the setting up in recent years of special departments and staff reinforcement. Numerous right-wing extremist groups which systematically incited xenophobia have been banned during the last few years. In Germany, incitement of racial hatred, denying that the Nazi Holocaust took place, and disseminating right-wing extremist propaganda materials or using the symbols of anti-Constitutional organizations are forbidden and punishable by years in prison. While in 1993 the number of racially-motivated crimes against foreigners in Germany totaled 6,721, it dropped in 1996 to 2,232. Following minor state election successes at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, extreme right-wing political parties such as the Republikaner, the National Democratic Party (NPD), or the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) have in the meantime become insignificant again and are hardly represented in state parliaments. They have never gained a single seat in the Bundestag in Bonn.
One thing, however, must not be forgotten in this connection. All that parliaments and governments can do is produce regulations of the formal, legal, and administrative kind. Real integration can be achieved only from person to person, in the establishment of personal links, in mutual understanding, in direct contact. (Liselotte Funcke, former Federal Government Commissioner for the Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families)

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Internet Addresses for Obtaining Resources

Translates documents
http://babelfish.altavista.digital.com/cgi-bin/translate?

Speeches of President of Federal Republic of Germany
http://www.bundespraesident.de

German Information Center
http://www.germany-info.org

General information on Germany
http://www.inter-nationes.de

House of the Wannsee Conference
http://wanseeedu@compuserve.com

Armonk Institute — American Jewish organization focusing on Germany’s role in contemporary Europe
http://www.armonk institute.org

Source of interdisciplinary units on human nature
http://fred.net/nhhs/html/beast.htm

Accesses sources dealing with world-wide genocide
http://www.igc.apc.org/iearn/hgp

The Making of a Skinhead — personal story of a former Skinhead

Website for Anti-Defamation League
http://www.adl.org

National organization examining racism, prejudice, and anti-Semitism
http://www.facing.org

United States Holocaust Museum
http://www.ushmm.org

Monitors “hate speech” across the Internet
http://www.hatewatch.org  (WARNING: this site contains actual messages. If students use this, they should be warned about content.)
RESOURCES

RESOURCE 17

German Citizenship and Naturalization

Source: copyright German Information Center
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Under current German law, nationality is determined by the nationality of the parents, not by the place of birth. This principle is called *ius sanguinis*, the law of parentage. 
*Ius soli*, the law of the birthplace, is the legal principle that determines citizenship by place of birth; it determines nationality in the United States of America and [some] other countries. Following a long debate over reforming Germany's naturalization laws, the governing SPD-Green coalition has proposed a series of changes that will give many children born in Germany to foreign parents a claim to German citizenship.

Citizenship and Naturalization at Present

What determines German citizenship?

A child born in wedlock is a German citizen if one parent is a German citizen. Following liberalization of the law in 1993, the same is true for children born out of wedlock. This is true whether the child is born in Germany or in another country. Inheriting the German nationality of one's parents (*ius sanguinis*) is the only way to become a German citizen automatically or by right. However, the German government intends to restrict the application of the *ius sanguinis* principle for Germans who live permanently in other countries. It is not German government policy to grant German citizenship to every person of German descent or to encourage them to claim it.

Foreign-born immigrants and their German-born children may apply for German citizenship if they fulfill a number of specific criteria. These include a lengthy stay in Germany and renunciation of their original citizenship.

History of the *ius sanguinis*

The concept of citizenship and nationality dates from the French Revolution of 1789 and was first set down in the French *Code Civile* of 1791. The principle of nationality by descent was first introduced in a German state, Bavaria, in 1818 and became the law of the German Reich in 1871. The present nationality law came into force in 1914. It has been amended a number of times since, without, however, changing the *ius sanguinis* principle.
International comparison

The traditional European concept of determining citizenship by descent is the most widely applied one internationally. It governs the nationality laws of all northern, central, and eastern European countries, of Islamic countries, and of Japan.

The principle of determining nationality by the place of birth, the ius soli or law of the birthplace, has its historic roots above all in the United States, Canada, and Australia, countries colonized by immigrants of different European nationalities who wanted their children to become Americans, Canadians, or Australians. Britain and France, which after World War II took in large numbers of European and non-European residents of former colonies, added the ius soli principle to their nationality laws.

The “right of return” for “ethnic Germans” and victims of Nazi persecution

Ethnic Germans are, in most instances, the descendants of German farmers and craftspeople who settled in Russia, Romania, and other parts of Eastern Europe in the 18th century. Many were resettled within their countries by Stalin after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in World War II. After the war, some fled to West Germany, but the Cold War prevented the majority from leaving. These ethnic Germans enjoy the “right of return” under Article 116, paragraph 1 of Germany’s constitution and may take up residence in Germany.

Article 116, paragraph 2 extends the right to German citizenship to those deprived of it on political, racial, or religious grounds between 1933 and 1945.

Becoming German: the naturalization process

Germany has a resident foreign population of about 7 million out of a total population of 80 million. Although foreign-born children do not enjoy the benefit of the ius soli, naturalization has always been possible and has become less restrictive in recent years. Restrictions were eased in 1991 and again in 1993 with the intention of facilitating the integration of long-term foreign residents and their children. Under current law, a foreigner between the ages of 16 and 23 has a claim to naturalization if he/she

• has resided legally in Germany for eight years
• has attended a school in Germany for six years
• gives up his/her previous citizenship, and
• has not been convicted of a major felony.

A foreigner who has resided legally in Germany for 15 years has a claim to naturalization if he/she

• gives up his/her previous citizenship
• has not been convicted of a major felony, and
• is able to support himself/herself and his/her family. (If the individual becomes dependent upon public assistance for reasons for which he/she is not responsible, this condition is waived.)

Spouses and underage children can be naturalized together with the original applicant without having to fulfill the 15-year residency requirement.
Planned Changes in Naturalization Law

Germany is currently home to 7.4 million foreigners, and the question of how they can best be integrated within German society is the focus of a long-running public debate. Two central questions in that debate are whether the requirements for naturalization should be made less stringent and whether Germany should recognize dual citizenship. The SPD-Green government that took office in October 1998 intends to introduce legislation to revise Germany’s naturalization laws. In the coalition agreement outlining their agenda for the 1998–2002 legislative term, the Social Democrats and Greens back the following changes:

- Children born in Germany to foreign parents would automatically receive German citizenship if at least one parent had been born in Germany or had arrived legally in the country before the age of 14.
- The residency requirement for individuals seeking German citizenship would be cut from 15 to 8 years.
- Minors with foreign citizenship would be able to apply for German citizenship if at least one parent with an open-ended residence permit had lived in Germany for five years or longer.
- Foreigners married to Germans would be eligible for citizenship after three years’ legal residence in Germany, providing he or she had been married to the German partner for at least two years.
- Foreigners acquiring German citizenship by birth or by naturalization would not be required to renounce their foreign citizenship — i.e., dual citizenship would be allowed.
The Nature of Constitutions: Germany and the United States

Background

The American Constitution of 1787 is a reflection of classical Liberalism, drawing heavily on the thinking of such political philosophers as David Hume, John Locke, and Montesquieu. Largely as a result of their influence the American Constitution provides for a national government limited in the powers granted it and constrained by a system of separation of powers (three branches of government with the offices in each branch occupied by different, separately selected individuals) and checks and balances (each branch having a certain check on the others). A Bill of Rights containing most of the classical rights promoted by “liberal” (“liberal” is in quotations here and below in order to distinguish its classical meaning from its use today in the United States to indicate “left wing”) thinkers was not contained in the original Constitution. It was added in the form of the first ten amendments two years after the Constitution went into effect and provides for the protection of private property and a variety of civil liberties.

With the passage of a new constitution in 1949, called the Basic Law because it was intended to be “temporary” until Germany was re-united, the Federal Republic became the fifth political system or regime in Germany since Otto von Bismarck united the relatively independent German states in 1871. These five political systems were

- Bismark’s Germany — 1871 to 1918
- the democratic Weimar Republic — 1919 to 1933
- the Third Reich — 1933 to 1945
- the Allied occupation — 1945 to 1949 (legally to 1955), and
- the Federal Republic — 1949 to the present.

Some observers argue that the unification of Germany in 1990 ushered in a “new” Federal Republic (see Lesson VI), but this claim is controversial.

The Basic Law reflects three philosophical traditions. First, it contains the classical “liberal” freedoms in the first eighteen articles that make up the German Bill of Rights. It also contains articles providing for a considerable degree of separation of powers and checks and balances. (It should be noted, however, that no parliamentary democracy — which includes most democracies in the world — has these features to the extent we have them in our American presidential democracy.) Secondly, the Basic Law reflects the socialist tradition. This can be seen, for example, in the provisions concerning the welfare state, obligations of owning property, public ownership of property, and uniform or equivalent living conditions throughout the country. Thirdly, the Basic Law reflects a Christian tradition, seen in provisions concerning social morality, religious education, institutional prerogatives of the established churches, and rights associated with marriage and the family. Donald Kommers, who has written extensively on German constitutional law, notes that “[p]hilosophically and politically these traditions diverge significantly from one another, yet they converge around a common core of belief about the role of the state, the nature of constitutionalism, and the dignity of the human person [sic].”
In accordance with the tradition of civil law or code law in continental European countries, and in contrast to the British and American common law tradition, the Basic Law is long and detailed — quite different from the brief U.S. Constitution. The Basic Law has 146 articles in comparison to the 7 original articles and 27 amendments in the American Constitution. It has been amended 43 times since 1949, while the American constitution has been amended only 17 times since the first 10 amendments were added in 1791. Some of the German amending laws have changed old articles in multiple ways or have added new articles so that the total number of changes is much larger than 43.

As these numbers suggest, it is much easier to change the Basic Law than the Constitution. All that is required is a two-thirds majority vote in the Bundestag (the popularly elected national parliament) and Bundesrat (a second legislative chamber in which the governments [cabinets] of the Länder are represented by a small delegation headed by a specially appointed Land minister). In the United States, amending the Constitution requires not only a two-thirds vote in the House and Senate, but also majority approval by the state legislatures in three-fourths of the states. It can be argued, of course, that the Supreme Court is an instrument of continuing constitutional change in the United States, since its decisions serve in some ways as a substitute for formal constitutional amendments. But this is true also, if to a lesser extent, of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany.

**Similarities and Differences in Basic Rights**

Like the American Bill of Rights, the Basic Law protects classical human rights such as the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion. In some respects, however, the Basic Law goes further by covering certain rights that are not mentioned in the American Constitution and by being more specific about others. For example, the first twenty articles provide for protection of human dignity, equality of men and women, freedom of artistic expression, freedom of research and teaching, the right to exercise conscientious objection to the military draft in return for alternative service, and protection against discrimination based on race, birth, language, etc. Marriage and the family are protected, provisions for public and private education are mentioned, and an article on asylum is included. (The very liberal provisions of this article were recently revised to make Germany less of a magnet for asylum seekers.) In addition to guarantees of religious freedom, the Basic Law calls for a “socially conscious” welfare state, although the definition of such a state is left open. A new article added in 1994 provides for protection of the environment. Attempts after unification in 1990 to add new provisions concerning certain social rights and “state goals” such as the right to employment, the right to housing, and the right to education and training were not successful.

**Federalism**

Germany, like the United States, Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium, is a federation. During the era of the Holy Roman Empire (which lasted many centuries until it was finally dissolved in 1806 as a result of pressures from Napoleon) there were hundreds of kingdoms, principalities, dukedoms, bishoprics, and city states making up the territory of
the Empire. After Napoleon was defeated in 1815 and the Congress of Vienna was held, a German confederation of 39 states was formed. In 1871, Germany was united under Bismarck as a modern state for the first time; however, unlike France and Britain, the Bismarck Reich respected German history in its organization as a federation of 25 states. After World War I and the formation of the democratic Weimar Republic, Germany remained a federation of 17 states. When Hitler became Chancellor, he abolished the federal system and created a highly centralized, unitary state. A dozen states re-emerged after World War II in the western occupation zones, but only three of these — Bavaria, Hamburg, and Bremen — had existed before Hitler. The other German states consisted of territories consolidated and rearranged by the allies. As indicated above, many city states existed in the Holy Roman Empire, and two of these, Hamburg and Bremen, have survived. (We have no city states in the United States, of course, although Washington, D.C., would be one if it were to achieve statehood.)

After the War, the newly created and three older Länder came into existence before the Federal Republic was created as a federal nation-state. But unlike in the United States, there was no legal controversy in Germany over the role of the states as opposed to the “people” in creating the federation. Representatives from the Länder met in 1948 at Herrenchiemsee, a lake in Bavaria, to draft the new constitution and form the parliamentary council which in 1949 negotiated with the Allies over the final text of the constitution. The Basic Law or constitution was then approved by the parliaments of the Länder (except Bavaria) rather than by popular referendum. Thus the Federal Republic is clearly the creation of the German Länder. This was reflected in the Preamble of the original Basic Law, which stated that the German people in the Länder were creating the new constitution and acting also on behalf of those Germans in the East who were not allowed to participate. All Germans were then asked to strive for unification in freedom. (At first, the East German constitution also appealed for unity under its system, but this goal was later dropped when the Communist regime tried to draw a sharp distinction between East and West Germans). After unification in October 1990, the Preamble was changed. It now states, like the American Constitution, that “the people” have adopted the Basic Law and that the Germans in the current sixteen states have achieved “the unity and freedom of Germany.” It should be noted, however, that neither in Germany nor the United States did “the people” vote directly for their constitutions.

Many of the articles of the Basic Law are related in a direct or indirect manner to federalism, and most amendments have concerned some aspect of federalism. In the first paragraph of Article 20, the Federal Republic is described as a “democratic and socially conscious [sozialer] federal state.” Federalism, though not defined by the Basic Law, is even protected by a “perpetuity clause” that forbids changes in “the division of the federation into Länder” or changes which affect their fundamental participation in the legislative process.

Until about the time of the New Deal in the 1930s, American federalism was described as “dual federalism.” This meant that the national government had certain tasks to perform with its own revenues and bureaucratic personnel, and the states had their separate functions that they carried out with their own resources and personnel. Beginning more or less with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration and continuing to the present time, the federal government has taken a more activist role in many areas of government and implemented policies that called for a sharing of resources and responsibilities in
dealing with numerous problems. This came to be known as “cooperative federalism.” Though it has gone through numerous changes and challenges through the years, it is still a characteristic of American federalism to a considerable extent.

Federalism in Germany is also often described as “dual federalism,” but in this case the concept refers to legislation being passed mostly at the national level and administration taking place mostly at the state level. Some observers, especially foreigners, believe this means that Germany is really a kind of decentralized unitary state rather than a federation. This is not quite accurate, because there are a number of subjects that are the legislative responsibility of the states — e.g., local governments, police, cultural affairs including education at all levels, planning, and economic development policies of various kinds. Administration of federal laws by the states is also done within a system of considerable autonomy, which is to say that there is relatively little federal interference.

Of great importance in understanding German federalism is recognizing the role of the second legislative chamber at the national level, the Bundesrat. This chamber is not elected by the people. Rather, it represents the state governments roughly in proportion to the size of their populations. Approval by the Bundesrat is required for about 60 percent of the bills passed by the popularly elected parliament, the Bundestag. The legislative process will be discussed in more detail below.

Parties and Elections in Germany

Parties and the Constitution

The authors of the Basic Law were people who had participated in politics in a variety of ways during the Weimar Republic, the German democratic system that followed World War I but was replaced in 1933 by Adolf Hitler and his dictatorship of one party under one leader. The founding fathers were determined to write a constitution that would protect the new democratic Germany from some of the forces that had undermined the Weimar Republic.

A number of their ideas are contained in the Basic Law’s Article 21, which deals with political parties. Unlike most older constitutions including the American one, the Basic Law explicitly mentions political parties. Article 21 says that parties have the right to participate freely in the political process. It requires that they exercise intraparty democracy and account for the sources of their funds. Another provision in the same Article permits the Federal Constitutional Court to outlaw political parties that try to undermine the free democratic order of the country.

Of particular interest today is the constitutional provision in Article 21 that the political parties “must publicly account for the sources and use of their funds and for their assets.” As a result of this provision, the Bundestag passed a “Party Law” in 1967 that has been revised on several occasions. This law has provided not only for accounting procedures for sources of funds and assets, but also for an elaborate and very generous (and therefore controversial) system of public financing for the German parties and their election expenditures. As in all other European countries, German parties also receive free television and radio time. In general one could argue that if the United States represents one end of a continuum featuring candidate-oriented elections managed by the candidate and financed largely with private and even personal funds, Germany represents the other end with party-oriented, party-managed, privately and publicly financed campaigns.
Political parties

With the occupation and division of the country into four zones in 1945, selected political parties were allowed to form. These were the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and, in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU); the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD); the Free Democratic Party (FDP); and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD).

In the Soviet Zone, the SPD was forced in 1946 to merge with the KPD, thus forming the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The East German Communist regime continued the pretense of permitting other parties to exist, but these “block parties” had to recognize and support the leading role of the SED. Thus East Germany was really a one-party state. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and German unification in 1990, the West German parties became the dominant parties in the East as well. However, the former Communist SED re-emerged as a reformed Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) under new leadership, and it has been able to secure a strong foothold in the East, ranging from 15 to 25 percent of the total vote. It draws support from many former East German officials such as public employees, military officers, and police, and from people who feel they have suffered from the effects of unification such as unemployment. The PDS has minimal support in West Germany, and its future in the united Germany over the long run is uncertain. However, it did receive slightly more than 5 percent of the total vote in the 1998 parliamentary elections — almost 22 percent in the East and about 1 percent in the West.

Early on in West Germany, several small parties contested elections especially at the state and local levels. With the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949, however, significant changes in the traditional German multiparty system soon occurred. Under Article 21 of the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court outlawed an extreme right party in 1952 and the extreme left Communist KPD in 1956, even though both extremes had been discredited anyway among all but a few German voters. In 1968, the Communists reappeared under a new name, German Communist Party (DKP). This still exists today as a small group of true believers who were not capable of assimilating with the new PDS.

The German party system came to be characterized as a 2½ party system. This was in part because of the new electoral system which requires that parties, in order to gain parliamentary seats, must either receive at least five percent of the votes or win a plurality in a single-member district. It was probably even more due to a decline in extremist political ideas and movements. The two large parties were the SPD and the coalition consisting of the CDU and CSU, which together formed one party group in the national parliament. The FDP was the small “½ party” in between that at different times joined government-forming coalitions with both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Because the FDP was generally needed by one or the other of the large parties to form a coalition government with a parliamentary majority, it could “tip the scales” as Zünglein an der Waage. From the 1950s to the federal election of March 1983, the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP completely dominated the national party scene with more than 90 percent of the vote.

The CDU and the SPD became the two largest parties in part because of their growing efforts to become pragmatic “catch-all parties” (Volksparteien) that could appeal to a broad cross-section of the voters. The CDU moved first in this direction by appealing to
Protestants as well as to its Catholic base, by promoting traditional family and religious values, by supporting a free-market economy within the framework of a generous welfare state (a feature that distinguishes it from the Republican Party in the U.S.), and by taking a staunchly pro-Western, pro-European integration, and anti-Communist stance. It received its strongest support from the more religious voters, both Catholic and Protestant, in the West and South of Germany especially in small towns, with the CSU getting a majority of the votes in conservative, Catholic Bavaria. Both the CDU and CSU can be seen as moderate-to-conservative parties, but the CSU is somewhat more conservative on many issues than the CDU.

At first the SPD was for more socialism and less capitalism; for more neutrality in foreign affairs in order to encourage the Soviets to let Germany reunify; for more separation of church and state. It was more working class and more Protestant in its voter support. It has generally been strongest in the mostly Protestant northern half of Germany, especially in the cities. After 1959, the SPD began to copy the CDU by moving in the direction of a broadly based catch-all party. It remained a strong supporter of the welfare state, but it was no longer hostile to capitalism; it decided to support strong ties to the West including German membership in NATO; and it reached out to the less conservative Catholic and middle-class voters. It became and remains today the moderate-to-left alternative to the Christian Democratic CDU and CSU. After unification in 1990, it had high hopes of gaining a majority of the voters in former East Germany, which is overwhelmingly working class and, at least nominally, Protestant. The SPD was strong in that part of Germany before Hitler, but since 1990 the party’s support there has been disappointing. The SPD found itself caught between the PDS, the party of the “real” socialists which appeals to the disappointed portion of the population following unification, and the CDU, which appeals to those who see free enterprise and unification in a more favorable light. However, by the end of the 1990s there was growing evidence that support for the CDU was declining rather precipitously. This was confirmed in the elections of 1998, when the CDU lost badly to the SPD, especially in the East.

Like the SPD, the FDP has roots that go back to the second half of the nineteenth century. It is a “classical liberal” party — that is, a party that focuses on free enterprise and human rights such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, etc. The FDP is a centrist party leaning to the right in supporting the free enterprise system and pro-Western foreign and defense policies and to the left in advocating the protection of civil liberties and separation of church and state. Thus it is more like the American Republicans in terms of its economic and foreign policy orientation and more like the Democrats in its focus on civil liberties and religious separation. It appeals largely to Protestant middle-class voters in western Germany. It has very little support in the East.

Following the turmoil associated with the student movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were strong signs of a return to ideology and militancy in German politics. This was expressed in a variety of ways, including the formation of a number of radical student groups that were largely anti-American (due to, for example, the Vietnam war, “aggressive” American Cold War policies, U.S. dominance of NATO, and racial and social conflict in the U.S.), pro-Third World, vehemently anti-establishment, anti-capitalist, and even pro-Communist in some cases. A small group of radicals known as the “Baader-Meinhoff” gang (later called the Red Army Faction, or RAF, which announced its dissolution in late winter of 1998) even became so extreme that they engaged in terrorist activi-
ties, including the kidnaping and murder of government and industry officials. Their activities and the sometimes violent behavior of some of the student rebels led to the “radical or extremist decree” of 1972 authorizing the exclusion of radical group members or adherents from any kind of public service. These included appointments to teaching posts, judgeships, and the traditional bureaucracy — the traditional career goals for a majority of students. Since membership in or adherence to radical groups had to be documented, widespread surveillance of student activities took place. This, in turn, led to great controversy, including charges of police-state behavior on the part of the authorities. Some of the states began to reduce their surveillance and enforcement of the decree in the 1980s, and student radicalism began also to subside during that decade. However, the controversy over this issue and the constitutional issues raised by it did not cease until the collapse of the East German regime in 1989 and 1990.

Another result of the student turmoil of the 1960s and 70s was increased tensions and conflict inside the left-of-center SPD and the emergence of the strongly environmentalist, feminist, and pacifist Greens in the late 1970s. With the collapse in September 1982 of the SPD-FDP, Social-Liberal government coalition under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the formation of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a two-block system emerged with the CDU/CSU and FDP generally to the right of center and the SPD and Greens to the left.

Beginning in 1989, a new party on the far right, the Republicans, joined with older, small right-wing parties, only to be more or less replaced in 1998 by the German Peoples’ Union (DVU). Since 1990, some former Communists especially in the East have formed the PDS, taking up a position on the far left of the party spectrum. There have been some voices advocating the banning of far left and far right parties on the grounds that their goals are to undermine the basic democratic order; however, such voices have been ignored for a variety of reasons including the belief that German democracy is certainly strong enough to withstand such challenges they pose and that they should be fought at the polls rather than in the courts.

Due to a general decline of votes for the CDU/CSU, SPD, and, especially, the FDP since 1980, and the rise of the Greens, PDS, Republicans, and now DVU to relatively small but still noteworthy levels of electoral support, the German party system has undergone considerable change. By the mid 1990s, doubts were being expressed whether the traditional party coalitions of CDU/CSU-FDP, SPD-FDP, or a combination of SPD and Greens (which since the early 1980s formed coalition governments in several states) could create a stable majority government in Bonn. Thus a “street light coalition” consisting of the “red” SPD, the “yellow” FDP, and the Greens, or a grand coalition consisting of the CDU/CSU and SPD (which existed in Bonn in the years 1966–1969), might be required to form a government. The Republicans on the far right, who have never gained the required five percent of the national vote but have received up to ten percent of the vote in a few south German state elections, are not considered an acceptable partner by the other parties, including the Christian Democrats. The far-left, former Communists in the PDS are not acceptable to the national leadership of the SPD and Greens, although the PDS has held seats in the Bundestag since 1990 and is giving parliamentary support to a minority SPD government in one of the eastern states. There is a small minority of politicians in the SPD and Greens, however, who see the PDS as a potential partner in Bonn. This has led to serious conflicts within the SPD and Greens over what should be their relationships
to the PDS. However, this issue became less pressing after the 1998 elections, when it became clear that an SPD-Green coalition government could be formed.

In summary, it is clear today that the old 2½ party system is history and a more complicated multi-party system has taken its place. One can argue that there is now a two-block system, with the CDU/CSU, FDP, and Republicans on the right and the SPD, Greens, and PDS on the left. However, the two parties on the opposite ends of the spectrum, the Republicans and the PDS, are not considered to be acceptable coalition partners. Whether the CDU/CSU and FDP on the right and the SPD and Greens on the left will be able in the future to form a stable right or left majority for governing purposes remains to be seen. If not, we may witness the return of a grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD. While many voters would like to see a grand coalition (just as many Americans want Republicans and Democrats to “stop bickering” and work together), the problem would then be that of no strong opposition party to check and control the majority and the government it supports.

The German electoral system

Though not a part of the Basic Law, the electoral system of Germany is both very important for the way the political party system functions and very interesting for Americans and other foreign observers.

In the United States and other former British colonies, the electoral system is based on the British “first-past-the-post” system. We call it the “single-member-district” or “majority” system, sometimes also the “majority-take-all” system. That means that in our country, with some exceptions at the local level, the territory of the towns, cities, and states is divided into districts of various sizes in which only one of the candidates can win. For U.S. Senators and state-wide elected officials such as governors, the entire state becomes the electoral district. The states and the District of Columbia make up 51 electoral districts for Presidential candidates. But again, it is “winner take all” in each state. If there are three major presidential candidates, as in 1992 and 1996, the candidate with the most votes, not necessarily an absolute majority, wins all of the electoral college votes in that state.

In Germany after World War I, a system of pure proportional representation (PR) was introduced. PR means that the percentage of votes received by each party equals or comes close to the percentage of seats it gets in the parliament. It took only about 60,000 votes in the entire country for a party to win a seat. While this was a very “democratic” and “fair” system, many informed observers of German politics believe that it contributed significantly to the fragmentation of political parties and to the rise of extremist parties, such as the Nazis and Communists. The dozens of parties that emerged in the Weimar Republic due to PR made the formation of a stable majority government very difficult, while making it easier for the extremist parties to gain a foothold and then undermine the democratic system itself.

Today the German electoral system is a fascinating combination of PR and single-member districts that has also been adopted in part by other countries such as Russia and New Zealand. It is a “personalized PR system” in which the voter casts two votes. The first vote is cast for candidates running in a single-member district where, as in the United States, only one candidate can win. The second vote is the more important of the two. With it the voter selects a political party — i.e., selects a list of party candidates chosen by
party committees in the voter's state. The total number of seats in the Bundestag won by a particular party is determined by a special formula based on the total number of "second votes" cast in the entire country for that party. These seats are then distributed among the states in proportion to the party's share of the state's allocated seats. (The number of seats in the Bundestag allocated to a state is based on the proportion of its population to the national population.) For example, if a state is allocated 40 seats and a party wins around 50 percent of the vote in that state, the party receives about 20 seats of that state's seats.

To qualify for seats, however, a party must either win at least five percent of the national vote or win three direct single-member seats. While this famous "five percent clause" has prevented tiny splinter parties from fragmenting the party system, critics complain that it favors the older, established parties at the expense of new parties. In fact, however, the clause has not prevented several new parties from entering many local government councils and state parliaments, and it did not prevent the Greens, who emerged around 1980, from entering the Bundestag in 1983.

Regarding the first vote that is cast for candidates running in a single-member district where only one candidate can win, half of the seats in the Bundestag are gained in this manner. The other half are won by candidates on the party lists via the PR process described above. The seats won in the single-member districts are subtracted from the total seats won by each party in each state, and the remaining seats are filled by candidates taken from the party lists. Former Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats, which in the elections of 1990 and 1994 won most of the single-member district seats, received fewer party-list seats, while the major opposition party, the Social Democrats, won fewer seats directly and more from the party lists. The small parties such as the FDP and Greens, which receive more than five percent of the national vote but not enough to win in a single-member district, get all of their seats from the party lists — i.e., from the PR feature of the electoral system. If a party fails to win at least five percent of the total national vote, it may also qualify for receiving party-list seats by winning a plurality in at least three single-member districts. This happened for the first time in the elections of 1994, when the communist PDS party in eastern Germany won four direct seats. In 1998 they again won four direct seats, but they also qualified for the PR feature of the electoral system by receiving five percent of the total national vote.

Government Institutions

The Basic Law and the parliamentary system

The Basic Law, or constitution, of 1949 is regarded today as a model of democratic government and has been examined carefully and copied to some extent by a number of European and other countries that have made or are making the transition from a dictatorship of the Right (e.g., Spain in the mid 1970s) or the Left (e.g., former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe in the 1990s). The Basic Law provides for legislative, executive, and judicial branches just as the American Constitution does; however, the German institutions are very different from ours in some ways. Germany, like most other democracies, has what is called a parliamentary system, whereas we have a presidential system. In our system, each branch is separate from the others, and each checks and balances the others. In a parliamentary system, the judicial branch is separate and independent from the
other two branches, but the executive and legislative branches are not so separate. Indeed, the legislature (parliament) selects the head of government (in Britain, the prime minister; in Germany and Austria, the chancellor). The head of government is different from the head of state (in Britain, the monarch; in Germany, the president), who is selected not by the people but by an assembly made up of legislators from the Bundestag and the state parliaments. The German president has mostly ceremonial duties, while the chancellor and his cabinet ministers make up the actual “government.”

Parliament and the legislative process

The German parliament is said to consist of two chambers, the Bundestag (Federal Assembly) elected by the people, and the Bundesrat (Federal Council), which consists of unelected members sent by the state governments. As we shall see, however, the Bundesrat is not really a house of parliament. It is a part of the legislative branch in that it deals with the passage of many laws, but it is also part of the executive branch in so far as it represents the elected governments of the states — i.e., the state prime ministers (“minister presidents”) and their cabinets. It is sometimes referred to as “the state chamber.”

Before unification, the Bundestag had 496 members, not including the nonvoting members from West Berlin, which legally was under Allied occupation and not a part of West Germany. Since unification, the Bundestag has been officially enlarged to 656 members. According to reform plans, it will have 598 members after the 2002 elections. In accordance with the complicated electoral system, half of the members are elected in single-member districts and half enter the parliament via party lists. As discussed above, the total number of seats received by each party is based on the proportion of votes received nation-wide, that is, the percentage of seats equals (more or less) the percentage of votes. Only parties that receive five percent or more of the vote are represented in the distribution of seats; however, any seats captured in single-member districts can be retained, and, if a party wins in three or more single-member districts, it participates in the proportional distribution of party-list seats just as if it had won five percent of the total vote. So far only the communist PDS party has gained party-list seats by winning enough single-member district seats to make up for its receiving less than five percent of the total vote. Thus in the 1994 national elections, the PDS was able to take advantage of the proportional distribution of seats by winning a plurality in four districts in East Berlin.

A major difference between the American presidential system and a parliamentary system such as the one found in Germany, most other European countries, or Canada, is the differing role of the parliament in supporting the government (or, as we would say, the Administration). The general rule in a parliamentary system is that the government is formed by a parliamentary majority consisting of one or more parties. In Great Britain, which has two major parties in addition to a few smaller ones as a result of its “first-past-the-post” or single-member district electoral system, one of the two large parties almost always has a majority of seats in the House of Commons. On the European continent, in contrast, almost all governments are coalition governments consisting of two or more parties that together have a majority in parliament. This, of course, is because most European countries have a proportional representation electoral system and therefore a multi-party system in which a single party rarely gains an absolute majority of the seats in parliament.
As noted in the discussion above, German national governments are always coalition governments. For example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl has managed to stay in office since October 1982 because his party, the CDU, together with its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, and their smaller coalition partner, the FDP, have retained a majority of seats during that entire period of time. Thus Chancellor Kohl, just like any British or Canadian prime minister, stays in office only so long as he has majority support in parliament and remains leader of his party. The chancellor can be removed from office in between elections by a vote of no-confidence by a parliamentary majority, but only if that majority can support a new chancellor at the same time. The Germans call this a "constructive vote of no-confidence." Thus Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in October 1982 because the FDP deserted its coalition partner, the SPD, and joined with the CDU/CSU in forming a new majority and thus a new government by voting for Kohl to replace the former SPD Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.

The Bundesrat, as we have seen, is not an elected body comparable to the American Senate (which was selected by state legislatures until 1916!), but rather a unique body that represents state governments in the national legislative process. A comparable American system would be each American governor having a secretary in the national cabinet who would represent the governor’s administration in Washington vis-à-vis the House of Representatives and the President. Each state in Germany has a cabinet minister in the Bundesrat who serves as a kind of state ambassador in the national capital, where each state has a mission. The Bundesrat cabinet minister also has a number of high-level civil servants from the state who serve on Bundesrat committees and negotiate policies behind the scenes for their minister. They usually sit with the minister in the Bundesrat when it is in session, but only the minister votes.

Depending on the size of its population, each state has from three to six votes in the Bundesrat, which are cast as a bloc by the state cabinet minister or the state prime minister. The majority of the 69 votes in the Bundesrat does not have to correspond to the same majority in the Bundestag. Indeed, for much of the Kohl era, the SPD has done better than the CDU and FDP in state elections; therefore, it has more state prime ministers and parliamentary majorities in the sixteen states than the CDU and FDP, and, as a result, has more votes in the Bundesrat. This means that the Germans, like the Americans, can have divided government. As in the United States, this is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it means that in order to function well, the political system requires a certain amount of cooperation, because the parties must reach a compromise if the Bundestag and Bundesrat are both going to pass a bill. On the other hand, it can mean that the majority in the Bundesrat can block many of the most important bills passed by the government-controlled Bundestag and thus engage in the politics of gridlock. Thus the Bundesrat can exercise a check on the government and its majority in the Bundestag that is without parallel in other European parliamentary systems.

As in the United States, where a conference committee usually irons out differences between the House and Senate, a mediation committee composed of members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat is usually able to reach some kind of compromise when the two bodies have voted in opposite ways. Unlike in the United States, however, the two bodies in Germany do not have to approve all legislation: the Bundesrat votes only on constitutional amendments and on those bills that affect the states directly or indirectly, which is about 60 percent of all legislation.
UNIT III: INTRODUCTION

The chancellor

As we have seen above, the chancellor is the head of government elected by the majority party or parties in the Bundestag. He or she must be elected at the beginning of each Bundestag term following a general election. He/she can be removed involuntarily between elections only by the “constructive vote of no-confidence” described above. The constructive vote of no-confidence was another innovative provision of the Basic Law of 1949 that gave more stability to the German parliamentary system. Thus, a constitutional barrier was constructed against negative majorities, such as the Nazis and Communists at the end of the Weimar Republic who together could bring down governments but not form one themselves.

The president

The president of Germany is the ceremonial head of state, like the constitutional monarch in Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. He or she serves a five-year term and may be re-elected only once. The president is not elected by the people, but by a Federal Assembly consisting of the members of the Bundestag and an equal number of state legislators. The president makes a number of routine appointments including federal judges, higher civil servants, and military officers, and can issue pardons. But his/her most important domestic duties are to propose a candidate for chancellor (normally this is the leader of the largest party or party coalition), appoint federal ministers on the recommendation of the chancellor, and decide whether under certain circumstances to dissolve the Bundestag and call for new elections. The president also serves as a moral spokesman for the country — for example, President Richard von Weizsäcker gave a speech in the Bundestag on the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II in which he expressed deep regret for the War and, in particular, for the atrocities and violations of human rights committed by the Nazi state. The president’s important international duties consist of representing Germany by making official visits abroad.

In the Weimar Republic, the democratic political system that emerged after WWI and which was overthrown by Hitler in 1933, the president was elected by the people and had considerable power including appointing chancellors and exercising emergency rule. It was out of frustration with the ability of the parliament to form a majority government that President Hindenburg appointed Hitler, who was never formally elected to office. Hindenburg and many others thought Hitler would not last long in office, but Hindenburg died shortly after he appointed Hitler, and Hitler soon outlawed the non-Nazi parties.

It was because of such bad experience with an elected president that the founders of the Basic Law made the president of the Federal Republic a largely ceremonial head of state. In carrying out his duties today, the president, like other ceremonial heads of state, is expected to remain “above politics” and not become involved in controversy. Nevertheless, some presidents, such as the current president, Roman Herzog, and his predecessor, Richard von Weizsäcker, have exercised considerable moral authority through their speeches and behavior.

The federal courts

In the United States, we have Federal District and Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court, plus some special federal courts such as the Military Court of Justice. Each state
also has a court system. In Germany, almost all of the federal courts are appeals courts to which decisions of state-level courts can be appealed. There are different kinds of courts, depending on the kinds of law involved. There are separate federal courts for social welfare questions, labor questions, questions of administrative law, and criminal and civil law issues. The court that is best known is the Federal Constitutional Court (the equivalent of our Supreme Court), which deals only with constitutional issues that are generally sent to it directly rather than through the appeals process, as in the United States. The Federal Constitutional Court is divided into two parts, called Senates, which deal with different sets of questions. Half of the judges are selected by the Bundestag, and half by the Bundesrat for nonrenewable terms of twelve years. This serves to grant the judges independence from the government.

The Federal Constitutional Court, like the American Supreme Court, has the right of judicial review, that is, the right to declare acts of the executive and legislative branches unconstitutional. As in the United States, this function can become very controversial, and the Federal Constitutional Court is often criticized for many of its most important decisions. Unlike the U.S. Federal Courts, which can hear only real “cases and controversies,” the Federal Constitutional Court can issue “advisory” rulings involving legislation that has not yet been implemented. In spite of the controversy that surrounds the Court, it enjoys great prestige and public approval.

Conclusion

It is clear that the German and American constitutions are very different in many respects. The American Constitution is derived from one philosophical tradition, classical “liberalism,” while the German Basic Law is based on three traditions: classical liberalism, socialism, and Christian, especially Catholic, social doctrine. The American Constitution provides for a presidential system with a pronounced separation of powers and checks and balances, while the Basic Law is the foundation of a parliamentary democracy with separation of powers found primarily between the Bundestag and Bundesrat, especially when there is divided government. The Bundesrat is an institution unique to Germany in that it is a non-elected body consisting of appointed delegates that represent the respective state governments. Like the Supreme Court in the United States, the Federal Constitutional Court is also an example of separation of powers and a powerful instrument of checks and balances.

Like the American Bill of Rights, the Basic Law protects classical human rights; but certain other rights not specifically covered in the American Bill are also mentioned. Also in contrast to the American Constitution, the Basic Law calls for a “socially conscious” welfare state and for the protection of the environment.

The German Basic Law was the first to mention the role of political parties. The parties are regulated by a Party Law, passed in 1967 and revised many times since, that regulates the internal order of the parties, insists on procedures that guarantee a considerable degree of intraparty democracy, and provides for an elaborate system of public financing of parties and elections. The Basic Law also makes it possible for the federal government — i.e., the cabinet — to bring a party before the Federal Constitutional Court and ask that it be outlawed on the grounds that its goals include the undermining of the
free democratic order. An extreme right party was banned under this provision in 1952, and the Communist Party was outlawed in 1956; however, a renamed Communist Party was allowed to return in 1968, and a reformed version of the old East German SED now operates as the PDS.

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The German States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State (Land)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No. of seats in the Bundesrat</th>
<th>Capital city</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>10,300,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>11,900,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Munich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin*</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Potsdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen*</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg*</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wiesbaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg-West Pomerania</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Schwerin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
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<td>Hanover</td>
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<td>Düsseldorf</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Mainz</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Saarbrücken</td>
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<td>Saxony</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dresden</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Erfurt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>81,400,000</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Bonn/Berlin**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*City-states

**Berlin is now the official capital, but the government and parliament will remain in Bonn until construction of new facilities is completed after the year 2000. Some ministries will remain in Bonn even after 2000.
Bibliography


The Nature of Constitutions: Germany and the United States

Lessons in Unit III
- Lesson 1: Comparing the Basic Law and the Constitution
- Lesson 2: Comparing the Language of the German and U.S. Preambles
- Lesson 3: The Court's Role in Interpreting Laws

Overview
The lessons in this Unit compare and contrast two constitutional documents, the Federal Republic of Germany's Basic Law (1949/90) and the United States Constitution (1789). They also emphasize the historical reasons for the differences between these two documents. The lessons are designed to provide the students with an understanding of the principles and concepts common to all representative governments. They fit nicely into the comparative government units of high school government courses. Included are exercises designed to meet specific SOL in History/Social Science and English.

Lesson 1: Comparing the Basic Law and the Constitution

Preview of Main Points
These activities address the differences and similarities between the German Basic Law and the U.S. Constitution. This analysis is based on the principle that the words do matter. The issue of how these documents have changed or stayed the same is critical, given the 150-year time span from the ratification of the Constitution to the post-World War II drafting of the Basic Law. Students will see that regardless of how different our governments may seem on the surface, certain key principles and components serve as the foundation for most modern constitutional democracies.

Key Concepts
- Constitutional government
- Basic freedoms
- Constitution making
UNIT III: LESSONS

Related Concepts
• Civil rights
• Civil liberties
• Statutory law
• Amendments
• Preambles
• The legislative process

Objectives
During this lesson, the students will
• compare and contrast the primary components of the U.S. Constitution and the German Basic Law
• identify German legislative and amendment processes and evaluate their function relative to the American model
• compare and contrast civil liberties as expressed in the 18th-century U.S. Constitution and the 20th-century Basic Law
• explain the philosophies of government represented by the two contrasting preambles.

Focus Questions
1. How do experiences had and the resulting lessons learned by our parents and grandparents affect the choices and decisions we make today?
2. How do family and community documents help communicate important experiences to younger generations?
3. How did Germany, as a result of historical experiences, change the basic functions of government to meet the new challenges facing the German people in the 20th century?

Teaching Suggestions
It is recommended that information from Units I, II, and V be introduced so that the students can place in historical context the origi-
nal drafting of the Basic Law in 1949 and the significant changes generated by reunification in 1990. This lesson is a concept-based package of activities that should work well as a substantial review of the chapter(s) relating to the Constitution in most Government textbooks. In addition, teachers should feel free to adjust each exercise to fit the various needs of their students and class situations. The activities lend themselves to careful examination of the two documents and the use of group discussion at various stages. Opportunities to integrate more formal written components are evident in each.

Beginning the Lesson

Ask the students to identify experiences had and the resulting lessons learned by their parents and grandparents that affect the students' choices and decisions today. Ask them to identify what family documents communicate these experiences to the younger generations. Discuss what the students identify. Explain that historical experiences in the United States and Germany directly shaped the constitutional choices and decisions of both countries.

Review with the students the events surrounding the creation of the U.S. Constitution (refer to U.S. History or Government textbooks), and supplement their knowledge of the equivalent German process with information gleaned from other Units in this resource guide.

Remind the students of the basic structure of the U.S. Constitution (preamble, articles with sections and paragraphs/clauses, and amendments). Inform the students that the German Basic Law consists of major sections (starting with the German version of a Bill of Rights) broken into a long list of articles (1–141). Advise students that they can find the entire Basic Law on the Internet at:

http://www.bundesregierung.de/english/01/newsf.html

Developing the Lesson

Ask the students to read the preambles of the German Basic Law and the U.S. Constitution (see Resource 1). Conduct a class discussion that compares and contrasts the two
Group the students into small groups, and ask each group to examine the U.S. Bill of Rights and Articles 1–19 in the German Basic Law (see Unit II, Resource 13). Compare and contrast the two documents (see Activity 2).

Ask the students to imagine that they are members of an American advertising team, and ask them to use this perspective to write a business memorandum about the limitations on free speech in Germany (see Activity 3). This activity integrates the content about the Basic Law with the English SOL for writing. It is an optional, supplemental activity.

Ask the students to read Articles 76–78 of the Basic Law (see Resource 2). Ask them to compare and contrast how the United States and Germany pass legislation. Which legislative system is best? (see Activity 4)

Ask the students to read Article V of the U.S. Constitution and Article 79 of the German Basic Law (see Resource 3). Ask them to compare, contrast, and evaluate the two amending processes (see Activity 5).

Concluding the Lesson

Conduct a review of the major similarities and differences between the U.S. Constitution and the German Basic Law. Ask the students to explain the reasons for the similarities and differences. Focus on the German Basic Law. How did the basic functions of government change to meet the new challenges facing Germany after World War II and again after reunification?

Activity 1

Conduct a discussion that compares and contrasts the preambles of the U.S. Constitution and German Basic Law (see Resource 1), highlighting the key components. Use the following questions:

- What tasks does each preamble provide for the government?
- What is the equivalent of “We the people...” in the German Basic Law? (“The Germans in the Länder of ...”) What issue does this sentence address? (The sovereign status of the states and the nature of their strength within the federal republics)
- What issues are addressed in the Basic Law’s preamble but not in the Constitution? (The issues of responsibility, world peace, and European union or partnership) Why are these issues addressed here but not in the Constitution?

Ask the students to write a working hypothesis as to why the 20th-century German preamble is different from the 18th-century American preamble, taking into account the historical events leading up to these two documents.
Activity 2

Group the students into small groups of three to four students each. Assign each group one of the amendments in the U.S. Bill of Rights. Ask each group to compose a list of the specific, discrete rights guaranteed by the amendment (e.g., First Amendment: free exercise of religion, no establishment of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of press, right to assemble peaceably, right to petition). As a class, make a master list of all these rights.

Assign the same groups two or more articles from the Basic Law's statement of Basic Rights (see Unit II, Resource 13). Ask each group to compose a list of the specific, discrete rights guaranteed by the articles. As a class, make a master list of all these rights.

Now create three lists: 1) rights dealt with in both documents, 2) rights dealt with in the Basic Law only, 3) rights dealt with in the Constitution only. Ask the students to look at the second and third lists and generate a working hypothesis explaining the differences (broad or specific) between the two lists. Consider the historical time frame of each documents and the goals of the people drafting each.

Ask the students to look at the first list. Ask them to speculate about why both documents contain these common rights.

Activity 3

This activity reinforces English SOL 11.8 and 12.7. Ask small groups of students to examine how Articles 1–19 of the Basic Law (see Unit II, Resource 13) might affect the workplace. Specifically, have them consider Article 5 of the Basic Law. After they have formulated their responses, conduct a discussion with the whole class.

Ask the students to complete a business memorandum writing assignment based on the following situation: “You are the director of a creative team in an American advertising company. Your company has been given a large contract to develop a series of print and television ads for a chocolate company in Bonn, Germany. Write a memorandum to the other team members explaining the limitations and freedoms of expression as described in the Basic Law.” The form and style of a memorandum may need to be taught.

Determine the follow-up lesson necessary to support the students in completing the writing assignment. Have students research examples of freedom of expression in Germany. They may need additional instruction, such as analyzing American and German advertisements, in order to edit and revise their memoranda to acceptable levels.

Assess the memoranda, using the following rubric:

**Memo: Analytic Rubric**

Standard: Effective communication of specific information in a memo

Scoring Guide: Each category rated 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest)

**Purpose and Content**

3 stated purpose clearly and recognized exceptions and limitations in freedom of speech

2 stated purpose in a confusing manner yet acknowledged paradox

1 did not state purpose and failed to see that there are limits
UNIT III: Lessons

Tone
3 used appropriate tone appropriate for audience (polite and businesslike) and chose technically correct words
2 used somewhat inappropriate tone for audience (impolite, too personal, too emotional) and chose very limited words
1 used completely inappropriate tone and words for audience

Language Control
3 made no errors in usage or mechanics
2 made several minor errors in usage or mechanics
1 made frequent and/or major errors in usage or mechanics

Format
3 used correct memo format
2 made some mistakes in memo format
1 used confusing, cluttered, or incorrect format

Activity 4
Review the standard graphic representation of “How a Bill Becomes a Law” in your textbook. Ask small groups of students to create a similar graphic representation of the legislative process as outlined in Articles 76–78 of the Basic Law (see Resource 2). Have the class identify critical differences in the two approaches for passing legislation.

Conduct a class discussion in which the students evaluate the two systems. Under which system is it easier to pass legislation? Which system offers the best potential for solving a country’s problems? Which system best ensures that multiple viewpoints are heard? Make sure the students consider the role political parties play in each system and the impact of divided government in the U.S. and coalition governments (all but one since 1949) in Germany.

Ask the students to write a position paper on which legislative system is best.

Activity 5
Review the procedures for constitutional amendments in the U.S. Constitution — Article V (see Resource 3). Ask the students to read the amendment process for the German Basic Law found in Article 79 (see Resource 3). Ask them to identify the differences between the two processes. Highlight the following:

1. In the U.S. procedure, a completely separate step exists for the states to take, with a higher proportion (three-fourths) required for approval.

2. The Basic Law states the process as a legal one in which the existing text is merely edited, whereas the U.S. model, in fact and tradition, leaves the existing text alone and gives the changes separate, distinct status as added “amendments.”

Ask the students to evaluate the two amendment processes. Which one makes amendments easier to add? Should adding amendments be easy? The Basic Law has been amended dozens of times in a 50-year period, while the American Constitution has been amended only 27 times. What are the consequences of the relative ease in amending the Basic Law
and the difficulty in amending the Constitution? Help the students to realize that with the Basic Law, changes become technical editing and the document takes on more of the characteristics of just another law, even given the super-majorities needed to ratify those changes. However, the German model does allow greater flexibility in dealing with issues like the Cold War and the reunification process of 1990. The reverence for the U.S. Constitution has encouraged other means for change such as Supreme Court decisions and legislative efforts to develop and/or change laws.

Lesson 2: Comparing the Language of the German and U.S. Preambles

Preview of Main Points
This lesson integrates English skills with the study of American government. Although the plans and activities described are intended for use in conjunction with the other lessons of Unit III, teachers may use each as a stand-alone lesson for instruction based on the English Standards of Learning. By using elements of the United States Constitution and the German Basic Law, the students acquire skills for understanding the relationship of style and meaning in writing.

Key concepts
- Style
- Point of view
- Main idea

Related concepts
- Diction
- Syntax

Objectives
During this lesson, the students will
- analyze the syntax used in each preamble
- describe the relationship between style and meaning.

Focus Question
How does style affect meaning?
Teaching Suggestions

This lesson uses individual writing, small group discussion, and manipulation as a means of determining the relationship between the style and meaning of the two preambles. Students are asked to draw on prior knowledge to identify basic sentence elements and to apply that knowledge to restructuring the sentences. Through the exercises and discussion, the students will be prepared to write an explanation of the relationship between style and meaning.

Beginning the Lesson

Initiate a discussion to define the term preamble, and assess the students’ prior knowledge of the preamble of the U.S. Constitution. Suggest to the students that a preamble often sets the tone and establishes the intent of the entire document. Explain that this lesson is designed to help them examine the importance of word choices and sentence structures in conveying a writer’s meaning.

Developing the Lesson

Ask the individual students and then small groups of students to paraphrase the two preambles (see Resource 1). Use the ensuing discussion to determine the extent to which the students understand the relationship between language and meaning (see Activity 1).

Ask the small groups of students to rearrange the words in each preamble to change its meaning without changing the vocabulary (see Activity 2).

Concluding the Lesson

Conduct a class discussion on style and its effect on meaning as presented in this lesson.

Activity 1

Distribute copies of the U.S. and German preambles (see Resource 1). Ask the students to individually draft paraphrases of the preambles of both documents. Then ask groups of three students each to compare their paraphrases. Tell the groups that the discussion of the paraphrased versions should focus on clarifying their understanding of each passage. Following the discussion of literal content, have the students answer the following questions in their group discussions:

- What is the subject of each sentence? What words modify each subject?
- What are the verbs in each sentence? How are the verbs used?
- How do the sentence structures differ?
- What differences do you find in the writing?

RELATIONSHIP TO THE VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF LEARNING

English

11.3 The student will read and analyze relationships among American literature, history, and culture.
   f. Describe how use of context and language structures conveys an author’s point of view in contemporary and historical essays, speeches, and critical reviews.

11.4 The student will read a variety of print material.

The Grade 12 SOL overview states: “To the extent feasible, selections will include those which relate to other subjects, such as the study of American and Virginia government.”
Have the groups share their ideas in a class discussion. Ask the whole group to discuss the question: What may have influenced the different styles of the two preambles? In prompting this discussion, focus on the historical context of each document, eliciting from the students their general knowledge of the events preceding the writing of the U.S. Constitution and assisting the students with knowledge of the events leading to the Basic Law.

Activity 2

Distribute phrase strips with portions of the first sentence of each preamble on separate strips (see Resource 4). Direct small groups to rearrange the given parts of each sentence to create a change in idea without changing any vocabulary. Encourage the students to experiment with movement of the parts. The small groups should discuss the rearrangement in terms of how it changes the meaning, its effect on the reader, and what it suggests about the writer.

Ask each group to display its new version to the class and explain the effects of the rearrangement.

Lesson 3: The Court’s Role in Interpreting Laws

Preview of Main Points

This lesson provides an additional opportunity for the students to compare and contrast the Basic Law of Germany and the Constitution of the United States. Emphasis will be placed on two ways in which these documents were written to be flexible enough to meet the changes and demands of each country over time. The students will see that the Basic Law and the Constitution are “living documents” in that the framers of each provided for the future in several ways: one way involves the amendment process, and the other way involves the responsibility of the Federal Court System.

Key Concepts

- Judicial review
- Constitutional law
- Censorship
- Civil liberties
- Precedents

Related Concepts

- Landmark case
- Personal freedom (individual rights)
Objectives
During this lesson, the students will
• define judicial review
• identify the constitutional questions in specific court cases
• analyze the impact of federal court decisions on society
• explain the reasons why Germans and Americans interpret their basic laws differently.

Focus Question
How does the American court system differ from the German court system in interpreting the laws of their respective countries?

Teaching Suggestions
This is a reading and application lesson in which cooperative learning plays a major role in the discussion stage. The students are asked to read, discuss, and interpret several court cases. It is suggested that they read silently and work in small groups. However, if the class is small, the students might participate in a group reading before any discussion. The students must be able to make comparisons between the German court system and its interpretation of laws and the American court system and its interpretation of laws. Each exercise is a test of the student’s ability to interpret the cases.

Beginning the Lesson
Provide the students with definitions of the terms judicial review and constitutional law. (Judicial review is the right of the Supreme Court to declare acts of the executive and legislative branches unconstitutional. Constitutional law is formulated by judges who interpret and apply the Constitution to specific cases. The decisions of these judges add substance to the general framework of the government established by the Constitution.)

Provide the students with copies of the Basic Law and the Constitution (see Resources 1–3 in this Unit and Resource 13 in Unit II). Have the students look at the physical difference in the documents. Point out the difference in length, and allow time for them to locate the number of amendments for each document. Where available, have the students watch videos that describe the key principles of the documents.
Developing the Lessons

Ask the students to read the Supreme Court case “Marbury vs. Madison” (see Resource 5) and answer the questions for analysis (see Activity 1). Then ask the students to research and report on how the German system provides for judicial review.

Divide the students into four groups and ask each group to read a different court case, two cases from the United States and two from Germany (see Resources 6, 7, 8, and 9). Ask the groups to summarize and report on the cases. Conduct a class discussion on the influence of American and German history and culture on the court decisions (see Activity 2).

Concluding the Lesson

Group the students into small groups of three to five students each to discuss the phrase “abridging the freedom of speech.” Have the students in each group compare 18th century forms of speech with current forms. Conduct a class discussion about government regulation of free speech. Ask the students to prepare persuasive speeches on cyber communications (see Activity 3).

Activity 1

Ask the students to read the court case of “Marbury v. Madison” (see Resource 5). Explain that it is a landmark case and help the students understand the term landmark. Ask the students to answer the following questions for analysis:

1. What legal principle gave Marbury a right to some remedy under law?
2. Why was Marshall hesitant to serve as cabinet officer with a writ?
3. Why is Marbury v. Madison of particular importance to the role of the court?
4. In what way does Marbury v. Madison enhance the system of checks and balances?

Discuss the students’ answers with the whole class, making sure the class understands the principle of judicial review.

Ask the students to speculate on ways in which the German system developed the principle of judicial review. Ask the students to research the topic of judicial review in the German court system by using the Internet, library resources, and information from the German Embassy. Once research has been completed, allow time for brief presentations of information to the class. Have each student write a one-page summary explaining the application of judicial review in both United States courts and German courts.

Activity 2

This activity provides an opportunity for the students to compare a German court case to an American court case. The students will read and discuss four different court cases, two from German courts and two from American courts.

Divide the class into four groups. Ask each group to read one of the following court cases:

- “German Court Rules That Providing Internet Link to Outlawed Site Not a Crime” (see Resource 6)
UNIT III: LESSONS

- “The Deckert Case: No Tolerance for Holocaust Denial” (see Resource 7)
- “Judge Rules That Encryption Software is Speech” (see Resource 8)
- “Adderley v. Florida: Freedom of Speech, Rights of the Accused” (see Resource 9)

Have each group write a summary of its court case that answers the following questions:
1. What are the complaints in the case?
2. What is the constitutional question in the case?
3. Is there a court ruling in the case? If so, what is the court ruling on the complaint?

Conduct a class discussion on each case. Start by asking each group to report on its case. Then ask the students to speculate on the reasons for the decisions and express their opinions of the decisions.

Ask small groups of students to complete a chart that organizes the information from each case. The category headings for the chart might be: Name of Case, Constitutional Issue or Question, Arguments for Each Side, Court Decision (if there is one), and Reasons for Court Decision.

Discuss with the class what differences or similarities in history and culture affected the rulings in each case and how.

Activity 3

Group the students into small groups of three to four students each. Ask each group to discuss the phrase of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech...” What did the writers mean? What types of speech would have occurred in the 18th Century? Ask them to list the types of speech that occur today that were not known in the 18th Century.

Conduct a whole class discussion on this issue. Is it possible to write a more specific amendment to encompass the current forms of speech? Is that a good idea? If so, what might that amendment say?

Ask the students to read Article 5 of the Basic Law (see Unit II, Resource 13). Discuss the following questions: How is this article different from Article 1 of the Bill of Rights? What 1949 forms of expression are included? Does the article anticipate forms of speech that are current? What parts do so? Conclude the discussion by focusing on the issue of government regulation of information or communication. What forms of information should a government regulate?

Ask the students to prepare five- to ten-minute persuasive speeches on the question: Should governments regulate cyber communication? Assess their speeches, using the following rubric:

**Oral Presentation: Primary Trait Rubric**

Standard: Delivery of an interesting, focused, and audience-appropriate oral presentation

Criteria:
- Defends a position
Develops a logical, clear, and convincing argument
Uses details, illustrations, statistics, comparisons, and analogies to support position
Uses visuals effectively
Displays effective speaking techniques

**Scoring Guide: 4 (highest) to 1 (lowest)**

4  Effective: Presentation is well developed, unified, and focused. Presenter delivers presentation with enthusiasm, a thorough understanding of the topic, and a good sense of audience. Presenter demonstrates skillful use of language and speech techniques. Speech techniques include eye contact, timing, clarity, and voice projection. Visuals add relevance to the spoken information and are creative and well prepared. Presenter uses time effectively.

3  Competent: Presentation is complete, organized, and focused, and individual parts are integrated. Information is delivered in a knowledgeable manner. Presenter demonstrates adequate use of language and speech techniques, but may not be comfortable in front of the audience. Evidence of that may be pacing or other nervous movement, speaking too fast or too softly, or avoiding eye contact with the audience. Visuals are appropriate, but may lack clarity or creativity.

2  Limited: Presentation may be clear and easy to understand but lack focus. Material is not well developed. Presenter demonstrates inept use of language and speech techniques. He/she may read from notes or scripts rather than use notes for reminders. Visuals, if included, do not enhance the communication of ideas.

1  Minimal: Presentation is incomplete, undeveloped, or unclear. Presenter may demonstrate no awareness of language or speech techniques. He/she reads from scripts or notes showing little or no preparation. Visuals, if included, show little relationship to the topic or little care in preparation. Presenter conveys little awareness of audience. Presenter makes poor use of time to present the topic.
RESOURCE 1
Preamble of the German Basic Law
Preamble of the United States Constitution

Sources: Basic Law:
The Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany
English translation revised by the Federal Ministers of the Interior, Justice and Finance, July 1991
Reprinting permitted

U.S. Constitution:
Web Site: http://www.constitutionfacts.com/cons.shtml
Reprinting permitted

Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic of Germany

Conscious of their responsibility before God and Men, animated by the resolve to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people have adopted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law.
The Germans in the Länder of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. This Basic Law is thus valid for the entire German People.

Constitution of the United States (1787)

We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
RESOURCES

RESOURCE 2

German Basic Law – Articles 76–78

Source: The Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany
   English translation revised by the Federal Ministers of the Interior, Justice and
   Finance, July 1991
   Reprinting permitted

Article 76 (Bills; amended 15 November 1968 and 12 May 1969).
(1) Bills are introduced in the Bundestag by the Federal Government, by members of the
   Bundestag or by the Bundesrat.

(2) Bills of the Federal Government shall be submitted first to the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat
   is entitled to state its position on these bills within six weeks.

(3) Bills of the Bundesrat shall be submitted to the Bundestag by the Federal Government
   within three months. In doing so the Federal Government shall state its own views.

Article 77 (Legislative procedure; amended 15 November 1968).
(1) Federal laws are adopted by the Bundestag. Upon their adoption, they shall, without
   delay, be transmitted to the Bundesrat by the President of the Bundestag.

(2) The Bundesrat may, within three weeks of the receipt of the adopted bill, demand that
   a committee for joint consideration of bills, composed of members of the Bundestag and
   the Bundesrat, be convened. The composition and the procedure of this committee are
   regulated by rules of procedure adopted by the Bundestag and requiring the consent of the
   Bundesrat. The members of the Bundesrat on this committee are not bound by instruc-
   tions. Where the consent of the Bundesrat is required for a law, the demand for convening
   this committee may also be made by the Bundestag or the Federal Government. Should
   the committee propose any amendment to the adopted bill, the Bundestag must again
   vote on the bill.

(3) Insofar as the consent of the Bundesrat is not required for a law, the Bundesrat may,
   if the proceedings under paragraph 2 are completed, enter a protest within two weeks
   against a law adopted by the Bundestag. This period begins, in the case of paragraph 2,
   last sentence, on the receipt of the bill as re-adopted by the Bundestag, in all other cases
   on the receipt of a communication from the chairman of the committee provided for in
   paragraph (2) of this Article to the effect that the committee's proceedings have been
   concluded.

(4) If the protest is adopted by a majority of the votes of the Bundesrat, it can be rejected
   by a decision of the majority of the members of the Bundestag. If the Bundesrat adopted
   the protest by a majority of at least two-thirds of its votes, the rejection by the Bundestag
Article 78 (Passage of federal statutes).
A bill adopted by the Bundestag is deemed to have been passed if the Bundesrat consents to it, does not make a demand pursuant to Article 77, paragraph 2, does not enter a protest within the time limited by Article 77 paragraph 3, or withdraws such protest, or if the protest is overridden by the Bundestag.

RESOURCE 3
German Basic Law — Article 79
United States Constitution — Article V

Article 79 (Amendment of the Basic Law; amended March 27, 1954).
(1) The Basic law can be amended only by a law which expressly amends or supplements the text thereof. With respect to international treaties the subject of which is a peace settlement, the preparation of a peace settlement or the abolition of an occupation regime, or which are designed to serve the defense of the Federal Republic, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of a clarifying interpretation to the effect that the provisions of the Basic Law are not contrary to the conclusion and entry into force of such treaties, to effect a supplementation of the Basic Law confined to this clarifying interpretation.

(2) Such a law requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Bundestag and two-thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.

(3) An amendment of this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, the participation in principle of the Länder in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20, is inadmissible.
Article V
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

RESOURCE 4
Phrase Strips

Write each phrase shown below onto a separate strip of cardboard or poster board or on a large note card for rearrangement by students.

Preamble of the German Basic Law
conscious of their responsibility before God and Men
animated by the resolve to serve world peace
as an equal partner in a United Europe
the German people
have adopted
by virtue of their constituent power
this Basic Law

Preamble of the United States Constitution
we the people of the United States
in Order to form a more Perfect Union
establish Justice
insure domestic Tranquility
provide for the common Defense
promote the general Welfare
and
secure the Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America
RESOURCE 5
Marbury v. Madison (1803)

The Facts of the Case

The election of 1800 transferred power from the Federalist Party to the Republican Party. In the closing days of President John Adams' administration, the Federalists created many new offices, appointing Federalists to fill them. One of these last-minute appointments was William Marbury, who was appointed as a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. His commission papers had been signed and sealed, but they were not delivered before the change in administration occurred.

After taking office, President Thomas Jefferson asked his new secretary of state, James Madison, not to deliver Marbury's commission papers. Marbury then applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus (an order from a court that some action be performed) commanding that Madison deliver the commission. Such writs had been authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789.

The Constitutional Questions

Was Marbury entitled to his appointment? If so, was Marbury entitled to some remedy under the law? Was the Supreme Court the place for Marbury to get the relief he requested?

The Decision of the Supreme Court

Chief Justice John Marshall decided the first question by holding that an appointment is effective once a commission has been signed and the United States seal affixed. Therefore, Marbury had been legally appointed, and Madison's refusal to deliver the commission violated Marbury's right to the appointment. A long-established legal principle states that where a right exists, a corresponding remedy for any violation of that right must exist as well. Accordingly, in response to the second question, Marshall held that Marbury was entitled to some remedy under United States law. The final question dealt with whether the proper remedy for Marbury was to apply for a writ against Madison and whether the Supreme Court was empowered to issue such a writ.

Considering the constitutional principle of separation of powers, Marshall reasoned that there is a difference between a cabinet secretary acting according to the President's orders and acting as directed by law. The former would improperly involve the Court in a political area. The latter, however, involves legal questions that are properly part of the Court's business. Since Marbury had no other course of legal action open to him, and since Madison could properly be served with a writ to comply with the law, Marshall ruled that Marbury did indeed have a right to this specific remedy under United States law.

Finally, Marshall examined whether the Supreme Court had the power to issue the writ, saying that if the Supreme Court was not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus, it must be because the law is unconstitutional. According to Article III of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the duty to hear certain cases directly (original jurisdiction). In all
other instances, it hears cases only on appeal (appellate jurisdiction). The Court had not been given the authority of original jurisdiction necessary to issue a writ of mandamus by the Constitution, and Marshall held that the Constitution gives Congress no power to add new instances of original jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, Congress had in fact passed such a law. Should the Court enforce it? Marshall said that it should not because the law was unconstitutional and, therefore, void.

The sole remaining issue to decide was who was responsible for determining that a law is unconstitutional. In Marshall's opinion, it was emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. "If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each." Thus Marshall declared the Supreme Court to be the final judge of constitutionality.

RESOURCE 6
German Court Rules That Providing Internet Link to Outlawed Site Not a Crime

In the fall of 1996, Angela Marquardt, a 24-year-old left-wing university student and former deputy leader of Germany's reform communist Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS), was charged with the crime of continuing to provide on her Internet home page an electronic link to a site that featured a left-wing newspaper called Radikal.

Police had ordered German Internet providers to block access to the Dutch Web site, XS4All, which showed the newspaper, because one could find instructions there for sabotaging train lines and other guerrilla acts.

In the trial, Ms. Marquardt maintained that she was innocent of any wrongdoing. She pointed out that people could read the German underground publication on many different Internet sites and that her link to the Dutch site was only one of many ways to access Radikal. She also said that she had provided the link before the magazine had published the objectionable instructions and that she should not in any way be held responsible for the contents of the publication.

Lawmakers and law enforcement officers in Germany, more than in other Western democracies, had been increasingly anxious to control the almost uncontrollable arena of cyberspace. They had been trying to block access to other Internet distributors of material they deemed to be violent, obscene, or in any way a danger to society.

The case was heard in a Berlin court in June of 1997. The court ruled that Ms. Marquardt could not be held responsible for the contents of the magazine, that the magazine was accessible by Germans in many other ways, and that she could not be punished for merely maintaining the link on her home page. The court also stated that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to expect users to make constant checks for illegal information
on Internet pages made accessible by hyperlinks, and, furthermore, that there was no legal basis for doing this.

This decision is an additional instance of the trend toward viewing the liability for harmful and/or illegal Internet material as resting with the authors or producers of the material itself, not with the network operators who provide access to the Internet, nor even with others who provide links to the material.

Other cases of strict controls on freedom of expression over the Internet are now being overturned, as shown by a ruling in the U.S. that overturns the Communications and Decency Act. This act sought to ban pornography and other material considered indecent by the bill’s authors.

RESOURCE 7
The Deckert Case: No Tolerance for Holocaust Denial

Source: Law-Related Internet Project Saarbrücken (English Service)
Web site: http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/Entscheidungen/abstracts/deckert.html
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In this decision, the Federal Supreme Court of Justice clearly enunciated its position that denial of the fact of the Holocaust is a serious crime and should be handled as such in view of its serious implications. The defendant Deckert is a right extremist who was charged with incitement to riot and promoting racial hatred. The Landesgericht in Mannheim had sentenced the defendant to one year of probation for expressing his belief that the Nazis did not commit mass murder of the Jews in the gas chambers, but this was a mitigated sentence as [because] the court saw his as an honest expression of a political opinion in the effort to protect Germany from what he saw as unjust recriminations.

The Federal Supreme Court refused to allow such reasoning to stand. The crime of Holocaust denial is a serious one in Germany due to its history, and the mass murder of the Jews in gas chambers is a historical fact. Thus, there should be no mitigating results for those who refuse to open their eyes to the truth, even if they do so out of political conviction. Political conviction (as opposed to acts committed in one's personal interest) should not be treated as a mitigating factor in determining guilt in criminal cases. This holds true especially when a breach of the peace is likely, or when human dignity is in danger of being injured. There is no constitutional right or principle which allows for the justification or even mitigation of a criminal act through the devaluing characterization of a particular group. Finally, the Landesgericht was in error by even considering a sentence mitigation in a case dealing with criminal penalties geared at maintaining the public order.
RESOURCES

RESOURCE 8
Judge Rules That Encryption Software Is Speech

Daniel Bernstein, a mathematician at the University of Illinois-Chicago, sued the Justice Department in 1995 after he was prevented from freely publishing and exporting his encryption computer program. He was told that because the government of the U.S. classifies encryption software as a weapon, along with bombs and jet fighters, he would have to register as an international weapons dealer if he wanted to publish his software or present it at conferences where foreigners might be present. The reason for this classification is that such encryption software can be used to conceal illegal activities.

Bernstein maintained in his suit that the government controls were an unconstitutional prior restraint of his freedom of speech, which is guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution. The Justice Department responded that computer software is not speech and also that the courts have no jurisdiction over national security policy.

The judge in the preliminary hearing ruled that software encryption code is speech and is therefore protected under the First Amendment. In her decision, she wrote that “this court can find no meaningful difference between a computer language and German or French.” She added that the suit was about free speech and its protection, not about national security issues.

In its final decision, rendered in August, 1997, the court rejected the government’s distinction between electronic and paper publication of encryption code as “untenable,” and also struck down a federal encryption licensing program that, the court found, provided inadequate safeguards against prior restraint on free speech. One reporter observed that “The decision knocks out a major part of the Clinton Administration’s effort to force companies to design government surveillance into computers, telephones, and consumer electronics.”

Following this, the Justice Department appealed the decision.
RESOURCE 9

Source: The OYEZ Project of Northwestern University
Website: http://oyez.nwu.edu/cases/cases.cgi?command=show&case_id=6&page=abstract

The Facts of the Case
Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a nonpublic jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and to demonstrate against the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and 31 others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of “trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent” for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.

The Constitutional Question
Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Conclusion
The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jailhouse and not because he “objected to what was being sung…or disagreed with the objectives of the protest,” there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.
The New Federal Republic of Germany

With the passage in May 1949 of a new constitution, called the Basic Law because it was intended to be “temporary” until Germany was re-united (see Lesson III), the Western Allies allowed their three occupation zones to form the territory of the new Federal Republic of Germany. The first election campaign for the popularly elected parliament (Bundestag) could then begin (state and local elections had been held earlier), and the national election took place in August 1949.

Most observers expected the Social Democrats (SPD) to win. The SPD had been the major party of the left in both the Bismarck Reich, or Imperial Germany, and the Weimar Republic, during which it had been severely challenged and weakened by the pro-Soviet Communist Party (KPD). It had been a bitter opponent of the Nazi movement and the only party that had had the courage in 1933 to vote in the parliament against special powers for Hitler. Following this, Hitler, using these very powers, had had the SPD along with other parties outlawed.

The other major party was the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer had been the mayor of Cologne before he was removed from office by the Nazis in 1933, after which he withdrew to the country and from politics. After the War, the British occupation authorities placed him back in the Cologne lord mayor’s office, but they became dissatisfied and removed him from this position. Nevertheless, he remained the leader of the CDU in the British zone and soon became leader of the party in all three western zones. The CDU, in contrast to the pre-1933 Catholic “Center Party,” combined mostly Catholic but also Protestant supporters in a “Christian” organization that was staunchly pro-West, anti-communist, and generally pro-capitalist but still committed to selected welfare state measures in accordance with German Catholic social doctrine.

There were several other political parties that participated in the elections, including the Communists (KPD), but, of course, no party that could be described as Nazi or Neo-Nazi was allowed to form. The results of the election gave the CDU and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social (not “Socialist”!) Union (CSU), a plurality of 31 percent and the SPD a little more than 29 percent. This was a bitter disappointment for
the SPD and Schumacher, who, given the party's traditional working class support and democratic credentials, had assumed they would lead the first government. Instead, Konrad Adenauer was able to form a majority coalition of parties in the Bundestag behind the CDU/CSU, and he became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in September 1949 with a margin of one vote.

Germany, Europe, the U.S., and Economic Developments

It was probably a critical turning point in postwar German history that Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic. In the first place, he accepted the basic principles of the free market, appointing Ludwig Erhard, a free market economist and the father of the postwar “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder), as his minister of economics. But above all, Adenauer wanted economic, political, and military integration with the West, including rapprochement with the French, whatever implications this policy might have for relations with the Soviet Union and reunification. In return, he hoped for treatment by the Western Allies as an equal partner. (This goal was largely but not entirely achieved in 1955, when the Federal Republic was granted sovereignty over its own affairs; however, it was not fully achieved until reunification in 1990.)

Soon after becoming Chancellor, Adenauer met with the Allied High Commissioners, who had replaced the military governors of the three occupation zones, and in November 1949, the Petersburg Agreement was signed. Under this agreement, the continuing démontage of the German industrial plant, especially in the French zone, was scaled down, among other things. Adenauer also agreed to join the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), established in 1948 to help administer the Marshall Plan (and changed in 1960 to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1951, Germany also became a full member of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, which had been established in 1949 as an organization designed to bring about cooperation among democratic European countries on a wide variety of issues, excluding defense and military questions. (This council should not be confused with the Common Market [EEC], mentioned in the next paragraph.)

In the meantime, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman had accepted Jean Monnet’s plan for close cooperation among Western European states, and especially between Germany and France, in the areas of coal and steel production. In 1951, Schuman proposed a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with supranational institutions, such as a High Commission composed of civil servants from the various states, a Council of Ministers as a decision-making body, a European Court, and a Parliamentary Assembly with advisory powers only and composed of delegates appointed by the parliaments of the member states. Adenauer accepted the Schuman plan with enthusiasm, and the ECSC Treaty went into effect in 1952. The ECSC consisted of six member states: France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries. Great Britain refused to join because the British objected then, as now, to the supranational features of the Treaty. The ECSC proved to be very successful, however, and it was followed in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) and in 1958 by the Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1958 with the same six core European member states.
The institutions of the EEC, the ECSA, and Euratom, were merged in 1967 into the European Community (EC). The British finally joined the EC in 1973, after two vetoes in 1963 and 1967 by the French President, Charles de Gaulle. He opposed British membership for several reasons, one of which was his suspicion that the British would be a kind of American Trojan Horse. Denmark and Ireland also joined the EC with the British, so that the membership was expanded to nine states. In 1981, Greece was allowed to join, even though that country was hardly qualified on economic grounds. Greece had emerged from a military dictatorship lasting from 1969 until 1974, and “the Nine” wanted to anchor the country in a democratic framework of European states that would help ensure the stability of its new democratic system. Similar arguments were then applied to Spain and Portugal, both of which had been transformed in the tumultuous 1970s, with considerable help from Germany, from dictatorships to struggling democracies. When these two countries followed Greece and joined the EC in 1986, the community was then obliged to open its markets and offer crucial economic aid to three relatively poor southern European states. Their political and economic development since then has demonstrated the wisdom of the EC decisions.

In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed, and by 1987 it was ratified by all of the EC member states’ parliaments. This treaty was designed to bring about the true “single market” that the original Common Market (EEC) had established only imperfectly. The treaty called for the implementation of almost 300 measures designed to remove all remaining non-tariff barriers to trade and commerce within the EC, thus assuring the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital. The SEA went into effect in January 1993.

In the meantime the “Europe of the Twelve” gained considerably in world influence and prestige. Numerous other European countries, including Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, and the former Eastern European Soviet satellite states, expressed interest in joining the EC. East Germany became part of the EC when it joined the Federal Republic in October 1990.

As a result of the Maastricht Conference in 1991, the EC eventually became the European Union (EU). The Maastricht Treaty went into effect in November 1993, later than planned because of ratification problems in Denmark, France, and Germany. Denmark first narrowly rejected and then narrowly approved by referendum a somewhat revised treaty. France in a referendum barely approved the treaty, while in Germany the treaty was challenged legally but then approved by the Federal Constitutional Court. The EU consists of “three pillars”:

• a reformed and strengthened EC (which includes a common currency, the “euro,” after 1999)
• a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
• Home and Justice Affairs.

In 1995, three new states, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, joined the EU. In each of these countries, the application for admission to the EU was approved in a popular referendum during the summer of 1994. Norway also applied and was accepted for membership, but, as in 1972, the referendum on joining was rejected. Thus the EU now has fifteen members.

Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus have been invited by the EU to enter negotiations for membership in 2002. Turkey together with other
European states in Central Europe will try to join in the future, thus raising questions about the capacity of the EU to absorb so many states without changing rather dramatically some of the institutions that might not be able to function very well with so many members.

Throughout this period, the United States has been and continues to be a strong supporter of European integration, even though there have been and are tensions between the U.S. and the EEC/EC/EU regarding various trade issues. In the early 1960s, there was the famous “chicken war,” which erupted when the EEC tried to limit the import of cheap American chickens. In the years since then, there have been numerous conflicts over other issues, such as soybeans, grains, hormones in beef products, and so forth. There have also been serious disagreements over agricultural subsidies. While farmers in both the United States and the EU are heavily subsidized, the European farmers receive a significantly larger proportion of their income from support programs than is generally the case in the United States. This has led to charges of unfair trade practices, since American products cannot always compete in the European market against those of heavily subsidized European farmers. Subsidies in Europe also encourage overproduction of various products (“wine lakes,” “milk lakes,” “butter mountains,” etc.) and the sale of European products (e.g., wheat) to foreign markets below cost, which, of course, infuriates American producers and encourages the American government to retaliate in kind.

In recent years, the controversial issues involved in numerous matters have been the subjects of various negotiations. These matters include:

- agricultural subsidies
- beef hormones
- American “cultural imperialism” (e.g., movies and television programs), and
- the European Airbus (manufactured by a consortium of German, French, British, and Spanish firms versus America’s Boeing and McDonald-Douglas).

In general, although these issues have been settled by compromises that are more or less satisfactory to the parties, tensions remain. Today major disagreement exists between the U.S. and the EU over:

- the Helms-Burton Act (which threatens various sanctions against foreign firms and their managers if they operate and profit from properties in Cuba confiscated from American owners) and
- the D’Amato-Kennedy Act (which threatens sanctions against countries that trade with Iran).

The Europeans see these Acts as attempts to apply American policy to foreigners and thus to interfere in their affairs.

The United States has always supported German efforts to become such an integral part of a European economic and political framework that its neighbors will never again fear its dominance. Examples of these efforts are:

- economic integration under the Common Market and the SEA
- the common currency that will be introduced in 1999
- the Common Foreign and Security Policy (still more of a goal than a fact), and
- other actions taken by the EU that involve a sharing of sovereignty.

Ironically, however, some critics have suggested that Germany is merely planning now to dominate Europe through the far more sophisticated and subtle means of manipulating EU institutions for its own advantage. One example they sometimes cite is the new Euro-
European Central Bank, which is based on the German model of the Bundesbank (very similar to the American Federal Reserve), which will be located in Frankfurt after January 1999. It therefore seems to many Germans that whatever they do, some people will always question their motives and imagine some kind of conspiracy against the rest of Europe.

**Foreign Policy and Military Cooperation with the United States and Europe**

Military cooperation was another concern of great importance to Adenauer. The Soviet Union was perceived as a major threat to Western Europe. An East German military “police” force was organized as early as 1948; the West, however, was reluctant to give the Federal Republic its own army. But when the Korean War began in June 1950 with a North Korean invasion of South Korea, Churchill and others suggested that a European Army that included German troops might be an alternative. In 1952, the French government proposed a European Defense Community (EDC) with an army under supranational control in accordance with the principle behind the ECSC. The United States approved of German membership in both the EDC and NATO. Of course, the French assumed they would provide the commander of the EDC troops. Adenauer agreed to accept the French proposal, but in 1954, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC.

In 1952, Adenauer got the Allies to end their occupation of Germany. In the same year, Stalin, probably because he feared German rearmament in a Western European context, sent a note to the German government in which he offered reunification if Germany would become neutral. Adenauer rejected the offer, because he feared Soviet influence and Communist subversion in a neutral Germany, and because he insisted that West German integration in the West was his most important goal, even if it had to be purchased at the price of reunification.

Shortly after the French parliament’s rejection of the EDC, Germany was admitted to NATO, which had been formed in 1949 following the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the 1948–49 Berlin Airlift. Germany was also admitted to the Western European Union (WEU), a strictly European defense force formed in 1954. It remained more of a paper tiger until the 1980s and is still today very much in the shadow of NATO in spite of hopes that it might become the military arm of the European Union.

In 1955 at the Geneva Conference with the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, it was agreed that the Allies and Soviets would withdraw from occupied Austria, which would then become neutral like Switzerland. Germany was again offered unity if it, too, would become neutral. Adenauer continued to refuse to give up his Western ties for a neutral Germany suspended between East and West. On the other hand, he accepted an invitation to visit Moscow, where it was decided that the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic would establish diplomatic relations and that the Soviets would release 10,000 German POWs, the last remaining German soldier prisoners captured during the War. Adenauer insisted that the Federal Republic actually represented all Germans in spite of the existence of the German Democratic Republic, which the Soviets had created shortly after the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949. The Soviets, of course, ignored this claim.

At first, the United States was the only NATO Alliance member with nuclear weap-
ons, but the British and French followed in the 1950s and 1960s. Neither then nor today have the Germans ever given serious consideration to possessing their own nuclear weapons. Of course, only the Americans had the capability of seriously deterring the Soviets from a frontal attack against Western Europe. The American doctrine of “massive retaliation,” which meant that the United States would — or at least might — retaliate against such a Soviet attack on Europe by a massive nuclear strike that would probably destroy the Soviet Union and its satellites, was supported by Adenauer and his government as the best way to deter any Soviet aggression.

In 1956, East-West tensions grew dramatically when the Soviets and most of its East European allies, including East Germany, invaded Hungary and put down the Hungarian Revolution. In spite of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s rhetorical advocacy of a “roll back” of the Iron Curtain, the West did not offer the Hungarians any material support. Relations were also severely strained in 1958 when the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, sent an ultimatum to the West demanding that West Berlin be given to East Germany and that the Allies leave the city. He then issued a draft peace treaty with Germany that would grant East Germany international recognition. He threatened that he would sign it unilaterally if the West rejected it. Adenauer was concerned about Western resolve, but Khrushchev withdrew his ultimatum during his visit to the United States in 1959.

When the new Kennedy Administration came into office, a new nuclear doctrine of “flexible response” was enunciated. This meant that the American reaction would depend on Soviet actions. If, for example, the Soviets launched only a limited attack with limited objectives, the United States might defend the territory with conventional weapons and/or retaliate with a limited nuclear response. This alarmed Adenauer, because he saw it as a weakening of the deterrent effect and possibly even as encouragement for small-scale Soviet attacks with the goal, for example, of capturing West Berlin or Hamburg. In this case, he feared the U.S. in fact would not be willing to trade Chicago for Hamburg in case the Soviets retaliated against a limited American nuclear attack. The flexible response doctrine also meant a greater focus on conventional forces for NATO, which were more expensive than nuclear weapons and, in the minds of some experts, much less of a deterrent.

When the Berlin Wall was erected in August 1961, Adenauer and the Germans were not in any position to act militarily. As it turned out, there was not much that the Americans or NATO could do, either. Some voices insisted that the United States tear down the Wall virtually as it was being built, since it violated agreements among the Allies to treat the city as one. But besides loud protests and the sending of some tanks into East Berlin near the Wall to demonstrate the Allies’ right to go anywhere in the city without restrictions, the West was not willing to risk a military conflict over Berlin. Adenauer and Kennedy met in Washington in November 1961, but it was apparent that their meeting did not go well.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, there was some concern in Germany that Berlin might become a pawn in a tradeoff of some kind, but these fears proved unfounded, and the Germans gave enthusiastic support to Kennedy’s resolution of that conflict. Indeed, when Kennedy visited Berlin in June 1963, he received perhaps the most enthusiastic reception of his career, in part, no doubt, because of his famous statement that he, too, was a Berliner.
In spite of, but also because of Berlin and Cuba, Kennedy wanted to open a dialogue with the Soviets and its leader, Khrushchev, in order to arrive at a nuclear testing agreement and to promote detente between East and West. Adenauer was highly suspicious of this policy, because he feared it would lead to agreements at the cost of Germany's national interests. As a result, Adenauer took steps to strengthen his already good relationship with French President Charles de Gaulle. A Franco-German Treaty was signed in 1963 which provided for closer French-German cooperation in a number of areas, including large-scale youth exchanges, and led to numerous French-German city and town partnerships. De Gaulle disagreed with American policy in many areas, rejecting the doctrine of flexible response and the dominance of the United States in European military affairs. In the mid-1960s, he even withdrew France from the NATO integrated command structures and ordered all non-French NATO troops out of France, although France remained a member of the Alliance per se.

By the time Adenauer left office in 1963 (a month before Kennedy was assassinated), a dispute was growing in Germany between those who wanted closer ties to France and de Gaulle and those (called the “Atlanticists”) who insisted on close ties with the United States. This dispute divided the government of Adenauer’s successor, Ludwig Erhard, and continued until de Gaulle’s resignation from office in 1969. In the meantime, however, the pro-Atlantic forces grew, and with the formation of the Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD in 1966 that replaced the ineffective Erhard government, detente won the upper hand. Under Erhard, Germany had already given up the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, according to which the Federal Republic would break off diplomatic relations with any country except the USSR that recognized East Germany. With Willy Brandt, the leader of the SPD, as the foreign minister of the Grand Coalition government, Germany entered diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries and made overtures to the East Germans and Soviets. Tensions developed between the German government and de Gaulle after 1966, an example of which was Germany’s support for Britain’s membership in the EC and de Gaulle’s second veto of Britain’s entry in 1967.

When the SPD and FDP formed a new government following the elections of 1969 that placed the CDU/CSU in opposition for the first time, the Germans began a policy of detente known as Ostpolitik, or policy towards the East, that went beyond anything attempted before by either the Germans or the Americans. By the early 1970s, the Germans had concluded treaties with

- Poland, virtually recognizing the existing borders and the loss of one-fourth of pre-War Germany
- the Soviet Union, accepting the status quo in divided Europe
- the Four World War II Allies, concerning Berlin, and
- East Germany, according to which the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic joined the UN and established with each other “permanent representative missions” rather than embassies.

In other words, Chancellor Brandt was acknowledging that there were two German states in one German nation, that the eastern territories had been lost as a result of the War, and that one had to recognize this reality. Opponents argued that Brandt’s Ostpolitik amounted to giving away all of Germany’s lost territories for little in return.

While it can be argued that Ostpolitik contributed to an easing of tensions that helped bring about eventual reunification, a stronger case can probably be made that it was
really designed to recognize the division of Germany and make that division more acceptable for those most affected, such as the East Germans and families that remained divided. As a result of Brandt’s efforts and those of his successor, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a number of very restrictive and repressive policies were eased or eliminated by the East German authorities: the possibilities of limited travel by East Germans and, especially, by Westerners to East Germany were broadened. But the Wall and the fortified borders remained in place, even if some of the automatic shooting devices were removed, and the improvements in relations between the two Germanys made people on both sides of the border more resigned to the status quo.

The 1972 Bundestag elections were fought largely on the issue of Ostpolitik. Though the SPD under Brandt’s leadership and their coalition partner, the FDP, won a resounding victory, Brandt resigned in 1974 as a result of growing economic problems, rumors of sexual escapades, and, especially, the discovery of an East German spy in his inner circle of advisers. He was replaced by Helmut Schmidt, a less visionary and more pragmatic leader than Brandt, and one who quickly developed the reputation as a highly competent manager of German economic and military affairs.

Schmidt got along well with U.S. President Gerald Ford, but he had problems with Jimmy Carter. Schmidt was recognized for his competence in economic affairs, and he became increasingly critical of the Carter Administration’s economic policies. Carter, in return, thought that Schmidt sometimes acted like a schoolmaster with his allies, which did not help relieve tensions with them. In 1978, Schmidt and French President Giscard d’Estaing initiated the European Monetary System (EMS) with an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) that was designed to secure the stability of currencies of EC member states and, among other things, protect them from American inflationary tendencies.

The Carter Administration urged the replacement of regular nuclear warheads with so-called “clean” neutron bombs that would kill enemy troops with radiation more than blast effects and therefore leave more buildings and infrastructure intact. Schmidt used up a great deal of political capital in his own party in accepting this proposal only to see it withdrawn abruptly a few years after it was first suggested. This did not help relations between Schmidt and Carter.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to put down an Islamic anti-Soviet government, the Carter Administration reacted strongly, including boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Like most of its European allies, the U.S. was joined by Germany in the boycott and in the criticism of the Soviet invasion. On the other hand, the Germans argued that the Afghanistan issue could be separated from issues of Ostpolitik and general detente between East and West. The Americans disagreed, and tensions mounted between the U.S. and the Soviets, which the Germans saw as threatening their decade-long policy of improving political and economic relations with the Soviets and their Eastern European satellites.

A good example of the tension that developed between the U.S. and its Western Allies was the policy enunciated by the new Reagan Administration in 1981 that opposed the construction of gas pipelines from the Soviet Union to Western European countries. The Reagan Administration argued that these pipelines would make the Europeans dependent on Soviet supplies of energy and thus threaten the security of the NATO Allies. It ordered American firms and their European branches not to participate in the project, which had already been negotiated. The Europeans were incensed by this policy, seeing it
as an unacceptable interference in their internal affairs and an illegal attempt to force European companies to abide by American laws. After much controversy, the Americans gave in, but at the cost of considerable irritation between the two sides.

In the meantime, the Soviets were preparing to modernize and upgrade their intermediate range nuclear missiles pointed toward Western Europe. These were so-called SS 20 missiles that were mobile, more accurate, and armed with three warheads. Many experts believed they were designed to divide Europe from the U.S., because they could not reach the U.S. They said that this might tempt the U.S. to accept a nuclear threat or attack against Western Europe in order to save American cities from the threat of an attack from Soviet strategic missiles. Schmidt insisted that NATO had to answer the Soviet threat with new missiles in Western Europe aimed at the Soviet Union. In January 1979, the U.S., UK, France, and Germany met and declared their support not only for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), but also for NATO intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe. In December of 1979, NATO announced its twin-track decision, according to which NATO would negotiate an intermediate missile agreement with the Soviets while rearming at the same time.

During this time, Schmidt was losing control over his own party, which had become even pacifist and increasingly opposed to any new nuclear weapons in Europe. This opposition was expressed openly in party meetings as well as in defections of SPD members and supporters to the new Green movement, which was militantly pro-environment, anti-nuclear-power, anti-nuclear-weapons, and pacifist. This nuclear weapons issue, together with a declining economy, which seemed to challenge Schmidt’s reputation for competence in that field, placed him increasingly on the defensive. In September 1982, his coalition partner, the FDP, decided to withdraw its support, and in a “constructive vote of no-confidence” joined with the opposition CDU/CSU in voting for a new coalition government under the leader of the CDU, Helmut Kohl.

**Helmut Kohl, Europe, and the United States**

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in September 1982, he became the third conservative leader of a major Western country to assume office about that time. Margaret Thatcher had become British Prime Minister in 1979, and Ronald Reagan entered office in January 1981. Many observers expected Kohl to follow more or less the anti-union, anti-welfare-state, militantly anti-Communist, and strongly pro-free-enterprise rhetoric and policy initiatives of Thatcher and Reagan. While Kohl and his party, the CDU/CSU, and his coalition partner, the FDP, sympathized to some extent with the efforts of Thatcher and Reagan to cut back on the welfare state, reduce government spending in general, and stand up to Soviet intimidation by their SS 20 missiles aimed at Europe, he was not willing or able, due to domestic pressures, to follow them entirely.

The most controversial subject at the time Kohl came into office was the two-track NATO decision regarding the Soviet SS 20 missiles. Even though negotiations between NATO and the Soviets continued, they did not resolve the issues, and it became clear that NATO missiles would be deployed in response, mostly in Germany. The domestic opposition to these missiles was severe on the grounds that they were a provocation and made Germany potentially a major nuclear target. Demonstrations against them put considerable pressure on the Kohl government. Kohl’s relations with the SPD, which had rejected
former Chancellor Schmidt's arguments for the missiles and left him virtually isolated in his own party, also became more strained. But Kohl remained steadfast, and by late 1983 the first missiles were deployed.

Once this happened, the demonstrations decreased, to the surprise of many, and many opponents seemed reluctantly to accept the missiles or became resigned to their introduction. When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, relations between East and West began to change dramatically, and in December 1987, President Reagan and Gorbachev signed an agreement that eliminated the medium range missiles in Europe that had caused so much tension between NATO and the Soviet Union and so much internal opposition within Germany.

After that agreement, however, another controversy arose regarding the modernization of NATO short-range missiles that were aimed at East Germany. Of course the Soviets also had short-range missiles aimed at the Federal Republic, so both German governments were interested in the elimination of these so-called battlefield nuclear weapons. As one conservative German politician noted: “The shorter the range, the deader the Germans.” This controversy was not really resolved until the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Even though Kohl backed the NATO double-track decision with the support of his party and his coalition partner, the FDP, he also continued the Ostpolitik of former chancellors Brandt and Schmidt and their SPD/FDP coalition governments. The Germans tried to improve relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, and they continued to deal with the East German government in an effort to relieve tensions between the two German states. Some large loans to the East Germans were granted, and the East German leader, Erich Honecker, was invited to the Federal Republic in 1987 for a state visit. Both Honecker and Kohl argued that in spite of the increased tensions in Europe brought about by the missile conflicts and Reagan’s decision to engage in research and development of an anti-ballistic missile defense system (“Starwars”), detente was essential for the two Germanys. Nevertheless, Kohl and his government welcomed Reagan’s call in front of the Berlin Wall in 1988 for Gorbachev “to tear down this Wall.”

Kohl also pursued economic policies that differed from the Thatcher and Reagan models. While he and his government believed the very generous German welfare state had become too expensive and that labor costs were making it increasingly difficult for German products to compete in the world market, he and the CDU were not opposed in principle to many aspects of the welfare state. Indeed, in spite of certain cuts, new programs were introduced under Kohl — e.g., even more generous family leave policies that protected the jobs and benefits especially of women with small children, and a new social insurance program for nursing home or at-home care for the aged. These and other examples can be seen not as “socialism,” but as policies conforming to Catholic social doctrine regarding state support for families.

In June 1989, President George Bush visited the Federal Republic, called for German self-determination, and suggested that Germany would become America’s major partner in Europe. This statement was not welcomed by Prime Minister Thatcher, but it did recognize the growing German influence in world affairs and, especially, in the increasingly important European Community. Shortly after Bush’s visit, Gorbachev visited Germany and received an enthusiastic welcome. He was seen as a progressive, dynamic leader
who was encouraging and allowing major changes in Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union. His reform policies were much less appreciated by the East German government, which had gone so far as to prohibit the distribution of certain Soviet publications that were considered subversive by East German authorities.

By the late summer of 1989, thousands of East Germans were leaving the GDR by traveling “on vacation” to Hungary. The Hungarian Communist regime had been taken over by reformers who had decided to open their borders with Austria in spite of an agreement with the GDR not to do so. This was the beginning of the end for the Communist regime in East Germany, because once it became known that it was possible to escape East Germany via Hungary, there was little the East Germans could do but prohibit its citizens to travel even to other East European countries from which they could proceed to Hungary. This would have produced an explosive situation in the GDR. However, before the East Germans could devise a counter strategy, they lost control of the population — just about the time of the fortieth anniversary of the GDR in October 1989. The Wall was opened on November 9, 1989.

From the beginning of the disintegration of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe — and especially in East Germany — the United States under President Bush made clear its support for German reunification. This had been official Western policy and NATO policy for decades, but once reunification appeared possible (which few people had believed would actually happen even well into the next century), the voices of unequivocal support were few and far between. Prime Minister Thatcher expressed her reservations rather openly, warning against taking precipitous action, and President Mitterrand of France was also skeptical, even flying to Moscow to suggest Soviet-French cooperation in checking reunification efforts. Soon, however, Mitterrand, like Gorbachev, accepted the inevitability of German reunification, and Kohl was able during the first half of 1990 to get the approval of the four Allies for reunification. Without Soviet approval, of course, reunification could not have occurred, and even though Gorbachev seemed sympathetic, it was doubtful that he would accept a united Germany’s membership in NATO. But the Americans and Germans pointed out that united Germany’s integration in NATO actually offered the Soviets more security than a Germany without moorings. Kohl and Gorbachev met in the Caucasus in July 1990, and Kohl, to make Soviet acceptance easier, offered several billion dollars to the Soviets for the withdrawal of their armed forces from East Germany by 1994. The Soviets accepted, and the road to reunification was open.

**Germany, Europe, and the United States after Reunification**

Even before reunification, Kohl had been a strong supporter of the European Community and efforts to further European integration. He realized in 1990 that German reunification would raise a number of concerns in neighboring countries, and in order to demonstrate Germany’s good will, he urged that Germany become even more integrated in Europe: “a European Germany, not a German Europe.” This was a French goal as well, and it was to be accomplished at the meeting at Maastricht, Holland, in December 1991, when a treaty was negotiated that would bring about an “ever closer union” and create the European Union.

As noted above, the Maastricht Treaty that went into effect in November 1993 consists of three “pillars”: a reformed and strengthened EC; a Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP); and Home Affairs and Justice. The idea behind these pillars is to create through a wide variety of policies “an ever closer union” of member states. Whether the ultimate goal should be a kind of confederation, federation, or something else remains controversial. Some Europeans, especially some British observers, are vehemently opposed even to a confederation, let alone a federation, which they see as undermining the sovereignty of the individual member states and turning their fate over to “Eurocrats” in Brussels. Others argue that there is already a considerable amount of sharing of sovereignty in the EU — e.g., in trade; agricultural, social, and economic development; immigration; and foreign policies, just for starters. A common currency, introduced in January 1999, is a major example of shared sovereignty. For these observers, the EU is already a confederation on the way to becoming some kind of federation. Still others argue that the EU is neither an alliance, a confederation, nor a federation, but rather a unique organization that does not fit any of the conventional concepts of political cooperation among states. In any case, it is clear that Helmut Kohl is one of the strongest supporters of European integration and, at heart, a “federalist.” Whether he continues in office after the September 1998 elections or not, his legacies will be German reunification and promotion of European integration. For that reason he has for some years been called “Mr. Europe.”

When the United States was looking for allies during the Persian Gulf crisis that led to war with Iraq, Germany was caught off balance. It had just gone through reunification and was confronted by the very difficult psychological, political, and economic/financial challenges resulting from the new conditions facing the country. Given the traumatic events of World War II and the deep opposition in Germany to any military operations outside of German territory, the Kohl government had little choice but to offer only relatively modest military support which, nevertheless, consisted of providing German bases, some equipment, and some naval support units in the Mediterranean as well as fighter aircraft to help protect Turkey. Like Japan, which also has historical and domestic political reasons for not participating in combat operations, Germany did make a major financial contribution — about twelve billion dollars — to help finance the UN operations in the Gulf. Given the huge costs associated with reunification, this was a considerable sacrifice.

There were many Germans, especially in the SPD and Greens, who argued that the Basic Law (Constitution) prohibits so-called “out-of-area” actions, i.e., German military involvement in areas outside of the boundaries of NATO countries. This became a bitterly debated issue with Kohl and his government, among others, arguing that this was a misinterpretation of the Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional Court finally ruled in 1994 that German forces could be deployed “out-of-area” but only with parliamentary approval. In spite of this decision, even German conservatives remain very reluctant to see German forces participate in conflicts abroad. (Nevertheless, German troops are serving in a peacekeeping role in Bosnia along with American and other European forces.)

As noted above, one of the pillars of the Maastricht Treaty is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU member states do attempt to have common foreign policies on many issues and generally vote together in the UN. Indeed, Germany would like to become a permanent member of the Security Council along with Britain and France. The fact is, however, that in real crisis situations, such as the Gulf Crisis in 1991, the Yugoslavian conflict from 1991 to 1995, and the U.S.–Iraqi standoff in 1997–98, the Germans and French and other European states took different positions. The apparent in-
ability of EU states to agree in such situations makes the goal of a common foreign policy on important issues unlikely in the near future.

Security policy is, of course, closely related to foreign policy. The Western European Union (WEU), established in 1954 as a defensive alliance of strictly European countries, consists today of ten of the fifteen EU member states. The traditionally neutral states, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, and Ireland, are not members. Nevertheless, some EU member states such as France see the WEU as an EU alternative to NATO that could act without the United States in protecting European interests. In fact, however, the WEU lacks the common command structures and crucial logistical and technological support units that would make it a true alternative to NATO. As a kind of substitute, the Germans and French, together with a few other European countries, have formed a “Eurocorps” that could theoretically serve as a rapid strike force for Europe.

At the end of the 1990s, agreement between Germany and the United States on most foreign policy issues remains strong. There are some differences, however, and some reasons for concern. The Germans, along with the rest of Europe, object strongly to what they see as unilateral American efforts to force their compliance with American policies regarding Iran and Cuba. They agree that Iran is a problem country: in fact the EU in 1996 cut off diplomatic relations with Iran for more than a year due to a German court finding that the Iranian secret service was behind the murder of several Iranian opposition figures in Berlin. But Germans resist the provisions of the D’Amato-Kennedy Act, which calls for American sanctions against countries that have major business dealings with Iran. They also reject the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act, which calls for sanctions against foreign companies and individuals that have managed or invested in properties in Cuba that were owned by Americans and expropriated by the Castro government. Additionally, they are very critical of the failure of the United States to pay its UN dues, which is the result of the actions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the Chairmanship of Jesse Helms. Thus they object to instances of America’s tendency to conduct its foreign policy without considering the views of its friends and allies.

Finally, the Germans in particular are concerned about what they see as a declining interest in Europe by the U.S. Evidence of this decline includes the drop in the number of students in American schools enrolling in German, Russian, and even French classes; curricular changes in American colleges and universities that reject “Eurocentric” courses such as “Introduction to Western Civilization” and courses that require reading books by “dead European white males”; and an apparently generation-related change in American politicians who increasingly seem far less interested in foreign policy in general and European affairs in particular. One German author has noted that not a single American Congressperson visited Bonn or Berlin in 1995, and German journalists, scholars, and [European] politicians are complaining that American politicians today seem to have little interest in meeting and discussing common problems.

Summary and Conclusion

The first government of the Federal Republic of Germany, established in 1949, was led by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer was also the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) which soon joined with its Bavarian “sister party,” the Christian Social Union (CSU). That Adenauer and the CDU/CSU took command of the West German
government had some very significant consequences. First, Adenauer had three foreign policy goals: integration into Western Europe; close ties to France; and close ties to the United States. He achieved all three, even at the cost of German reunification in neutrality between East and West. The CDU/CSU also contributed greatly to domestic stability by becoming a broadly based catch-all party that played down narrow ideological principles that appealed only to a part of the population. Ideological parties were the norm in Germany and Europe, and the success of the CDU/CSU as a pragmatic alternative soon made it a model for the main opposition party, the Social Democrats (SPD), which also became more of a catch-all party after a major meeting in 1959.

Since 1949, the United States, Germany, and Western Europe in general have developed close economic, military, diplomatic, and other ties that make it difficult to imagine how we could get along without them. The “ever closer union” that is the goal of the growing European Union will make it even more difficult for us to imagine going off in separate directions. The “transatlantic agenda” therefore calls for regular meetings and a variety of contacts between Americans and Europeans to promote common values and goals in the world. Nevertheless, there appear to be some Americans, including politicians, who have a very limited view or seem unaware of the importance of maintaining close ties with Europe as partners engaged in mostly common purposes.

Those of us who teach young people about foreign countries, foreign cultures, and foreign languages therefore must try to help our students become more aware of the rest of the world and to discourage them from believing that the United States is the center of the universe. In fact the United States is a kind of huge island with many of its citizens harboring an island mentality — a mentality of isolationism. In a world characterized by globalization and increasing interdependence, isolationism for the world’s only superpower is not a viable option.

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October 1998

Bibliography

This text can be found on the Armonk Institute's Web site at armonkinstitute.org/ gunlickslesson14.htm
Germany, Europe, and the United States after 1949

Lessons in Unit IV

Lesson 1: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Lesson 2: Germany and the European Union

Overview

This Unit focuses on Germany’s role in the evolution of two organizations in Europe from the end of World War II until today. The first lesson explores the origins of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1949 as responses to the growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the war. The lesson shows in particular how the emergence of NATO played an important role in forming a bond among Europe, Germany, and the United States, and how more recently Germany has emerged as the acknowledged economic leader of the 15-member European Union (EU).

The second lesson examines the origins of this economic union, the controversy surrounding a single currency (the euro), and the shape of things to come. What will happen to Germany’s unique history and recently restored sense of national pride if their primary identification is with the EU? How accepting will Europe be of German leadership?

Lesson 1: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Preview of Main Points

This lesson allows students to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the creation of NATO and understand its mission. It focuses on the Allies’ perception that the future of democracy in Europe was at stake, and it stresses the lengths to which they were willing to go to preserve democratic institutions. It also gives attention to the reaction of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Warsaw Pact, and it examines Germany’s central role in the military and political affairs of Western and Central Europe.

Key Concepts

- Conflict and conflict management
- Security
- Multiple perspectives
- Intervention
UNIT IV: LESSONS

Related Concepts
- Containment
- Alliance
- Treaty

Objectives
During this lesson, students will
- identify and evaluate reasons for foreign intervention
- identify the major provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty
- identify the countries who were/are members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
- explain the reasons for the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
- evaluate whether the creation of NATO was helpful or harmful.

Focus Questions
1. Why do countries intervene in the affairs of other countries?
2. Was the formation of NATO helpful or harmful?

Teaching Suggestions
This is an excellent opportunity for students to engage in a class discussion on the merits of NATO. Students should attempt to look at the situation in Europe from at the end of World War II from the perspectives of the United States and Western Europe as well as that of the Soviet Union. Teachers should ask students to examine the policy of containment adopted by the United States. In addition, teachers should examine the history of Russia in order to help the students understand Stalin’s determination to create a fortification against invasion. The lesson includes a debate activity that contains structures and procedures to get all students involved. Teachers might also choose to ask students to write a position paper on the debate issue.
Beginning the Lesson

Brainstorm with the class the question of when, if ever, a country should interfere in the affairs of another. Distribute copies of the “Crisis Cards” (see Resource 1 below), and develop criteria for when a country should intervene the affairs of another (see Activity 1).

Developing the Lesson

Review the political and military situation of Europe in 1949. Ask students to read the condensed version of “The North Atlantic Treaty” (see Resource 2). Use a map to identify the members of NATO. Discuss the major ideas found in the treaty, focusing on possible reasons for the treaty and possible Soviet reaction. Ask the class to identify any criteria from the “Crisis Cards” that apply to the situation in Europe in 1949.

Ask students to read: “The Warsaw Treaty Organization” (see Resource 3). Use a map to identify the members of the Warsaw Pact. Discuss the reasons for the formation of the Warsaw Pact.

Concluding the Lesson

Conduct an advocate decision-making debate (see Activity 2) on the question: Was the creation of NATO helpful or harmful to world peace and security?

Activity 1

Distribute copies of the “Crisis Cards” (Resource 1) to all students. For each crisis described, ask each student to indicate without consulting with others whether or not he/she thinks the United States should intervene militarily in the crisis. Discuss each crisis situation with the class, asking them to explain the reasons for their decisions. As the discussion moves forward, begin developing on the board a set of criteria for intervention, drawing upon the better reasons students give for their decisions (e.g., national security, human rights violations). By the end of the session, the class should have a list of 10 to 15 criteria for intervention.

Activity 2

Begin this advocate decision-making debate activity by clarifying the following debate proposition: “The creation of NATO was more helpful than harmful for peace and

History and Social Science continued

12.17 The student will evaluate the effect of monetary and fiscal policies on personal economic well-being including employment opportunities, purchasing power, credit and interest rates, and opportunities for investment and savings.

English

9.2 The student will make planned oral presentations.
9.4 The student will read and analyze a variety of print materials.
9.6 The student will develop narrative, literary, expository, and technical writings to inform, explain, analyze, or entertain.
9.7 The student will credit the sources of both quoted and paraphrased ideas.
9.8 The student will use electronic databases to access information.
10.4 The student will read and interpret printed consumer materials.
10.7 The student will develop a variety of writings with an emphasis on exposition.
10.9 The student will use writing to interpret, analyze, and evaluate ideas.
10.10 The student will collect, evaluate, and organize information.
11.3 The student will read and analyze relationships among American literature, history, and culture.
11.4 The student will read a variety of print material.
11.7 The student will write in a variety of forms with an emphasis on persuasion.
11.9 The student will analyze, evaluate, synthesize, and organize information from a variety of sources into a documented paper dealing with a question, problem, or issue.
12.4 The student will read a variety of print material.
12.7 The student will develop expository and technical writings.
12.8 The student will write documented research papers.
security in Europe." Then divide the class into three groups of equal size — advocates for the proposition, advocates against the proposition, and decision-makers. Ask each student who is an advocate, either for or against, to research two reasons in support of his/her group’s position. Each reason should be supported with evidence. Ask each student who is a decision-maker to prepare three questions to ask the advocates. When the preliminary research is completed, ask all members of each group meet to share what they have prepared. Each group should determine its four best reasons and pieces of evidence or its five best questions.

After this preparation is complete, divide the class further into groups of three students, each containing an advocate for, an advocate against, and a decision-maker. The debate, moderated by the decision-maker, occurs in these small groups of three students each. Each advocate is given no more than 10 minutes to present his or her case without interruption by the opponent. The decision-maker should allow equal time for each advocate to respond to the other. The decision-makers can ask their questions at any time during the debate.

The activity ends with a full class discussion in which students identify the strongest reasons and evidence in the debate.

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Lesson 2: Germany and the European Union

Preview of Main Points

This lesson focuses on the evolution of Germany’s role in the European Union. The European Union was designed to promote economic cooperation in Europe in hopes of reducing the risk of future ethnic and nationalistic turmoil in the process. The lesson examines the origin and growth of European economic cooperation, the leadership within the EU, how the EU affects the daily life of the people, the use of a single currency, and the future of the Union. Since reunification, Germany and the other members of the EU have confronted two main issues stemming from their membership in the Union — the single currency and Germany’s role as the economic superpower of Europe.

Key Concepts

- Change
- Interdependence
- Economic growth and stability

Related Concepts

- Movement
- Nationalism
- Competition
- Gross domestic product
Objectives
During this lesson, students will
• explain the fundamental purpose and operation of the European Union
• analyze the relative strengths of the various members of the European Union
• identify and evaluate the challenges facing the European Union.

Focus Questions
1. What is the European Union?
2. What are the prospects for the European Union?

Teaching Suggestions
This lesson provides an excellent opportunity for students to get acquainted with the basic framework and purpose of the European Union, identify its members, and define the challenges facing the organization. In order to aid student understanding, teachers might compare the effect of the European Union to the situation of Americans being able to move and trade easily across state borders in the United States. The lesson includes group work on the strengths and weaknesses of the EU, as well as outside research and an inquiry activity on the relative strengths of the EU’s member nations.

Beginning the Lesson
Ask students to imagine each state in the United States having its own unique currency. How would these multiple currencies, each having a different value in relation to the others, affect a trip through all 50 states?

Introduce the students to the European Union. Use a map of Europe to identify the 15 countries that are members. Ask the student why they think such a union was formed. What might be its strengths? What are potential problems created by its formation? What reservations might countries have about joining?
Developing the Lesson

Divide the class into three or six small groups, depending on the size of the class. Assign one of the following readings to each group: “The EU: At a Watershed in History” (Resource 4), “The EU: Economic Powerhouse” (Resource 5), and “The EU: The Shape of Things to Come” (Resource 6). Ask each group to prepare a summary report of their article. The questions in Activity 1 provide the basis for organizing the reports.

Concluding the Lesson

Divide the class into small groups to research the countries that comprise the EU. Have each group research the population and gross domestic product (GDP) of each country, prepare a graph using the information they collect, and present their graph and findings to the class. Ask the class to draw some conclusions from these presentations about the future of the EU and take a position on the value of the EU from the different perspectives of the different countries (see Activity 2).

Activity 1

Depending on the size of the class, group the students into three or six small groups. Give each group one of the three readings and ask them to prepare a summary report of the article. Below are listed the readings and a set of guideline questions to help the students develop their summaries:

Groups One and Four: “The EU: At a Watershed in History” (Resource 4)
1. What organizations preceded the EU? Why were they created? What were the results?
2. What are the main provisions of the Treaty of Union at Maastricht signed in 1993?

Groups Two and Five: “The EU: Economic Powerhouse” (Resource 5)
1. What was the reason for the creation of the EU?
2. How does the economic strength of the EU compare to other nations in the world?
3. What challenges face the EU?

History and Social Science continued
12.17 The student will evaluate the effect of monetary and fiscal policies on personal economic well-being including employment opportunities, purchasing power, credit and interest rates, and opportunities for investment and savings.

English
9.2 The student will make planned oral presentations.
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12.4 The student will read a variety of print material.
12.7 The student will develop expository and technical writings.
12.8 The student will write documented research papers.
Groups Three and Six: “The EU: The Shape of Things to Come” (Resource 6)
1. What are the prospects for the growth of the EU? Why is this growth likely to happen?
2. What concerns are raised by the growth?
   Ask each group to make a brief report to the class. After each report, brainstorm a list of the strengths and challenges created by a unified Europe.

Activity 2
This activity is designed to help students understand the proportions of the EU countries’ populations and GDPs. Divide the class into small groups. Have each group, using the library and the Internet, find the populations, GDP, inflation rate, total debt, and annual growth rate of each EU country. Ask the students in each group to prepare a pie chart or bar graph representing the information they find. (Microsoft Excel is easy to use in preparing graphs.) Based on this information, ask each group to list which countries should have the most power in the EU and why. Discuss with the students the potential problems of the EU created by the economic differences among the members. Ask each student to select an EU country and write a position paper in which he/she challenges or defends the country’s decision to join the EU.
RESOURCE 1
Crisis Cards

The northeastern coast of Canada has been attacked by a fleet of enemy ships. The Canadian government formally requests that you send U.S. troops to help repel the invaders.

A civil war has broken out among three different factions in an eastern European country, formerly a satellite of the Soviet Union. A neighboring country of common ethnic and religious background with one of the factions supplies military weapons to that faction, allowing its forces to take land away from the opposing factions. Tales of torture against civilians and other atrocities committed primarily by the dominant faction have been confirmed by the U.N.

Chinese communists infiltrate the northern defenses on India’s border. India requests that you send a small force of military advisers to help her own forces fight off the guerrillas.

The U.S. imports more than half of its oil from the Middle East. One of the major oil producers there, Saudi Arabia, is about to hold elections, and it is apparent that the victors will be a group that plans huge increases in the price of oil now charged the U.S.

A socialist government takes over a Latin American country and immediately nationalizes (takes out of private hands and gives to the government to run) all foreign banks and industries. Included are 18 large American banks and the largest U.S. mining company, all of which request U.S. armed intervention to get back their plants and other facilities.
RESOURCE 2
The North Atlantic Treaty

(Condensed version)

Source: Washington D.C., April 4, 1949
Reprinting permitted

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1
International disputes should be resolved by a peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. Treaty members must be consistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2
Member nations are to promote conditions of stability and well-being. They are also to encourage economic collaboration between any and all countries to prevent economic conflicts.

Article 3
Member nations are to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4
The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5
Member nations agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense will assist the Nation or Nations so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Nations, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.
Article 6
(Defines territories of Nations)

... 

Article 9
Each Member nation is to be represented on an established council. A defense committee shall recommend measures for the implementation of Article 3 and 5.

Article 10
New nations may be invited to join the Treaty by unanimous agreement of present member nations.

Article 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Member Nations in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The Treaty will go into effect when a majority of member nations have ratified the treaty.

Article 12
After the Treaty has been in effect for 10 years it may be revised.

Article 13
After the Treaty has been in effect for 20 years any nation may withdraw after a one year notice.

RESOURCE 3
The Warsaw Treaty Organization and Eastern Europe (excerpt)

By Jan Sjöblom

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The Origins of the WTO and the Reasons for Establishing It

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance
The Warsaw Treaty was, as the name implies, signed in the capital of Poland on May 14, 1955, between representatives of the socialist republics of Poland, Bulgaria, Albania,
East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Of the East European People’s Democracies, Yugoslavia was the sole non-signatory state, soon joined by Albania, who formally withdrew from its obligations in 1968. Romania, on the other hand, never officially denounced the Treaty, but increasingly distanced itself from it beginning in the early 1960s.

The treaty consisted of 11 articles whose purpose was to define the member-states’ relations to one another, to the United Nations, and to non-member states. The treaty was to be based on a “principle of respect for independence and sovereignty of others and non-interference in internal affairs.” According to the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, there should prevail in the relationships of the signatories “the noble principles of socialist internationalism, the noble idea of fraternal friendship between free and equal Nations” (Remington, p. 14). The Treaty’s embodiment of “socialist internationalism” on one hand, and “equality”, “sovereignty,” and “independence” on the other, turned out not to be compatible with each other.

In the Warsaw Treaty, the eight signatory states agreed to settle henceforth all disputes amongst themselves as well as with others through peaceful means. In the event of any one of the partners being threatened with armed attack by outsiders, the members of the Treaty were to immediately convene to consult so as to ensure joint defense.

In order to draw up the practical guidelines for this joint defense, a Joint Command of the allied armies was to be established, as was a body named the Political Consultative Committee, which in turn was to enjoy the highest decision-making authority in the newly founded organization. The partners pledged their intent to participate in international activities designed to safeguard peace but not to join any alliances in conflict with the Treaty. The Treaty was to last 20 years and was to automatically continue for a further 10 years for those members who did not denounce it by May 1975. None except Albania did. The Treaty was, however, to cease to exist the day the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was dismantled or the day a collective European security system was agreed upon.

With these conditions and objectives established, “all European states” were invited to join the Warsaw Treaty irrespective of their social or economic systems (see the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” in the Warsaw Treaty text). This invitation has to be seen as a carrot for tempting those West European nations who had doubts about the outspoken stand of NATO as being the champion of capitalism and bourgeois-liberal democracy, to join instead a “truly neutral,” “all-comprising” security establishment. In the NATO Treaty text of 1948, the organization had specified a need for consultations whenever “territorial integrity, political independence or security” was at stake, which was fairly obviously put for pre-emptive NATO intervention in case of a communist coup d’etat in a member country (see the NATO Treaty text). The Warsaw Treaty had no such clauses requiring a specific ideological adherence from its members, nor did it give any right to the members of the alliance to military intervention in the affairs of partner states ....
RESOURCE 4
The EU: At a Watershed in History

We are asking the nations of Europe, between whom rivers of blood have flowed, to
forget the feuds of a thousand years.
— Winston Churchill, February 1948

Even if Britain's great statesman had said, “the feuds of two thousand years,” Europeans in the late 1940s would have known what he meant. Their continent had a history of invasions, battles, and wars stretching back to the days of the Roman Empire. Now, as weary survivors of World War II (1939–1945), they were ready to forget their feuds. Post-war leaders saw great hope for peace in the United Nations. A dozen nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And West Europeans looked with interest at a unique proposal by a French statesman, Robert Schulman.

A brand-new idea

Schuman knew that many of Europe's wars had been the result of competition over key resources. The coal and steel industries of France and Germany were special target of this rivalry. So Schuman argued: Rather than compete for such resources, why not have both countries cooperate in their development?

Not only France and Germany, but four other nations [as well] bought the concept. In 1952, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). To give it clout, the six governments assigned decision-making powers to a new ECSC High Authority. The Authority would supervise the development of coal, steel, and iron for purposes of trade.

“But will it work?”

The results were astonishing. Within five years, trade in coal and steel among the six members of the ECSC increased by almost 130 percent. Moreover, the U.S. government declared that in matters related to coal and steel, it would deal directly with the ECSC rather than with its individual members. Such recognition by other countries reflected the group’s acceptance by the global community.

The success of the ECSC led its six members to apply the same formula to all other economic resources. In 1958, under the Treaty of Rome, they launched the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Like the ECSC, EURATOM and the EEC were institutions in which representatives of the six nations worked out goals and policies.
Success followed success. As border tariffs and other barriers to trade among the nations fell, the value of that trade soared. Between 1958 and 1972, it jumped from $6.8 billion to $60 billion.

More than trade was expanding. The group’s organization and membership were evolving, too. In 1967, the tasks of the ECSC, EURATOM, and EEC were merged, and the group became known as the European Community (EC). In 1968, the EC announced that all its internal trade tariffs had finally been dissolved. And in 1973, it admitted three additional nations, which were followed by three more in the 1980s (see box).

**Turning points**

The time seemed ripe for returning to a long-neglected part of Schulman’s original proposal. Schuman had, in fact, seen economic unity as a steppingstone to a politically united Europe. The idea was too bold for the 1950s — but not the 1980s. The EC’s members approved the Single European Act (SEA), which authorized work on a plan of union. In 1992, they signed the Treaty of Union at Maastricht in the Netherlands. And in 1993, after ratification by all EC members, the European Union (EU) was born.

**Something to ponder**

The EU, now 15 nations strong, represents a watershed in European history. Unlike the U.S.A., which relies on a constitution, the EU rests on a treaty providing for joint decision making. Three of the treaty’s provisions are viewed as “pillars” of the EU: The first provides for the free flow of people, goods, capital, and services among member nations, which have agreed to form numerous domestic policies in unity with one another. The second calls for the development of joint policy making in foreign affairs. And the third deals with shared policy making in such matters as international terrorism and immigration.

With a gross domestic product topping $7 trillion, there’s no question about the EU’s economic success. But can it reconcile its members’ hopes for peace-through-unity with their desire to retain their unique national identities, too? And, even if it does succeed, will political unity weaken Europe’s cultural diversity? Here are two sources to help you begin exploring such questions:


RESOURCES

RESOURCE 5
The EU: Economic Powerhouse

Source Inside the European Union, Part Two
Learning Enrichment, Inc.
Web site www.learningenrichment.org
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POSITION WANTED
Materials analyst. 5 years experience. Degrees in chemistry and computer programming. Spanish-born. Fluent in English and German. Seeks work in European chemical firm.

The item above is fictional. But it closely resembles many “position-wanted” ads appearing weekly in The European in the mid 1990s. Serving readers across Europe, the newspaper’s employment section reflects a basic fact about today's global marketplace. High-tech skills are hot, and the ability to speak and read more than one language boosts the odds of getting a job with a multinational firm. No one is more aware of this than the people who live in the European Union (EU).

A single market
In November 1993, a handful of West European nations gave life to their dream of economic unity by ratifying the Treaty on European Union. By 1995, with 15 nations and 372 million people, the EU was churning out the biggest collective gross domestic product (GDP) in the world and handling a healthy chunk of its trade, too.

The EU is a single market — much like the market created by the union of 50 states in the U.S.A. Within the EU, consumers, investors, students, job seekers, goods, and services move freely from one country to another: no visas necessary; no border taxes along the way.

But that description doesn’t tell the full story. The EU’s governing bodies play an active role in helping members address special economic concerns. Job training, for example, is a key issue, given the EU’s loss of industrial jobs to countries with lower wage scales. Under its “Leonardo” program, the EU helps member nations train their students for careers in such areas as information technology.

The rationale is simple: the more prepared people are for tomorrow’s workplace, the better their chances to continue enjoying the benefits of EU membership. And those benefits are many. Top scientists from each nation cooperate in fighting cancer. Poorer regions within EU nations receive aid from the European Regional Development Fund. Networks of new roads and railways — built with the aid of EU funds — strengthen links among member nations. And people in every city and village thrive under the EU’s promotion of high standards in matters ranging from environmental protection to safe workplaces.
A single currency?

Some challenges facing the EU are tougher than others. Take the matter of currency exchanges. Every world traveler knows the problem: Two tourists leave Country “A” thinking that one unit of “A’s” currency equals 10 units of Country “B’s”. They arrive in “B,” only to discover that the ratio is now 1 to 5. Result? The money they set aside for the trip will cover only half the cost of what they planned to see, buy, and do.

While the ratio in that example is exaggerated, the problem is not. Currency fluctuations around the world nag traders and investors every day. They even make some businesses hesitate to locate in the EU, which embraces 15 currencies. To remedy the problem, the EU has a bold plan: It is inviting its 15 members to discard their national currencies in favor of a single new unit, the “euro.” When the euro comes into circulation, it will be issued by a central bank.

Switching to the euro will not be easy. Before making the switch, each nation must fulfill at least these four conditions:

- Keep its annual budget deficit at or below three percent of its GDP
- Keep its total debt at or below 60 percent of its GDP
- Keep its inflation rate near that of such stable EU members as Germany
- Keep the exchange rate for its present currency steady for two years.

Something to ponder

Will the euro strengthen the EU? Or (if only a few nations qualify to use it), might the euro divide the EU into “rich” nations vs. “poor” nations? Can the EU continue as a global economic force in the 21st century? And would it function as well after admitting up to a dozen more nations? Here are two sources to help you begin exploring such questions:

The Treaty on European Union is not the end of European integration, but merely an intermediate stage along the road.

— Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, European Integration

When the treaty forming the European Union (EU) took effect in 1993, journalists had trouble defining the new association. Since the EU can pass laws binding the citizens of member nations, it is far more powerful than a trade organization. Yet it isn’t quite an international government, either. True, a nation must yield some of its sovereign rights when joining the EU. But in practice, major decision are made jointly by all members. What, then, is it? The answer is that the EU of the 1990s is one stage in the evolution of a dream.

A continuing goal

In the short run, the six nations that formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 wanted to cooperate in reviving their economies after World War II. In the long run, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany were dreaming of the political unification of Europe. Repugnance for war fueled that dream. So did pragmatism: in the modern world, it makes more sense for nations to cooperate than to compete.

The success of the ECSC paved the way for other market “communities” among the six nations. It attracted new members and led to the formation of a unique system of government (see box). Known in the 1970s as the European Community (EC), this group of countries continued to focus on economic growth, but they kept the other part of their dream alive, too.

A changing arena

When the ECSC was formed, Europe was politically divided. The communist East was separated by concrete walls and walls of terror from the democratic West. When those walls collapsed between 1989 and 1991, the vision of a unified Europe changed dramatically. Suddenly, there was the possibility of admitting members from Central and Eastern Europe. And a new question arose: how far east might a united Europe stretch?

From all signs, the EU, as the group is now called, will expand in several direction, perhaps to include as many as 25 nations in the near future. Cyprus and Malta are leading candidates for admission. Poland, Hungary, and at least eight other nations are interested, too.
Views of the future

Such expansion raises new concerns: as more diverse societies enter the EU’s ranks, will differences in language and customs make it more difficult (or more exciting and challenging) to forge a real unity of purpose among all members?

That’s the big issue. And there will be others in the years to come. Since the 1950s, for example, Europeans have debated this question: does political union require a strong political federation? Jean Monnet, the French citizen who launched an “Action Committee for the United States of Europe” in the 1950s, said Yes — and his followers still agree. Other EU members resist the idea, saying that federalism is not appropriate for countries with unique, centuries-old histories. EU policies, they argue, should continue to be formed by the joint consent of its members.

Something to ponder

Perhaps in the 21st century, the issue of federalism will not be so important as the answer to a simple question: within the world community of nations and their peoples, what does the EU stand for?

Speaking for the EU’s Delegation to the United States, Ambassador Hugo Paeman recently addressed that question. Like the U.S.A., observed the Ambassador, the EU is working “to promote security and prosperity” throughout the world, “with respect for democracy and human rights.” The world is looking for leaders, observed the Ambassador. And together, he emphasized, “the U.S. and the EU can make the difference.”

As you watch the EU evolve, you might ponder its impact. Is the EU a model for economic and political relationships in the world of the future? Is working for consensus truly more important than competing for power? Here are two sources to help you begin exploring such questions:


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<th>WORKING TO FULFILL THE DREAM</th>
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<td>The EU’s four key governing bodies are profiled below. Others include the Court of Justice, which interprets EU law, and the Court of Auditors, which supervises EU expenditures.</td>
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European Parliament
- Has 626 members, directly chosen during EU-wide election.
- Cannot enact laws, as do national legislatures, but has veto power in certain policy areas and can amend or reject EU budget.

European Council
- Includes head of government (or head of state) from each EU nation, and the president of the European Commission.
- Meets twice a year to decide EU strategies.

Council of the European Union
- Composed of ministers representing the governments of member states, who participate according to the topic under discussion. (Agricultural ministers would discuss farm prices, for example.)
- Enacts EU laws which have been proposed by the European Commission.

European Commission
- Has 20 members — two each from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK — and one each from the other 10 EU members.
- Proposes laws and ensures that EU treaties and decisions are implemented.
Relations between East Germany and West Germany from 1949 to Reunification and the End of the Cold War

History of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

At first, the Soviet Zone of Germany was governed by the Soviet Military Administration, but the Soviet authorities had long-range plans for Germany that involved reeducating the people and eventually winning them over to communism. German Communists who had spent the Nazi years in the Soviet Union were brought back, put in charge of local governments, and given control over the press, radio, and book publishing. Their instructions were to educate the people in anti-fascism and to gain their cooperation for the Soviet occupiers.

On April 30, 1945, Walter Ulbricht returned from the USSR in a Soviet aircraft and in June announced the reestablishment of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). It combined with the CDU, SPD, and Liberal Democrats to form an “Anti-fascist Democratic Bloc,” which the KPD soon dominated. The Soviets had expected that the Communists’ long record of anti-fascism would make the KPD popular among workers, but the latter clearly preferred the SPD. In April of 1946, this prompted the forcible uniting of the two parties into a Socialist Unity Party (SED) with Ulbricht as General Secretary. The other parties declined in significance until they became little more than a facade.

In 1948, work on a new constitution began, and on October 7, 1949, the GDR came into being. Industry was nationalized and agriculture was collectivized, creating a state-controlled economy. SED domination was tightened through a pervasive state police (Stasi), which spied on the citizenry and stifled dissent in every form. Few people dared to speak their minds openly, and reading materials were strictly controlled. Western travel was severely restricted. Elections were not free and were rigged to insure that the SED would always win. On May 26, 1952, the border between the two Germanys was sealed by barbed wire, mine-fields, watchtowers, and free-fire zones. However, the border between East and West Berlin remained open, since the city was legally still under joint Allied occupation.

The death in March 1953 of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin undermined the positions of many orthodox Communist leaders in Eastern Europe and gave the peoples of Eastern Europe hope that their regimes would be liberalized. These hopes were quickly dashed in the GDR. Buckling under reparations to the USSR, higher production quotas, and the lack of personal freedom, workers revolted on June 17, 1953. Soviet forces brutally put down the insurrection. Until German reunification in 1990, this date was commemorated in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as the “Day of German Unity.” On January 29, 1956, the GDR joined hands militarily with the Soviet Union by creating a National People’s Army (NVA) and joining a Communist military alliance called the Warsaw Pact.

On August 13, 1961, East German leaders, backed by the Soviets, authorized the sudden construction of a wall between West and East Berlin, where hundreds of thou-
sands of East Germans had continued to flee to the West. This wall sealed the last escape route and forced East Germans to come to terms with their plight and their government; there was no longer any alternative. This was the only instance in the history of the world that a wall was erected to keep an entire people confined, rather than to keep enemies out. The constant drain on manpower, particularly skilled persons, had been an important economic reason for the wall. Despite the devastating blow it delivered to the international prestige of this socialist state, which presented itself as the model for Germany's future, it led to greater prosperity in the GDR after 1961 and helped provide East Germans with the highest standard of living within the Soviet empire.

Ten years later the Soviet Union concluded that its interests required closer relations between the two Germanys. When Ulbricht opposed this, he was replaced in 1971 by Erich Honecker. Honecker had opposed any form of “revisionism” and was totally loyal to the Soviet Union. He strongly supported the erection of the Berlin Wall and was involved in the decision to shoot to kill along the dividing line between East and West Germany. About 350 persons were killed trying to cross the border.

**East-West Relations, 1949 to 1969**

From the beginning, West Germany's foreign policy was heavily influenced by the fact that Germany had emerged from the Second World War as a divided nation in the middle of Europe. The Cold War froze the division of Germany, but it also provided West Germany with opportunities that its crafty first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, knew how to exploit for the benefit of his country and his party.

There were intense fears in Western Europe and North America that the Soviet Union sought direct or indirect domination over all of Europe. This fear led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949, several months before the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG — West Germany). When NATO planners began working on plans for defending Western Europe, it was quickly apparent that the necessary forces could not be provided by the Western Allies and smaller West European countries alone. A defense was conceivable only with the help of Germany. In 1949, the U.S. General Staff drafted a plan for the inclusion of German troops in NATO.

Adenauer listened very carefully to the message which was coming from Western capital “No NATO without Germany; no Germany without NATO.” He reflected on his country's three principal goals and the best way they could be achieved. These goals were as follows:

1) West Germans, viewing the painful plight of their countrymen in East Germany, wanted protection from Soviet domination.
2) They wanted to continue the political and economic recovery out of the ashes of disgrace, to regain their national sovereignty, to create jobs, to rebuild their cities, to share in international trade and thereby to acquire material prosperity, and to be respected as equals in the Western world, whose values they shared.
3) Finally, they wanted their country to be reunified within the German borders of 1937.

The Chancellor decided to strike a bargain with the NATO countries. On November 11, 1949, he announced that “if a common Supreme Command could be created, the Fed-
eral Republic would be willing at an appropriate time to integrate itself into a European defense system.” He stated the issue very simply: “We are faced with a choice between slavery and freedom. We choose freedom.” In the years to come, Adenauer was successful in getting an important political advantage for each increase in German activity or responsibility in NATO. He set a course which was never fundamentally changed by his successors in the Chancellor’s office.

There was, however, a problem with Adenauer’s bargain which the opposition Social Democrats simply could not get out of their minds: how would this integration with the West, and especially the military part of it, affect the goal of German reunification? This was a goal which most Germans at that time wanted very much and which was an obligation placed on all West German governments by the framers of the Basic Law. Social Democrats strongly sensed at the time that by seeking to achieve the objectives of security and recovery through political, economic, and military integration with the West, the FRG was greatly reducing the chances that the Soviet Union would permit the reunification of Germany.

The SPD’s order of priorities was almost the complete reverse of Adenauer’s. Throughout the 1950s, reunification was its top priority. It was not in principle opposed to reconciliation and integration with the West, nor was it ever opposed to a military defense for Germany. But it believed that the military and economic commitments the FRG had assumed in order to achieve Adenauer’s goals would reduce or eliminate the chances that the pieces of Germany would find their way back together again.

With the FRG integrated economically in Western Europe, with NATO and Soviet troops facing each other along the Elbe River, and with each part of a divided Germany serving as an essential element in the European balance of power, the Soviet Union would be far less inclined to withdraw its troops from East Germany. This would especially be the case if a reunified Germany were free to join NATO, as Adenauer always insisted it should be. The SPD feared that the military balance in Europe would require a perpetually divided Germany. It therefore showed much greater willingness than the Adenauer government to examine closely Soviet proposals for reunification and to assume that the Soviets were acting at least partly in good faith.

An example was a series of notes the Soviet Union sent to the three Western Allies in 1952. The Soviets offered a unified Germany extending as far eastward as the Oder-Neisse line, East Germany’s border with Poland. An all-German government could be formed, and “democratic rights” would be guaranteed to all German people. Only organizations opposed to democracy and to the maintenance of peace would be prohibited from operating within Germany. All occupation troops would be withdrawn from Germany within a year’s time, and no foreign military bases would be permitted on German soil thereafter. The Germans would be forbidden from entering any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power, such as the Soviet Union, that had fought against Germany. They would be permitted to maintain a limited number of their own military forces. Finally, a peace treaty would be signed with Germany.

Sensing danger, and after consulting with Adenauer, the three Western Allies rejected the offer on several grounds. One of the most important was the absence to any reference to free elections in all parts of Germany. The Western allies and Adenauer insisted that free elections precede the formation of an all-German government. The terms democracy and democratic, which Soviet leaders understood differently than in the West, were left undefined.
Adenauer's brusk rejection of the notes was in some respects a mistake since the initiative had awakened in Germany high expectations and hopes among the SPD, some respected journalists, and the general population. Many felt that a unique opportunity to achieve German reunification had been neglected and missed. It helped deepen the gap that divided the government from the parliamentary opposition. Even some Christian Democrats thought their government should have probed this initiative. One lamented that "the year 1952 will go down in history as the year of the historic division of Germany." For decades, the memories of this debate over the Soviet notes continued to resurface in controversies over the political costs of the FRG's membership in NATO.

Adenauer continued to argue that his policy would not undermine the aim of German reunification, which he, like the Social Democrats, wanted to see happen "in peace and freedom." He argued that in return for the FRG's entering the Western Alliance, the three Western powers had formally committed themselves to seek German reunification. He also predicted that unrest in Eastern Europe would eventually be directed against the Soviet Union's tight and self-serving grip on its satellites.

He predicted that, in time, the balance of power would shift in favor of the West, and this shift would make possible negotiations "on the basis of strength" with the Soviet Union. He argued that the Soviets held the key to reunification and would ultimately see themselves compelled to settle the German question on Western terms. This latter element of Adenauer's reunification policy was, as the SPD correctly foresaw, an illusion. With the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1950s, there could be no serious talk of rolling back what Churchill had aptly named the "Iron Curtain" through demonstrations of military strength.

Adenauer was right, though, in his assessment of what West Germans wanted most and of the enormous advantages for his disgraced and impoverished country which Western European unity, crowned by the creation of the Common Market (EC) in 1957, offered: the FRG would be an equal member of such a community and would derive all the economic benefits that the trade and pooling of raw materials would bring. The position of the SPD, although it appeared to be grounded in the desire of many Germans for reunification, actually caused an erosion of the party's domestic political position within the FRG. Social Democrats had to watch with dismay and bitterness how Adenauer's Christian Democratic party grew progressively stronger while the SPD stagnated.

The domestic battle over the crucial foreign and security policy decisions made in the 1950s was so intense and emotional that it is almost a wonder that the young democracy survived it. The issues were serious ones related to the future of Germany and the German nation. These bitter controversies of the 1950s never completely disappeared, resurfacing periodically, even in the 1980s.

German rearmament was a truly explosive issue which dominated West German politics until the FRG's formal entry into NATO in 1955. From the point of view of the Western Allies and the Adenauer government, the major problem was how to place international controls on West German troops. The FRG's future allies, who had fought against Germany only five years earlier, wanted security from West Germany, as well as security for it.

Well aware of these fears, Adenauer stubbornly refused to consider establishing an independent German national army. In an effort to solve this problem, the French presented the "Pleven Plan" in 1950, calling for the establishment of a European Defense Community (EDC). West German military units would be completely fused with a larger
European army, and no German generals would command German corps. The FRG would technically not have NATO status, but it would be included de facto since the EDC itself would belong to NATO.

The link between the FRG’s entry into the EDC and the regaining of West German sovereignty was clear from the very beginning. In 1951, the FRG was permitted to establish a Ministry for Foreign Affairs and to establish diplomatic relations with other states. Also, the Deutschland Vertrag (Germany Treaty, also known as the Bonn Conventions) was drafted for signing together with the EDC Treaty. It provided for the abolition of the Occupation Statute and of the Allied High Commission, which formally ruled Germany. It prepared the way for West German sovereignty, but with certain restrictions.

In 1954, the issue of a German military role became acute again when the French National Assembly rejected the EDC, which an earlier French Foreign Minister had proposed. Surprisingly quickly, however, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Canada, and the U.S. met with the prospective members of the EDC to discuss alternatives. They signed the Paris Treaties calling for the direct entry of the FRG into NATO, an end to Germany’s occupation status, and the restoration of full German sovereignty. The three Western powers retained their authority on matters relating to German reunification, Berlin, and a final German peace treaty.

In late 1955, Adenauer traveled to the Soviet Union to establish full diplomatic relations and to negotiate the release of the last German prisoners of war remaining in Soviet hands. After 1955, the FRG did not pursue a determined policy of German reunification, preferring instead to focus on Western economic and military integration while preventing the legitimization of the status quo in central Europe.

The West German debate over foreign policy remained very polarized. In 1956, the first thousand volunteer soldiers entered the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). There was a powerful pacifist strain within the SPD and society in general, which opposed all forms of German rearmament. This element was a part of an emotional mass movement known by the slogan ohne mich (without me). Because of the recent memories and the direct experience which Germans had with the war, the ohne mich movement enjoyed widespread support among the general population.

The results of the 1957 federal parliamentary elections stunned the Social Democrats. The Christian Democrats’ vote rose from 44 percent to more than 50 percent, and it gained the only absolute majority in the Bundestag ever achieved in the history of the FRG. The election was widely interpreted as approval of Adenauer’s foreign and economic policies. This election disaster convinced the SPD to change its foreign policy tack and to support Adenauer’s policy of rearmament and integration with the West. Although there were quarrels between the parties occasionally, by the time of Adenauer’s retirement in 1963, a foreign policy consensus had taken shape in the FRG which continued to exist throughout the 1960s.

With the FRG firmly planted in the Western alliance, West German leaders began to look eastward to see how they could improve West Germany’s relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 had made it clear that the two Germanys would not be reunified for a long time. Before that time, East and West Berliners could pass freely from one part of the city to the other. But the ugly wall that cut right through Germany’s largest city destroyed the last hope of national unity.
In the early 1960s, the Bonn government began a “policy of movement.” This involved a loosening of the “Hallstein Doctrine,” which had forbidden West German diplomatic contact with any country which officially recognized East Germany (with the exception of the Soviet Union). This policy was an important beginning, but it did not go far enough. The FRG still aimed to isolate the GDR diplomatically. Bonn neither discarded the Hallstein Doctrine altogether nor recognized the Oder-Neisse border between the GDR and Poland. That frontier had been drawn by Moscow at the end of the war and had delivered to Poland former German territory in Pomerania and Silesia.

Although top level political contacts were studiously avoided in public, the FRG had always worked closely with East German officials on practical, day-to-day questions, especially those involving economic matters. For instance, the FRG insisted, as a condition for its entry into the EU, that trade between the two Germanys be conducted as if there were only one Germany. Such free trade was enormously beneficial for the GDR, providing it with an open entry to the EU and serving as a basis for the relatively high economic prosperity in the GDR as compared with other Eastern European countries.

Agreements between the two German states increasingly enabled West Germans and West Berliners to visit the GDR. Travel possibilities to the West were more restrictive for East Germans; only pensioners and those with urgent family emergencies were permitted to visit the FRG. From the early 1960s, the two Germanys also engaged in a secret and, according to some, sordid cooperation: West Germany paid cash for the release and deportation of thousands of political prisoners from East German jails.

In 1966, the FRG’s two largest parties formed a “Grand Coalition,” with Kurt Georg Kiesinger of the CDU as chancellor. Many West Germans supported the Grand Coalition’s policy of seeking improved relations with the East. The government took steps toward overcoming the impasse in German reunification. It announced that it was prepared to accept the East German regime as a de facto government, and it even exchanged letters for the first time on a semi-official basis with East German leaders.

The 1970s and 1980s

In 1969, the SPD and Free Democratic Party (FDP) won a razor-thin victory in parliamentary elections, and Willy Brandt became chancellor. The new government had no intention of changing the FRG’s policy toward the West, but it was determined to conduct a dynamic and innovative policy toward the East. Fundamentally, the Brandt government decided to overturn two decades of West German foreign policy and to recognize the territorial status quo in Europe, including the division of Germany. The word reunification was dropped from the government’s vocabulary.

In August 1970, the first dramatic step was a German-Soviet treaty in which both states renounced the use of force in Europe. West Germany also declared that it had no territorial claims against any country and that the borders of all European states are inviolable, including the Oder-Neisse line and the border between East and West Germany. This treaty was the first West German recognition of East Germany’s international legitimacy. Brandt was correct in commenting that in actual fact, “nothing is lost with this treaty that was not gambled away long ago.”

A further step, not involving the FRG directly but strongly encouraged by it, was the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971. The FRG had linked its ratification of the Ger-
man-Soviet Treaty with a successful resolution of the Berlin problem. Brandt reasoned that if the FRG was willing to recognize the status quo in Europe, the Soviet Union should be willing to recognize the status quo in Berlin. The Four-Power Agreement contained a Western Powers’ acknowledgment that West Berlin was “not a constituent part of the FRG” and the Soviet Union’s recognition that there were “ties” between the FRG and West Berlin. Further, the FRG would perform consular services for West Berliners and represent them in international organizations and conferences. The Soviet Union also promised that transit traffic to and from West Berlin from the FRG would proceed unimpeaded. That was deemed necessary since the East German government had frequently hampered access to the city which it surrounded in order to put pressure on the Bonn government. The Soviet Union admitted that West Berlin was neither located on the territory of the GDR nor was it an entity entirely separate from the FRG.

The last significant step was the Basic Treaty between the two Germanys themselves. Bonn knew that it could not by-pass East Berlin despite the fact that the East German regime was defensive, rigid, and determined to exact a very high price for any concession. After many months of frustrating negotiations, an agreement was signed in 1972 and ratified the next year which normalized the access between the FRG and West Berlin and made it possible for West Berliners to visit both East Berlin and the GDR. By signing the Basic Treaty, the FRG publicly accepted the GDR as a legitimate state and agreed to deal with it as an equal.

Nevertheless, Bonn continued to insist that there was only one German nation (even if there were two German states) and that the GDR would not be treated like any other foreign country. To underscore this, the FRG maintained a permanent liaison mission in East Berlin, not an embassy, and Bonn’s dealings with the GDR were conducted by the Chancellor’s office, the Ministry of All-German Affairs, or a special office in the Interior Ministry, but not by the Foreign Office. The official relations between the two Germanys improved as a result of the Basic Treaty. But the two countries’ relationships remained ambiguous and tense, charged with conflict and suspicion.

A major scandal occurred in 1974 when it was revealed that one of Brandt’s chief aides, Günter Guillaume, was an East German spy who had access not only to top secret information, but also was privy to knowledge of Brandt’s intimate private life, which was reported to be spicy. This embarrassing revelation and intra-party criticism of Brandt’s leadership led to his resignation from the office of chancellor in May. Helmut Schmidt of the SPD became chancellor. The global energy crisis and the resultant economic problems began increasingly to replace the Eastern policy focus of the government. Plagued by continual dissension within the SPD and recurrent coalition crises with the FDP, the Schmidt government collapsed in 1982.

Led by Helmut Kohl, the CDU/FDP coalition then took power. The Kohl government pursued the policy of detente with the GDR and the USSR with as much vigor as had the SPD. Like most West German leaders, Kohl no longer believed that German reunification could be achieved in the present era. In 1987, he stated in Moscow that he personally would never live to see the day when the two Germanys would become one country. That same year he hosted a state visit to Bonn by the East German leader, Erich Honecker. This is something no chancellor would have done if he had known that the man would soon be driven from power and then tried in court for ordering the murder of hundreds of East Germans trying to escape the GDR. Like virtually everybody else, Kohl was caught
completely by surprise as the GDR collapsed before his unbelieving eyes and the elusive German unity fell into his lap.

When Soviet Communist Party Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev launched his reformist policy of perestroika in 1985, East German leaders resisted introducing it in the GDR on the grounds that the East German economy was working well. They argued that if the GDR ceased to have a rigidly socialist economy, then there would be nothing to distinguish it from the FRG. Consequently there would be no further justification for the GDR to exist as a separate state. They also resisted introducing more freedom in the political realm and even prevented the distribution of some free-thinking Soviet newspapers, such as the Moscow News. It was extremely embarrassing for a party which had been so servile to the Soviet Union to be in a position of having to resist the new Soviet leadership. The East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) realized that it was in a fatal dilemma from which it could never extricate itself.

Reunification, 1989–1990

In 1989, one of the most dramatic postwar developments began taking place before the very eyes of a stunned world public: German reunification. In late summer, a human hemorrhaging westward commenced as East German vacationers began crossing the newly opened border between Hungary and Austria. Budapest informed the irate East German leaders that the human rights agreements accepted at the Helsinki Conference in 1975 superseded earlier bilateral treaties preventing the free movement of peoples. The next avenue of escape was through Czechoslovakia. After thousands had taken refuge at the West German embassy in Prague, “freedom trains” took East Germans through the GDR into the West. The stampede grew when Czechoslovakia opened its western borders.

Under enormous stress, the GDR celebrated its fortieth and final anniversary on October 7, 1989. The honored guest was Gorbachev himself, who at that time was the most popular political figure in Germany, East and West. However, rather than lending his prestige to the struggling East German leaders, he made it known that they would have to pay a high price if they did not learn the lessons of history and adopt timely reforms. He informed them that they could not expect the support of Soviet troops in the GDR to prop up their rule against the people. Without Soviet military backing, Communist rule could survive nowhere in Germany.

This was a very important message in a country in which public demonstrations had been going on for some time. An umbrella opposition group, New Forum, had come into existence a few weeks earlier, and huge demonstrations had spread to all major East German cities. Things came to a head on October 9 in Leipzig, where massive, non-violent demonstrations, starting in the Nikolai Church and then proceeding along the ring street surrounding the city center, took place every Monday. SED Party chief, Erich Honecker, reportedly issued an order to security forces to put down the demonstration by any means.

Communist leaders in Leipzig, fearing a massacre such as had occurred in China the previous June, decided to prevent such a bloodbath in their city. With Kurt Masur, director of Leipzig’s Gewandhaus Orchestra, as spokesman, and joined by Protestant Church leaders, they issued an appeal for calm. They coupled this with a call for non-violence. On October 18, Honecker was ousted from power and replaced by Egon Krenz.

The Berlin Wall came tumbling down on November 9. Giving in to East Germans’
long-standing demand for Western travel, SED leaders had decided earlier that day to allow citizens to apply for permits to visit the FRG several times a year. However, when Politburo member, Günter Schabowski, announced the decision in a press conference, he mistakenly stated that the Berlin Wall would be opened “immediately.” Within minutes, millions of East Germans began pouring over the border, while the once-feared border police looked on helplessly.

Germans, who for decades had suppressed displays of national feeling, experienced a deeply emotional outpouring. While millions sat in front of their televisions and wept, Berliners danced together on top of the Wall, embraced each other on the streets, and chiseled away at the ugly barrier. When word arrived at the Bundestag, many members, including some Greens, stood up and spontaneously sang the third and officially accepted verse of the national anthem, which stresses “unity and justice and freedom.” The rest of Europe looked on with mixed feelings, stirred by the sight of people casting off their shackles and demanding freedom and self-determination, but uneasily remembering a frightening German past.

Unable to put an end to either the demonstrations or the continued emigration to the West, Krenz promised “free, democratic, and secret elections,” a move toward a market economy, separation of party and state, freedom of assembly, and a new law on broadcasting and press freedom. He also appointed as prime minister Hans Modrow from Dresden, one of the very few East German Communists who was personally popular. However, Krenz could not save his party or himself, and he and the other members of the Politburo resigned on December 3.

Five days later, a special SED party congress met and installed Gregor Gysi, a lawyer who had made a name for himself by defending dissidents and the opposition New Forum. Upon accepting the leadership, Gysi admitted that a complete break with Stalinism and a new form of socialism was needed and that the SED was responsible for plunging the GDR into crisis. Feeling betrayed, 700,000 of the 2.3 million members left within two months, and the party renamed itself the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) in an attempt to survive by distinguishing itself from the old Communist SED.

There was an outpouring of disgust and rage among East Germans as massive corruption on the part of their former leaders was revealed. Many had enriched themselves while in office, and their living standards had been much higher than the meager everyday existence of normal GDR citizens long used to exhortations for austerity. The television broadcast images of the “proletarian” leaders’ luxury compound in Wandlitz, estates with as many as 22 staff members, hunting lodges, deer parks, well-stocked wine cellars, and satellite dishes for better reception of Western broadcasts. Even worse were revelations of shady financial dealings totaling millions of marks and involving illegal arms sales to Third World countries and foreign currency maneuvers, the profits of which ended up in personal Swiss bank accounts. Said one rank-and-file SED member, “We did not expect this of Communists with their creed of equality.”

German reunification returned suddenly to Europe’s and the superpowers’ agendas, and developments leading toward it raced along faster than any government’s ability to react. The rapid collapse of Communist rule left a political vacuum in the GDR. Demonstrators in East German streets unfurled banners bearing the words “Germany — One Fatherland!” Aware of his constitutional mandate to seek German reunification and wishing to calm the waters and counter right- and left-wing extremists, Chancellor Helmut Kohl
announced on November 28, 1989, a 10-step plan for gradual reunification if that were the will of the German people, especially those in East Germany.

To reassure his NATO and European allies, he stressed that any unified Germany would be embedded in the Western community of nations and NATO. To those who feared for stability in Europe, which until then had been guaranteed by a divided Germany, he asserted that “freedom does not cause instability.” West Germans no longer needed to sacrifice unity for freedom, as they had done since 1949.

In March 1990, the last Communist government, led by Hans Modrow, was voted out of power. East Germans had conducted the only successful revolution in German history, and it was a bloodless one. The pace of the reunification movement quickened with the first free elections in East German history on March 18, 1990. The surprise victor was the conservative coalition, “Alliance for Germany,” led by the CDU-East, which won 48 percent of the vote by promising prosperity and union with the FRG. The SPD-East was a distant second. The Communists, running under a new name — PDS — won only 16 percent. As in 1949, Germans turned to the CDU as the party which assured democracy and prosperity. A “grand coalition” of conservatives and SPD formed a government and entered negotiations with the Kohl government to overcome the political, economic, and military obstacles to “One United Germany.”

The train was speeding toward unity, and the best the Bonn government could do was to make it an orderly, legal process. There was no time for a transition, no pause to “study the problems.” A breathless Kohl, who had said a few years earlier in Moscow that he would never live to see German unity, saw a unique opportunity. He announced in February 1990, “We are jumping with a single leap!” He waved aside Social Democrats’ calls for a more deliberate process and the demand of many intellectuals for a “better” East Germany treading a “third path” between capitalism and socialism.

The next steps toward unity were taken with dizzying rapidity. On July 1, the West German mark was introduced in the GDR in a currency reform without precedent on such a large scale. American President George Bush overcame earlier reservations by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand against a larger Germany in the heart of Germany. In a stunning diplomatic breakthrough in mid-July, Kohl got Gorbachev’s assurances that the latter would not stand in the way of German unity and that a united Germany could decide “freely and by itself if, and in which alliance, it desires membership.” Germany would not have to leave NATO in order to be united.

Returning to the Soviet Union on September 12, Bonn’s leaders joined GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière and the foreign ministers of the four Allied powers (Poland had observer status) to sign the “two plus four” treaty granting full sovereignty to Germany and suspending the four powers’ rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now called the OSCE for Organization) endorsed the agreement in New York on October 1. It went into effect at midnight on October 2, when unity was rung in by a “Liberty Bell” which the U.S. had given to Berlin four decades earlier.

The prelude to the first free all-German elections in almost six decades, scheduled for December 2, 1990, were state elections in the five newly recreated Länder in the East; on October 14, the CDU won in four of them. Therefore, few observers were surprised to see the CDU/FDP coalition win a resounding victory in December and Kohl reap the electoral reward for presiding over the mending of Germany’s division.
Kohl and former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher knew that while no European country wanted to thwart German unity, there was uneasiness about the possibility that an economically powerful Germany (43 percent larger than before and more populous than any country west of Russia) would dominate Europe. Most European leaders were too polite to express these fears publicly. To minimize them, Germany signed landmark treaties with the USSR and Poland. On November 9, 1990, it signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union which called for a mutual renunciation of force and amounted to the closest links the Soviets ever had with any major Western nation (a little over a year later, in December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist).

The ink was hardly dry when Germany signed a treaty with Poland on November 14, 1990, fixing their mutual border along the Oder-Neisse Line. The former German land to the East of this demarcation constitutes a third of Poland’s present-day territory. Another major problem was the fact that the Soviet Union had 375,000 troops still positioned in East German territory. After the FRG pledged massive financial assistance to retrain many of them for civilian jobs, to pay their wages while they were still in Germany, to help transport them home, and to construct housing for them in the former USSR, the last of the Soviet Union’s soldiers in East Germany departed on August 31, 1994.

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This text can be found on the Armonk Institute’s Web site at armonk-institute.org/gunlickslesson15.htm
Relations between East Germany and West Germany from 1949 to Reunification and the End of the Cold War

Overview

The lessons in this Unit focuses on the cultural, political, and economic differences which emerged as a result of the postwar division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). A comparison of the two Germanys — one free, one totalitarian — reveal how a common culture became, over the years, two distinct societies. This artificial physical and political division came to an end very suddenly in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. By 1991, when reunification became constitutionally recognized, the euphoria surrounding this dramatic event had given way to the sober realization that Germany would face many problems in making these two societies again one.

Lesson 1: Why Was Germany Divided?

Preview of Main Points

This lesson addresses the causes for the division of Germany after World War II. This division occurred along the military and political lines at the cessation of hostilities in 1945. Though at first assumed to be temporary, this division became a long-term part of the political and social makeup of central Europe. As two separate countries, the two Germanys evolved into two distinct societies separated by both physical and psychological barriers.

Key Concepts

- Totalitarianism
- Balance of power
- Spheres of influence
Related Concepts
• Dictatorship
• Security
• Confrontation

Objectives
During this lesson, students will
• differentiate between the Soviet sphere of influence and the Western sphere of influence
• identify and explain the reasons for the division of Germany at the end of World War II
• recognize the importance of Berlin as a symbol of freedom and point of confrontation
• justify the division of Germany from the viewpoint of a Russian citizen and a British citizen.

Focus Question
For what reasons might both the victor and the vanquished accept occupation and division as a necessary consequence of war?

Teaching Suggestions
This is a quick review that is intended to create a background for the study of the reunification of the GDR and the FRG in 1991. By utilizing maps, other visuals, and written responses, the students will gain a better understanding of the issues and events which concerned the German people during the period of separation from 1945 to 1989. This background will serve as an important source of factual information from which the students will draw when completing the later lessons about the reunification.

Beginning the Lesson
Have the students view a short video clip showing the celebration surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Lead a discussion that explores the focus question: For what reasons might both the victor and the vanquished accept occupation and division as necessary consequences of war? Brainstorm possible hypotheses.
Developing the Lesson

Using an overhead projector, display a map that shows the occupation zones in Germany at the end of World War II (see Historical Maps on File by Martin Greewald Associates [Facts on File: New York, N.Y] 1994). Ask students to predict the possible outcomes of the situation depicted by the map. Explain that the occupation zones led to the division of Germany into the “spheres of influence” as prescribed by the Potsdam Agreement. Ask students to explain the reasons for the development of the “spheres of influence.” What might have been the intentions of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union?

Show a map of the division of the city of Berlin. Ask the students to predict the possible outcomes of this division. Explain how the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 solidified the division.

Concluding the Lesson

Ask the students to write a narrative in which they justify the division of Germany from three points of view: that of a Russian citizen, that of a German citizen, and that of a British citizen. The narratives should reflect the reasoning of each citizen’s government.

Ask the students to volunteer to read several of their narratives and discuss the emotions which surrounded the aftermath of World War II and Germany’s role in it. Have them address the possible concerns which caused the division of Germany.

Lesson 2: Life in Totalitarian Germany

Preview of Main Points

In this lesson, the students will confront the realities of life in a police state as experienced by citizens of the GDR. Emphasis should be placed on the issues of personal rights, personal privacy, and the corruption of society caused by the totalitarian regime. The lesson presents the methods used by the East German government to restrict individual freedom and stresses the impact of these methods on the citizens of the GDR and particularly on their individual social relationships. The teacher should emphasize the sense of isolation and disassociation from reality that eventually characterized GDR society from top to bottom.

Key Concepts

- Totalitarianism
- Individualism
- Civil liberties
- Freedom of thought

Related Concepts

- Indoctrination
- Communism
Objectives

During this lesson, students will
- identify features of East German society that reflected totalitarian characteristics
- analyze the effects of totalitarianism on the lives of East German citizens
- describe how citizens might compromise their individualism to comply with the demands of a totalitarian society.

Focus Question

How is it possible to compromise one’s individualism with the demands of a totalitarian society?

Teaching Suggestions

The character of life in the former GDR is very difficult for most Americans to comprehend. By examining the impact of totalitarianism on the lives of athletes and educators, students will get a good idea of the nature of East German society and should be able to contrast it with either American or West German society.

Beginning the Lesson

Describe the domination of East German athletes at the 1988 Summer Olympics and explain the sports regimen supported by the Communist state. Have the students read the August 1998 article from the Washington Post, “Steroid Probe Finds East Germans Guilty” (available from the Washington Post Internet Archive Service found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm. Ask the students why a government would go to such lengths to achieve victory over their Western counterparts in this high-profile sporting event with political overtones. Conduct a discussion on the ethical implications of things like drug-enhanced athletic performance as an instrument of state policy.

Developing the Lesson

Have the students read the article “Berlin, June 1983, continued” (see Resource 1) by Cliff Docherty in which he describes a visit to East Berlin. Then conduct a discussion of Docherty’s impressions of East Berlin, highlighting the manifestations of totalitarianism.
As an alternative activity, briefly describe the major characteristics of Communist economics and explain how economic policies developed in the GDR.

Read “My Experiences as a University Professor in the GDR” (see Resource 2). Conduct a discussion about how the state controlled the life of professors and students in East Germany. Explain how the major ideas in the memoirs are related to the sports issues in the earlier discussion. Some questions to ask are: How were individual civil rights restricted? How was life different from what we experience in the United States? How would you have felt if you had been a student in East Germany? How do the experiences of Dr. Stoyan and others explain the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989?

Concluding the Lesson

Discuss the major social and ethical issues that emerged from the lesson. Use the focus question to discuss how East Germans compromised their individualism in a totalitarian system.

Have the students write diary entries from the point of view of a student enrolled in a gymnasium in the GDR and preparing to attend university. The entry should reflect the conflict between individualism and the demands of a totalitarian state (see the Activity below).

Activity

Ask each student to write a diary entry of no more than two pages from the point of view of a student in the GDR who is enrolled in a gymnasium and is preparing to go to university. The entry should focus on the compromises necessitated by living in a totalitarian society. In the diary entry, the student must address the following given conditions:

- Your parents are not Communist party members and quietly oppose the regime.
- At home you have been taught the importance of individualism.
- You are aware that in order to be successful in the GDR one must compromise one’s individualism and submit to the authority of the state.
- You are intelligent and know that you could have a bright future if only you would “toe the party line.”

To assess this assignment, use the following questions as criteria:

- Did the student address the personal conflicts involved in this situation?
- Did the student relate these personal conflicts to those involved in all matters of a totalitarian state?
- Did the student detail the possible repercussions of defying state authority?
Lesson 3: The Collapse of the Wall and the Issue of German Reunification

Preview of Main Points
This lesson examines the reasons for the building of the Berlin Wall, the attitudes of Germans toward the Wall, and the reasons for the fall of the Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany. Emphasis will be given to the significance of reunification for East and West Germany, Europe, the United States, and the former Soviet Union.

Key Concepts
• Nationalism
• Reunification/unification
• Security
• Repression
• Freedom

Related Concepts
• Communism
• Capitalism
• Ostpolitik
• Perestroika
• Glasnost

Objectives
During this lesson, students will
• explain the reasons for the building of the Berlin Wall
• describe the attitudes and feelings of Germans toward the Wall
• analyze the reasons for the fall of the Wall
• analyze and evaluate the impact of reunification upon Germany, Europe, and the rest of the world.

Focus Question
How would a long-term separation affect a society that was once united?
Teaching Suggestions

This lesson uses video footage and readings to describe the attitudes and feelings of the German people about the building and collapse of the Berlin Wall. The video footage conveys the euphoria surrounding the destruction of the Wall. The lesson ends with a role-play of a press conference in which students confront the difficult issues created by reunification. Teachers might review the purpose of a press conference and show a brief portion of a recently televised press conference involving the President and one or more foreign leaders.

Beginning the Lesson

Ask the students to imagine that the city or town in which they live is divided by a guarded wall that stretches from one end to the opposite end. Ask them to imagine further that a special pass is required to travel between the two halves. Ask them: How would they feel? What problems would it create? What would you do?

Show the short video interview of East Berliner Stephan as he describes his memories of life in East Germany at the time of the collapse of the Berlin Wall (the video accompanies this document or is available from the Department of Education). Ask the students to take notes on the following questions:

1) How important was November 9, 1989, to Stephan?
2) How does he describe his life in the GDR?
3) What are his feelings about the future of Germany?

Conduct a brief discussion of the video, using these questions.

Developing the Lesson

Ask the students to read “Berlin, June 1983,” Parts 1 and 2 by Cliff Docherty, discussing the Berlin Wall (see Resource 3). Ask students to brainstorm about why the Wall was built and how the Germans felt about it. Why did the Berlin Wall fall so easily and quickly in November 1989?

To provide the proper historical context for the fall of the Wall, explain the terms perestroika and glasnost to the students, describing the changes that took place in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe in 1989. Show the students pictures of the Wall coming down. Ask the students to write a diary entry about the Wall from the point of view of residents of West Berlin or East Berlin just after the fall of the Wall.

Concluding the Lesson

Explain to the students that shortly after the fall of the Wall, East and West Germany were reunited under the leadership of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Ask the students to read “The New Superpower” in the February 26, 1990, issue of Newsweek magazine. Brainstorm the important issues that face the unified Germany.

Ask students to role-play a press conference concerning the future of Germany after the collapse of the GDR (see the Activity below).
Activity

Divide the class into five groups representing former East Germans, former West Germans, Americans, former Soviets, and foreign correspondents. Ask the first four groups to

1) prepare a list of concerns that they have about German reunification.
2) construct a best case scenario outlining what they would like to see happen in Germany and making sure that their plans reflect both economic and security policies.

Ask the foreign correspondents to prepare a set of questions to ask each of the other groups, inquiring about the advantages and disadvantages of reunification. Then conduct a press conference using the following procedure:

• Begin by allowing three minutes for each of the first four groups to deliver its opening statement, which should include its concerns and best case scenario.
• Allow 10 minutes for the foreign correspondents to ask questions of each group.
• Conclude by allowing 15 minutes for a roundtable discussion during which each group may reply to the others.

Assign an essay in which each student selects one of the viewpoints presented by one of the groups during the press conference. The student should explain why this group’s positions are the best for the future of Germany, Europe, and the rest of the world. The student must argue his/her points from a valid historical and political context.
Lesson 4: Wessis and Ossis — Bridging the Gap

Preview of Main Points

The realities of German reunification pose major problems for Germany and, ultimately, all of Europe. Social, cultural, and economic differences between eastern and western Germany in conjunction with the economic dominance of the former FRG bedevil the nation and have delayed true integration of the two societies. This lesson examines the issues that separate the two areas of Germany and asks students to understand how critical the resolution of these issues is to the future well-being of the new Germany.

Key Concepts

- Capitalism
- Cultural identity
- Regionalism

Related Concepts

- Social Safety Net
- Socialism
- Second-class citizenship
- Consumerism

Objectives

During this lesson, students will
- describe the causes of the disillusionment that accompanied Germany’s reunification.
- identify the similarities and differences between eastern and western Germans in the areas of living standards, political identity, and expectations for the future.
- differentiate between the perspectives of the eastern and western Germans on the challenges created by reunification.

Focus Question

What happens when diverse groups try to unify as one?

Teaching Suggestions

In this lesson, the class will create two newspapers to illustrate the differences between eastern and western Germany. It would be helpful if the teacher would review the various sections of a newspaper so the students will better understand what they are to create: for example, information for an Op-ed piece would not be appropriate for a classified ad. There should be an editor appointed for each of the two papers, and if the classes
Beginning the Lesson

Ask students to identify problems that might be created when two groups of diverse people attempt to unify as one. Have them read “Five Years after Reunification — Easterners Discover Themselves” (see Resource 4) and “Back in the GDR” (available through the Time International Web site at http://cgi.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/archive/1996/dom/960930/gdr.html)

Conduct a class discussion that focuses on the situation as it existed five years after reunification and the reasons for the nostalgia felt by many who remembered the benefits of the socialist state.

Developing the Lesson

Divide the class into two groups — Wessis and Ossis — which will later be sub-divided into “newspaper desks.” Ask each large group to create and write articles for a newspaper that will portray the issues, concerns, and emotions surrounding the gap between eastern and western Germany (see the Activity below).

Concluding the Lesson

After copies of the two newspapers have been exchanged and read by all the students, ask each student to write a brief essay predicting how the friction between the two German societies might influence the future of both Germany and Europe.

Activity

Ask each group to assign some students in the group to do research and become experts on one of the following issues from the perspective of Wessis or Ossis: economic disparity, political power, cultural heritage, social welfare, and societal self-esteem. Their research must include material gathered from newspapers, news magazines, and the Internet. Each team of experts should form a “news desk” and pool the information they collect.
When the research is completed, ask both the Wessis and the Ossis to create their newspapers with sections for local, regional, and national news; entertainment; political cartoons; classified ads; and op-ed. Divide each news staff into smaller groups, each responsible for a different section. Each small group should have access to the research collected by the news desks researchers. Each paper should have the appropriate Wessi or Ossi perspective. The primary focus of each paper should be how Germany will bridge the gap between East and West.
What about East Berlin — the topsy-turvy world where truth is fiction and fiction is truth? I felt I couldn’t form a clear opinion about West Berlin without finding out more about its eastern counterpart. At this stage I was still a little leery of crossing the border, so I arranged to go over with an English friend who was working in West Berlin.

When the day came, we opted to travel on an escorted coach tour, which on reflection was probably a mistake, but the thought of crossing the maze that was Checkpoint Charlie was daunting for even the most hardy. In the event, we were marooned in no-man’s land for over an hour because it transpired that one of our fellow passengers was a journalist. Despite that, East Berlin was to prove quite revealing.

Peering over the Wall from West Berlin, the eastern sector looked rather drab, dull and depressing. I thought this might be misleading. West Berlin didn’t look its best near the sector boundary either. Land adjacent to the old border tended to be occupied by tenements and slums. Once through Checkpoint Charlie and into the main streets, East Berlin was actually a pleasantly laid out city. Our first stop was at Unter den Linden. This is the main thoroughfare on the eastern side of the Brandenburg Gate.

In Berlin’s heyday it was the place to stroll after dark and take in the atmosphere. In the 1980s, although largely restored after the wartime bombing and replanted with the famous Linden trees, it seemed to lack charm. The cafes had largely gone, only to be replaced with solid looking embassy buildings and DDR [GDR] government ministries. Soldiers goose-stepped at the tomb of the unknown soldier, renamed by the DDR as the monument to the victims of militarism and fascism. Quite a mouthful.

Reconstruction in East Berlin had not reached the level of that in the west. Restoration was still in progress in many places, whereas in the west much of the rebuilding had been completed. This was made worse by the fact that East Berlin faced a chronic shortage of housing, despite having a lower population than West Berlin. In noting this, however, it is important to remember that before the war East Berlin consisted largely of working-class districts. The original buildings were mostly slums and had not withstood allied bombing as well as those further west. Most people moved to where there was better protection. The DDR was therefore faced with a two-fold problem: it had to start with a smaller labour force, and it had more damaged buildings to repair.

As time went on, both halves of Berlin began to recover from the war years, although money poured into West Berlin, leaving the eastern sector rather less buoyant. Nevertheless, East Berlin was the showpiece city of the eastern bloc and generally speaking enjoyed the best standard of living.

The differences between the two Berlins were unsubtle. In the east, statues to Lenin, Marx, and Engels sprouted up. Advertising hoardings and billboards disappeared in stark
contrast to the neon glow of the west. There was less traffic, older cars, and worse pollution. The shops were poorly stocked; the buildings were grubbier and in need of paint. Overall there was no doubting that you were in the same city, but everything seemed basic and lacking in frills. Adequate, but little more.

Despite everything, most East Germans seemed reasonably happy with their lot. Many thought that the West Germans had it too good and felt that the Federal Republic had lost its German-ness. Certainly there was a strong American influence in the west, but the Russians maintained a low profile in the east. Nevertheless, as we are now aware, hidden sentiments ran deep and it was only a matter of a few years before they exploded to the surface.

At Treptow park there is a huge granite exercise in socialist realist art. This is the Soviet war memorial, and our tour group was taken there to pay its respects to the dead. It is a rather Stalinesque structure in its proportions, although given the millions of ordinary Russians who were killed during Hitler’s abortive invasion, one can easily understand the sentiments.

The East Germans I spoke to seemed happy enough (had they been briefed, I wonder?). A youthful population, most had never known any other kind of government. The state attended to all of their immediate needs, providing healthcare, creches for working mothers, and social support. From school age, the state “explained” its policies through a continual process of political education. Eventually you began to believe some of what you were told, if not everything. Nevertheless, you were always on your guard. Stasi informers were everywhere, so you did not speak out of turn or complain about all the poor-quality goods.

I left East Berlin considering what I had seen. Even with the restrictions on individual liberties, you found yourself thinking that much of what we were told was exaggerated. It was a topsy-turvy world as I thought, but if you kept your nose clean you could live reasonably well. So why did I have a nagging doubt?

Thinking back on the subtleties of propaganda, I was reminded of the tour guide. She fully believed her patter and her facts and figures. As a result, so did we. It was hard to continually question what was said. Here in the west many consider that it is rarely necessary to do that. You might say we lack skills in that area. Arriving back in West Berlin with its media, its loud, brash pace of life, and its prejudices, you then realise that the evil of such an oppressive regime is not illustrated just by the Wall, but in the subtleties of its doctrines. You are never lied to outright, just cajoled into accepting half-information.

I quote from our tour guide, “It is sad that our countries cannot be better friends. We in the DDR sincerely hope that the Swedish negotiations are a success.” We all did as we were told and sincerely hoped too, but for what? What negotiations? Was there a crisis that I was unaware of? I never did find out, and the guide didn’t elaborate further. Who was fooling who? The communists for planting a seed of doubt, or the west for not being more open about what was going on in our name? You could no more say the east was evil than you could say the west was best.

There is no doubt that both Germany’s made great progress; both were proud of their achievements. Not everything in the east was bad, but one must ask at what price where those achievements accomplished? Personal freedom was greatly limited, therefore the final progress was forced and was ultimately insubstantial.
At the time of my visit, I felt that there could be no happy ending where Berlin was concerned. It was in limbo. I felt it highly likely to remain so unless, God forbid, there was another war to undo what it took one war to put in place. The Germans in both countries seemed unlikely to allow another on their soil. Even today there are too many reminders: the ruins of Anhalter Station, the deserted concentration camps, Hitler's bunker, and the remains of the Wall. The people, although united, remain divided by history. No country should suffer the way Germany was made to. Perhaps its destiny was to remind us of what can happen to a proud nation and what might easily happen again.

For the present Berlin remains a reminder of the follies of war. Since unification the east has continued to suffer — mostly economically. Political tensions continue to surface in German life as the people struggle to reconcile years of separate development. No one can say what the future holds, but for Berlin and its people, the worst must surely be over.

If you would like to know more about the Berlin Wall, I can heartily recommend Chris De Witt's website. Chris has put together a superb collection of essays and photographs covering his many visits to Berlin since the late 70s.
RESOURCES

RESOURCE 3
My Experiences as a University Professor in the GDR

By Professor Dietrich Stoyan
Translated by Susan Steiner and Jörg Rothe

Source: Armonk Institute Web site www.armonkinstitute.org/GDR.htm
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[Some names and terms have been changed to protect people who are still living.]

Summary of My Experiences as a University Professor in the GDR

Professor Dietrich Stoyan gives a detailed description about life at a GDR university with the following analysis, “My experiences as a University Professor in the GDR.” The author focuses on the GDR requirements to become a University professor, linked not just to teaching experience and academic achievement but also to the proof of “academic leadership” in the sense of GDR political standards. Professor Stoyan also deals with student life at the University and offers the reader an inside view of life under GDR rule and the changes that came along for his profession and university life since the reunification in 1989/1990.

Professor Dietrich Stoyan:

I have often been asked by foreigners about my life as a university professor in the GDR. I was always happy to attempt such an explanation, and I learned a good deal myself along the way about conditions in the GDR (because I came to see them through western eyes) and in the western countries. Today I know that much was the same as life in the western states, much was similar, and much was so different that it is incomprehensible to Americans or western Europeans without an explanation. Of course, my discussion partners tried to view my descriptions in the context of their own experiences. By doing so, they tended to equate their own difficulties with the political developments in the GDR. How else could they understand life in a totalitarian system?

I was a Dozent (lecturer) in mathematical analysis at a small university in Germany. Two things are essential in this regard. First, mathematics is a subject that is generally independent of politics and political systems, and second, everywhere in the world political issues are taken less seriously in the provinces than in the centers of politics and administration.

How did I become a Dozent (a kind of lower-level professor with tenure) although I was not a comrade or member of the Communist Party (called the Party of Socialist Unity in the GDR)? It was for several reasons — because my specialty was both rare and urgently needed, because they couldn't find anyone else, and because my boss, a powerful comrade, wanted to leave the university and couldn't do so without presenting a successor.

The GDR demanded similar qualifications of its university professors as West Germany and the U.S. One needed to show proof of teaching experience and academic achieve-
ment. One external symbol for the latter was the second Ph.D., the so-called promotion B, which one could not gain without making compromises with the State since both academic research and proof of “academic leadership” were required. Candidates who were good comrades but poor researchers thus had good chances of receiving the degree; candidates without party affiliation, of course, did not.

I taught my students probably the same material taught to western students of mathematical analysis in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the GDR’s isolation and poverty, we had all the important mathematics books and were well informed about mathematical trends, although our methods of procuring information were sometimes rather unusual. I received review copies, for example, of the man (often American) books I reviewed for scientific journals in the GDR. Today I have a large private library. We read other books in Russian translation (we read Russian better than we spoke it). Important books were purchased by the university with a small fund of western currency. There was also another way to get our hands on western books. Every year, the big western publishing companies exhibited their scholarly books at the Leipzig Spring Fair. Those books remained in the GDR after the fair and were then distributed among the university libraries. I represented my university at those meetings of the Fachnetz Mathematik, which used to have quite the character of an eastern bazaar. It was here that Dr. W. Romberg learned how to trade and to negotiate, a skill from which he later benefitted as the Minister of Finance of the freely elected GDR government under de Maziere, in 1990.

It was unpleasant to give lectures on March 1. That was the “Day of the National People’s Army” (NVA, founded on March 1, 1956) and you had to congratulate the students who had already done military service (that was the majority). The professor had to say in the lecture hall how important it was that the students had served in the NVA and thus had contributed to keeping peace. People like me hated the NVA, which was nothing more than an auxiliary to the Red Army.

Every once in a while we also had to hold lectures that proved that Marxism-Leninism (ML) contributed particularly to academic success. That was often embarrassing, because one didn’t believe it and because the GDR’s academic successes were largely achieved despite, not because of, ML. Also, in the case of mathematics, it was almost impossible to prove, despite the success of Soviet mathematicians in theoretical mathematics. The students of the 1970s despised such speeches; the ones who followed them in the 1980s simply tuned out. I remember once that I had to speak to this topic. As I began, sighing heavily, one of the comrade students tittered and nudged her neighbor: “Here it comes.” (The young woman probably had heard at the party meeting that I, like all university teachers, would have to speak to this topic, and so she was proud to be able to announce this event to her classmates.) Rejoicing inside, I abruptly broke off my remarks and began to talk about mathematics again. After the lecture, I complained to the party secretary that “Comrade M” had hampered my efforts to lecture on ML. This caused some trouble for her at the next party meeting — criticism by the party secretary followed by her self-criticism — and enabled me to “save my efforts” for this time. In general however, we did our duty and obediently, if not convincingly, praised ML. This praising was expected to come spontaneously right from the heart, which in most cases was beyond our abilities.

To ensure that we university lecturers knew enough to honor ML as it deserved, we attended Marxist-Leninist Evening School (MLA). It never actually took place in the evening, since in the GDR the Feierabend (the time after work) was “holy” and untouch-
It was impossible to schedule MLA classes in the evening. Instead, every three years, one had to attend three courses, each one-week long, that covered, over and over again, the basic philosophy of ML, materialist philosophy, Marxist economy, and Leninist political theory. We heard lectures, held short ones ourselves, and engaged in pseudo-discussions where we occasionally tested the limits of the party line. (Such cases usually concerned peripheral topics, for example, GDR cultural policies. The real problems, such as the incredible economic problems that threatened the existence of the GDR, were never discussed in my presence. In this regard, we non-comrades also had our heads buried in the sand.) We also were able to hear what were often very interesting lectures by outside experts on political, economic, and cultural issues. These experts showed off their knowledge of things that we, as readers of Communist newspapers, did not have access to. Once, one of the guests spoke of Helmut Schmidt, then the chancellor of the hostile Federal Republic of Germany, as “our” chancellor. He had obviously read too many western newspapers. There was no visible reaction by the MLA participants, no laughter, no criticism.

**Student Life at GDR Universities**

Our students arrived at the university better prepared in those days than they do today, and probably also better prepared than in many western countries. They had spent eight years in elementary school, followed by four in high schools that explicitly prepared them for university study. Students were required to name their preferred area of study in their eighth school year, the last year of elementary school. Because only between 10 and 15 percent of each birth year actually went to university, those who did take that path were generally talented and did well in secondary school. Unfortunately, this perhaps good system was politically deformed. Children of people who were out of favor in some way were not allowed to attend secondary school, while less talented children who said their career goal was to become an officer in the NVA were accepted and kept to the end. Children often lied about their desired career goals, naming areas of study they believed had good chances of being accepted.

During the 1980s, high school study was reduced to two years. In the new system, all the students remained together through the tenth grade, which of course led to a drop in the level of performance. Everybody complained about it, but there was no public protest. Traditionally in Germany, schools fall under the jurisdiction of the states, but the strong parents’ associations of western Germany did not exist in the GDR. People were accustomed to accepting everything. We only knew citizens’ groups from western television and if somebody had organized one, he or she would have become acquainted with the state security police. And filing a lawsuit against the government, as western Germans so love to do, was absolutely unthinkable.

The choice of majors was not free. Anyone could study subjects like mathematics, because there was a strong demand for mathematicians and it was not overfull. For this reason, and because mathematics are independent of politics, many people in the GDR studied math — people who would have gone into law, history, or philosophy if they had lived in western states. That’s why so many mathematicians in the GDR became politicians after 1989. People who studied medicine, which was highly desirable and very sought after, were primarily the children of doctors (because the authorities didn’t want to anger desperately needed doctors) as well as children who had “good lineage.” Having good lineage didn’t mean being an Aryan as with the Nazis, but rather being the child of a peasant or a worker.
At my university, geology was very popular. Generally, only the children of workers and peasants and the offspring of politically particularly reliable people were allowed to study geology. There were two reasons for this. One was to control the number of people who wanted to become geologists, and the other was because geologists worked with very exact maps, which were kept secret in the GDR. We later learned that such maps could be bought freely in the West.

In order to get into the more desirable subjects, male students were required to serve three years of voluntary military service — twice the obligatory period. They were pushed into this by special teachers in the secondary schools. There were mathematics students who did the three years as well and were gently mocked for it later.

The choice of university was free, however. Thus, our university too had the job each spring of going through a big pile of applications. No applicant for mathematics or engineering was denied entrance because of bad grades, partly because they desperately needed students and graduates and also because the GDR's secondary school certificate was a certain guarantee of quality.

The students were divided into seminars. These were groups of 20 to 30 students that, like school classes, had common courses and practical exercises. It's a shame that these seminar groups no longer exist: they were a way for the students to form long-lasting contacts, and they often led to competition for good grades and good performance. On the other hand, there were Stasi spies in the seminar groups, and above the groups, the Party had the students under control. When dividing the students into groups, the university made sure that students who were out of favor, for example practicing Christians, were not concentrated in certain groups. Nearly all the students (all of them in the last years of the GDR) received a grant from the government that was sufficient to cover their living expenses. Thus, it was rare that students worked, and they were able to concentrate completely on their studies.

The State invested a lot of money in its students, and it expected them to finish their degrees. (I'm sure many parents in the West use similar methods to keep their kids at the university.) It was hard to drop out unless you had failed the exams. The students really had to fight to do it. One of the students at my university, a young woman, passed all her exams and still wanted to quit after two years for personal reasons. Her requests were ignored, until she reported — whether it was true or not, I don't know — that she had suddenly found herself standing in a bus reflecting on a mathematical problem. She thought that was horrible, the first step to going crazy. The students' manager, who still believed in science, immediately released her.

The students had extensive lessons in ML — about three hours a week for three years. They first studied Marxist philosophy, which supposedly offered a scientific world view without God. This was followed by political economy, the treatment of ideas formulated by Karl Marx in the 19th century and augmented by the theories of certain Soviet and Eastern German economists. Finally, they encountered scientific Communism, which consisted of a lot of confused talk about the future Communist society. From the 1950s through the 1970s, there were frequent discussions with the ML teachers about particularly absurd claims. During the 1980s there were signs of general fatigue. The ML teachers became more "liberal" and the students seemed to lose interest and simply say what was expected of them. ("You just had to say it.")

Apparently some people were annoyed that only men were required to do military service. Because of this, a course in Civil Defense was introduced for female students and
males who were considered unfit for military service. The women had to live like soldiers in a camp for four weeks, where they marched and exercised and learned first aid and lifesaving techniques. They learned that you can survive an atomic bomb very well if you lie down in a ditch fast enough and brush yourself off thoroughly afterwards. (I understand that soldiers all over the world were told that — but young women?)

Pregnant women did not need to go to the Civil Defense camp, and it was obvious that some students became pregnant at just the right time. These students were instructed at the university, where they were excused from marching but still had to learn how to survive an atom bomb. I also had to participate in this instruction, for five weeks with one week for preparation, for five years. Among other things, I had to teach the women how to knot ropes. It may be that some of them still use the knots to hang up washing, to climb mountains, or to sail; I’ve forgotten them.

In general, we tried to persuade talented students to go on for a doctoral degree. It was typical for us to persuade them, rather than for them to apply on their own. There were problems if they were politically out of favor, for example, if they were active members of a church. I had to look on while highly talented people were not allowed for political reasons into a research program.

Today students often have difficulties finding a job after they finish their degrees, although this is not true of mathematics students. In the GDR, the students were assigned to jobs where they had to stay for two years. The way this happened was that lists of jobs were sent to the seminar groups and the students chose positions from these lists. There were often twice as many positions as students, so that the students were generally satisfied with the offerings. In fall 1997, I met a former student again who proudly told me that the company she was assigned to in 1989 had successfully mastered all the turbulences of the reunification and the time thereafter and still was employing her. When there were only a few positions on offer, it sometimes created tragic situations where people were forced into completely inappropriate jobs against their will.

The Life of a GDR Researcher

University professors in the GDR, as today in united Germany and the U.S.A., carried out academic research. The professors published their research to satisfy their ambitions, to enter into dialogue with colleagues, and to further academic development. This led to correspondence with colleagues, which in the GDR took place exclusively through the mail. Since I was very active in research, I received a good deal of mail from abroad, mostly from western countries and above all from the United States. As a lecturer at a prominent and economically important university, I was allowed to answer my mail, but many professors at other universities, particularly the newer ones, were not allowed to do so. However, I was criticized for it, especially by my head of department (the same one mentioned at the beginning) who had not yet left.

This head of department was then a Reisekader, a privileged comrade who had the right to travel to western countries. He spent two long periods in the U.S.A., with quite successful results. His lectures were based in part on my research results, which I had to explain to him. (He had access to my research because all manuscripts had to be approved before publication by him and also — if the text was to be sent abroad — by a gentleman in the university administration.)

A story that strikes me as funny in retrospect was this: I had had the feeling for several weeks that I was not receiving my foreign mail. (As a matter of course, all foreign
mail was opened and read and outgoing letters were examined critically. Sometimes I had to revise them. But I knew pretty well what was possible and what was not and only rarely ran into trouble. I used postcards for really important information, because the Stasi did not seem to check them.) At any rate, the department head called me into his office on March 30, 198_ and criticized me for receiving so much mail from western countries. Then, with a twisted smile, he shoved an airmail letter from Spain across the table. I took it, and the rest of my missing foreign mail, and prepared to go. “No, stay, please read the letter,” he said. It was an invitation from a Spanish conference organizer to hold an important talk at a large international academic convention, with some 500 participants, in Leipzig, a city in the former GDR. The conference organizer asked me to let him know by March 31. I told my boss that I would like to do it, and he told me that I could. After 1989, I learned that the Spanish conference organizer had become uneasy because I did not respond to his letter and had dangled a bait before my boss. They knew of his interest in architecture and invited him to spend a week in Spain, making clear that the invitation was dependent on my participation in the Leipzig conference. Since he loved to travel, he took the bait, went to the Alhambra, and let me give my lecture. The alternative would have been for him to tell the university administration that my lecture in Leipzig would pose a threat to the GDR, and forbid me to attend.

I was very much concerned about our falling behind in computer technology during the last years of the GDR. Of course, we had computers as well, mainly made by the GDR company Robotron, a Volkswagen Betrieb, that is, a company owned by the state. Robotron accomplished quite a deal in software technology by modifying existing western software. It soon became clear, however, that we were less and less able to keep up with international standards. I could foresee — it didn’t take much to predict this — that in the near future, publishing houses and journals would require manuscripts to be submitted on floppy disks (as I do today without any problems) and to be written in text processing systems not known in the former GDR. Also in this regard, the collapse of the GDR came at just the right time.

At this point I’d like to speculate. What would have happened in case the Internet and e-mail had existed already in the former GDR? There probably would have been two trends. Tough east German computer specialists would have tried, copying western ideas and adding their own ones, to create something similar for the GDR and the entire Eastern Block. We regular academicians would have used this for our correspondence within the GDR and the Eastern Block.

There would have been basically no access to the western Internet. Private access — widely common today — would have been completely inconceivable, except of course for a very small number of highly powerful comrades granted all kinds of privileges. Our university would probably have had access to the western Internet, to save money, time, and scientific journals. If I were going to write e-mail messages to my colleagues in the west, I would have had to write them on paper. My message would then have been checked twice and eventually typed into the computer by a secretary not able to understand English. In the Office for International Affairs (we called it the “Office for Preventing International Affairs”), there would have been an employee with a university degree whose job was to search the Internet upon inquiry by the scientists. People like me would have called him the “Surfer.”

Under these circumstances (exploitation by my boss, lack of political freedom), why didn’t I just look for another position at another university or outside academia? There
are several reasons. Political conditions were the same everywhere in the GDR. My brother, who wanted to go to the West, was charged with the crime of not reporting an acquaintance's planned flight to West Germany and spend half a year as a prisoner of the State Security Service of the GDR. After his release, he emigrated to the West. I found this price too high. There were only a few other places in the GDR where I would have found suitable work, for example in East Berlin, where I didn't want to go. I had invested a great deal of work in my academic career. Additionally, there was a great shortage of apartments in the GDR. Once people had an apartment (with cheap rent, as they all were), they generally stayed where they were, because they would have had to wait years for a new apartment in a new town, separated from their families all the while. Finally, the Party was everywhere. In the familiar place, one at least knew the comrades...

And why didn't I simply become a comrade? Twice in the 1960s and 1970s I was asked by superiors if I wanted to join the Party. Today I believe they were routine questions (the Communist Party had a kind of marketing plan), because nobody thought I would agree. Other, more important people were pressured to join the Party. Of course, we discussed the issue of Party membership at home and we finally decided against it. My three siblings were not in the party either, and my wife was very much against it. We obviously accepted our classification as second-class citizens, but in exchange we did not have to act against the dictates of our conscience (although we did sometimes have to lie and make hypocritical statements), nor did we have to support the dubious teachings of ML and their application in politics. (There were, however, honest comrades who believed the Party's teachings. A saying going around was that of the following characteristics one could have only two at a time: honesty, intelligence, and party membership.)

What is Different Today?

I open all my letters myself, still a large number despite e-mail. The former ML teachers now have well-paid jobs and drive around in fancy cars. Many of the really unpleasant characters of earlier GDR times, including my boss, are now comfortably retired with high pensions.

One can surely say that I am one of the winners of the great changes in eastern Germany. I am now a real professor, can attend all the meetings I want (as long as funding is available), and am free to enjoy my academic successes. I am in charge of a postgraduate seminar at my university, where doctoral candidates primarily from the western states do research. The intellectual niveau of the students has sunk since the GDR era, but they are freer and more independent. As then, some are very talented. We are beginning to forget the ridiculous problems we had in the GDR and complain instead about the new problems in united Germany.

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Imagine London divided by a wall that stretches from Watford in the north, through the west end, to Croydon in the south. Imagine that wall encircling every London borough west of the City. Now imagine that the Tower of London and Houses of Parliament are in two different countries, and that a passport is required to travel between the two. If you can imagine this, you start to get an idea of what happened to the city of Berlin.

Berlin was politically divided at the end of World War II. To emphasise this point and to stem an escalating flow of skilled labour from the eastern sector, it was further physically divided in 1961 by a wall. Fleeing the republic became a criminal offence, and the people of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany or the DDR [GDR]) were effectively locked into their country. There was little the western powers felt able to do, and once the furor had settled down, it seemed as though people didn’t really give Berlin a second thought. Nevertheless, despite this “business as usual attitude,” Berlin was one of the most militarily sensitive places in the world.

The Berlin Wall was not just an international frontier between two countries, it was also the front-line between two diametrically opposed ways of life. It was the border between communism and capitalism, totalitarianism and democracy, and ultimately it also represented the boundary between war and peaceful coexistence for the superpowers.

Berlin’s situation, in reality, was quite bizarre. West Berlin — a lively and cosmopolitan city by any measure — lay 110 miles inside the borders of the DDR. It was geographically closer to communist Poland than capitalist West Germany. Served by only a handful of road, rail, and air corridors, it nevertheless managed to function with zest and enthusiasm. It was hard to imagine whilst strolling along the Kufürstendamm that only a few miles away lay the heart of a staunchly Leninist-Marxist state, whose inhabitants were forbidden to ever come to the western half of the city unless they were very privileged indeed.

Realising how much we had come to accept the Berlin situation as normal, I decided I would like to see the place for myself. It was 1983 and the Cold War was still in full swing. Russia and America continued to periodically trade insults, Poland’s struggle with the Solidarity union continued to look like a potential flashpoint, and the days of Gorbachev and perestroika were still a few years away. I decided the best way to really get the feel of the place would be to travel overland, so I booked passage on the Nord Express, a train that linked the Hook of Holland with Moscow, travelling via Berlin and Warsaw. The journey would take 21 hours.

There were practical problems with such a long journey. First of all, there was a long and rather tedious ferry crossing to endure, but more of a nuisance was the fact it was necessary to cross several national borders. This ensured that throughout the journey you couldn’t expect to get more than a couple of hours sleep. The Dutch and West German
borders were easy to negotiate, but the East German border would be another matter altogether. Because of the transit restrictions in force at the time, only two trains a day were permitted on the route — often at inconvenient times. As a result, I could expect to reach the Helmstedt/Marienborn border crossing at 3 a.m.

I woke up with a start, sensing a change in the atmosphere around me. Glancing out the window, I could see a cluster of lights glowing in the distance. After seventeen hours of continual travel, we were approaching the border. This was Helmstedt station, the West German half of the checkpoint, though you'd never guess where you were. All that could be seen was a clean, well-equipped, and modern West German railway station. The only hint of our proximity to the border was the length of time we waited before resuming our journey.

I walked out into the passageway outside my compartment and observed the people milling about. Most of them were Germans, and far from being used to checks and delays, many, in fact, looked rather nervous. The feeling was mutual. I was unsure of what was going to happen next, and I felt rather alone, perhaps just a little frightened too. I told myself not to be silly and reassured myself with the thought that hundreds of people must make this journey every day. Nevertheless, the atmosphere appeared tense. Did these people know something I didn't?

After some delay, the train moved on, passing through an area of heavy forest before emerging a few minutes later at the border itself. There I saw it in all its ugliness. A huge fluorescent snake stretching as far as the eye could see, floodlit and deadly, all the way from the Baltic Sea to Czechoslovakia, slicing the German nation in half.

It was too dark to see very much, and the bright lights only made it more difficult to pick out detail save for the shape of this relentless fence. I could easily imagine the mines and machine guns that lay on either side of the railway track, so it was a comfort not to be able to see anything.

A couple of minutes and we were through, pulling into Marienborn station, the East German half of the checkpoint. It was almost a cliché. Drab and old fashioned, the station was dimly lit and dirty. I could see a few people in lumpy uniforms preparing to board the train. No ordinary people were to be seen anywhere. The DDR government had depopulated a five-kilometre strip of land alongside the border to make it easier to observe. No one was permitted to be inside it without a very good reason. Being unable to travel abroad, ordinary East Germans would have no business being at Marienborn station, so the only people to be seen were border guards, customs officers, and railway employees.

More delays ensued, then we were once again on our way. It had all seemed relatively uneventful. I settled down in my seat again and tried to go back to sleep. Barely moments later I heard heavy footsteps in the corridor, which came crashing into compartment. Without warning all the lights went on and a systematic search of the compartment and its passengers got underway. This was followed by more heavy footsteps, this time belonging to a guard who appeared to be carrying a portable immigration desk around his neck. It consisted of a large box rather like the sort carried by cinema usherettes. From this box, he analysed passports, issued visas, and carried out other indeterminate exercises. The most disturbing thing about his appearance, however, was the machine gun that was casually slung over his shoulder. Not something I was accustomed to seeing, and a reminder of what sort of country I was entering.

I wondered if the guard had ever had to use it. Had he ever been present during an escape attempt? Did this man secretly want to come to the west, or was he perfectly happy
living in the DDR. He wasn't much older than me, was quite ordinary looking, and could quite easily have been an old school friend. He was just another ordinary person who happened to be wearing an East German uniform. There were two sides to this train of thought. Which was the real one? Was this person a human being first or a soldier?

I pondered the nature of propaganda, realising that it isn't necessarily something that always originates from "the other side." Politicians in the west are just as capable of withholding or distorting the truth if it suits their needs. It could even be argued that western methods are more subtle so we don't realise we are being taken in. Logically then, if I was caught up in a crisis of some sort, this man would be quite prepared to shoot me. From his point of view, "my side" may well be feeding me misinformation. Therefore my actions would be based on lies and could be unpredictable. Even if he didn't want to, the guard would still carry out his orders to shoot because I would represent a corrupt society.

I didn't for one minute believe that the DDR regime was more honest or moral, but when you begin to perceive your "enemy" as an individual with a human face, it is much harder to condemn him without first questioning your own prejudices. I felt my stomach turn over. I was in an alien environment, surrounded by people whose attitudes had not been moulded by freedom of speech and debate. Instead, these were ordinary people who had lived under the shadow of hostile and cruel dictatorships. Who knows what they thought in private? As the guards left, I tried to push such sobering thoughts out of my mind, and settled down yet again to sleep for an hour or two.

I awoke at 5:30, just after dawn as we were approaching Berlin. In the pale early morning light, I could make out the countryside. We were in the heart of the Brandenburg lake district and every so often the train would skirt the lake shores, passing little sailing boats that bobbed up and down gently on the water. It was an idyllic scene and gave no hint of what lay a little further up the track.

The train made a by-pass around Potsdam, and just outside Berlin we pulled into a deserted station. Bold Gothic lettering spelt out Berlin Griebnitzsee. Nothing appeared to have changed since the 1930s, and as I looked out the window my sense of time became distorted. I felt as though I was peering back 40 years to the days of the Third Reich. With the border guards standing sentry on the platforms with their machine guns and Alsatian dogs, it was difficult not to draw a comparison with the Gestapo or SS. If Hitler himself had suddenly appeared, it would not have surprised me.

Tank traps and rows of barbed wire were strewn around the railway platforms, and occasionally it was possible to just make out trip wires which led to machine gun bunkers. If disturbed, these wires would cause a rapid volley of bullets to be fired in a 180° degree arc. Deadly stuff.

Here was the evidence that one part of Germany had lived under constant repression since Hitler's accession to power in 1933. Whole generations had grown up without ever knowing complete freedom of expression. In this respect, the Soviet system of control did not appear to be very much different from that of the Nazis; only ideology separated them. Fascist or communist — was there really any difference when it came to the lives of ordinary people?

On the opposite side of the train, the Berlin Wall could be clearly seen for the first time. Only a couple of yards away, it was interesting to note that few people ever got this close on the East German side. Like everything else along the border, access was barred by guard dogs, minefields, sentried watch towers, and yet more machine guns. What a
strange feeling. This was the closest you could actually get to this side of the wall unless you were an East German escapee. You would probably be dead long before you got even this close.

The train began to move and entered a trench, enclosed on both sides by concrete blocks, and roofed with tangled barbed wire. After a minute or two, the walls on either side parted and the train emerged, free at last, into the suburbs of West Berlin. The feeling of oppression lifted, and the relief showed quite plainly on the faces of the passengers.

What an experience. Nothing really prepared you for it, and it was actually a very frightening experience. The worst aspect of it all was that all the menaces and horrors shown nightly on our television screens became so much more believable. Seeing the division at first hand made the Cold War so much more real. This wasn’t about James Bond or Hollywood. You knew with a chilling certainty that these conflicts were undeniable, and a careless action could possibly unleash the nightmare of a third world war. You came to Berlin and lost your innocence about such things.

Why had the East Germans erected such an elaborate defence. It couldn’t be truly defensive as they claimed, because West Berlin was hardly likely to be able to invade the DDR, even with the western troop garrisons. The DDR could switch off West Berlin’s power, water, trade routes, and so forth, without stepping outside of their own territory. Clearly the communist leaders were defending themselves from the danger within. The DDR was a grim topsy-turvy world, like that in Alice Through the Looking Glass. Nothing was what it seemed — or was it? This is what I’d come to find out.

Berlin 1983, continued . . . (Part 2)

West Berliners often regarded themselves as islanders, which indeed they were. Never was this so clearly demonstrated than during the Berlin Airlift.

After the Second World War ended, all decisions on the administration of the city were made by a council consisting of the four victorious powers. However, as the Cold War progressed, the Soviet sector of Germany began to go its own way. It was obvious that the Soviet Union was intent on turning the country into a one-party socialist state, answerable to Moscow and no one else. The western allies had already seen the effects of this influence on Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the other eastern European states that had been “liberated” by the Soviets. The allies were intent on preventing the same thing happening in Germany, and arguments raged as who had the right to do what. The result was stalemate.

Finally, the western allies felt they had no option but to press ahead with separate development for their sectors. Currency reforms in the western sectors proved to be the final nail in the coffin of the joint council, and in 1948, the Soviet side walked out, never to return. Almost immediately, the Soviets blockaded Berlin, cutting off all access and supply routes to the west, thereby holding the city captive.

The Soviets felt that the situation had become intolerable. An embarrassingly capitalist West Berlin was undermining the viability of the eastern sector and could not be allowed to exist so deep inside Soviet-controlled territory.

The Soviets were not prepared, however, when the western allies took the decision to stick by its guarantees to West Berlin. A massive airlift of food and other vital supplies
got underway and carried on for many months until at last the Soviets were prepared to back down.

From this point in time, the fate of Germany was sealed, and two distinctly different countries emerged. The three western sectors became the Federal Republic of Germany, whilst in the soviet sector the German Democratic Republic emerged, with land east of the Oder-Neisse line falling under Polish administration. With the two sides lined up, the Cold War began in earnest.

Some thirteen years later rumours were flying about that the East German authorities were going to seal off West Berlin in order to put a stop to the ever increasing exodus of skilled labour across the sector boundaries. The loss of so much manpower was seriously damaging the DDR’s economy. Walther Ulbricht, the DDR premier, vigorously denied any such intention. However, less than a year later, the West Berliners awoke to find themselves completely encircled. With the support of his Soviet advisors, Ulbricht had surrounded the three western sectors with a concrete and barbed wire wall.

Below ground, all gas, electricity, telephone, water, and sewerage connections stopped dead at the sector boundary. Roads, railways, and even canals came to an abrupt halt wherever the wall dissected the city. It cut across ancient thoroughfares, parks, farm land — and families. Berliners were stunned. They had been physically cut off from friends and family with little hope of ever seeing them again.

The psychological blow was tremendous. Many people refused to accept the division, and in the early years, there were to be many border incidents involving the deaths of people attempting to reach the west. The Federal Republic welcomed with open arms anyone who got out, but as the years passed and the wall became more heavily fortified, the numbers of refugees fell dramatically. Ulbricht’s plan had worked.

The cruelty and heartlessness of the DDR authorities astounded the people of a city that had endured some of the worst excesses of the twentieth century. The die was cast when Peter Fechter, a young East Berliner, made a dash to the wall and was shot in the attempt. He was left at the foot of the Wall, wounded and bleeding, for several hours until he finally died from his injuries. It was a needless death. He’d been made an example of.

The border guards themselves were prolific deserters — perhaps because they had the most opportunity — so the DDR eventually posted guards on the guards....

In the DDR’s view, this was self defence. The Wall remained in place. It was improved, streamlined, and made more efficient until it reached such a level of sophistication that it was no longer a defence, but a weapon.

Arriving in Berlin, I made almost immediately for the Wall, despite the early hour. Curiosity drove me there. Wherever you went, as you approached the Wall there would usually be a sign to inform you that you were leaving the western sector, a remnant of the fifties when it was possible to cross the Bernauerstraße without walking headlong into a concrete block.

What few people realised was that the real DDR border lay just in front of the Wall, and if you went up to it, there was always a possibility that a border guard would appear from nowhere and arrest you. This occasionally caught people out, who would then find themselves taken to East Berlin where they would be held for 24 hours or so, then released on payment of a hard-currency fine. All in all, it was a pretty lucrative business.

Even a generation after the Wall was constructed, you could still see where it cut across the street. It was unsettling to see the road continue beyond, but of course no one
could drive down it. You could only marvel at the audacity of the people that planned it. The West Berliners used it as a vast graffiti board. The wall was covered with slogans and political cartoons calling for the reunification of the Germany, for the liberation of the oppressed people of the Eastern Bloc, and of course there were also the more sexual type of comments.

The DDR spent vast sums of money whitewashing the Wall, so the artists would come along to start all over again. This was the cold war at its most subtle.

As you touched the Wall, you were aware that on the other side, just a foot away, were the usual deadly machine guns and other instruments of death. Along Bernauerstraße, there was something more. A church was lodged in no-mans land. It was situated in the ploughed strip between the inner and outer Wall. Cut off from its congregation, it rotted, surrounded by death. This unassuming little church was demolished in the years just before reunification but was probably the most famous in Germany. It was called the Church of the Reconciliation. Ironic perhaps, but Berlin was full of irony in those days.

Despite being heavy with history and intrigue, Berlin was not a cheerless place. The western part of Berlin was always lively and exciting with a thriving nightlife and plenty of things to see and do. It has been largely rebuilt, but at the end of the Kurfürstendamm stands the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church. The main part of the church was left in ruins after the war, whilst a new church was built amongst the debris, incorporating the partially destroyed steeple. The Berliners themselves requested that the ruins be left as a permanent reminder of the folly of war. The remainder of the “Ku-damm” is a modern mixture of large shops, cinemas, theatres, and cafes. After the division of the city, it took over from Unter den Linden as the main promenade. The Ku-damm is the centre of excitement in the west, but a few miles out of town, still within city limits, you find yourself in the middle of beautiful countryside, surrounded by farms, forests, green fields, and lakes.

As I mentioned earlier, Berlin is situated in the Brandenburg lake district. Several large lakes lie within the boundaries of Berlin, and they have been a frequent escape for tired citizens down the centuries. To the uninitiated, all this is a very pleasant surprise. In the west of Berlin you can catch the S-Bahn train to Lake Havel, and from there take one of the numerous pleasure boat rides. Cruising amongst the islands, you really could be anywhere. Here on Lake Havel, Berlin boasts Europe’s largest inland beach. You can play most water sports and all the amenities of a good seaside resort are at hand — there is even a nudist beach.

If you catch the boat that goes down to Glienicke, you eventually reach what was the westernmost point of West Berlin. Hidden away out of view, you encountered the Wall as it ran its way through the lakeland countryside. Never did you feel more enclosed than here amongst all that open space. On my trip, I had spent a relaxing day enjoying the sunshine and the lake, but I began to feel like a ball in a squash court, continually rebounding from wall to wall, and never finding the way out.

At this point, the border was situated in the middle of Glienicke Bridge, a rusty construction on what had been the road to the village of Drewitz. Here some of the most famous spy exchanges took place. People such as air force pilot Gary Powers and Anatoly Scharansky were exchanged for Russian and East German spies, presenting western film makers with the setting for a hundred films. Looking across the bridge, you saw the usual border guards, but what was unusual was the fact that you could see the Soviet flag. This was the only place in Berlin where it was flown, anywhere else you would see the DDR tricolour.
The opposite shore of the lake looked pretty much the same as the one in the western sector, but it was deserted. No one sat by the water’s edge and no pleasure craft hugged the shore. The actual border ran through the lake, and near the far side you could see marker buoys indicating the point beyond which boats on our side could not pass. On the shore itself, the Wall ran along the beach, and watch-towers were posted on every bend. Should someone attempt to climb the Wall with all of its hazards, they then faced a swim which the DDR had deemed should be as difficult as possible. There were underwater traps and wires which would ensnare swimmers. I could only muse that in most countries you could drown without the state actively helping your demise.

On the rocky outcrops either side of the lake, radar antennae sat glaring at one another. West Berlin was surrounded by several Red Army divisions, with air force squadrons for back-up and stockpiles of tactical nuclear weaponry. The very thought made my blood run cold. The city appeared to be a microcosm of the mistrust that divided the world at that time. It would have been easy to get depressed, but in Germany the emphasis was on the positive. Part of Berlin remained free from the Soviet bloc, and despite losing its hinterland, the city had prospered. Large subsidies from the Bonn government undoubtedly helped, but in general West Berlin shared the economic miracle that had transformed West Germany. By 1983, little remained of the devastated ghost city of 1945.
If you’ve never heard of or been to the Mokka Milch Eisbar next to the Kino Interna-
tional on Berlin’s Karl-Marx-Allee just east of Alexanderplatz, you’re obviously a foreigner
or a West German (which in East Berlin is one and the same). Back in the days of the
German Democratic Republic it was the place to go between 10 a.m. and midnight, and if
you really wanted to impress your date, you bought a gooey sherbet, syrup, and fruit
concoction, topped by chocolate flakes, called “Pittiplatsch.” It was East Berlin’s — ergo
the GDR’s — leading ice cream parlor, and even the theme of a hit song that led the top of
the East German charts from the mid 1970s until well into the 1980s: “In der Mokka
Milch Eisbar hat sie mich gesehen, in der Mokka Milch Eisbar, da ist es geschehen,” [“In
the Mocca Milk Ice Cream Parlor she saw me, in the Mocca Milk Ice Cream Parlor it
happened”] went the lines.

But then came the opening of the Berlin Wall, introduction of the D-mark, German
reunification, and a slew of McDonalds, Baskin Robbins, and Häagen-Dazs emporiums.
Soon the Mokka Milch Eisbar was as out of fashion as Trabant and Wartburg cars. The
plastic-topped tables and rickety chairs were empty, and starting in late 1991, the place
had a permanent “Closed” sign on the door.

Last March, however, it reopened with fanfare. Even Thomas Natschinski, the singer
whose band had recorded the Mokka-Milch song more than 20 years ago, was on hand for
the event. “Pittiplatsch” is again on the menu, and the place is swinging. The rebirth of
the Mokka Milch Eisbar, “where she first saw me and where it happened” is symbolic and
symptomatic of what is happening in eastern Germany merely five years after reunifica-
tion: a wave of nostalgia for GDR times, a rediscovery of the East German past, a sense of
pride in past achievements, all combined with a growing alienation between East and
West and an almost defiant East German, Ossi, resentment of the West and Wessis.

In fact, although the Berlin Wall is long gone and no one really wants it back, the
wall in people’s heads is growing taller and thicker, say two-thirds of eastern Germans,
according to a recent poll by western Germany’s Emnid Institute. The evidence is omni-
present. I hear and sense it during my frequent travels on reporting assignments in
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia.

Opinion surveys and sociological studies confirm it. So do voting patterns, if you look
closer at why 20-to-30 percent of eastern Germans support the Party of Democratic So-
cialism (PDS), self-styled reform successor to the GDR’s once-ruling Socialist Unity Party
(SED). Another indicator is the comeback of Communist-era products and brand names
on eastern German store shelves, now that the initial craze for anything and everything that was or looked western has subsided.

“Wherever East communicates with West, the conversation is usually full of hidden digs and provocations,” says Bernd Okun, an eastern German management consultant based in Leipzig. “We are starting to see what really divides us: forty years of completely different lifestyles and experiences.”

Eastern and western Germans have entirely different habits, attitudes, and behavioral patterns, rooted in the one having been raised in a collective and mutually cooperative society, the other in a culture based on competition and personal achievement, say Horst-Eberhard Richter and Elmar Bröhler, two western German sociologists who collaborated with eastern German psychotherapist Michael Geyer on a national study.

Ossis, according to their observations, are more social, feel more respected at work, enjoy sex more, are two centimeters shorter, and also die two years earlier than Wessis. They tend to avoid competing against one another, have closer and more convivial private ties with co-workers, and are generally less reserved and more spontaneous in human relations. Moreover, they go to bed and get up one hour earlier, prefer higher temperatures — 77 degrees to 66 degrees — in their offices, and, for what it’s worth, stand closer to each other when queuing at the bank or post office — maximum 15 centimeters apart, whereas West Germans prefer to keep a distance of 45 centimeters from each other.

They also have different reading preferences, to judge from the bestseller lists published regularly by the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel and the formerly Communist daily Neues Deutschland. Der Spiegel bases its list on a nationwide survey compiled by the publishing industry magazine Buchreport; Neues Deutschland queries 50 of the largest bookshops in the five new eastern states and the eastern boroughs of Berlin. In the last week of July, three of the top ten fiction titles in Neues Deutschland did not even make the Spiegel list, and conversely, three of those in Der Spiegel were not on the Neues Deutschland list, though all six titles were distributed nationwide by leading publishers. The discrepancy was even greater on the non-fiction lists. Six of the top-selling ten in Neues Deutschland did not make the Spiegel, among them the newest Duden, the German spelling dictionary, whereas six of the ten bestsellers in Der Spiegel failed to make the list of Neues Deutschland.

Although eastern German newsstands have been inundated with western German magazines and weekly newspapers since reunification, there are a few holdovers from GDR times that are making a comeback, as well as startups that address eastern German interests and which are virtually unknown in western Germany.

Two weekly newspapers, almost impossible to find in western Germany except at large airport and railway station newsstands, are Freitag and the Wochenpost. Both were launched in eastern Berlin after reunification and are edited by and for mainly Ossis, though they also cover international events and global culture.

The most astonishing phenomenon is the survival and revival of Das Magazin, launched in 1954 by Hilde Eisler, wife of Gerhart Eisler, who was chief of East German radio and a veteran Communist propagandist who made headlines in the United States in 1949 by jumping bail on a contempt of Congress charge and fleeing for East Germany aboard the Polish ship Batory. Das Magazin, a piquant monthly grab-bag of erotica, literature, art, culture, science, humor, and fashion news, spiced with a glossy center spread of a nude, became a GDR version of Playboy. The aim was to take some of the dullness and
drabness out of life and persuade the upper-class-less that communism could be more than fulfilling production plans. It became a surrogate window on the West for East Germans, whose press was censored by the regime and who had no access to Western print media. Though Das Magazin had an official circulation of 55,000 — substantial in a country of 16 million — copies were almost impossible to get without bribing a news dealer or knowing the friend of a friend with the right connections. For decades, dog-eared copies made the rounds. But when the Wall came down, the fate of Das Magazin seemed sealed: extinction. After all, who needed or wanted it when newsstand shelves were suddenly bending under the weight of not only the real Playboy, but hundreds of other glossy and provocative journals? At first, of course, no one did.

But Das Magazin is still around and better in content and appearance and more erotic than ever, with a monthly paid circulation of 80,000 — 93 percent of it in East Germany, though it is owned and edited by a small team of West Germans who bought it in 1993 from the Treuhandanstalt, the federal government agency responsible for privatizing or liquidating formerly state-owned East German businesses. Moreover, circulation is growing steadily, according to editor Martina Rellin, who operates in the same seedy East Berlin building where Hilde Eisler started Das Magazin more than 40 years ago.

The survival and revival of Das Magazin are symptomatic not only of the mood in eastern Germany but also of the widening gap of perspective and attitude between East and West.

Some 64 percent of eastern Germans say that life and living conditions during GDR times were better than the “negative descriptions and reports” in today’s German media, according to a comprehensive survey conducted between mid-April and mid-June of 1995 by Emnid, the West German polling institute. Around 79 percent of eastern Germans said that “the idea of socialism was good, but the politicians we had were incompetent.” Five years ago, in a similar poll, the majority of eastern Germans were very critical and condemnatory of the GDR and its system. Today, the majority still do not want the GDR back, but a surprising 15 percent do. An equal number wish there had been no reunification.

Whatever the causes — nostalgia for the “bad old times” or disillusionment with the “good new times” because of the economic strictures in East Germany — attitudes are increasingly critical of the West and more favorable toward the old East.

In 1990, for example, 91 percent of East Germans regarded the standard of living in West Germany higher than in the GDR and only 2 percent thought it was better in East Germany. Today, 85 percent say life in the West is better, and 8 percent claim it was better in the GDR. In 1990, some 62 percent of East Germans thought the GDR provided better crime protection than West Germany; today 88 percent are of that opinion.

Likewise, five years ago, 67 percent of eastern Germans thought the GDR offered women more equality than West Germany; today 88 percent say so.

Whereas, in 1990, 87 percent of East Germans thought that West Germany was more advanced in science and technology than the GDR, today only 63 percent hold that opinion, and 6 percent say the GDR was more developed.

Attitudes about the social-welfare system and education are also undergoing a pronounced revision. Five years ago, for example, 16 percent of eastern Germans rated West German social security better than their own, 65 percent thought the GDR’s was better.
Today only 3 percent prefer the West’s; 92 percent favor the GDR’s. In a similar vein, 65 percent of East Germans in 1990 thought the health-care system in West Germany was better than in the East; today, 57 percent say East Germany’s was better. Five years ago, a mere 11 percent rated the GDR’s educational system superior to West Germany’s, now 64 percent do.

According to the Emnid survey, there is widespread disappointment in both East and West with the overall development in Germany since reunification. Only 25 percent of westerners and 13 percent of easterners say “the situation” is better than they had expected; 28 and 33 percent respectively, believe it is “about” the way they had anticipated five years ago. But 43 percent in the West and 53 percent in the East feel “matters are worse” than they had anticipated.

Though the German government is still transferring some $150 billion to the new states each year to build up the economy in the East, and will be doing so at least until 2000, disagreement between westerners and easterners about this remains intense. Whereas 25 percent of western Germans think the government is doing too much to raise the living standard, only 1 percent of eastern Germans feel that way. Conversely, 68 percent of eastern Germans say the government is not doing enough — a view shared by only 9 percent of western Germans.

As the gap between East and West widens (at least in the minds of the country’s citizens), eastern Germans are looking backward and viewing their own past and life experience in the GDR more benignly and favorably. For example, an overwhelming majority — 82 percent — say that “life was easier in GDR times,” although they qualify this by adding that it was because one was told what to do by the regime, needed to think less for oneself, and had fewer choices and decisions to make. Nearly 90 percent note that people were closer to each other and less selfish under communism. They staunchly deny that they did not and do not work as hard as westerners, and 87 percent attribute the GDR’s low productivity rate to “bad working conditions, supply shortages, and outdated machinery.”

As time passes, eastern Germans are also looking back on their past achievements under and despite communism with pride. Simultaneously, they have come to regard western Germans as ignorant and arrogant judges. According to the Emnid poll, 75 percent say they can be proud of their past life in the GDR because “I made the best of things and cooperated with the regime only insofar as it was absolutely necessary.” And nearly 97 percent say defiantly that “only those who experienced life in the GDR have a right to talk about it.”

This sense of pride — linked, no doubt, with a certain amount of nostalgia for less trying and challenging times when everyone was more or less equal, nobody got very rich but also no one was poor — has led to a surprising rediscovery of past values and symbols. The most significant symptom is the return to products and brand names of GDR times, even those that are now manufactured by formerly state-owned companies that have been taken over by western German or multinational corporations. The days right after the opening of the Berlin Wall and the July 1990 currency unification, when East Germans gobbled up western products, are long gone. Indeed, 45 percent say they try to buy only eastern German products or as many as possible.

Though western German, West European, and Japanese cars seem to dominate the streets and highways of eastern Germany, the Trabant — once the apple of every Ossi’s
eye and the brunt of every Wessi joke — is still around. Of the 3.2 million that were built in Zwickau over a period of more than 30 years (production started in 1958), 1.5 million are still putt-putting their way around Central and Eastern Europe — 900,000 of them in eastern Germany. Trabbie rallies are the rage.

As an old GDR hand, traveling in and reporting on that country for many years, I could never help chuckling over the dowdy ads for and packaging of Florena cosmetics. I was certain they would disappear, along with the red banners and other symbols of communism, in no time. The dowdy ads and packages did, but Florena, a 75-year-old company and brand name from Waldheim in Saxony that had been expropriated by the GDR regime, is back almost as strong as ever. By 1991, sales volume had dropped from a 1989 high of about $200 million to around $12 million, and more than 500 of the original 700 workers had been laid off. In 1992, finally, the Treuhandanstalt agreed to a management buyout of three of the executives. The company now employs 200 people and is hiring more, sold more than $32 million worth of cosmetics in 1994 (making a profit of around $540,000), and expects a 10 percent increase in sales and earnings for 1995. In western Germany, the brand name is virtually unknown, but in eastern Germany, it is the market leader for shaving soaps, skin lotions, and skin creams. More than 80 percent of its products are sold there, the rest being exported to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Before 1990, there was hardly an East German woman who didn’t use Indra or Koivo lipsticks, produced by state-owned Berlin Kosmetik. They were virtually the only lipstick brands available. After reunification, the bottom fell out and the brands almost disappeared. By 1992, sales had dropped to a mere $4 million and staff had been reduced from 900 to 110 people. In 1993, an American, Raymond J. Learsy, bought the plant. Last year, sales topped $17 million, there was a small profit, and 30 people were rehired. But most importantly, East German women are again buying Indra and Koivo lipsticks. The brands, unknown in western Germany, have recaptured 8 percent of the market in the eastern states.

Except for imported bubbly from Crimea, practically the only sparkling wine in the GDR was a brew named Rotkäppchen — Little Red Riding Hood. No party or celebration was complete without it. Even East Germans — because of the odd name — thought that it was some kind of Communist invention, though the brand, from the wine-growing town of Freyburg on the Unstrut, has a pedigree more than 100 years old. In 1949, the winery became state-owned. After the opening of the Berlin Wall, because of the flood of Western wines, Little Red Riding Hood took a very big fall. Sales plummeted from an average 15 million bottles a year to 2.9 million in 1991. In 1993, Rotkäppchen Sektkellerei was privatized. Co-workers bought 60 percent of the shares, and Harald Eckes, a West German spirits maker, 40 percent. Sales have soared ever since: 17 million bottles in 1994 (only 50,000 in western Germany). The brand has an overall 20 percent share of the market; 60 percent for semi-dry varieties.

Similar “Buy East” success stories can be told for a number of wine, spirits, and beer brands, no matter whether western German giants or eastern German entrepreneurs are behind them. Even “Club Cola,” a concoction launched by the GDR regime in 1969 as a deliberate ploy to take people’s minds off evil capitalist drinks such as Coke and Pepsi that they saw being imbibed on West German TV, is back in the running: with a slightly modernized label and clever commercials using old newsreels of GDR events and celebrities, Erich Honecker and East German Cosmonaut Sigmund Jahn among them.
RFT-Rundfunk-Fernseh-Telekommunikation, the GDR’s monopoly TV maker (500,000 sets a year), is also back, thanks to its 1994 privatization and a contract with Luigi Colani, who redesigned the top-of-the-line models. The company, now owned by 3,000 retail dealers, has 12 percent of the East German TV-set market; Sony has 15 percent. They’re billed by the company as “our TVs.”

Like East Berlin’s Mokka Milch Eisbar, these are symptoms of the East-West divide getting bigger, and of eastern German society starting to move full circle.

Not all too far from that again-popular ice cream parlor in Berlin’s Friedrichshain borough, there’s a supermarket where 50 percent of the products are eastern German made, with brand names familiar only to Ossis. One of the proprietors, 34-year old Harald Kujus, is as typical an Ossi as one can find. He was born a couple of weeks after the Berlin Wall was built, and opened his shop a few weeks after it came down. “The only way we’re going to make progress, “ he says, “is by going back to the old products and to what traditionally is ours.” Kujus named his store Zurück in die Zukunft — Back to the Future.

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The Challenges of Reunification, European Integration, and Globalization

German Reunification

After viewing the scenes of joy on top of and around the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and recalling the demonstrators in Leipzig and elsewhere in East Germany who proclaimed first that “We are the People” and then “We are One People,” one can conclude only that there was a strong desire for reunification in both parts of what had been a Germany divided by two very different economic and political systems. Few Germans thought reunification would be easy, but most probably thought that the difficulties could be overcome within a few years. After all, the East Germans were seen as the most technologically advanced and affluent of the Soviet satellite states in eastern Europe.

East Germany had become a highly industrialized state with well trained workers who, it was thought, would surely prosper in a free enterprise system integrated into the West German and, therefore, free-world economy. Analogies were drawn between the “German economic miracle” in West Germany in the late 1940s and 1950s and prospects for economic improvement in the East following reunification. Chancellor Kohl predicted that the East German economy would be booming in a few years and that the eastern part of Germany would be on an equal footing with the western part in about five years. East Germans eagerly looked forward to the standard of living enjoyed by most Germans in “the Golden West” and to the opportunities to travel abroad in their newly acquired, expensive cars. Few people predicted that in spite of many dramatic improvements eight or ten years after the October 1990 reunification, there would be great disappointment and even bitterness in the East and considerable resentment and frustration in the West that things had not gone so smoothly after all.

The Domestic Opposition to Reunification

There were some Germans, of course, who were not pleased with the prospect of one Germany. In the East, these were above all Communist officials and government employees — police and military officers, secret police operatives, and others — who had benefited from the regime. There were also many fellow travelers, such as non-office-holding informers and loyal party members who honestly believed, at least to some extent, in the ideological superiority of their system vis-à-vis that of the West. Persons opposed to reunification probably made up between 10 and 15 percent of the East German population. In the first and last free election for the East German parliament in March 1990, the reformed Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) that replaced the old communist Socialist Unity Party (SED), received 16 percent of the vote. That percentage was expected to decline as time went on. The card-carrying membership has indeed shrunk considerably, but more recent elections have seen the percentage of the vote for the PDS not only stabilize but actually increase; it has benefitted from numerous protest votes in addition to the
support of many still-loyal followers.

There were also some intellectuals in the East who dreamed of an independent East Germany which would adopt a “third way” between communism and capitalism, become neutral, and serve as a bridge between East and West. Many of these intellectuals had led the opposition groups and parties in the last months of the East German regime, and they were bitterly disappointed in the very small percentage of votes they received in the March 1990 elections in the GDR. In the West, also, there were some intellectuals who agreed with their counterparts in the East. There were also some who warned that a united Germany would be a danger once again to itself and its neighbors. But they were small in number and had little influence on developments during and after the reunification process.

Reunification and Economic Problems

As noted above, probably most Germans in the West and certainly most Germans in the East thought in 1990 that reunification would bring prosperity to the East and new markets and other opportunities to the West. The East Germans had been deprived of many modern consumer products, and they were eager to buy cars, various electronic products, appliances, etc. with the increased wages they expected to receive with reunification. Their industries had good markets and contacts in eastern European countries and the Soviet Union so that trade between East Germany and its eastern neighbors seemed assured.

When the economic and currency union between East and West Germany occurred in July 1990, many experts warned that the exchange rate of one West DM for one East DM was for most purposes too favorable and would have severe negative consequences for the East. It was very difficult to explain this to workers in the East, whose per capita income in 1990 was only about one-third that of West Germans. It was natural for them to want at least a one-to-one exchange rate. They saw this value equivalence for the two currencies as a first step in closing the gap with workers in West Germany. Many thousands of East Germans — as many as 2,000 per day — were moving to West Germany, and the Kohl government felt it had no choice but to make a political decision to offer a one-to-one exchange rate in an effort to avoid “unification in the territory of West Germany.”

The problem was that the favorable exchange rate raised dramatically the costs of labor and materials for production in the East, which was especially damaging since virtually all factories there employed excessive numbers of workers and had old, inefficient machinery. East German products were not competitive in the world market unless they were inexpensive. To make their products at least somewhat less expensive, factories would not only have to have expensive new machinery but also far fewer workers. But before the East German factories could be modernized and workers let go, events in eastern Europe changed the rules of the game dramatically. Because countries in eastern Europe and Russia now had to purchase East German goods with hard currency, which was always in short supply, and because their own, still largely state-run, economies were also in turmoil, the East Germans practically lost their eastern markets overnight.

Before the collapse of communist governments in eastern Europe, the economy of the GDR was thought to be the strongest among the Soviet satellites. It may have been,
but that merely demonstrated how weak the other eastern economies were. When the
“trustee agency” was created after reunification to privatize the state-owned East Ger-
man industries and properties, it soon became apparent that many industries could hardly
attract buyers because of far too many employees, too much outdated equipment and
technology, and generally poor quality control and design of products, not to mention the
lost markets in the East. It also became clear within a short time that many factories were
responsible for huge environmental damage that someone was going to have to clean up at
great cost.

As a result of these and other factors, the trustee agency was not able to sell some
industries at any price, and the selling prices for those it was able to sell were generally
far lower than had been anticipated. Many industries closed, and most factories that re-
mained in existence reduced their work force in large numbers. East Germans stood by in
frustration and anger as they saw their former country being de-industrialized (industrial
production fell by 65 percent in 1991) and hundreds of thousands of workers becoming
unemployed.

Unemployment now stands officially at about 18 to 20 percent, but it is higher when
one considers the job training and make-work programs that keep large numbers of work-
ers off the unemployment rolls. Unemployment has been especially high for workers over
40 or 50 and for women, more than 90 percent of whom had been employed in the GDR in
contrast to the 55 percent of women employed in West Germany. While unemployment
compensation and other benefits are very generous in Germany by American standards,
the psychological impact on the large numbers of unemployed East Germans was and is
serious.

In the East, there is strong resistance, however, to accepting lower wages. Lower
wages might make investment and job creation more attractive to those with means, but
one problem with economic development has been that the unions and many East Ger-
mans, for understandable reasons, insist on wages comparable to those in West Germany,
where productivity is significantly higher. Given the penchant for equality in Germany,
and perhaps also the size of the country, there is little acceptance of wage differentials
common in the United States, e.g., between Connecticut and Mississippi.

On the other hand, workers in eastern Germany seem to have a greater willingness
than those in western Germany to accept somewhat lower wages in return for more job
security, often in spite of opposition by the unions. Workers — and unions — in both
eastern and western Germany also seem now to be accepting more flexible working hours
and less overtime, which helps factories cut costs and offer some job security.

Another controversial issue after reunification was what to do about property that
had been confiscated by the communists. For example, between 1945 and 1949, the Sovi-
et government had expropriated the large land holdings that the German nobility and others owned
until 1945 and given it to the peasants. But by 1960 at the latest, it and the land owned by
small farmers was taken over by the state-owned collective farms. In a decision by the
West German government that remains controversial to the present day, it was decided
that properties confiscated up to the time the GDR came into existence in 1949 would not
be returned to their original owners. Rather, the former owners would be compensated
given the opportunity to purchase the property at a favorable price. This decision was
made because allegedly the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had insisted, at the request
of the last East German government before reunification, that respect for those Soviet
expropriations was a condition for Soviet approval of reunification. (To the surprise and irritation of West German officials, Gorbachev has said recently that he had placed no such condition on Soviet approval.)

The other problem was what to do with property confiscated by the GDR authorities. There were two basic alternatives. One was to use mostly public funds to compensate the original owners. This was deemed by many to be prohibitively expensive and/or unjust. The other alternative was to return the property ("return before compensation"), and it was decided to take this approach. Unfortunately, this created huge problems. One was finding the original owners and distinguishing their claims from East Germans who secured the property according to East German law. Another was deciding what to do where property had been divided or improved in various ways. Another was determining liability for operating or closing factories that had polluted the environment. Still another was that virtually all of the former owners were now in West Germany or living abroad, so that few East Germans were benefitting, and very few of the East Germans could afford to purchase the properties that the original owners were now trying to sell. East Germans therefore complain that their former country is literally being "sold out."

The picture presented above is rather negative. It should also be pointed out, however, that there have been many dramatic improvements in the former GDR. East Germans have joined their West German cousins in their urge to travel to every conceivable spot in the world. Hundreds of billion of dollars have been invested in such things as a new telephone system, arguably now the most modern anywhere in the world, new Autobahnen and other roads, new railroad tracks and rolling stock, new airports, expensive clean-up operations in areas heavily polluted during the rule of the GDR, and the renovation and construction of thousands of buildings. Large subsidies of various kinds have also been paid to businesses that needed start-up capital or additional funds for investment purposes. When one visits almost any city in eastern Germany today, one sees a seeming forest of metal construction cranes. The basic problem is that the economy of the entire European continent in the 1990s is suffering from stagnation and even recession. There is little or no evidence in Europe of the kind of economic boom the United States has enjoyed from the mid-to-late 1990s.

Federalism

One of the most obvious changes resulting from reunification is the addition of five new states, or Länder, and the reunification of the city-state, Berlin. The pre-reunification Federal Republic had eight "territorial" states and two city-states, Hamburg and Bremen. West Berlin was treated like a third city-state, but legally it was under the control of the three Western Allies until reunification in 1990. The five "territorial" states that had made up East Germany had been created by the GDR in the late 1940s. They had been replaced by fifteen districts in 1952 when the GDR became a unitary state both de jure as well as de facto. After reunification, they were reconstituted as states and today are usually referred to in Germany as "the five new Länder."

Several problems have emerged since Germany became a federation of sixteen, rather than eleven, states. The most serious one is finances. In Germany there is strong popular pressure for equality in public services of various kinds, including welfare services. Most of the latter are financed and regulated according to national law, but many typical public
services, including schools and universities, are state and local responsibilities. In contrast to the United States, the wealthier states are required to transfer some of their tax revenues to the poorer states so that all states fall within a narrow range of per capita revenue. This system is called "fiscal equalization." The transfers that take place under it are in addition to federal grants similar in principle to grant-in-aid programs given by the U.S. federal government to American states.

There have always been disagreements among the West German states about the best way to calculate the equalization payments. Now the problems are far more serious and the disagreements even greater. The five new states and Berlin are so much poorer than the average western state that the transfer payments are a real burden for the western states. The federal government, too, has strained to meet its financial responsibilities to the new states. Both the equalization transfers and the federal grant payments have been made especially painful for the past several years because of the economic downturn, including high unemployment in Germany and in the rest of the continent.

The addition of five new states and the financial problems associated with German federalism have led to renewed calls for a reduction in the number of states to something like eight or ten. The three city-states are obvious targets for consolidation, but Bremen has opposed consolidation, and in a May 1966 referendum voters rejected the consolidation of united Berlin and the surrounding state of Brandenburg. The government of the small state of Saarland has also rejected consolidation with larger neighbors.

The larger number of German states has also made the political process more complicated. The second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, represents not the people but the governments of the states — as does the U.S. Senate. Even though votes that the states must cast as a bloc range from three to six, based on population, the smaller states are over represented. This is especially true of Bremen and the Saarland in the West and all five of the states in the East. One can argue that the reasoning in favor of reducing the number of states in Germany (which, after all, is only the size of Montana) is most sound; however, the emotional and political arguments are very difficult to overcome. It seems unlikely, therefore, that any consolidations will occur in the near future.

On the other hand, the transfer of about $100 billion per year to East Germany since reunification and the imposition of a 7.5 percent surtax on German taxpayers to help pay for these transfers have led to more demands for tax relief and cuts in the support for the East. Indeed, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, two of the most affluent German states — and therefore the two largest net payers in the system of fiscal equalization — are threatening to take the procedures of the fiscal equalization scheme to the Federal Constitutional Court for review if the states do not agree on changes and cost cutting measures that would probably require some consolidation of states.

**Political Party Developments**

There have been some important changes in the German party system since reunification. As noted in Lesson III, the West Germans had a 2½ party system until about 1980, with the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) on the center right, the Free Democrats (FDP) in the center, and the Social Democrats (SPD) on the center left of the party spectrum. The much smaller FDP had formed coalition governments with both of the larger parties, and these had formed a "grand coalition" in years 1966–1969.
In the late 1970s, the Greens emerged at first as a “movement” and then as a party emphasizing
- the environment in general and nuclear power in particular
- pacifism with the focus on eliminating nuclear weapons
- minority rights, especially feminism, but also rights of asylum seekers and other refugees
- civil liberties.

The Greens, supported mostly by young people, drained considerable support from the SPD. By the end of the 1980s, the CDU/CSU was being challenged by groups on the far right, especially the so-called “Republicans” whose specialty was protesting the many immigrants of various kinds coming into the country in larger numbers. The Greens were somewhat successful in local and state elections in the 1980s and gained a small number of seats in the 1983 and 1987 federal parliament elections and the 1984 and 1989 European Parliament elections. The Republicans were also successful in a relatively small number of local elections and also gained some seats in a few state legislatures and in the European Parliament; however, they have never gained any seats in the federal parliament.

With reunification, the party scene became even more complicated. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) had become a regular player in local and state elections in former East Germany, and it has been able to win seats in the federal parliament since 1990 through a special provision of the electoral law. Normally, as noted in Lesson III, a party at the state and national levels must receive at least 5 percent of the total vote; however, there is a provision in the national law according to which a party also benefits from the proportional features of the law if it wins three direct seats in American-type single-member districts. The PDS did not win 5 percent of the total German vote in the national elections of 1990 and 1994, but in 1990 there was a one-time procedure that allowed the PDS entrance to the parliament because it won more than 5 percent in East Germany, and in 1994 it won the three required direct seats (actually, it won four in East Berlin) as an alternative to receiving 5 percent of the total German vote.

Today, then, Germany does not have a 2½ party system but a two-bloc system with the PDS on the far left, the Greens somewhat to their right, and the SPD generally left-of-center. The FDP is generally in the center to slightly right on the spectrum, while the CDU on most issues is somewhat to its right. The CDU’s sister party, the CSU of Bavaria, is somewhat more to the right, and the Republicans are far right. All three parties on the left are in the federal parliament, but only the FDP and CDU/CSU are represented. The parties on the left now have a slight majority of the popular vote, but as the successor to the Communist SED, the PDS has been rejected by the Greens and SPD as a potential partner for a coalition government. Nevertheless, there are some factions in both the Greens and SPD that would be willing to accept PDS support if it meant being able to remove the CDU/CSU-FDP government. Given the Green’s militance on a number of issues, such as the environment and nuclear power, and their hostility toward NATO and the use of German troops for peacekeeping purposes, it would be difficult for the SPD to invite the Greens to join a coalition government at the national level as they have on several occasions at the state level. The FDP, on the other hand, is still a welcome partner for the CDU/CSU, but its position with the electorate is so precarious that it must always struggle just to get the necessary 5 percent.
Thus German party politics have become more complicated since reunification. Only the SPD and CDU/CSU are really national parties; the PDS receives almost all of its votes in the East, the FDP finds its support in the West, and the Greens are much stronger in the West than in the East. Because of the larger number of smaller parties and the extremism of the PDS and even the Greens, the formation of stable coalitions has become more difficult. If the FDP fails to win 5 percent of the vote in September 1998, the CDU/CSU and Chancellor Kohl will not have a coalition partner. But the SPD might also be unable to form a coalition with the Greens because of their radical policy positions on certain issues, and, of course, the PDS is not an acceptable coalition partner. Therefore, we could well see a “grand coalition” of the two large parties, SPD and CDU/CSU, emerge in the fall of 1998.

United Germany and Europe

Reunification has had a significant impact on Germany’s position in Europe and the world. United Germany has about 80 million inhabitants, while the Federal Republic had about 62 million, including about 5.5 million foreigners, and East Germany (GDR) had about 17 million. The West Germans had been closely integrated in the West under American leadership, the East Germans in the East under Soviet domination. They had been separated for more than forty years in two very hostile systems. After the collapse and breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, united Germany was again a major political factor in Europe and the world. It was no longer an economic giant and a political dwarf. Indeed, it is now seeking a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations next to Britain, France, and Russia.

This does not mean that Germany is somehow a military threat in Central Europe. In the first place, military conflict between Germany and any one or combination of its nine neighbors is about as probable as war between the United States and Canada or Mexico. In the second place, united Germany’s military force, currently numbering 330,000, is a considerable reduction from the 500,000 West German plus 170,000 East German troops before reunification. In the third place, united Germany is fully integrated in NATO, which means that German troops could not take any significant action without NATO support. Germany was one of the strongest advocates of NATO and of its expansion to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and it has worked hard to convince the Russians that NATO expansion is not directed against them. Germany has never sought the possession of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, although it did rely on the American nuclear shield during the Cold War.

Still another example of the German effort to counter its neighbors’ potential fears of possible German ambitions for domination in the region is the very active policy it has pursued promoting further European integration. “A European Germany, not a German Europe” is not merely a slogan. Chancellor Kohl is known as “Mr. Europe” because of his support for both the widening and deepening of the European Union (EU). As soon as it became clear that Germany would be united, Kohl and French President Mitterrand agreed that the EU should be strengthened. This explains the origins of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) negotiated in Maastricht in December 1991. This treaty provides for three pillars of the new EU: a strengthened European Community (EC); a common foreign and security policy (CFSP); and increased cooperation and coordination in home and judicial
affairs. The EC is the most important pillar because it includes the activities of the EC up to the TEU — e.g., agricultural and trade policies as well as some new policies such as economic and monetary union (EMU). This latter involves above all a common currency — the euro — to be introduced in January 1999. The CFSP is also an important pillar, but more in its future potential than its present practice. In the meantime, the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in the summer of 1997, and other, continuing agreements among the EU member-states have led to increased integration. In 1998, negotiations will be held by the EU with Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus to determine whether and when they might join the EU. Negotiations with other states in eastern Europe will be held also in the coming years (see also Lesson IV).

Nationalism and the Extreme Right

One might argue that an important reason for Germany's very benign behavior during the past decades, and especially since reunification, is the prevalence of contemptuous and even hostile attitudes toward nationalistic sentiments. If a German politician were to engage in the kind of rhetoric common among American politicians — "This is the greatest country in the world." "This country has been chosen by God to do great deeds." "We are the greatest people in the world." etc. — he or she would be considered a great embarrassment and would shunned. That is why some observers go so far as to argue that Germany has become the world's first "post-national" state — i.e., the first modern state to reject nationalism and even patriotism for an utterly pragmatic popular attachment to the political system. While many intellectuals in Germany, especially Greens, support and promote this view, others worry about the potential loss of the wide-spread patriotic support needed by a democratic nation in times of crisis.

Policies of the German government have been pro European Union and pro cooperation and friendship with neighbors in the East. Such policies have generally been supported by the political opposition parties and public opinion. The German public has expressed great caution and even hostility toward the use of German troops for U.N. or NATO actions outside of German borders. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that there is no patriotic sentiment in Germany at all. If that were the case, there would not have been so much support for reunification. Chancellor Kohl likes to talk about "the German people" and the fatherland, but he does so in a very non-threatening way. Many Germans talk about "constitutional patriotism," a "civil patriotism" based on support for democratic and humanitarian values rather than ethnicity or "blood." However, unlike Americans, whose identity is supposedly based largely on "civil patriotism," it is difficult for Germans to accept the outward signs of patriotic feelings so common in the United States, such as singing the national anthem at athletic events, pledging allegiance to the flag in school, and so forth. This reminds them too much of the practices of the Nazis.

It is true that there are some Germans such as the skinheads and their allies who still support the worst kind of nationalistic feelings. There have been a number of incidents since reunification involving skinheads in which foreigners have been accosted, injured, and even killed. Skinheads and extreme leftist youths have also clashed in the streets. The skinheads and other extreme right-wing militants are a tiny minority of the population, but they have done great damage to Germany's self-image and image abroad. Almost all are under 25 years of age, unemployed or underemployed, poorly educated,
pessimistic about their future, and deeply resentful of the millions of foreigners who have come to Germany as foreign workers, asylum seekers, other refugees (the refugees consist largely of several hundred thousand people from the former Yugoslavia), or wanderers such as gypsies. A disproportionate percentage of the skinheads come from East Germany, where the social and economic conditions are especially poor. The governments at all levels have cracked down on their activities, but it is difficult to control them entirely because many of their actions are not planned but are the result of, for example, too much drinking and tough talk in a local tavern. They are not organized in any political party and do not represent an electoral threat, although if they vote at all, they probably vote for the small right wing parties such as the Republicans. It should be noted that there are skinheads in all European countries, but for obvious historical reasons those in Germany receive more international media attention.

The Challenge of Globalization

Globalization is usually thought of in economic terms related to the large-scale activities of multinational corporations in such areas as international banking and the transfer of factories and jobs from first world countries to third world countries. This is indeed the sense in which the term is most commonly used. But in a broader sense, globalization also involves international crime, including international computer fraud; international terrorism; and population shifts caused by illegal immigration, asylum seekers, refugees from civil wars and ethnic conflicts, etc.

The German Economy and Welfare State

In recent years, the German economy, like the economies of most European countries, has not been doing as well as before. Unemployment was a problem even before reunification, but it has grown rather dramatically since then. In the late 1990s, it has been about 9 percent in the West and about 18 to 20 percent in the East — a national average of about 12 percent. This has put a tremendous strain on German governments at all levels. Unemployment benefits are generous by American standards with the unemployed receiving about two-thirds of their former income for a period of at least one year and usually longer. If they were not employed before or if they remain unemployed for more than one or two years, Germans receive public assistance providing a minimal standard of living until they can finally find employment. The national government is responsible for unemployment compensation, but the local governments pay for public assistance for both German citizens and foreigners, including asylum seekers and other refugees. Needless to say, there are also high psychological costs incurred by the unemployed, even if they do receive relatively generous benefits.

There are several reasons for high unemployment in Germany and many other European states. One is the high total compensation paid to the workers. Not only are German workers among the best paid in the world, they also are the most expensive in terms of benefits. They receive five to six weeks of paid vacation, and they enjoy numerous holidays for which they are paid; as a result they work the fewest yearly total hours of the world’s workers. They also receive up to six weeks of paid sick leave. The law has been
changed to allow firms to provide only 80 percent of full pay, but the unions have fiercely resisted this change, preventing many businesses and public employers from applying it. All German workers have health and disability insurance coverage, which is organized regionally and paid for jointly by the workers and employers. This insurance includes coverage for dental care and eye glasses as well as rehabilitative treatment in the many spas in the country. Recent requirements that those who get treatment in spas make a relatively modest contribution have led to a dramatic decline in the number of spa patients and an unemployment crisis in that industry. German workers are also covered by and contribute to unemployment compensation insurance and, of course, to old age pension insurance. More recently the Kohl government introduced an insurance program for nursing home care and home care for the elderly. All of these programs amount to about 42 percent of the total costs of German labor, making labor costs in Germany among the highest in the world.

The high costs of German labor are encouraging German firms to invest abroad: some firms are even finding the United States to be a good location for investment due to our comparatively inexpensive labor in addition to other factors. Therefore, we have Mercedes-Benz in Alabama and BMW in South Carolina; and in Virginia we have the new joint venture by Motorola and Siemens in Henrico County just outside of Richmond.

As German firms invest abroad in countries with lower labor costs, pressure is growing on German unions to lower their demands and even accept cutbacks. With some exceptions, they have not been willing to accept cuts. They have resisted the reductions authorized by law for sick pay, and in some cases they are even demanding a reduction to a thirty-hour work week at full pay in order to increase employment. This in spite of the fact that the normal German work week is already the shortest in the world and that there is little evidence that shorter work weeks lead to employment of more people. Rather, the evidence suggests that firms merely introduce more technology to compensate for fewer hours of work and/or rearrange the schedules for workers to make their existing work hours more efficient. The unions are now discovering that some workers, especially in East Germany, are accepting contracts with individual firms that provide employment guarantees in exchange for lower wages and benefits. This is a dangerous development for German unions, because the German tradition is to negotiate contracts with top business associations for an entire region that then serve as models for the entire country.

As in other European countries, then, the German welfare state is in crisis. Its generosity, its abuse by too many recipients, and demographic changes such as an aging population, have made it too expensive to sustain. Taxes and required insurance contributions are already very high in Germany and most of the rest of Europe, ranging between 45 and 50 percent on average in contrast to about 33 percent in the United States. Even higher taxes will drive even more firms abroad, and yet cutbacks are strongly resisted by the unions and probably most of the population. Chancellor Kohl has said that the high social costs of 42 percent of labor costs of German workers should be reduced to 38 percent. How that is to be done at a time of high unemployment and opposition by much of the public is not clear. The Greens urge even higher taxes on energy, including gasoline, to be used to lower social costs, but their proposals have not gained much public support.

In spite of the high costs of labor, the long vacations, and the short work week, German exports have been very successful. Thus there is a strong contrast between the rather stagnant domestic market and the foreign market. For example, in 1997, exports
to the U.S. and Latin America increased by 26 percent, to eastern Europe by 27 percent, to southeast Asia by almost 9.5 percent, and overall by 12.5 percent. This was made possible in part by the rise in the value of the dollar and concomitant weakening of the D-Mark, which made German exports cheaper. The total export surplus in 1997 was 122 billion D-Marks, which was offset by a 52 billion D-Mark deficit in tourist expenditures, 28 billion D-marks in net payments to the EU, and large German investments in foreign countries. Unfortunately for German workers, the boom in exports has not led to any noticeable decline in unemployment figures.

Immigrants, Refugees, and Other Foreigners

As was discussed in Unit I, Germany after about 1948 became known throughout the world for its “economic miracle.” The economy was so strong that there were severe labor shortages by the 1960s, in spite of millions of German refugees from the lost territories in the East and from East Germany. In the early 1960s, “guest workers” from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and, especially, Turkey, were invited to come to Germany to fill the many vacant job positions. It is not true, as is sometimes alleged, that the foreigners received lower pay and benefits than Germans; indeed, German unions insisted that no cheap labor be admitted. On the other hand, the foreigners did take jobs in factories, hotels, restaurants, and city services (for example, as garbage collectors) that were at the low end of the pay scale and not desired by most Germans. Later these foreigners began to bring family members into the country so that by the time of reunification, there were five to six million foreigners living in Germany. While they have become integrated to a considerable extent with many foreigners now owning their own businesses, they are not universally welcomed, as has already been discussed.

Some of the guest workers have now been in the country for two generations, yet relatively few have become citizens. There are many reasons for this. First, German law makes it difficult for foreigners to become citizens, although it has been made somewhat easier in recent years. A second reason is that, like many other countries, Germany does not generally accept dual citizenship, and many of the foreigners who would be interested in German citizenship do not want to give up their existing citizenship. Some countries such as Turkey do not allow foreigners to own property; therefore, if Turkish workers in Germany become German citizens, they cannot then retain or acquire property back home in Turkey. Thirdly, many of the foreigners claim that they are planning to return to their original countries when they retire, although they generally do not. If they have become German citizens, they certainly will not. Finally, foreign workers are not likely to return if they have and raise children in Germany, children who would literally be lost back in the homeland. According to German law, children who are born in Germany to foreign parents are not German citizens. This results in the difficult circumstance in which they are not legally Germans nor are they culturally quite the same as their parents or others in the “native” country. There is much discussion about granting citizenship rights to such children. At first, the new SPD/Green government announced that it would grant double citizenship to any qualifying foreigner, including children born in Germany. After losing the state election in Hesse in February 1999, however, the SPD and Greens agreed to accept the proposal of the FDP to grant double citizenship to children only until age 23,
at which point the young person would have to choose either German or foreign citizenship. This proposal will probably become law in the spring or summer of 1999. In any case, it is a difficult and controversial issue, and it will probably never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction.

Another problem has been the integration of several hundred thousand ethnic Germans who in recent years have come to Germany from Russia (Volga Germans), Poland, Romania, and elsewhere. In contrast to the foreign workers, these are immigrants who receive German citizenship on the grounds that they are the descendants of ethnic Germans who emigrated to countries in the East even hundreds of years ago and were then mistreated or repressed in some way during and after WW II because they were of German extraction. Many of these recent immigrants do not speak German well or at all and are not in other ways culturally very German. Also many of them have few skills that allow them to get good jobs. The result has often been frustration on the part of young immigrants in particular and resentment and even rejection by some native Germans.

A third group of foreigners consists of asylum seekers. During the Third Reich, German Jews and opponents of the regime had great difficulty finding refuge or asylum in other countries. The creators of the German Basic Law therefore placed a provision in the constitution that guaranteed asylum in Germany to persons who were politically persecuted in their home countries. The problem is that this provision has been used over the last two decades by millions of persons from eastern Europe and several third world countries seeking economic asylum. As in other countries including the United States, there is no German law granting asylum to such immigrants, and elaborate procedures have had to be established for determining whether those seeking asylum really are victims of political persecution. This determination often takes years, and in the meantime, the refugees live mostly on relatively generous welfare benefits that hardly serve as inducements to return home. In fact, only a very small percentage — some 2 to 5 percent — have been determined to be genuine political refugees. But the Germans have been reluctant to deport economic refugees, in part because many of them did come from desperately poor countries or from countries that had/have repressive regimes. After much heated discussion and controversy, the Basic Law was changed in the summer of 1993 to make it more difficult for asylum seekers to enter Germany, but many thousands still manage to arrive every month, sometimes through the help of professional smugglers.

A final category of foreigners in Germany is the refugee population of 350,000 to 400,000 from the former Yugoslavia, more than in the rest of Europe combined. These people entered as temporary refugees with the understanding, at least on the part of the Germans, that when the conflict ended they would return home. The fighting ended with the Dayton Accord in 1995, but relatively few refugees have returned. This is largely due to the lack of jobs and housing in the homeland as well as to the continuing ethnic hostility that persists in areas to which the refugees would have to return. These conditions and situations have made it difficult for the German authorities to force the refugees to leave. An example of the dilemma facing the authorities is the plight of the 150,000 Albanian refugees from Kosovo, a province of Serbia. It was decided by the governments in several states that because of the recent, highly repressive actions taken against the Albanian population in Kosovo by the Serb authorities, these refugees should not be forced to return.
It is clear from the above that globalization in the sense of population shifts of various kinds has had a serious impact in Germany. The entrance of so many people of different languages and cultures in a very short period of time has created a good deal of anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany. Of course such sentiments are found also in France and, for that matter, the United States. In France, there is even an anti-immigrant party, the National Front, that has received more than 15 percent of the total vote in national elections. As noted above, anti-immigrant sentiment has even resulted in some violence in Germany. Nevertheless, it can be said that on balance Germany has accepted more asylum seekers and refugees than any other European country, has treated them generously in terms of housing and benefits, and has generally been cautious about returning refugees who are rejected for permanent asylum status.

Conclusion

Since reunification, Germany has surely been presented with more numerous, varied, and difficult challenges than it expected to face in the 1990s. Most Germans probably realized that there would be a variety of problems associated with reunification, but the number, nature, and severity of the problems were not anticipated. Public opinion polls suggest that most Germans, including those in the former GDR, would not want to see unification reversed, but most wish that developments had been more positive, especially in the economy. It is not surprising that there is much disappointment and even bitterness in eastern Germany today in spite of numerous dramatic improvements in the infrastructure, travel opportunities, and political freedoms gained since the collapse of the Wall. But neither is it surprising that there is growing resentment in western Germany to the seemingly endless transfer payments to the East — huge sums paid for by supposedly temporary higher taxes in the more affluent western states.

Nor did Germans anticipate the effects of a problematic global economy that would hit them with particular severity just as reunification was occurring. Much of the positive rhetoric about the rosy future of eastern Germany was based on conditions that obtained before the impact of globalization began to be felt. As a result, some promises were made in good faith and expectations raised that were soon seen to be unrealistic and unattainable. Full employment in eastern Germany with wages comparable to those in the western part of the country simply could not be achieved in the face of the loss of markets for eastern German products, the lack of buyers for eastern German industries, low productivity, and the competition coming from low-wage countries in eastern Europe and the third world.

To avoid ending on a negative note, we should point out that in economic terms, Germany is still a very wealthy country. It is second or third — depending in part on exchange rates — in the world in terms of exports, and “made in Germany” is still a sign of high quality and good design. It has a welfare state that was considered for many years to be a model until recently, when it became increasingly apparent that its costs could not be sustained indefinitely. Germany has been a leader — indeed, the leader — in promoting European integration, seeking both the deepening and the widening of the EU and the expansion of NATO. It is a leading advocate of human rights throughout the world, and it continues to give more generously than the United States to various international causes,
including foreign aid. In spite of some extreme right violence by skinheads, Germany has become and continues to be a refuge for millions of immigrants, asylum seekers, and other refugees, who have generally been well treated at a huge financial cost. It has tried to make amends to the extent it could with Jews at home and abroad, and, indeed, it has become a place of settlement for many Jews from newly independent states, including Russia, that had been a part of the Soviet Union. It represents no military threat to anyone, and it has integrated its most powerful economic institutions, including the Bundesbank and its D-Mark, in the EU. Going out of its way to maintain and deepen its relationship with the United States, it has become one of America's best friends and allies.

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October 1998

Selected Bibliography


This text can be found on the Armonk Institute's Web site at armonkinstitute.org/gunlickslesson16.htm
The Challenges of Reunification, European Integration, and Globalization

Lessons in Unit VI

Lesson 1: Challenges of the New Federalism
Lesson 2: Challenges of the Integrated Economy
Lesson 3: Challenges of the Welfare State: Model or Muddle?
Lesson 4: The Challenge of Germany within the New Europe

Overview

The lessons in this Unit focus on the challenges Germany faces as a result of reunification. These challenges include the structure of the new federal state, the ramifications of the integrated economy, the image and substance of the welfare state, and the role of a diversified Germany within the new European community. In learning about modern Germany and the important changes taking place there, students will be able to understand the thoughts and feelings of citizens from both former East Germany and West Germany as they face the problems and promises of the future. The introductory essay that accompanies this Unit will prove a valuable tool for the teacher.

Lesson 1: Challenges of the New Federalism

Preview of Main Points

This lesson addresses the concept of federalism as it has been put into practice in Germany since reunification in 1990. The pros and cons associated with three characteristics of the new federalism are discussed:

1. the creation of the new Länder (federal states)
2. the federal system of representation in the Bundestag as outlined in the Basic Law (the German federal constitution)
3. the process of fiscal equalization.

Key Concepts

- Federalism
- Constitutionalism
- Reunification/unification
- Economic stability and security
- Fiscal equalization
- Representation
Related Concepts

- Territorial expansion
- Tradition
- Opportunity cost

Objectives

During this lesson, students will

- differentiate the new federal structure from the pre-unification structure of Germany
- explain the problems posed by the representation system outlined in the Basic Law
- describe the process of fiscal equalization
- take and defend a position on fiscal equalization.

Focus Questions

1. Should democratic representation be sacrificed for the sake of economic efficiency?
2. Should one group in a society be responsible for financially supporting other groups?

Teaching Suggestions

This lesson challenges students to compare and contrast specific characteristics of life in pre-unification and in present-day Germany from the respective viewpoints of citizens in the former East and West Germanys. Using such questions as, “Is it fair?” and “How would you feel if …?”, students will react to situations from their own life experiences and then apply their reactions to analogous situations in present-day Germany. These initial reactions will then be re-examined after the presentation of factual material on the new federal structure, representation in the Bundestag, and the policy of fiscal equalization. Students will create final projects in which they assume the identity of a Germany citizen and, after examining both sides of a current federal
issue, choose and defend either the pro or con position.

Beginning the Lesson

Begin the lesson with a newspaper headline (see Resource 1) and a series of “what ifs” such as, “You are a life-long resident of ___(your own locality)__; you have just found out that beginning in 1999 your community will be annexed by ___(a neighboring locality)__.“ Ask for student reaction, and discuss the pros and cons of such an occurrence.

Add to the complexity of the situation: “Today’s newspaper also announces that when this annexation takes place, 40 percent of each family’s income will be used to support the unemployed and homeless in ___(that neighboring locality)__.“ Ask for student reaction. See Activity 1 below for more details.

Explain to the class that these “what if” situations are real in Germany and have actually occurred or will occur in the near future.

Developing the Lesson

Review with students that each U.S. state, regardless of its size, sends two representatives to the Senate; hence, there are as many senators from tiny Rhode Island as there are from large Texas. Explain that the situation is different in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ask students to study a map showing the states in both East and West Germany before reunification. Ask them also to study the chart showing each state’s representation in the Bundesrat (see Resource 2). Then ask them to complete the application exercises in Activity 2 below.

Show students the video (accompanying this document or available from the Virginia Department of Education), which illustrates the current differences in living and working conditions between the former East and West Germanys. Distribute and ask the students to read Articles 51, 104a, and 107 of the Basic Law (see Resource 3). Use the video as the basis for a discussion on the policy of fiscal equalization.

Conduct a discussion of these articles and the students’ findings on fiscal equalization. Use the discussion to determine the extent to which students understand the issues of regional loyalty, representation, and use of tax monies. Try to correct any misunder-
standings and to reinforce knowledge of the changes brought about by the new federalism. See Activity 3 below for more details.

**Concluding the Lesson**

Ask the student to write a position paper on the pros and cons of the new federalism. This final evaluative assignment allows the teacher to gauge the extent to which students understand the challenges which the new federalism poses for German citizens from both the former East and West Germany. See Activity 4 below for more details.

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**Activity 1**

The purpose of this activity is to help students understand the ramifications of the reunification and the reactions of the two areas involved and to assess the students’ understanding as expressed in their own writings.

Begin with a brainstorming/discussion session (whole-group or smaller groups) in which students react to a headline (see Resource 1) that suggests that their own locality is about to be merged with another that is considerably poorer or less desirable.

Divide the class into two or more groups, each representing citizen groups from one of the two localities to be merged. Have the groups discuss the pros and cons of the merger and then decide upon a response to an appropriate authority, political leader, or friend. Possible responses include the following:

- a letter to the editor of a local newspaper
- a flyer to be posted around the community alerting people to the issues that will affect them
- a personal letter to a friend or family member living in another state or country.
Evaluate the students’ understanding of the issues by using the following rubric:

5 pts. The writing presents clearly a locality’s pro or con position on the potential merger and redistribution of tax monies, identifies an intended audience, and uses at least three legitimate points to support the position.

3 pts. The writing presents clearly a locality’s pro or con position, but it only vaguely relates to the intended audience or uses only two legitimate points to support the position.

1 pt. The writing fails to present clearly a locality’s position, to identify an intended audience, or to provide adequate supporting points for the position.

Activity 2

After reviewing the United States’ own system of representation in the U.S. Senate, give each student a map of all the Germany states before reunification and copies of Resources 2 and 3. In pairs or for homework, ask the students to examine the maps and charts, read the relevant passage in the Basic Law, and answer the following questions:

1. List the Länder in the former Federal Republic of Germany (FDR). How many were there?
2. List the Länder in the new Federal Republic of Germany. How many have been added in the unified country?
3. Which Länder have the largest representation?
4. Why does this situation exist? (Consult the Basic Law.)
5. Hypothetical situation: You and your family have always lived and paid taxes in the Saarland. How many representatives have you had in the Bundestag? In 1999, the Saarland is scheduled to be joined with Rhineland-Palatinate. According to the Basic Law, what is the maximum number of representatives the new state (Land) may have? Will you, a citizen of the former Saarland, have greater or lesser representation in the Bundestag?

Activity 3

Ask students to examine and discuss in small groups the various states’ unemployment figures (see Resource 4) in order to determine which Länder are wealthier and which are poorer and to come to an understanding of what “fiscal equalization” means. After the small groups report their conclusions to the whole class, ask the students what economic and social effects and challenges are created by the economic inequality of the Länder. Explain the term “fiscal equalization” and ask them if such equalization as defined in Germany’s new federalism is a good idea. Summarize the changes that have already taken place in the federal structure, those which are proposed for next year, and how these affect citizens in both the former East and West Germanys. Use Activity 4 to evaluate how well students meet the lesson’s objectives.

Activity 4

Ask the students to write position papers in which they assume the identities of German citizens of Bremen or Berlin. Have them discuss the pros and cons of their impending merger with Lower Saxony or Brandenburg respectively, decide whether they
oppose or approve of the merger, and then defend their position.

The following evaluation rubric may be used:

4 pts The paper, written in the first person, clearly describes the situation and explains both the pros and cons of the impending merger. It then chooses and defends one position with at least three well-developed supporting details. It demonstrates good language control and contains no more than surface mechanical and usage errors.

3 pts The paper, written in the first person, clearly describes the situation and explains both the pros and cons of the impending merger. It then chooses and defends one position but uses only two supporting details. It demonstrates adequate language control but may contain mechanical and usage errors that impede comprehension.

2 pts The paper, written in the first person, states an opinion and gives logical reasons supporting it. It may contain a brief summary of the opposite point of view, but it fails to discuss or refute that position. There may be inadequate scene-setting and/or factual errors. The language usage may contain numerous errors that continually distract the reader.

1 pt The paper fails to state a position, or it gives reasons that are unclear or unrelated to the stated opinion. Little or no attempt is made to present the opposing point of view. The language usage may be so filled with errors that comprehension is at best limited.

Lesson 2: Challenges of the Integrated Economy

Preview of Main Points

This lesson focuses on the economic challenges posed by German reunification, which made two separate and diverse economic systems one. Students will become aware of the challenges posed by combining currencies as well as the problems of privatization of property in the former GDR. Environmental concerns will be considered. Students will also examine the unemployment situation since reunification.

Key Concepts

- Change and reform
- Human-environmental interaction
- Economic stability and security
- Market and command economies
- Interdependence

Related Concepts

- Continuity
- Productivity
- Labor
- Resources
- Supply and demand
Objectives
During this lesson, the students will
• compare and contrast market and command economic systems
• compare and contrast the industrial practices of the GDR and the FRG in terms of their impact on the environment
• identify and describe the problems facing the unified German economy.

Focus Questions
1. How can one move from a market to a command economy?
2. How healthy is the unified German economy?

Teaching Suggestions
Continuing the compare/contrast concept begun in Lesson 1, this lesson uses a small-group activity that demonstrates the basic differences between a market economy and a command economy. Using readings and class discussions, students confront the economic challenges faced by the unified German state. The lesson also uses a videotape interview to examine the environmental problems created by GDR industrial practices.

Beginning the Lesson
Explain to students the concepts of a market economy and a command economy. Use the list of definitions found in Resource 5.
Ask the class to develop two marketing plans for a product, the first using the principles of a market economy, the second following the principles of a command economy. See Activity 1 below.

Developing the Lesson
Ask students to read the article “Too Big for Its Boots?” (see Resource 6). When they are
finished, brainstorm with the class the strengths and weaknesses of the unified German economy. To what extent is Germany still “the economic giant” of Europe?

Show the video (accompanying this document) of the interview with Zacharias, a university student from the former East Germany. Conduct a general class discussion on the students’ reactions to Zacharias’s statements concerning the changes in Germany’s economic system. See Activity 2 below.

Concluding the Lesson
Ask the students to write a summary of the economic problems faced by the unified Germany. The summary could take the form of a journal entry, diary entry, newspaper article, song, or political cartoon.

Suggested Readings

Activity 1
Divide the class in half, then subdivide one of the halves into three or four small groups. Instruct these small groups to produce marketing plans for a product — e.g., toilet paper — to sell on the open market in a market economic system. Remind the students that such a plan needs to include factors like cost, intended target market, quality, advertising, packaging, and selling price.

Tell the other half of the class that it too should formulate plans for producing the same product in a command economic system. Have this large group choose one person to set all aspects of production including cost, quality, packaging, and price. Have each smaller, market-economy group describe how it will market
its product. Then have the larger, command-economy group explain why it does not have to be concerned about marketing its product. Have students write a paragraph explaining their understanding of market and command economies.

Activity 2
Show the Unit VI, Segment 1 video interview. Conduct a class discussion in which students explain the differences between the industries of the former GDR and those of the former FDR in terms of the impact those industries had on the environment and lifestyles of the people. Ask the following questions in order to generate a discussion:
1. How did the GDR and the FDR approach the problem of industrial pollution?
2. Why did the two countries approach the problem in different ways?
3. How did the different approaches affect the way people lived?
4. What problems does the unified Germany face in cleaning up the environment?

Lesson 3: Challenges of the Welfare State: Model or Muddle?

Preview of Main Points
Reunification has seriously affected several areas of the traditional German welfare system. Among these are the economic ramifications for state-supported welfare and the challenge of treating fairly the many guest workers and other foreign immigrants now living within German borders. Students will examine both of these issues against the backdrop of the German welfare system.

Key Concepts
- Needs/wants
- Labor
- Citizenship
- Constitutionalism
- Migration
- Social responsibility
- Human rights

Related Concepts
- Economic stability
- Wealth
- Due process
- Conflict
- Tradition
- Population
Objectives
In the course of this lesson, the students will
• define welfare state
• identify the impact of reunification on the German welfare system
• classify the various types of “foreigners” in Germany
• defend the position of foreigners in terms of their entitlement to welfare benefits under the German constitution.

Focus Question
Who deserves welfare?

Teaching Suggestions
This is a concept-learning-and-application lesson in which students are asked to take a definite stand on a controversial issue. Students should become familiar with the concept of the welfare state as opposed to the American system in which the government offers only limited services to its citizens. In order to demonstrate understanding of this distinction, students will engage in a prepared debate in which they either defend an aspect of the German welfare system or argue the validity of foreigners in Germany receiving state welfare support. [Note: Although activities may call for similar outcomes, they address different SOL expectations.]

Beginning the Lesson
Define the idea of welfare as it was applied to the German system before reunification. Make available to students the paragraphs in Facts About Germany, (Bonn: Societats-Verlag, 1995 edition) on pages 284–290.

Ask students to read the excerpts from the article “Letter from Germany” published in The New Yorker magazine (June 18, 1990), which lays out the basics of the respective welfare systems for both the former East and West Germanys. Ask students to delineate those ele-
ments that are common to both and those that are dissimilar. See Activity 1 below. [Note: This is a lengthy article, so the teacher may want to distribute only excerpts.]

Developing the Lesson

Introduce students to the concept of the “guest worker” (Gastarbeiter). Ask students to compare and contrast the cultural diversity of Germany with that found in the United States. Ask them to speculate on why so many foreigners are coming to Germany and what problems their arrival might create. See Activity 2 below and Resource 7.

Ask one half of the class to read “Notes from Hamburg: Immigrants Challenge Germany’s ‘Social Net’” (see Resource 8) and the other half to read “Foreigners in Germany” (see Resource 15 in Unit II). In addition, ask all students to read the articles in the Basic Law related to immigration and German citizenship (see Resource 9) as well as “German Citizenship and Naturalization” (see Resource 17 in Unit II). Brainstorm with students the advantages and disadvantages created by the arrival of foreigners. Then have them complete Activity 3.

Concluding the Lesson

Group the students in pairs and have each pair write two letters of complaint about the problems created by so many foreigners coming into unified Germany. One letter should be from the point of view of an Ossi (former East German), and the other from that of a Wessi (former West German). [Note: Former East Germans may refer to those in the West as Bundis.] See Activity 4 below.

Ask the students to make oral presentations to the class based on their letters of complaint. See Activity 5.

History and Social Science continued

environmental factors.

10.8 The student will identify natural hazards, describe their characteristics, explain their impact on human and physical systems, and assess efforts to manage their consequences in developed and less developed regions.

10.9 The student will identify natural, human, and capital resources, describe their distribution, and explain their significance, in terms of location of contemporary and selected historical economic and land-use regions.

11.11 The student will demonstrate an understanding of the origins and effects of World War II, with emphasis on

a. the rise and aggression of totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan;

b. the role of the Soviet Union;

c. appeasement, isolationism, and the war debates in Europe and the United States prior to the outbreak of war;

d. the impact of mobilization for war, at home and abroad;

e. major battles, military turning points, and key strategic decisions;

f. the Holocaust and its impact; and

g. the reshaping of the United States’ role in world affairs after the war.

11.12 The student will analyze and explain United States foreign policy since World War II, with emphasis on

a. the origins and both foreign and domestic consequences of the Cold War;

b. communist containment policies in Europe, Latin America, and Asia;

c. the strategic and economic factors in Middle East policy;

d. relations with South Africa and other African nations;

e. the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; and

f. new challenges to America’s leadership role in the world.

11.18 The student will develop skills in discussion, debate, and persuasive writing with respect to enduring issues and determine how divergent viewpoints have been addressed and reconciled. Such issues include

a. civil disobedience vs. the rule of law;

b. slavery and its impact;

c. the relationship of government to the individual in economic planning and social programs;

d. freedom of the press vs. the right to a fair trial;

e. the tension between majority and minority rights;

f. problems of intolerance toward racial, ethnic, and religious groups in American society; and

g. the evolution of rights, freedoms, and protections through political and social movements.

12.14 The student will compare the United States political and economic systems with those of major democratic and authoritarian nations, in terms of

a. the structures and powers of political institutions;

b. the rights and powers of the governed including grass roots citizen movements;

c. economic goals and institutions and the role of government in the economy;

d. the relationships between economic freedom and political freedom; and

e. the allocation of resources and its impact on productivity.

12.17 The student will evaluate the effect of monetary and fiscal policies on personal economic well-being continued overleaf
UNIT VI: LESSONS

Activity 1

After using information from Facts about Germany, 1995 edition, pages 284–290, to describe welfare as it existed in West Germany before reunification, lead the students in listing the many areas covered. Using the article “Letter from Germany” from the The New Yorker magazine (June 18, 1990), ask pairs of students to create a simple compare/contrast chart for welfare in the former East and West Germanys.

Activity 2*

Distribute copies of similar-scaled maps of the Continental United States and Europe, and a drawing compass to each group of students. Direct each group to set the radius of its compass to equal 500 miles, as indicated by the scale on the maps. Ask each group to draw a pair of circles, one on each map, by placing the point of the compass first on St. Louis and then on Frankfurt. Have them repeat the same procedure using 1,000 miles as the radius. Ask each group to compare their observations about the cultural diversity found within each pair of circles. [Note: Students should discover that there is far more cultural diversity within a 500 mile radius from Frankfurt than there is within a 500 mile radius from St. Louis.]

Distribute copies of “Some Basic Facts about Foreigners in Germany” (see Resource 7). Ask pairs of students or individual students for homework to answer the following questions:

1. From which countries do the largest number of foreigners come?
2. Why are foreigners coming to Germany?
3. What challenges do you think their arrival creates for Germany?

*Adapted from The Geography of Germany, written and developed by Glen Blankenship and D. William Tinkler, 1993.

Activity 3

Pose these question to the class:
1. What kinds of restrictions, if any, should be placed on immigrant groups and refugees entering Germany?
2. What types of pressures and concerns exist in Germany that would affect decisions about this matter?
3. Do such pressures and concerns exist in the United States?
Place the students into small groups and ask each group to prepare a written set of recommendations about such restrictions. Ask different groups to present their recommendations to the class, and conduct a short debate about the different recommendations.

**Activity 4**
Have pairs of students write point-of-view letters addressed to the government of a particular Land (e.g., Sachsen or Hessen), complaining about the present situation in terms of economic conditions, the welfare system, and/or the presence of foreigners. The letters should respond to the focus question for this lesson: Who deserves welfare?

**Activity 5**
Ask students to conduct library research in order to produce group presentations (plays or skits, debates, persuasive speeches) in which they highlight one of the following:
- dilemmas involving the welfare system such as unemployment in the former GDR
- attitudes of Wessis toward Ossis
- attitudes of Ossis toward Wessis
- problems facing guest workers.

Use one of the following rubrics to evaluate this activity.

**Oral Presentation: Primary Trait Rubric**
The standard is to deliver an interesting, focused, and audience-appropriate oral presentation. Criteria used for evaluation include development and focus, use of visuals, speaking techniques, and collaboration and integration.

4pts Effective: Presentation is well developed, unified, and focused. Presentation demonstrates a thorough understanding of the topic and contains sufficient detail to illustrate the main ideas. Presenters deliver their presentation with enthusiasm and a good sense of audience. Presenters demonstrate skillful use of language and speech techniques, including eye contact, timing, clarity, and voice projection. Visuals add relevance to the spoken information and are creative and well prepared. The presenters use time effectively. If presenting as a group, it is obvious that group planning and collaboration have gone into the presentation.

3pts Competent: Presentation is complete, organized, and focused, with individual parts well integrated. Presenters deliver their information in a knowledgeable manner but some ideas are unclear or not illustrated with sufficient detail. Presenters demonstrate adequate use of language and speech techniques but may not be comfortable in front of the audience; evidence of this may include pacing or other nervous movements, speaking too rapidly or too softly, or avoiding eye contact with the audience. Presenters use time effectively and are prepared for their own part of the delivery.

2pts Limited: Presentation may be clear and easy to understand but may lack focus. Material is not well developed nor thoroughly researched. Presenters demonstrate inept use of language and speech techniques. They may read from their notes or scripts rather than use notes for reminders. Visuals, if included, do not enhance the communication of ideas. If presenting as a group, collaborative efforts are not well coordinated.

1pt Minimal: Presentation is incomplete, underdeveloped, or unclear. Presenters may
demonstrate no awareness of language or speech techniques. Speakers read from scripts or notes, showing little or no preparation. Any visuals included show little relationship to the topic or little care in preparation. Presenters convey little awareness of audience. Presenters make poor use of time in delivering their topic. In group presentation, collaboration is not evident.

**Oral Presentation: Analytic Rubric**

The standard is to deliver an interesting, focused, and audience-appropriate oral presentation. For scoring, each consideration listed is given one point:

**Development and Focus** ___ of 3
- demonstrates thorough understanding of topic
- provides fully developed explanation of key points
- reiterates and reinforces the focus throughout the presentation

**Use of Visuals** ___ of 4
- is effective with good attention to size, color, perspective, and legibility
- is technically accurate
- reflects careful preparation
- adds relevance to the presentation

**Speaking Technique** ___ of 5
- speaks enthusiastically and knowledgeably about the subject
- uses clear and accurate pronunciation and intonation
- projects voice appropriately
- sets and maintains appropriate pace
- makes and maintains appropriate eye contact

**Collaboration (for group presentations)** ___ of 3
- reflects coordinated effort
- reveals awareness of the roles of others
- proceeds smoothly, integrating individual roles into the whole-group effort

Total score: ___ of 15

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**Lesson 4: The Challenge of Germany within the New Europe**

**Preview of Main Points**

The story of Germany and the European Union is evolving even as this lesson is being drafted. However, no longer is the thrust of this story the reunification itself; now it is the determination of the role Germany will play in the future of a united Europe. This lesson will draw the students into the realm of European politics, focusing on the Treaty of European Unity (TEU), signed at Maastricht in 1991, and its implications for economic and monetary policies, agricultural and trade policies, and foreign policies and security issues. Students will also be called upon to draw conclusions and make predictions based on current European affairs.
Key Concepts
- Conflict resolution
- Change
- Security
- Power
- Economic stability
- Trade
- Interdependence
- National identity
- Leadership

Related Concepts
- Population
- Citizenship
- Resources
- Location

Objectives
During this lesson, students will
- list the nations that comprise the new European Union (EU)
- identify the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
- explain the interactive relationship among the nations of the EU
- describe and evaluate the hopes and concerns about German leadership of the EU.

Focus Question
Is German leadership in the EU desirable?

Teaching Suggestions
This lesson marks a shift from the previous lessons in this Unit in that students will be asked to identify current concerns as well as predict future trends. In order to meet these objectives, students need to know which nations comprise the EU, how those nations qualified for membership, what their general concerns are in terms of the Treaty of European Union, and how they feel about German leadership of the European Union.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF LEARNING

History and Social Science
9.10 The student will analyze major historical events of the 20th century, in terms of
a. causes and effects of World War I and World War II;
b. the Russian Revolution;
c. the rise, aggression, and human costs of totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan;
d. the political, social, and economic impact of worldwide depression in the 1930's;
e. the Nazi Holocaust and other examples of genocide;
f. new technologies, including atomic power, and their influence on the patterns of conflict;
g. economic and military power shifts since 1945, including the rise of Germany and Japan as economic powers;
h. revolutionary movements in Asia and their leaders, including Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh;
i. how African and Asian countries achieved independence from European colonial rule, including India under Gandhi and Kenya under Kenyatta and how they have fared under self-rule;
j. regional and political conflicts including Korea and Vietnam; and
k. the beginning and end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

9.11 The student will demonstrate skills in historical research and geographical analysis by
a. identifying, analyzing, and interpreting primary and secondary sources and artifacts;
b. validating sources as to their authenticity, authority, credibility, and possible bias;
c. comparing trends in global population distribution since the 10th century;
d. constructing various time lines of key events, periods, and personalities since the 10th century;
e. identifying and analyzing major shifts in national political boundaries in Europe since 1815; and
f. identifying the distribution of major religious cultures in the contemporary world.

10.3 The student will explain how
a. geographic regions change over time;
b. characteristics of regions have led to regional labels;
c. regional landscapes reflect the cultural characteristics of their inhabitants as well as historical events; and
d. technological advances have led to increasing interaction among regions.

10.4 The student will analyze how certain cultural characteristics can link or divide regions, in terms of language, ethnic heritage, religion, political philosophy, social and economic systems, and shared history.

10.5 The student will compare and contrast the distribution, growth rates, and characteristics of human population, in terms of settlement patterns and the location of natural and capital resources.

10.9 The student will identify natural, human, and capital resources, describe their distribution, and explain their significance, in terms of location of contemporary and selected historical economic and land-use regions.

10.12 The student will analyze the patterns and networks of economic interdependence, with emphasis on formation...
History and Social Science continued

of multinational economic unions, international trade, and the theory of competitive advantage, in terms of job specialization, competition for resources, and access to labor, technology, transportation, and communications.

10.13 The student will distinguish between developed and developing countries and relate the level of economic development to the quality of life.

10.14 The student will analyze the forces of conflict and cooperation as they influence:
   a. the way in which the world is divided among independent countries and dependencies;
   b. disputes over borders, resources, and settlement areas;
   c. the historic and future ability of nations to survive and prosper; and
   d. the role of multinational organizations.

11.12 The student will analyze and explain United States foreign policy since World War II, with emphasis on:
   a. the causes and both foreign and domestic consequences of the Cold War;
   b. communist containment policies in Europe, Latin America, and Asia;
   c. the strategic and economic factors in Middle East policy;
   d. relations with South Africa and other African nations;
   e. the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; and
   f. new challenges to America’s leadership role in the world.

11.17 The student will develop skills for historical analysis, including the ability to:
   a. analyze documents, records, and data (such as artifacts, diaries, letters, photographs, journals, newspapers, historical accounts, etc.);
   b. evaluate the authenticity, authority, and credibility of sources;
   c. formulate historical questions and defend findings based on inquiry and interpretation;
   d. develop perspectives of time and place, including the construction of various time lines of events, periods, and personalities in American history; and
   e. communicate findings orally, in brief analytical essays, and in a comprehensive paper.

12.5 The student will compare the United States political and economic systems with those of major democratic and authoritarian nations, in terms of:
   a. the structures and powers of political institutions;
   b. the rights and powers of the governed including grass roots citizen movements;
   c. economic goals and institutions and the role of government in the economy;
   d. the relationships between economic freedom and political freedom; and
   e. the allocation of resources and its impact on productivity.

12.14 The student will evaluate the effect of monetary and fiscal policies on personal economic well-being including employment opportunities, purchasing power, credit and interest rates, and opportunities for investment and savings.

12.17 The student will define common economic terms, EU. The suggestions included below range from simple documentation to understanding the terms of a major treaty to engaging in a debate about the future of Germany in the EU.

**Beginning the Lesson**

Begin by asking students the following questions:

1. What block of nations has recently introduced a new currency?
2. Will this have any effect on the United States?
3. Will this have any effect on you personally?

After students have had an opportunity to respond, hand each student a copy of an outline map of Europe and the text of the Treaty on European Union (see Resource 10; full text of the Treaty is available on the Web at http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top/html). Ask students to place the original nations that formed the European Union on the map. Ask them which nations are missing and who might be expected to join in the future.

Ask the students to read the provisions of the Treaty. Then, ask them to identify the main provisions of the Treaty and the reasons given for approving it. Conduct a brief discussion to check for understanding. See Activity 1 below.

**Developing the Lesson**

Hand out copies of lead articles from The Week in Germany (see Resources 11a–g) and the article “One Europe, Up to a Point” (see Resource 12). Allow students time to read these articles and to make notes on the various concerns and hopes about Germany’s role in the EU. Help the students focus in their reading on looking for opposing ideas expressed by both Germans and other Europeans. See Activity 2 below.

**Concluding the Lesson**

Based on the reading of the above articles,
ask students to prepare a position paper in which they address the issue, “Germany's Role in the EU — Helpful or Harmful?”

Suggested Reading


Activity 1

Group the students into pairs or small groups, and ask each group to use the Treaty on European Union (Resource 10) to list the nations belonging to the EU as well as identify the main provisions of the Treaty and reasons for signing it. Conduct a class discussion to determine which nations belong to the EU at present and which nations may be added in the near future. What are the key elements of the Treaty? Why would many European nations want to join such a union? Have the students color in the nations on an outline map of Europe, creating a color legend to show original signatories to the Treaty, present members, and projected members (as of mid 1998: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).

Activity 2

Distribute copies of the seven articles from The Week in Germany and “One Europe, Up to a Point” to different students in the class. Assign one reading per student. As they read their articles, ask them to write down the hopes and concerns of Germans about the EU. After completing the readings, have the class brainstorm a list of hopes and concerns, listing them in two columns on the board. Then ask the students the question: “Is Germany's role in the EU helpful or harmful?” After the discussion, ask the students to write a position paper on the question.
RESOURCE 1

Headline

Northern Virginia Daily
Serving the Northern Shenandoah Valley
March 25, 1998

Warren County to be merged with Hardy County, West Virginia

By 1999 40% of Local Tax Revenue to Subsidize W. Va.

RESOURCE 2

The *Bundesrat* (Upper House)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land (State)</th>
<th>Number of representatives = number of votes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Berlin</td>
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<td>Hesse</td>
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<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalia</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
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<td>Saarland</td>
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<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
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<td>Thuringia</td>
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68
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic of Germany

IV. The Upper House of Parliament (Bundesrat)

Article 51 (Composition).
(1) The Bundesrat consists of members of the Länder governments which appoint and recall them. Other members of such governments may act as substitutes.

(2) Each Land has at least three votes; Länder with more than two million inhabitants have four, Länder with more than seven million inhabitants, six votes (amended by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990).

(3) Each Land may delegate as many members as it has votes. The votes of each Land may be cast only as a block vote and only by members present or their substitutes.

X. Finance

Article 104a (Apportionment of expenditure between the Federation and the Länder).
(1) The Federation and the Länder shall separately meet the expenditure resulting from the discharge of their respective tasks insofar as this Basic Law does not provide otherwise.

(2) Where the Länder act as agents of the Federation, the Federation shall meet the resulting expenditure.

(3) Federal statutes to be executed by the Länder and granting money payments may make provision for such payments to be met wholly or in part by the Federation. Where any such statute provides that the Federation shall meet one half of the expenditure or more, it shall be implemented by the Länder as agents of the Federation. Where any such statute provides that the Länder shall meet one quarter of the expenditure or more, it shall require the consent of the Bundesrat.

(4) The Federation may grant the Länder financial assistance for particularly important
investments by the Länder or communes or associations of communes, provided that such investments are necessary to avert a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium or to equalize differences of economic capacities within the federal territory or to promote economic growth. Details, especially concerning the kinds of investments to be promoted, shall be regulated by a federal statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat or by administrative arrangements under the federal budget law.

(5) The Federation and the Länder shall meet the administrative expenditure incurred by their respective authorities and shall be responsible to each other for ensuring proper administration. Details shall be regulated by a federal statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat.

Article 107 (Financial equalization; amended 12 May 1969)

(1) Revenue from Land taxes and the Land share of revenue from income and corporation taxes shall accrue to the individual Länder to the extent that such taxes are collected by revenue authorities within their respective territories (local revenue). A federal statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat may provide in detail for the delimitation as well as the manner and scope of allotment of local revenue from corporation and wage taxes. Such a statute may also provide for the delimitation and allotment of local revenue from other taxes. The Land share of revenue from the turnover tax shall accrue to the individual Länder on a per capita basis; a federal statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat may provide for supplementary shares not exceeding one quarter of a Land share to be granted to Länder whose per capita revenue from Land taxes and from the income and corporation taxes is below the average of all the Länder combined.

(2) Such a statute shall ensure a reasonable equalization between financially strong and financially weak Länder, due account being taken of the financial capacity and financial requirements of communes or associations of communes. Such a statute shall specify the conditions governing equalization claims of Länder entitled to equalization payments and equalization liabilities of Länder owing equalization payments as well as the criteria for determining the amounts of equalization payments. Such a statute may also provide for grants to be made by the Federation from federal funds to financially weak Länder in order to complement the coverage of their general financial requirements (supplementary grants).
# RESOURCE 4

## Unemployment, Percent of Unemployed, and Open Jobs by State

**Source:** Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn  
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### States in Former FRG Territory

<table>
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### Percentages

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### Unit VI: Resources

#### Open Jobs

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#### Unemployment — Total numbers

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#### Unemployment — Women

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<td>1,546</td>
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#### Unemployment — Foreigners

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#### Percentages

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#### Open Jobs

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RESOURCE 5
Basic Economic Definitions

economics.  Study of how society tries to satisfy unlimited wants through limited re-
sources.

economic system.  The way a society organizes the production and consumption of goods
and services.

scarcity.  Gap between what the consumer would like and what the consumer can get.

capital.  Factors of production used to make goods and services.

resources.  Buildings, tools, machinery, storage facilities, and transportation networks
used in production.

land.  Resources found under, on, and above the earth.

labor.  Human effort used in production.

entrepreneurship.  Management skill that organizes the other three factors of produc-
tion.

market economy.  An economy based on free choice by consumers and producers.

free enterprise.  An economic system based on the right of individuals and private com-
panies to go into business for themselves with a minimum of government regulation.
It also implies the right of a consumer to buy goods and services in any market.

competition.  The actions of one producer to attract customers away from another pro-
ducer; the driving force behind a market economy.

command economy.  An economy based on the dictates of a central authority rather
than individual choice.

Five Year Plan.  Under a command economy, the means of setting and realizing produc-
tion quotas in industry and agriculture; used by the USSR. from 1929 until 1985 and
by its East European “satellite” nations from the 1960s into the 1980s.
RESOURCE 6

Too big for its boots?

Source: The Economist, Nov. 9, 1996, p. S20 (2)
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“United Germany is ... number one in Europe. We have about 80 million people. We are the country with the strongest economy. We are particularly well organized, which is very important in a modern industrial society.... We have our pluses and minuses. But taking everything together, we will [not get into trouble] if we take our place in the [European] house. Naturally the others accept that we will need the biggest flat.” Chancellor Kohl’s remarks in a television interview last year may earn him no prizes for diplomacy, but they make it clear that unification has changed German attitudes. Until the Wende [turning point], the former West Germany was steeped in a “culture of restraint,” in the words of Volker Ruhe, its defense minister since 1992. Never mind that even before its sudden enlargement, Germany was economically the most important country in Europe; the label universally attached to it — with tacit German approval — was “an economic giant but a political dwarf.” Its leaders went to Israel and Poland to apologize for past sins. It paid the lion’s share of the European budget but rarely roared. It would not allow its troops to be deployed out of the NATO area, arguing that its constitution forbade it, which earned it accusations from its NATO partners of not pulling its weight. When in 1994 Germany’s constitutional court ruled that such deployment was compatible with the constitution after all, those partners were relieved. If Germany had to risk its own soldiers’ lives, they felt, its foreign policy could only benefit.

Through four decades of clean democratic living, Germany had managed to reassure the world that it had mended its ways. The “German question” — how to deal with a country too strong for its neighbours’ comfort but not strong enough to hold sway over them — seemed to have been answered by partition. No wonder, then, that when in 1989 unity — and therefore full German sovereignty — unexpectedly came into reach, the reaction from its partners was mixed. The strongest supporter for Chancellor Kohl’s plan for an instant merger was America’s then President Bush. At the other end of the spectrum, France’s then President Mitterrand in private was strongly opposed, and Britain’s then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, resisted unification because, as she records in her memoirs, a unified Germany would be “simply much too big and too powerful”.

Defining dominance

How does the new Germany stack up against its European neighbours in terms of size, economic strength, and military might? Geographically it occupies centre stage, but with 11 percent of the European Union’s land mass, it is not the largest country: that distinction goes to France, with nearly 17 percent. However, what it lacks in land it makes up in people. With a population of 82 million, it has 22 percent of the EU total, way ahead of France and Britain with 16 percent each.
Economically, Germany was already pre-eminent even before unification. Its share in the EU’s GDP last year was over 28 percent, compared with 18 percent for runner-up France and 13 percent each for laggards Britain and Italy. In trade, too, it towers over the rest, with a share in world exports last year of over 10 percent, around twice as much as that of its nearest EU competitors. And until the euro makes its appearance, the D-Mark is likely to remain the world’s second most important reserve currency after the dollar, way ahead of sterling and the French franc.

But has unification really made the German economy stronger, or has it weakened it? The new Länder have added only about 10 percent to Germany’s GDP and have actually reduced its GDP per head. Before the Wende, the Germans on a per-head basis were the third richest people in the world, after the Swiss and the Japanese. Now they come only tenth, trailing countries such as Austria and Belgium. Moreover, since 1990 some 4–5 percent of west Germany’s GDP has been transferred to the east to support the new Länder’s economies. This has helped to push up the country’s budget deficit so that Germany may have trouble meeting the 3 percent limit laid down in the Maastricht criteria for European monetary union membership. Public-sector debt since 1990 has doubled, from roughly DM1 trillion to DM2 trillion. As it happens, the difference between the two is much the same as the total paid out to date in life support for East Germany. Although west Germany is now trying to crank down the payments, they will absorb significant resources for years to come.

On the military front, Germany’s strength seems modest for its size. The two-plus-four treaty to settle the terms of unification, concluded in 1990 between the Allies and the two Germanys, called for a merger between West Germany’s Bundeswehr and the East German People’s Army, and a reduction within three to four years to their joint strength from 600,000 to 370,000. By last year, the number had come down to 340,000 — less than France’s 409,000 (though this is due for pruning) and only a little more than Italy’s 329,000. Germany also committed itself to maintaining permanently its ban on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Thoughtful Germans dismiss all these comparisons as rather beside the point. “It is not so much the division of Germany that has been overcome,” says a top official at the foreign ministry, “but the division of Europe.” German unity needs to be set in the context of the end of the cold war. Where once west Germany’s eastern flank abutted the walls, fences, and minefields of communist Eastern Europe, without a buffer against an unpredictable Soviet Union, now the larger Germany faces nothing more threatening than a bevy of new Central European democracies anxious to join the EU and NATO. Beyond is a Russia that may be chaotic, but is no longer hostile.

The end of the cold war and its consequences have also allayed anxieties about German borders, which a British historian, A. J. P. Taylor, once likened to an accordion: “Every German frontier is artificial, therefore, impermanent; that is the permanence of German geography.” No longer. Germany, having accepted the finality of Poland’s borders at last, for the first time in its history has clearly defined borders not disputed by anyone. It has no destabilizing minorities abroad and is making no territorial claims.

The ties that bind

But if that is still not reassuring enough, those German analysts continue, look at the plethora of relationships that now bind Germany to its partners in the EU and in
NATO as well as in other international bodies such as the World Trade Organization and the Group of Seven, establishing a series of interlocking networks that ensures that their members stay in line. The most important of these is the EU. Germany may be the biggest and richest member of that club, but it needs the other members just as much as they, in turn, need it. Two-thirds of German exports and 60 percent of German foreign investment go to other EU countries, France foremost among them.

True, Germany is looking more carefully at its contributions to the EU budget and has become more anxious to defend its rights to pay subsidies to its blasted eastern Länder against the protests of the EU competition overlords. True, the German public — to the extent that it is interested in Europe at all — has its reservations about dropping its cherished D-Mark in favour of an untried and possibly less solid euro. But the German political class has never left the slightest doubt that it is determined to press on with the European enterprise. That includes deepening the existing union in close association with its good friend France, speedily pressing forward with economic and monetary union — witness Mr. Kohl’s at first sight baffling statement earlier this year that he considered European integration “a matter of war and peace” in the next century. What they are after, say the Germans quoting their writer Thomas Mann, is “a European Germany,” not “a German Europe.” But Germany’s commitment to the European enterprise also means it wants to widen the union by letting in some of the applicants from Central Europe now hammering at the door. German politicians recognize that it is in their interest as immediate neighbours to help ensure that the Central Europeans stick with democracy and that their economies do not crack under the strain. If things were to go wrong there, the Germans would be first in line to clear up the mess.

Sometimes Germany gets over-enthusiastic. When in 1991 it strong-armed the EU into recognizing Croatia and Slovenia against almost everybody’s better judgment, its partners wondered whether they should start worrying again; but the moment passed. Most of the time the Germans still barely need to do anything to arouse suspicion. It remains in the air. A seminar of experts organized to brief Mrs. Thatcher for a visit by Mr. Kohl in 1992, nearly half a century after the end of the Second World War, came up with a list of German characteristics that included angst, aggressiveness, ruthlessness, complacency, inferiority complexes, and sentimentality. And during last summer’s European football championships, when both Germany and Britain had reached the semi-finals, one British tabloid newspaper filled page after page with headlines such as “Achtung! Surrender” and “Filthy Hun.” The Germans apologetically went on to win. However normal Germany may have become, its abnormal past still follows it around.
RESOURCE 7
Some Basic Facts about Foreigners in Germany

In 1991, approximately 5 million foreigners lived in Germany (6.5 percent of the total population). Many foreigners live with their families in Germany. The foreigners come mainly from the following countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
<th>Percent of Foreign Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,612,600</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>610,500</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>519,500</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>293,600</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>171,100</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>127,000</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>81,300</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>61,300</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>30,100</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(according to 1989 statistics from West Germany)

In 1989 in East Germany there were 191,190 foreigners, of which
- 106,095 were employed
- 10,225 were students
- 28,898 were apprentices
- 45,972 were others.

Foreigners have been particularly attracted to industrialized areas. For the states in the western sector, the numbers may be broken down as follows:

- Baden-Württemberg 968,594
- Bavaria 796,651
- Berlin (West) 276,396
- Bremen 56,839
- Hamburg 166,172
- Hesse 552,411
- Lower Saxony 310,770
- North Rhine-Westphalia 1,453,716
- Rhineland-Palatinate 182,768
- Saarland 50,768
- Schleswig-Holstein 90,797

(There are no exact statistics available for former East Germany.)
In West Germany in 1990, there were 1.8 million foreigners employed as “guest workers” (i.e., non-citizens with the equivalent of a “green card”), of which 1.2 million were male. Most of the “guest workers” are employed in manual labor. Most of the foreign workers come from the following countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>594,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>312,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>175,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>105,448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1989, 232,512 of the foreigners were unemployed. This is 13 percent of the foreigners compared with 7.9 percent of the total population.

Guest workers enjoy the same governmental benefits as do citizens — that is health insurance, job security, retirement benefits, aid to families, and unemployment benefits. They often live in ethnic communities and maintain their own cultural identity.

People who are being persecuted in their native countries for political, racial, or religious reasons may seek asylum in Germany. In 1990, the number of people seeking asylum climbed to 193,063, which was 59 percent higher than in 1989. In 1991, the number of people seeking asylum climbed to 256,112. Just under half of the refugees came from Eastern European countries. The countries of origin for refugees in 1989 were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>26,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>20,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>19,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>7,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>5,768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the flood of refugees coming into Germany, new regulations are being passed to control them. The new federal states are being required to take in 20 percent of the refugees.
Notes from Hamburg: Immigrants Challenge Germany’s “Social Net”

By Emily Voelckers Powell, AM 1995

Source: Advocates Forum Website: http://www.ssa.uchicago.edu/advocates_forum.html
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We asked for a work force and people came

“We asked for a work force and people came,” wrote author Max Frisch, crystallizing Germany’s relationship to immigrants who were encouraged to work and live in the country after World War II but were expected to leave way before now.

Beginning in full force in the late 1950s, people from Greece, Spain, and Italy, and later in 1961 Turkish immigrants, responded to the German government’s invitation to become Gastarbeiter (guest workers) in various industries to help rebuild Germany after the war.

In 1973, Germany ended its campaign for immigrant workers in an official action called the Anwerbestopp (recruiting stoppage). Germans assumed that guest workers would eventually leave after giving their best years to Germany’s industries. Guest workers themselves always assumed they would return home. Those who decided to stay brought their wives, husbands, and children to Germany. They now have grandchildren, a third generation, who go to school, speak fluent German, and work here. With work came sickness, unemployment, retirement, and other hardships — part of the natural course of life — for which Germany was unprepared.

In the 30 years between the immigrants’ arrival as guest workers and today, relationships between people changed, industries and Germany’s economic situation changed, and connections with one’s home country changed. Many guest workers were unable to return home. Immigrants have become an increasingly visible and significant part of society.

In more recent years, people from Asia, South America, and Eastern Europe have also come here seeking better opportunities for work and study. Presently about seven million immigrants live in Germany. As of June 30, 1995, there were officially 267,763 non-Germans in Hamburg. Among the largest groups, 71,670 are Turkish, 27,918 Yugoslavian, 18,919 Polish, 13,297 Iranian, and 10,685 Afghani. As the number of immigrants in Germany grows and families take root, acts of racial discrimination and violence also increase. The economic situation in the last few years is dominated by an 11-percent unemployment rate, the highest rate in Germany since the end of World War II. Increasing resentment towards immigrants is one effect of high unemployment and competition for jobs and training placements among youth.

Comparing Social Safety Nets: United States and Germany

Through my internship, I have encountered several organizations and initiatives
attempting to deal with the complex issues arising from the meetings between different cultures. My perspective on these groups is influenced by my study of social policy in the United States and my experience as a social worker in the area of self-advocacy and U.S. disability policy. I came here to learn about Germany's social welfare system, called the soziales Netz (social net), so well-known for providing basic welfare services as well as health insurance and pensions to everyone.

In comparison to the U.S. social welfare system, Germany's social net indeed has a relative lack of holes through which people can fall. But the German social net is not entirely without holes; there is an increasing number of homeless people; pensions are not as generous as they used to be; social services are not as stable due to funding cuts. And with Germany beginning to dismantle much of its social net, these holes will become wider, perhaps more closely resembling the U.S. where the gaps are huge and exacerbate such social injustices as homelessness and extreme poverty.

Another characteristic of German politics and policy making which is shared by the U.S. is that immigrants, unless they have become German citizens — a rather lengthy and difficult process — basically have no political voice. As citizens of other nations, they cannot vote here despite having lived in Germany for perhaps 20 or 30 years. In addition, there is no anti-discrimination law to which immigrants or minorities can turn. They are accorded the rights in Germany given to all workers — i.e., pension and health insurance — but because jobs obtained by immigrants often are less prestigious and lower paying, benefits are also lower. Due to a combination of low political, social, and economic status, immigrant groups therefore have limited means of applying political pressure on policy makers to address basic injustices such as discrimination in job and housing markets or lack of employment and educational opportunities.

As in the United States, most of Germany's hope for finding solutions or remedies to these problems does not emanate from its government alone. But quite distinct from the U.S. is Germany's political structure as a social state (Sozialstaat), which officially precludes the need for social welfare advocacy or lobbying by community organizations. As an intern with Worker's Welfare and a participant in the Self-help Organization of Turkish Retired and Older Persons in Bergedorf, I have been particularly struck by the efforts of immigrants to organize themselves in order to develop culturally relevant and meaningful responses to issues they face in Hamburg.

Social Advocacy in Germany's Immigrant Communities

In place of advocacy within the political realm, social advocacy is undertaken at the grassroots level, where improving conditions in the daily life of immigrants — whether retired, unemployed, illiterate, or drug-addicted — is the major goal. Various institutions and organizations have played roles in creating programs focused on achieving social integration and better opportunities for immigrants to live and work as equals in German society. Among these organizations are state-funded German foreigner “meeting places”, private welfare organizations (e.g., Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Diakonisches Werk administered by the Protestant Church, and Caritas Verband administered by the Catholic Church), community organizations, foundations which support social initiatives, and self-organized immigrant groups.

Meeting places, developed in Hamburg in 1980, allow Germans and immigrants to assemble together to work toward inter- and intra-group social integration. As the main
funding source of Hamburg’s eight meeting places, begun in 1980, the Authority for Employment, Health and Social Services currently sees the primary tasks of the program as 1) promoting social integration through counseling, language and computer courses, and other offerings to specific demographic groups (e.g., women, children, youth, elderly); 2) promoting the “living-togetherness” of Germans and immigrants through cultural events, exhibits, seminars, and public relations; and 3) fighting racism and xenophobia.

Activist work toward combating racist attitudes and activities has become a central focus since the early 1990s. The success of these centers in attracting Germans into the activist fold has been questionable. Meeting places have, however, become fixtures in immigrant communities by sponsoring informational and cultural events and discussion groups and seminars around issues such as discrimination and other neighborhood social concerns.

An interesting difference between the German and the American social welfare systems has to do with support for this type of community organizations. In the United States, most community and advocacy organizations rely heavily on funds raised from private foundations, individuals and corporations; there is also tough competition among not-for-profit and community organizations for public money (city or state) that is earmarked for special projects. Despite the relatively well-funded positions in which German community organizations find themselves, there are still tensions between the state and social workers over controversial issues, such as antidiscrimination and racism programming. For example, a meeting place in Altona, one of Hamburg’s poorer and most multi-cultural neighborhoods, perceives a persistent threat of losing funding if it engages too strongly in political, anti-racist activities.

**Working with Turkish Immigrants in St. Pauli, Hamburg**

The Hamburg neighborhood of St. Pauli is the home of the city’s notorious red-light district, a 40-to-50-percent immigrant population, and a well-established and state supported community organization called Gemeinwesenarbeit St. Pauli-Süd e.V. (GWA). Situated in a somewhat depressed area which confronts high rates of poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, and homelessness, the GWA aims to promote St. Pauli’s culture through sponsoring fine arts programs, as well as to address those social issues which affect life in the community. Similar to the meeting places, many of the GWA’s efforts are supported and strengthened by working together with other smaller initiatives and groups in the community, especially self-organized immigrant groups.

Decisions about life and survival in Germany are also confronted on a daily basis by the Turkish immigrants whom I have gotten to know in Bergedorf. They come to the Arbeiterwohlfahrt’s counseling agency for help in getting through Germany’s complicated, bureaucratic social welfare system. Counseling is offered by a social worker named Cengiz Yagli, my internship supervisor who came from Turkey 20 years ago and now has German citizenship. He is one of a few social workers in Hamburg who does counseling and casework in Turkish. Most of his clients speak little German and many do not read or write it at all. Cengiz’s clients, especially older men who have questions about health insurance and unemployment and retirement benefits, have been coming to him for ten years, bringing letters, advertisements, and official forms for him to translate and explain.

During his first five years of working at the agency, Cengiz reported noticing a remarkable pattern. Sometimes people would come to his office on the pretense of having a
question; other times they would just come to sit. They would almost inevitably begin to chat with others who had also come to sit. They would often let others go into the counseling office ahead of them, choosing to “wait until Cengiz had a free moment.” Questioning the possible reasons for such peculiar behavior — coming supposedly to get help, and yet once there, electing to wait extra minutes or hours — Cengiz discovered that these men felt bored and aimless since having taken early retirement, a pattern among guest workers. Out of this observation, Cengiz in 1990 helped establish with several of his most frequent visitors the Self-help Organization of Turkish Retired and Elderly Persons. Since then, the organization has grown to 30 steady members within a network of about 120, who meet regularly for organized activities and still often come for counseling. The group has created a kind of second home out of the Arbeiterwohlfahrt’s space.

Although I am not Turkish, I immediately felt welcomed by them; through this acceptance, I have been allowed a close glimpse of Turkish life in Germany. One of my reasons for wanting to do an internship with Turkish immigrants was to understand the relationships between Germans and Ausländer (foreigners, in this case Turks), but from foreigners’ perspectives. Speaking the only common and foreign language that we share — German — we have been able to learn a lot about each other. It has been fascinating to see how this group is finding its way, as members of the first generation of immigrants to retire in Germany. A country that devotes a great deal of attention to aging and the elderly, Germany has yet to realistically consider how its policies and formal care services will support those elderly persons who barely speak German, practice religions other than Catholicism or Protestantism (namely, Islam), observe different customs, have different ideas about growing older, and ultimately fear dying in this country.

Should I Stay or Should I go?

This question, so often asked by Turks in Germany, rarely seems to find a complete answer. For most Turkish immigrants, returning to Turkey permanently is like a dream — they can live in their homes by the sea, near their relatives; they can bask in the sun when it is still chilly and raining in Hamburg; and perhaps most significant, their longing for home would be fulfilled. But returning to Turkey also means leaving families who have come to settle in Germany with them. It means giving up hard-earned pensions, comprehensive health insurance, and accessible medical care. And for many it also would mean continuing to feel like a stranger, this time in ones own country where everything should, but may no longer, be familiar. The self-help organization exists to fulfill the Turks’ needs for companionship, community, and activity in Germany.

My experience with the Turkish immigrants in Hamburg has been profoundly moving. It has given me the chance to broaden my horizons, deepen my knowledge of German culture, politics, and society, and expand my role as a social worker through my exposure to another system of social services. It has become clearer to me, as well, that the best social work is done by a few engaged people who work in and with local communities.

Prior to my arrival last summer, I had not had preconceptions about social work in Germany. I knew generally that the state provided well for its citizens and that social problems were nowhere near as prevalent in Germany as in the United States. However, Germany’s status as a social state does not necessarily mean that all its people escape disadvantage and discrimination. It sometimes seems that disturbing acts of violence and discrimination can be read about or witnessed here on a daily basis. I feel as if my eyes
have been opened widely.

There are positive relationships which offer evidence that immigrants can make supported, fulfilling homes here. But Germany cannot be satisfied just to accept the existence of Turkish stores and food stands in all of its cities and neighborhoods. Immigrants do more than sell apples and oranges. They have invested their strength and their families in German life; many will most likely grow old here. The social net must allow room for this group of people, for all of its immigrants, and the contributions as well as needs they bring. It is hopeful to see that a few organizations, some of which I have described here, are taking up this task of showing German society that immigrants are a significant and human part of it, deserving of the attention now beginning to be paid to their lives’ concerns.

Emily Voelckers Powell graduated from SSA in June 1995 with her Masters in Social Administration. She is nearing the end of her 10-month social services internship in Hamburg, supported by Germany’s Korber Foundation.
RESOURCE 9
German Basic Law

Source: The Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany
        English translation revised by the Federal Ministers of the Interior, Justice and
        Finance, July 1991
        Reprinting permitted

Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic of Germany
(Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on May 23, 1949, as Amended by the

[Note: The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (May 23, 1949) is the
constitution for Germany. The following Articles relate to immigration and German
citizenship.]

Article 3 (Equality before the law).
(1) All persons are equal before the law.

(2) Men and women have equal rights.

(3) No one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his
language, his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.

[Note: Recruited by the German government, the foreign (guest) workers who have
not returned home can apply for naturalized citizenship after 10 years. Many who
have stayed have not been naturalized. Children born in Germany to these foreign-
ers are not automatically granted German citizenship.]

Article 16 (Deprivation of citizenship, Extradition, Right of asylum).
(1) No one may be deprived of his German citizenship. Loss of citizenship may arise only
pursuant to law, and against the will of the person affected only if such person does not
thereby become stateless.

(2) No German may be extradited to a foreign country. Persons persecuted on political
grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum.

Article 116 (Definition of “German,” Regranting of citizenship).
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is
a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of
the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of
German stock (Volkszugehörigkeit) or as the spouse or descendant of such person.
(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be regranted German citizenship on application. They shall be considered if they have established their domicile (Wohnsitz) in Germany after 8 May 1945 and have not expressed contrary intention.

[Note: People from Eastern Europe who can claim German ancestry and who can get to Germany, will be granted all rights of citizenship. Many of them cannot speak the German language.]

Article 119 (Refugees and expellees).
In matters relating to refugees and expellees, in particular as regards their distribution among the Länder, the Federal Government may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, issue regulations having the force of law pending the settlement of the matter by federal legislation. The Federal Government may in this matter be authorized to issue individual instructions for particular cases. Except where there is danger in delay, such instructions shall be addressed to the highest Land authorities.

[Note: Land and Länder refer to a state/states within the country. The Bundesrat is the Federal Council or the assembly of the federal state representatives.]
 RESOURCE 10
Treaty on European Union

Reprinting permitted

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS,
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF DENMARK,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC,
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SPAIN,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
The PRESIDENT OF IRELAND,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUKE OF LUXEMBOURG,
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC,
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

RESOLVED to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities,

RECALLING the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe,

CONFIRMING their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law,

DESIRING to deepen the solidarity between their people while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions.

DESIRING to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so as to enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to them,

RESOLVED to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies and to establish an economic and monetary union including, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a single and stable currency,

DETERMINED to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement policies ensuring that advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields,
RESOLVED to establish a citizenship common to the nationals of their countries,

RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world,

REAFFIRMING their objective to facilitate the free movement of persons while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by including provisions on justice and home affairs in this Treaty,

RESOLVED to continue to process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,

IN VIEW of further steps to be taken in order to advance European integration,

HAVE DECIDED to establish a European Union and to this end have designated as their plenipotentiaries:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS:  
Mark Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Philippe Maystadt, Minister for Finance;

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF DENMARK:  
Uffe Ellemna-Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Minister for Economic Affairs;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:  
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Theodor Waigel, Federal Minister for Finance;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC:  
Antonios Samaars, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Efthymios Christodoulou, Minister for Economic Affairs;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SPAIN:  
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Carlos Solchaga Catalan, Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC:  
Rolan Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Pierre Beregovy, Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs and the Budget;

THE PRESIDENT OF IRELAND:  
Gerard Collins, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Berite Ahern, Minister for Finance;
THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,
Gianni De Michelis, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Guido Carli, Minister for the Treasury;

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUKE OF LUXEMBOURG:
Jacques F. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Jean-Claude Juncker, Minister for Finance;

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS:
Hans van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Willem Kok, Minister for Finance;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC:
Joao de Deus Pinheiro, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Jorge Brag de Macedo, Minister for Finance;

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:
The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs;
The Hon. Francis Maude, Financial Secretary to the Treasury;

WHO, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

TITLE I
COMMON PROVISIONS

ARTICLE A
By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called “the Union.” This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples.

ARTICLE B
The Union shall set itself the following objectives:
- to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual fram-
ing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence;
• to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its
  Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union;
• to develop close cooperation on justice and home affairs;
• to maintain in full the “acquis communautaire” and build on it with a view to
  considering, through the procedure referred to in Article N(2), to what extent the
  policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be re-
  vised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the insti-
  tutions of the Community.

The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in accordance
with the condition and the timetable set out therein while respecting the principle of
subsidiarity as defined in Article 3b of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

ARTICLE C
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the
consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives
while respecting and building upon the “acquis communautaire.” The Union shall in par-
ticular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its
external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Com-
mission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the imple-
mentation of these policies, each in
accordance with its respective powers.

ARTICLE D
The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its develop-
ment and shall define the general political guidelines thereof. The European Council shall
bring together the Heads of State or of Government of the Member States and the Presi-
dent of the Commission. They shall be assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the
Member States and by a Member of the Commission. The European Council shall meet at
least twice a year, under the chairmanship of the Head of State or of Government of the
Member State which holds the Presidency of the Council. The European Council shall
submit to the European Parliament a report after each of its meetings and a yearly writ-
ten report on the progress achieved by the Union.

ARTICLE E
The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice shall
exercise their powers under the conditions and for the purposes provided for, on the one
hand, by the provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying and supplementing them and, on the other hand,
by the other provisions of this Treaty.

ARTICLE F
1. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose sys-
tems of government are founded on the principles of democracy.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.

3. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies...
RESOURCE 11a

Germany Ready to Compromise on EU Employment Policy, Holds Firm on Currency Union

Source: The Week in Germany
A Weekly Publication of the German Information Center in New York
June 13, 1997
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“A favorable outcome of the negotiations is within reach, but we do not have one in hand yet.” With a major European Union summit only days away, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel held out hope for a successful resolution of the remaining disagreements over EU reform. Kinkel, addressing the Bundestag Wednesday (June 11), indicated that Bonn would be willing to compromise in its resistance to including an article on employment policy in the reform treaty that the EU states are scheduled to sign in Amsterdam on June 16. At the same time, he underscored German opposition to a postponement of the planned start of the EU’s currency union.

The Kohl government, Kinkel told the parliament, will go along with an employment provision so long as it does not mandate the creation of any new funding or subsidy programs. “We cannot accept new disbursement programs that are out of touch with the public (bürgerfern), that can no longer be financed, and that are especially burdensome on us,” he said, reaffirming a position he outlined during an EU foreign ministers’ meeting in early June to consider a draft of the “Maastricht II” treaty that is to be signed in Amsterdam (TWIG 6/6/97, p. 2).

Kinkel’s announcement of the government’s willingness to compromise on an employment policy clause won little applause from the parliamentary opposition during Wednesday’s debate. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the Social Democrats spokesperson on European affairs, charged that the Kohl government is trying to water down the employment article of the draft treaty that most of the other EU states support. New allocations would not be necessary for an EU-funded jobs creation program, she argued, if other subsidy programs — notably those for agriculture — were scaled back. Speaking for the Greens, Bundestag deputy Christian Steringer dismissed the government’s new position as a “con job” (“Etikettenschwindel”).

Kinkel used Wednesday’s debate to underscore the government’s opposition to any postponement of the planned currency union. The possibility of a postponement became the topic of the moment two days earlier after French Minister of Finance Dominique Strauss-Kahn told his EU colleagues that the new government in Paris wanted extra time to consider the “stability pact” — the guidelines to assure governmental budgetary discipline once the currency union begins — drafted last year and slated to be signed at the Amsterdam summit (TWIG 12/20/96, p. 1). Kinkel, warning that Germany in particular would be harmed by a postponement, said he doubted Europe would have a second chance at currency union if the current timetable is abandoned.
As Kinkel was reaffirming Germany’s commitment to carrying through the currency union as planned, France signaled its eagerness to avert a crisis over the stability pact. “We will certainly find a solution,” Finance Minister Strauss-Kahn told reporters after a cabinet meeting Wednesday, “I don’t know when, but we will certainly find a solution,” Asked about German opposition to a postponement in signing the stability pact, Strauss-Kahn replied, “That is a point that will be discussed, and we will see what happens in the coming days.” Among those likely to be discussing the issue are Chancellor Helmut Kohl, President Jacques Chirac, and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, who are scheduled to meet in Poitiers Friday (June 13).
EU Prepares for the Future with Adoption of Currency Stability Pact and Reform Treaty

The European Union laid the foundation for making itself both larger and more effective by adopting a series of institutional reforms this week. Leaders of the fifteen-member union gathered in Amsterdam Monday (June 16) to conclude negotiations on revamping the EU’s internal workings and to sign the “stability pact” designed to assure the strength of the euro, the common European currency that is to be introduced at the end of the decade. Although the “Maastricht II” treaty approved at the two-day meeting postpones final decisions on several fundamental issues, EU leaders expressed general satisfaction with the progress that had been made in carrying forward the process of European integration.

Consideration of the currency stability pact dominated the first day of the Amsterdam summit. At issue was whether the pact, which sets out strict deficit and debt limits for states participating in the currency union, would be adopted as provisionally approved late last year and whether it would mandate EU action to reduce unemployment (TWIG 12/20/96, p.1; 6/13/97, p. 1). In recent months, Germany has taken the lead in pressing for measures to assure governmental budgetary discipline once the currency union is under-way. It responded coolly, on the other hand, to French proposals to amend the stability pact with a clause making the reduction of unemployment an EU policy priority.

After several long negotiating sessions over the weekend and early Monday, the EU finance ministers presented the stability pact as approved in December for the signatures of the heads of state and government. They also put forward a resolution on employment policy and agreed to incorporate an article on employment in the Maastricht II treaty. Federal Minister of Finance Theo Waigel told reporters that the employment provisions accepted in Amsterdam meet Germany’s main requirement, namely that no new job creation programs requiring additional EU expenditures be created. The resolution also echoes the German government’s position that, while policy coordination at the European level is desirable, primary responsibility for employment policy lies with the individual member states.

With agreement on the stability pact in place, the EU leaders devoted the remainder of the two-day summit to addressing a handful of disputed issues ranging from decision-making procedures to the relationship between the EU and the Western European Union (WEU), the European component of NATO. On decision-making, they agreed that the EU Commission, the EU’s executive body, should be limited to its current size — 20 members — even after new member states join. That means in practice the five larger member states that currently have two commissioners — France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain — will be giving up one seat apiece as the EU expands. In compensation, as
agreed in Amsterdam, those states will be given a vote weighted more heavily to reflect their populations. How that will work exactly remains to be decided.

The Amsterdam summit also postponed a concrete decision on what will happen with the EU Commission if, as generally expected, the EU grows to more than 20 members. Once that happens, some states will have to give up their seats on the commission at least temporarily if the limit of 20 commissioners is to be maintained. In Amsterdam, the EU leaders agreed to tackle this issue again as the process of accepting new member states begins.

In the areas of foreign policy and security, the treaty approved in Amsterdam will require unanimity on all important decisions; member states, however, will have the right of “constructive abstention” to distance themselves from decisions they do not support. The EU will be represented in international dealings by a general secretary, who will also be responsible for coordinating closer cooperation in foreign policy.

Security policy was reportedly the source of considerable disagreement in Amsterdam. Germany and France have proposed to have the WEU gradually assume responsibility for carrying out EU military operations (TWIG 3/28/97, p.1: 5/16/97, p.1). That proposal has met with resistance from the neutral EU members and very determined opposition from Great Britain, which has argued such a move would weaken the Atlantic alliance. As a compromise, the EU leaders agreed to include an article in the Maastricht II treaty recognizing the WEU as an integral component in the EU’s development and holding out the possibility of a closer institutional relationship between the two.

Not everyone was able to push through their favorite ideas,” Chancellor Helmut Kohl told reporters Wednesday morning (June 18). “There were too many differences and interests for that.” The chancellor stressed, though, that the treaty that resulted is an “extraordinary success.” “The Amsterdam treaty,” Kohl said, “is a solid foundation for the tasks that lie ahead.”
The European Union is growing, but its budget won’t be. The foreign ministers of the 15 member states met in Brussels Monday (September 15) to begin their review of a series of proposals on expanding the Union that the EU Commission put forward this summer. Although a decision on which prospective member states will be invited to start negotiations will not be made until December, there was reportedly general consensus at Monday’s meeting that the expansion should not be financed through an increase in the EU’s budget.

In mid-July, the Commission of the European Union issued its 1,200-page Agenda 2000, an outline of its vision of the EU’s future and numerous recommendations on how that vision can be realized. The most widely awaited of the commission’s recommendations was its choice of candidates for EU membership: in the commission’s view, membership talks should be opened in 1998 with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The final decision on which nations will be invited to negotiate joining the EU rests with the EU’s heads of state and government, who will be holding a summit to settle the matter at the end of the year.

The EU foreign ministers did not take a position on the commission’s list of prospective members at Monday’s meeting, but they nonetheless stressed that the membership talks tentatively scheduled to begin in early 1998 will not be the last. “The opening of talks with a few does not mean that all do not belong to the expansion process,” explained Foreign Minister Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, current president of the EU Council. The commission, Poos added, did not dismiss the membership aspirations of any nation in putting forward its lists of candidates for the first round of expansion. “All membership candidates must have a prospect to join,” Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of Germany insisted. Kinkel and his colleagues joined in reaffirming that the EU is not turning its back on the states interested in joining the EU but unlikely to be among those invited to begin membership negotiations next year.

Incorporating new members ought not affect the scale of the contributions the current member states pay to Brussels to fund the EU’s institutions and programs, the foreign ministers broadly agreed in Brussels. According to the German Press Agency (dpa), Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and Sweden came out very firmly against raising the EU’s budget at Monday’s meeting and found much support for that position. The foreign ministers are in favor of holding to the current fiscal guidelines, which limit funding for the EU to no more than the equivalent of 1.27 percent of the EU’s total GDP. Since, though, the EU’s budget now stands at 1.17 percent of the European GDP, there is room for a modest expansion in EU spending while remaining within the current guidelines.
The foreign ministers' discussion of the EU's finances also touched upon the long-controversial issue of member contributions. The net payers — the nations that pay more in contributions than they receive back from EU programs — are pressing to have the other member states take up more of the EU's financial burden, while the net recipients have argued that EU expansion should not result in a reduction in the aid and subsidies they receive from Brussels. After Monday's meeting, Foreign Minister Kinkel said that Germany expects to remain a net payer but wants to see a “somewhat fairer settlement of costs.”
The European Union took a major step toward remaking itself this week, but not, Germany insists, the last step. The foreign ministers of the 15 EU member states gathered in Amsterdam Thursday (October 2) to sign the treaty on EU reform and expansion drafted there this past summer (TWIG 6/20/97, p.1). Two days before the signing ceremony, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his cabinet formally endorsed the treaty and authorized Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to sign on Germany's behalf. In Bonn's view, Kinkel explained shortly before the signing, the Treaty of Amsterdam represents considerable progress in revamping the EU to make it more efficient and to prepare for the inclusion of new member states. It does not, however, resolve all the issues Germany considers central to the success of EU reform and expansion.

Chief among those issues, Kinkel said, is the assignment of financial responsibilities among the member states. Germany, which pays in considerably more to the EU than it receives back from the various EU programs, is determined to see a “more just division of the fiscal burden,” Kinkel told reporters in Bonn after the cabinet reviewed the Amsterdam Treaty Tuesday (September 30). Bonn, he noted, contributes DM 22 billion (U.S. $12.5 billion) annually to fund the EU's agricultural policy, but German farmers receive only half that sum back from Brussels.

“I am satisfied with the results,” Kinkel said in Amsterdam following the signing ceremony. Like several of his colleagues, he noted that further negotiations will be necessary to work out the details of institutional reform left open by the Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty, for example, limits the size of the EU Commission, the EU’s executive body, to 20 commissioners, but does not specify how commissioners will be chosen once the EU expands to more than 20 member states. “We still have a little bit of institutional touch-up work to do, particularly on the size of the Commission and the weighting of member-states’ votes,” Kinkel acknowledged, “I never expected a super-outcome from Amsterdam,” he added. “What we have here is 15 countries settling on the least common denominator.”
German unity has made European unity all the more imperative, Chancellor Helmut Kohl insisted as he summed up the accomplishments of the past seven years on the Day of German Unity. The two German states became one on October 3, 1990, and the anniversary of that event is now celebrated as Germany's national holiday. At the government's central celebration of October 3 in Stuttgart (Baden-Württemberg) this year, Kohl reminded the nation that Europe, too, had once been divided and that united Germany must dedicate itself to the challenge of European integration.

"One thing is certain: the path that we, Germans in the east and the west, have traveled together was difficult," the chancellor observed at the outset of his address to the nation in Stuttgart. Rebuilding eastern Germany's infrastructure and modernizing its economy has been more burdensome than many had expected, he noted. Much work remains to be done in closing the economic gap between the two halves of the country, Kohl acknowledged, and enormous problems, above all intolerably high unemployment, still confront the country. Much remains, too, in forging the "inner unity" of German society. "I wish, now as before, that the Germans in both the east and the west of our fatherland were much more ready to show empathy in coming to terms with each others' different experiences and conditions of life (Lebenswirklichkeit)," the chancellor said.

Neither the persistence of differences between east and west nor the difficulties now facing the country, Kohl was quick to stress, should obscure the progress that has been made and the fundamental achievement of the past seven years. "The Germans in the east and west can live together in freedom," he noted. "Together, they can shape their future in the 21st century. This is and remains a precious historical gift, a tremendous stroke of luck for us Germans — and we have every reason to celebrate that and to give thanks from the heart."

Noting this debt of gratitude, Chancellor Kohl paid tribute to the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in helping clear the way for German unification back in 1989 and 1990. He took the opportunity to praise the support for unification provided by then-President George Bush, who was the guest of honor at the Stuttgart celebration. "We Germans would not have been able to win our unity in freedom, or at least not so quickly, if you, George Bush, and the United States had not stood so loyally at our side."

"Not only the division of Germany, but also the division of Europe has been overcome," Kohl observed as he turned to consider united Germany's international role. Germany does not want to serve as a bridge between East and West, he explained, but rather is committed to helping the nations of Eastern and Southern Europe secure places in the structures that have safeguarded peace and prosperity in Western Europe. "Germany's
eastern border cannot and must not remain the eastern border of NATO and the Euro-
pean Union in the long run,” Kohl insisted. “German unity and European unification are
like two sides of the same coin,” he added. “German unity has been accomplished; now it
is necessary to push forward the integration of Europe with all our strength.”

Chancellor Kohl also spoke at an October 3 celebration in Berlin sponsored by the
groups Aktion Gemeinsinn (Action Civic Spirit) and Wir für Deutschland (We for Ger-
many). The text of this speech is available on the GIC’s Internet website (www.germany-
info.org/govern/statements.htm).
RESOURCES 11f
European Union Approves Plans for Expansion and “Euro Club” at Luxembourg Summit

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December 19, 1997
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The European Union brought 1997 to a close with landmark agreements on the twin goals of deepening the ties between its members and opening the way to membership for the new democracies of Eastern Europe. At a summit conference that opened in Luxembourg Friday (December 12), leaders of the 15 EU states settled on plans to open negotiations on membership with six countries early next year and to work closely with another five to prepare them for joining at a later date. They also approved a compromise agreement to establish a “Euro Club” for the member states participating in the EU’s currency union to meet informally on coordinating their economic policies. The agreements reached in Luxembourg were widely hailed as major steps forward in the process of European integration — Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel spoke of a “historical quantum leap” — but in the days following the summit they were partially obscured by Turkey’s disappointment at not being included in the expansion plans and its subsequent decision to suspend political dialogue with the EU.

On Saturday (December 13), the EU heads of state and government formally launched the expansion process by inviting six nations to start negotiations early next year on the terms of joining the EU: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia — the six perspective members the European Commission recommended this past June. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl noted to reporters in Luxembourg, the negotiations could take several years to conclude and the resulting agreements will have to be submitted for parliamentary ratification. The earliest that any of the six candidates would be able to join, EU officials speculated during the summit, is probably 2002.

While those negotiations are underway, the EU will also be working closely with another five states that have expressed an interest in joining the union: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. These states will be offered expanded political and economic assistance from the EU with an eye toward eventual membership. This process is set to begin with a foreign ministers’ meeting and the first session of a “Europe Conference” in London next March. The Europe Conference is to provide a forum for the EU states and prospective members to consult on a broad range of issues, from legal matters and economic policy to security and defense cooperation.

Turkey, too, has been invited to participate in the Europe Conference, although the EU leaders decided in Luxembourg against including it in the expansion process. The Cyprus conflict and Ankara’s poor relations with Athens, as well as the Kurdish conflict in eastern Turkey and continuing concerns about human rights violations rule out discus-
The EU leaders explained, “We are firmly committed to smoothing Turkey's path to Europe.” Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stressed in explaining the decision to invite Ankara to participate in the Europe Conference. He acknowledged, though, that Turkey was likely to be disappointed at not being included among the candidates for membership.

Kinkel was right: on Sunday (December 14), Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz of Turkey announced his government was suspending political dialogue with the EU. Turkey, he said, was no longer prepared to discuss controversial matters such as Cyprus and human rights with the EU. In the days that followed, he also held out the possibility that Turkey might formally withdraw its application for EU membership. Turkey, an associate member of the EU and its predecessors since 1964, has been seeking to join the EU for the past 10 years.

Germany and its EU partners were quick to urge Ankara to reconsider its position. “That cannot and will not be the final answer.” Kinkel told reporters in Bonn in response to Yilmaz's announcement. The EU, he said, made Turkey a fair offer at the Luxembourg summit and had left no doubts about its eagerness to build closer ties with Turkey. Ankara's “horizon of expectations,” he suggested, had been unrealistic. “But the door remains open,” Kinkel stressed.

The second major item on the agenda in Luxembourg was the Franco-German proposal to create a forum for the EU nations participating in the currency union to consult on financial and economic policy. This proposal came under criticism above all from Great Britain, which has ruled out participation in the currency union for the time being. No EU state, Britain insisted, should be excluded from policy discussions. Under the compromise reached in Luxembourg, the states joining in the currency union will meet in an informal “Euro Club” to address issues pertaining specifically to the common currency. Economic and fiscal matters of general concern, on the other hand, will be discussed within the context of the European Council. Federal Minister of Finance Theo Waigel welcomed this compromise as “reasonable and pragmatic.”
Kohl Makes Pitch for the Euro in London

Germany and Great Britain have been working to assure Europe's peace and prosperity for better than 40 years now, and Bonn is determined to keep the partnership going, Chancellor Helmut Kohl assured British officials as he accepted honorary citizenship from the City of London this week. At a ceremony Wednesday evening (February 18), Kohl received the “Honorary Freedom of the City of London” in recognition of his achievements as a statesman and his engagement on behalf of European integration. And never one to let opportunity to make the case for closer integration pass, the chancellor used the occasion to urge Britain to reconsider its doubts on the euro.

“In building the European house, we Germans want to cooperate as closely as possible with our British friends,” Kohl told the dignitaries assembled in London's Guildhall. “Europe needs the United Kingdom, and vice versa.” The European Union, in his view, has particular need of “that unique British blend of realism and traditionalism, pragmatism and idealism, level-headedness and love of freedom.” Without the qualities that have made Great Britain so admired the world round, an essential facet of the EU would be lacking. “Without the United Kingdom,” the chancellor added, “we Europeans would not be able to assert our mutual interests so effectively.”

Britain, he went on to note, holds the EU presidency at a time when several decisions of enormous bearing for the Union’s future are to be made. One, scheduled for May 2, is which EU member states will be invited to participate in the introduction of a common European currency. Great Britain has said it will not seek to take part in the currency union for the time being, but that did not deter Kohl from describing the benefits that will come with the new currency. “I am quite sure the punctual launching of the euro, with participants meeting the stability criteria, will distinctly improve the climate for investment and employment in Europe,” he said. The euro will help Europe compete more effectively in world markets, according to Kohl, and without the closer economic integration that will come with the currency union Europe would not be able to maintain its competitiveness in the long run.

“Wall Street will get used to the idea that the euro is the world's other great currency,” Kohl predicted as he looked to the future. “And when I put my ear to the ground here, my impression is that the City has long since accepted this tremendous change.” In the near future, he added, Britain's euro-skeptics will come around and acknowledge the necessity of the currency union. And that necessity, he stressed, is not solely economic. “The euro will not only strengthen Europe economically, it will also make for a more deeply integrated European Union as a system promoting peace and freedom.”

Before heading to the Guildhall to accept the Freedom of the City of London, Chancellor Kohl met briefly with Prime Minister Tony Blair. The upcoming EU meetings on European integration and the Iraq-United Nations impasse were reportedly the chief topics of discussion.
RESOURCES

RESOURCE 12

One Europe, Up to a Point: Germany and the Union

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BONN

WHAT would the Europe that Germany wants be like? Not, it seems increasingly clear, like the federal super-state that Eurosceptics groan about. Two things have coloured Germany's supranational vision: its rediscovery of a national identity following unification, and its growing recognition that this German identity may not be such a burden after all. The country that wanted to ditch the nation-state in favour of European integration is beginning to view the old devil with a certain tolerance.

Even before Helmut Kohl and fellow European heads of government try clarifying, let alone revising, their Maastricht vision in Dublin next month, a new picture of the EU that Germany favours is emerging. It is more pragmatic than Mr. Kohl has sometimes given his partners to understand. Since unification, the chancellor has toned down his rhetoric: he no longer refers to a "United States of Europe" or even a "federal Europe"; instead it is an "integrated Europe." And now he aims to cut Germany's huge contribution to the EU budget. Shoudering 30 percent of it is too much for the hard-pressed Germany of today.

The German picture of Europe in a few years would look something like this: a confederation of states joined by a single market, a single currency, and open frontiers, within which supranationally-minded members would operate a joint foreign policy, an army, and a police force in the FBI mould. The European Parliament's still-modest powers are enhanced to include confirming European commissioners and appointing a powerful new figure to stand for Europe on the world stage — that over-arching "Monsieur PESC" whose telephone number, once sought in vain by a mocking Henry Kissinger, is now wirt large in any American Secretary of State's contact book.

This modern-day Metternich is meant to personify the flexible EU that Germany, with France, has so far successfully campaigned for. It is one in which majority decision-making among the Union's score of members, including the first batch of East European entrants, has replaced unanimity. The veto has vanished. Co-operation on foreign policy is voluntary, like participation in the single currency now jingling in the pockets of Europeans whose countries have low deficits and low inflation.

Only those countries that want a common foreign and security policy count on Europe's "foreign minister" to develop and implement it. Discussions are open to all members, but only those committed to accepting majority decisions can vote on them. Similarly committed clusters of countries act together on immigration, crime, and social policy. Germany is part of every such vanguard, starting with monetary union, which at this early stage, is confined to Europe's northern tier.
But back to the present. Mr. Kohl’s multi-speed Europe is not, in his vision, a divided one. His Christian Democrats seem convinced that core groups (the “ins”) will act as magnets for countries that refuse or are not qualified to join them (the “pre-ins” as the jargon hopefully has it). Karl Lamers, a Christian Democrat, predicts that pre-ins will be drawn into every part of the European Union so that, in time, hard cores are no longer needed. The laggards’ fear of isolation and their desire to have their say will — so the argument runs — inexorably pull everyone in. All this begins to lend Europe the character of a single state. But Germany does not want a centralised one. And Germany’s federal hankerings have ever-clearer limits. In rediscovering its sense of nationhood, it leans increasingly towards decentralisation in all but foreign policy, defense, money, commerce, immigration, and crime, since these are seen as areas where European countries are bound to be punchier acting together than separately.

Without burying all its objections to the nation-state (its experiences since Bismarck made it one have largely been awful), Germany now envisages a Europe of nations, not the nation of Europe Mr. Kohl may have had in mind some years ago. There is, in fact, no stopping Germany from wanting to shape Europe after its own federal system, in which regional states (Länder), Bavaria and Saxony to the fore, increasingly assert their power and independence. Lifted to the European level, say Friedbert Pfluger, a Christian Democrat from the younger generation of German politicians, this model would give EU member countries a broader license to be themselves than Bavarians have had in the past. National parliaments and heads of government, paramount for the foreseeable future, would generally order daily life, writing laws on everything from income taxes to time zones.

Indeed, Germany seems less enthusiastic these days even about a European social policy, which could hamper its current assault on welfare privileges. “We must not level out Europe,” Mr. Pfluger insists. Fewer Germans, then, are Euro-fanatics — if many of them ever were. As they grow cooler, might those who fear a European super-state grow warmer?